In the Matter of A Proceeding Under Article 8 of The Family Court Act Alesia Marie Rollerson v. New

LEE HAND ELKINS, J.

The petitioner appeared pro se.Joel Borenstein, Esq., Brooklyn, for Respondent.LEE HAND ELKINS, J.

Respondent is the tenant of the Petitioner. They reside in the same house. Respondent, by counsel, moves to dismiss the petition asserting that the Family Court Act lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Article 8.

The Family Court's jurisdiction over crimes and offenses is limited by the state constitution to those committed “by or against minors or between spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household.” ( N.Y. Const. art. VI § 13[b] ). Under the state constitution, the legislature is empowered to grant “to the family court * * * jurisdiction over crimes and offenses” between the designated categories of litigants. ( N.Y. Const. art. VI § 7). Family Court Act § 115 provides that the Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the criminal courts over family offenses as defined in article 8 of the Act. Section 812 of the Family Court Act sets forth nineteen Penal Law sections over which the Family Court may exercise jurisdiction, provided the offense is committed by persons in the relationship required by the state constitutional provision delimiting the Family Court's jurisdiction. In addition to jurisdiction over the designated offenses committed “between spouses or between parent and child,” the statute grants to the court jurisdiction in such offenses committed between “members of the same family or household.”

In section 812 subd. 1, the legislature listed the relationships it deemed to constitute members of the same family or household over which the Family Court could exercise “family offense” jurisdiction. These categories were expanded periodically to include previously excluded relationships, such as persons formerly married, and persons with a child in common. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719, 261 N.E.2d 637 [1970]. Until 2008 these relationships were defined categorically, to include:

(a) persons related by consanguinity or affinity;

(b) persons legally married to one another;

(c) persons formerly married to one another, regardless of whether they live in the same household;

(d) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether such persons have been married or have lived together at any time.

In 2008, the legislature again amended section 812 to extend the jurisdiction of the Family Court to “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship.” The legislature rejected a categorical definition of an “intimate relationship,” ...; the frequency of interactions between the persons; and the duration of the relationship,” but is not limited to such considerations. The legislature specifically excluded “a casual acquaintance” and “ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts.” (Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e] ).

In implementing this new grant of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must be mindful of two principles: first, the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction; Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d 975, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112 [2nd Dept. 2010]; and second, the purpose of Family Court proceedings is to provide immediate redress from violence or from specified criminal acts committed by a member of the victim's family or household without requiring an arrest or criminal prosecution. The statute attempts to provide persons in intimate relationships with alternatives to criminal prosecution through proceedings which are essentially civil in nature, while also providing meaningful protection from abuse. (Family Ct. Act § 812[2][b] ); see, e.g., Eileen W. v. Mario A., 169 Misc.2d 484, 644 N.Y.S.2d 452 [Fam. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1996]. The legislature intended by amending the statute, to extend these benefits to nontraditional and unsolemized relationships, which are nonetheless “intimate.” Examples include dating couples, couples who do not share a child in common, and same-sex partners. See, Mark W. v. Damion W., 25 Misc.3d 1148, 887 N.Y.S.2d 822 [Fam. Ct. Kings Co. 2009].

Whether a particular relationship appropriately falls within the court's jurisdiction may require a hearing to establish the nature, type and duration of the relationship, the frequency of contacts, and other relevant considerations. However, where the court has sufficient information before it, based upon matters which are uncontested, the court may decline jurisdiction without a hearing. Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d 975, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112 [2nd Dept. 2010]. In this case, the issue of jurisdiction may be resolved on the pleadings, including the petition, the affirmation in support of the motion to dismiss and the affirmation in opposition.

Here, the parties concede that they are landlord and tenant. The petitioner owns a multilevel private home. The parties met behavior is disorderly. (RPAPL 711 [1] ); see, e.g., 40 West 67th Street v. Pullman, 100 N.Y.2d 147, 760 N.Y.S.2d 745, 790 N.E.2d 1174 [2003].

To extend the jurisdiction of the Family Court to this relationship would violate the constitutional limits placed upon that jurisdiction and would undermine the purposes of the Family Court Act. The Family Court is a forum for the resolution of disputes between persons who are intimately connected through familial ties or by emotional bonds arising from domesticity or companionship, even though unsolemized by marriage or not otherwise recognized by law. The legislature by amending the statute did not intend to create a forum for quasi-criminal proceedings brought by casual acquaintances or persons in commercial relationships who are unable to get prompt redress from the police for their grievances.

Respondent's motion is granted. The petition is dismissed with prejudice. All temporary orders are vacated.