Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

People v. Burke

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOURTH DIVISION
Dec 6, 2018

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 10 CR 155 Honorable Anna Helen Demacopoulos, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Gordon and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: We find that the evidence established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the State's closing argument did not deny defendant a fair trial, his mandatory natural life sentences were not unconstitutional as applied to defendant, and his two armed robbery convictions do not violate the one-act, one-crime rule. ¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Dwayne Burke was convicted of two counts of armed robbery with a firearm and sentenced as a habitual criminal to natural life imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where only one unreliable eyewitness identified him; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a firearm where both occurrence witnesses testified only that they observed what appeared to be the handle of a gun; (3) he was denied a fair trial by the State's closing argument which commented on his failure to testify; (4) the Habitual Criminal Act (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2008)) violates his constitutional rights; and (5) one of his convictions should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. For the reasons stated below, we affirm defendant's armed robbery convictions and sentences.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment as a habitual criminal with two counts of armed robbery with a firearm. The State alleged that on September 10, 2009, defendant robbed a Shell gas station in Dolton, Illinois. ¶ 4 Theresa Watt testified at trial that she was 65 years old and previously worked as a cashier at the Shell gas station in Dolton for approximately nine years. On September 10, 2009, she was working the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift with her co-worker, Ruthie Love. Watt described the layout of the premises. Upon entering through the main door, there was shelving to one side and coolers for beverages at the back of the store. To the left, there was an enclosed booth which housed the two cash register stations. The cashiers accessed the booth through a door located on the side of the booth opposite the entrance of the store. ¶ 5 Watt testified that at approximately 3:42 p.m., she and Love were both working inside the cashier booth when "a young man came in and we made eye contact as he was walking." Watt testified that the man approached the cashier counter and opened the door to the booth, which was an employee-only area but was unlocked at the time. She had never seen the man before, station. He interviewed Watt and Love, who both described the suspect as wearing a tan hat, dark sunglasses, tan shirt, and black jeans. ¶ 15 The defense made a motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Defense counsel also made a motion for a mistrial after the jury retired for deliberations. Defense counsel asserted that the State improperly commented on defendant's failure to testify at trial during closing arguments. The trial court denied the motion. ¶ 16 The jury convicted defendant of two counts of armed robbery. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial asserting, inter alia, that his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict based on the lack of firearm evidence, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial regarding the State's closing argument. The trial court denied the motion. ¶ 17 At sentencing, the State presented evidence of another armed robbery case against defendant from August 2009, in addition to a certified copy of defendant's guilty-plea armed robbery conviction in 1988 and a certified copy of defendant's guilty-plea conviction to armed robbery in 2001. The trial court noted defendant's extensive criminal record and found it was compelled to sentence defendant as a habitual criminal offender to mandatory natural life imprisonment. His sentences were to run concurrently to each other.

As defendant notes, he was also charged with four additional separate cases of armed robbery with a firearm; he was acquitted in two cases following a jury trial, he was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to natural life in People v. Burke, 2016 IL App (1st) 132489-U, and he pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery in another case. --------

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 19 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to establish (1) his identity as the perpetrator, and (2) that a firearm was involved. We address each argument in turn. ¶ 21 "[T]he State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense." People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979)). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine "whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime." Id. (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. 318-19). "A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." Id. at 225. On review, we will not "retry the defendant or substitute [our] judgment for that of the trier of fact." People v. Gabriel, 398 Ill. App. 3d 332, 341 (2010). Rather, we defer to the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, weight of their testimony, and resolution of conflicting evidence or inconsistencies in their testimony. Id. ¶ 22 The State bears the burden of proving the identity of the perpetrator. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989); 720 ILCS 5/3-1 (West 2008). "Where the finding of the defendant's guilt depends on eyewitness testimony, we decide whether the fact finder could reasonably accept the testimony as true beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131103, ¶ 69 (citing People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 279 (2004)). ¶ 23 Here, Love was the only eyewitness to identify defendant. "A single witness' identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification." Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 307. As set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and adopted by our supreme court in Slim, we consider the following factors in evaluating the reliability of identification testimony:

"(1) the opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the crime; (2) the degree of attention given by the witness; (3) the accuracy of the

witness' prior description of the offender; (4) the level of certainty the witness demonstrated when identifying the perpetrator in person; and (5) the amount of time that lapsed between the crime and the in-person identification." Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131103, ¶ 70 (citing Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 307-08).

