People v. Roldan

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-4842; the Hon. Noreen Valeria Love, Judge, presiding. Judgment Reversed. Counsel on Appeal Frank Vasquez, of Chicago, for appellant. Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary L. Boland, and Sarah L. Simpson, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.

¶ 1 Following a joint bench trial with codefendant Abraham Ramos (Ramos), who is not a party to this appeal, defendant Luis Roldan was found guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault (CSA) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (West 2012)), and sentenced to consecutive terms of four years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 2 The evidence adduced at trial shows that defendant and Ramos were charged with CSA in connection with events that took place on March 6, 2011, in Cicero, Illinois. That evening, Esperanza Castellanos, Yesenia Guerrero, and the victim, J.T., planned to go to a movie theater in Cicero to celebrate Yesenia's seventeenth birthday. When they could not decide which movie to see, they called Ramos, who arrived at the movie theater with his female cousin, Isamar. The group then drove to the home of Ramos' aunt, where he lived at the time. ¶ 3 J.T. testified that when they were in the living room, Ramos asked whose birthday it was, and then their ages. She told him she was 16, Yesenia told him she had just turned 17, and J.T. did not recall Esperanza answering that question. ¶ 4 At that point, Ramos gave Yesenia a one-liter bottle of Smirnoff vodka that was a third to halfway full and told her it was her birthday present. Yesenia started drinking straight out of the bottle, and J.T. also took a drink from it. J.T. testified that she had never consumed alcohol prior to that day. When Yesenia finished that bottle of vodka, Ramos produced an identical, but unopened one-liter bottle of Smirnoff vodka for them to drink. ¶ 5 Defendant, whom J.T. had never met before, arrived at the home of Ramos' aunt with orange juice, which he, Ramos, J.T., Yesenia, and Esperanza mixed with the vodka and used to play a drinking game that involved playing cards which dictated the length of the drink to be taken. She testified that Ramos provided each person with a cup that was about 8 to 10 inches tall and filled with 1 to 2 inches of vodka. He prepared the first round of drinks, then each girl either filled her own cup with the vodka and orange juice mixture, or he filled the cup for her. ¶ 6 After playing the drinking game for about an hour, the group ran out of orange juice and decided to go to Walgreens to buy more. Each of the five participants had finished two to four cups of the orange juice and vodka mixture at that point, with Yesenia drinking the most and J.T. a little less. ¶ 7 J.T. further testified that Yesenia wanted to accompany the others to Walgreens, but they decided she was too drunk to come along and made her sleep on the couch in the living room. On the way to Walgreens, J.T. walked with defendant, while Esperanza walked ahead of them with Ramos. J.T. testified that she was having trouble walking, and recalled that she and defendant kissed inside the store. She also remembered arguing with Ramos outside the store, but her next recollection was hearing "a lot of loud noise" and sitting in a chair in the hospital the following morning where she had her blood drawn. She did not remember returning to the home of Ramos' aunt, speaking to detectives, arriving at the hospital that night, or having sex with defendant. was incapable of giving knowing consent because she was unconscious before and during the sex act. Id. at 402. The court in that case also noted that its holding should not be misconstrued so that a defendant may be held liable for CSA where his "partner's inhibitions were merely relaxed through the consumption of alcohol." Id. at 403. In other words the consumption of alcohol does not necessarily render a person unable to consent to sex. ¶ 25 Here, the only uncontroverted evidence in the record indicating J.T.'s condition at the time she had sex with defendant was defendant's own statement to her that she was drunk and would regret having sex with him in the morning. Like the court noted in Fisher, under the facts of this case, defendant knew J.T. had consumed alcohol, but no evidence supports the conclusion that he knew that rather than simply having relaxed inhibitions, she was completely unable to consent. Thus, without more, this is insufficient to meet the State's burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that J.T. was incapable of giving knowing consent. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 44. ¶ 26 We also observe that J.T. testified that her blood was drawn at the hospital; however, there was no further inquiry into whether the blood was used for a toxicology report or was drawn for another purpose. Notably, the State did not introduce any medical evidence that J.T. was in a blackout state as a result of her consumption of alcohol. Similarly, there was no medical evidence presented by the State regarding the physiology of alcohol consumption and how it may have been a factor in this case. ¶ 27 Thus, the focus is on what defendant knew or should have known regarding J.T.'s condition. Whitten, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1042. Here, the court accepted J.T.'s testimony that she did not remember large portions of the night, including having sex with defendant, and therefore, the court assumed that J.T. must have been too intoxicated to knowingly consent. However, regardless of what J.T. remembers, the burden remains upon the State to produce credible evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knew or should have known of J.T.'s inability to give knowing consent to sexual intercourse at the point in time that the act took place. ¶ 28 The record is devoid of credible evidence to show that the State met its burden. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 44. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction for criminal sexual assault. ¶ 29 Reversed.