People v. Pettway

Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn (Michele Maxian and Juan Angrisani of counsel), for defendant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County (Jeanne Robitaille of counsel), for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J. The issue before this court is whether the service and filing of a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) abstract, supporting deposition and a certificate of readiness, off calendar but later in the same day, subsequent to a court appearance, tolls the CPL 30.30 speedy trial clock. This court holds that the service and filing of a DMV abstract, supporting deposition and a certificate of readiness off calendar later on same day and subsequent to a court appearance was proper and tolled the speedy trial clock. Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b) is denied. Defendant was arrested on May 18, 2000 and charged with violating: Penal Law § 120.20 (reckless endangerment in the second degree); Penal Law § 145.00 (3) (criminal mischief in the fourth degree); Penal Law § 165.05 (1) (unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree); Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (1) (a) (leaving the scene of an incident without reporting); Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (1) (a) (aggravated unlicenced operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree); Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 (1) (unlicenced operator); Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (D) (1) (failure to obey traffic control signal);Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (speed in excess of posted speed limit); and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1225-A (driving on sidewalks). Defendant moves to dismiss for denial of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b). The People oppose defendant's motion.

May 19, 2000 to May 24, 2000 (five days chargeable to the People)

A criminal court action begins by the filing of an accusatory instrument with the Criminal Court. (CPL 1.20 [17].) For purposes of calculating speedy trial time periods, however, the day of defendant's arraignment, i.e., the day the accusatory instrument is filed, is excluded from the computations. (See, General Construction Law § 20; People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 [1987].) Defendant was arraigned on May 19, 2000 and the case was adjourned until May 24, 2000 for the People to convert the complaint. People are charged with this five-day adjournment. (See, People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985]; People v Colon, 59 NY2d 921 [1983].)

May 24, 2000 to June 22, 2000 (29 days chargeable to the People)

The People failed to fully convert the complaint into an information and were therefore not ready for trial. The People are charged with 29 days.

June 22, 2000 to July 31, 2000 (39 days chargeable to the People)

The People failed to fully convert the complaint into an information and were therefore not ready for trial. The People are charged with 39 days.

July 31, 2000 to September 14, 2000 (0 days chargeable to the People)

Conclusion

This court finds that 73 days elapsed for CPL 30.30 (1) (b) purposes and are charged to the People. Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied in all respects.