¶ 24 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that Love's identification of defendant was sufficient to establish his identity beyond a reasonable doubt as the armed robber. First, regarding Love's opportunity to view the offender, Love testified that the encounter with defendant lasted "a few minutes." She had a close-up view of defendant during the robbery considering that he entered the cashier booth where she and Watt were. She was able to observe the defendant at close range. She recalled that defendant was wearing a cap and probably sunglasses. She observed him first take money from the other cashier and then come over to her register, where she opened the register drawer and stepped back and let him take the money. She also observed him take cigarettes from the shelf behind her. Under these circumstances, the brevity of the robbery did not impair Love's account as she had sufficient opportunity to view defendant. See Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131103, ¶ 74 ("Although the entire tragedy took place in a matter of minutes, the witnesses' opportunity to observe what happened goes to the weight and credibility of their testimony.") ¶ 25 With regard to the second factor, the evidence demonstrates that Love gave defendant a significant degree of attention. She first noticed him enter the store at a specific time: 3:42 p.m. She recounted his actions from the moment he entered until the moment he left the store. She observed the butt of a firearm that defendant displayed in his backpack. She followed his instructions regarding the register during the robbery. She provided a physical description to police and she was later able to identify him in a lineup. Contrary to defendant's argument, the State could still prove its case by presenting officers' testimony that the gun seized was in fact an operable firearm, defendant would not be able to refute this assertion. Id. at 712. Additionally, unlike Crowder, the present case does not involve destruction of evidence or a discovery violation.

¶ 38 B. Closing Arguments

¶ 39 Defendant next contends that the State improperly commented on his failure to testify during closing arguments. Defendant asserts that this comment denied him a fair trial. The State contends that defendant forfeited this issue because he failed to object to the statement during closing arguments. ¶ 40 Although defendant moved for a mistrial regarding the challenged remark after the jury retired for deliberations and included it in his posttrial motion for a new trial, he concedes he did not raise an objection at the time the comment was made. "To preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged error in a written posttrial motion." People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 (2010). Defendant argues, however, that we may review his claim under either prong of the plain error doctrine, under which a reviewing court may consider unpreserved error if the defendant shows that a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) the evidence was so closely balanced that it threatened to tip the weight of the evidence against defendant or (2) the error was so egregious that it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Nowells, 2013 IL App (1st) 113209, ¶ 18 (citing People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010)). Given that "[w]ithout reversible error, there can be no plain error[,]" People v. McGee, 398 Ill. App. 3d 789, 794 (2010), we first determine whether an error occurred. ¶ 41 We note that it is unclear whether the proper standard of review to be applied to claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is de novo or an abuse of discretion. See People v. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d 243, 274-75 (2009) (comparing People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007) (reviewing claim of prosecutorial misconduct de novo), with People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 132 (2000) (applying abuse of discretion standard to prosecutorial misconduct claim)). But see People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶¶ 63-64 (finding no conflict exists regarding the proper standard of review and holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies "to determinations about the propriety of a prosecutor's remarks during argument," while the de novo standard applies to "the legal issue of whether a prosecutor's misconduct, like improper remarks during argument, was so egregious that it warrants a new trial [citation].") Regardless, we need not resolve this issue because the outcome here will be the same under either standard. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 275. ¶ 42 "Every defendant is entitled to fair trial free from prejudicial comments by the prosecution." People v. Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d 909, 924 (2004). Generally, "prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and usually a trial court's determination as to the propriety of such arguments will not be disturbed on review." People v. Derr, 316 Ill. App. 3d 272, 275 (2000). We must view a prosecutor's closing argument as a whole, considering any challenged remarks in context. People v. Thompson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133648, ¶ 47. Improper remarks require reversal only if they " 'engender substantial prejudice against a defendant such that it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted from them.' " People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143036, ¶ 46 (quoting Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123). ¶ 43 In the present case, defendant objects to the following remark during the prosecutor's closing argument:

"That's the event that brings you here today, ladies and gentlemen. And the evidence you heard in this case came from this witness stand. There were three people present on the day of September 10th of 2009. And you have heard from two of them.
They told you what happened that day. It is not complicated. It is not complex. It comes down to what probably occurred in a matter of seconds." (Emphasis added.)

¶ 44 "A defendant has the constitutional right not to testify, and therefore a prosecutor cannot comment on the exercise of that right." People v. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶ 60. That said, a prosecutor may comment on the evidence and make reasonable inferences therefrom, "including a defendant's credibility or the credibility of the defense's theory of the case." People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 12. A prosecutor may also respond to comments or arguments by the defense which invite a response. People v. Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 102. Even more, "it is generally permissible for the State to point out that evidence is uncontradicted even if the defendant is the only person who could have provided contrary proof. [Citations.] Such comments are not permitted, however, if they are intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the defendant's failure to testify." Derr, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 275. ¶ 45 Here, defendant's trial counsel argued that the remark implied defendant should have testified or that there was a third victim or witness who could have testified in support of the State. The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel's failure to contemporaneously object deprived the court of an opportunity to give a limiting instruction to the jury. The trial court also held that the State's argument followed the evidence, as Love testified that there was a customer in the store at the time, which would have meant there were three people in the store. In comments regarding a defendant's failure to testify. People v. Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d 425, 446-47 (1987), People v. Sawyer, 42 Ill. 2d 294, 300-01 (1969)). As we have concluded that no error occurred, there can also be no plain error. McGee, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 794.

¶ 50 C. Proportionate Penalties

¶ 51 Defendant argues that, as applied to him, the Habitual Criminal Act, 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2008), under which he received a mandatory natural life sentence, is disproportionate to the severity of the offense such that it violates the State and federal constitutional guarantees of proportionality in sentencing. Ill. Const., art. I, § 11; U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV. Defendant argues that the sentence here was so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. ¶ 52 The State responds that our courts have repeatedly found the statute does not violate the proportionate penalties clause and it does not violate defendant's rights as applied to him because he has now been convicted of four armed robberies. The State asserts that armed robbery is not a "minor inconsequential offense" and defendant has an extensive criminal history. ¶ 53 "We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo." People v. Collins, 2015 IL App (1st) 131145, ¶ 32. There is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutional; the challenging party bears the burden of "clearly establish[ing]" that the statute violates constitutional protections. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 487 (2005). "[A]n as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to the specific facts and circumstances of the challenging party." People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 38. ¶ 54 Under the Illinois State Constitution, "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The eighth amendment, in turn, prohibits the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The proportionate penalties clause is "coextensive with" the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106. "To succeed on a proportionate penalties claim, a defendant must show either that the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or [that it is] so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community***." People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348-49 (2009). The legislature generally enjoys broad discretion in setting criminal penalties, which courts typically decline to overrule. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487. Ultimately, the relevant inquiry is "whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 10. ¶ 55 The challenged statute provides:

" 'Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now *** classified in Illinois as a Class X felony, *** and who is thereafter convicted of a Class X felony, *** committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an habitual criminal.' 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a)(1) (West 2010). In addition, 'anyone adjudged an habitual criminal shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.' 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (West 2010)." Collins, 2015 IL App (1st) 131145, ¶ 33.

¶ 56 Defendant acknowledges that Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the statute. See, e.g., People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 244-48 (1995); People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 148 (2004); People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL App (1st) 120508, ¶ 64; People v. Collins, 2015 IL App (1st) 131145, ¶¶ 34-35. He contends, however, that this court ¶ 59 Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the mandatory natural life sentences imposed under the Habitual Criminal Act constituted cruel and unusual punishment or violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause as applied to defendant. In light of the facts involved in the instant offenses and defendant's criminal history, defendant has demonstrated that he poses a significant risk to the community and is likely incapable of rehabilitation. We therefore affirm defendant's sentence.

¶ 60 D. One-Act, One-Crime Rule

¶ 61 In his final contention on appeal, defendant argues that his two convictions for armed robbery violate the one-act, one-crime rule, because the evidence showed that he only took money from one establishment—the gas station—and not any money or items belonging to Watt or Love personally. He contends that one of his armed robbery convictions should be vacated. ¶ 62 Defendant recognizes that he raises this issue for the first time on appeal, arguing that it is reviewable under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. People v. Scott, 2015 IL App (1st) 133180, ¶ 12. ¶ 63 According to the one-act, one-crime doctrine, multiple convictions cannot stem from the same physical act. Scott, 2015 IL App (1st) 133180, ¶ 14; People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161, 165 (2010); People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). As stated, a defendant "commits armed robbery when he or she knowingly takes property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force while carrying a firearm, or during the commission of the offense, personally discharges a firearm." Scott, 2015 IL App (1st) 133180, ¶ 15 (citing 720 ILCS 5/18-1, 18-2(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2010)). ¶ 64 "Under well-settled Illinois law, multiple armed robbery convictions cannot lie when there is a single taking of property, even when multiple individuals are present and threatened." twice took different property (i.e., money) from the presence or control of two different individuals. While both Watt and Love were present and both were threatened with force and with a gun, defendant approached each cashier individually and took money from their respective cash registers. This is distinct from Hunter or Scott where only one cash register was robbed while two individuals were present. We thus agree with the State that two separate acts of taking occurred here. See People v. Butler, 64 Ill. 2d 485, 489 (1976) (upholding two armed robbery convictions where two victims standing within arm's reach of each other were simultaneously robbed of their money by defendant and codefendant); People v. Thomas, 67 Ill. 2d 388, 389-90 (1977) (five armed robbery convictions upheld where the defendant took money and personal property from each of the five victims during robbery outside and inside of a house).

¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's armed robbery convictions and sentences. ¶ 69 Affirmed.