Gillard v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., Prentice Hosp., Starbucks Corp.

PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 16 L 5386 Honorable Marcia Maras, Judge Presiding. PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying a motion to amend the pleadings after plaintiff's third amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiff Lisa J. Gillard filed a four-count pro se complaint against Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Prentice Hospital, Starbucks Corporation, and Universal Protection Services reasons" in dismissing the third amended complaint, Gillard did not point to any specific error in the court's application of the law. In the motion, Gillard sought leave to file documents related to her criminal conviction and to amend her pleadings. She attached to the motion a transcript from her criminal trial, an affidavit from the judge who presided over that trial (which the judge had drafted in response to a complaint made by Gillard), and the criminal disposition sheet related to her conviction. She did not attach any proposed amended complaint to the motion. ¶ 11 Before the date noticed for presentment of that motion, Gillard filed an "emergency motion to substitute judge for cause." The motion alleged that Judge Maras lacked the knowledge and experience to hear such a "difficult" case. Another judge heard and denied the motion for substitution. Judge Maras then denied the "motion to rehear, amend and supplement." This appeal followed.

According to its brief, this defendant is named Morrison Management Specialist, Inc.

After a bench trial, Gillard was convicted of criminal battery and sentenced to one-year's supervision and ordered not to have any contact with Northwestern Memorial Hospital except in the case of medical emergency. This court affirmed Gillard's conviction. People v. Gillard, 2018 IL App (1st) 171121-U.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 At the outset, we note that there is some confusion about the scope of this appeal. Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) provides that a notice of appeal "shall specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). The filing of a notice of appeal is "the jurisdictional step which initiates appellate review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 163, 176 (2011). "Unless there is a properly filed notice of appeal, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the matter and is obligated to dismiss the appeal." Id. at 176. "A notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on a court of review to consider only the judgment or parts of judgments specified in the notice of appeal." Id. An unspecified order is reviewable only where it is a step in the "procedural progression" leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979). the court to determine the questions or issues sought to be raised.'" Id. (quoting People ex rel. Carter v. Touchette, 5 Ill. 2d 303, 305 (1955)). Although Gillard's briefs are somewhat muddled and lack consistent citations to the record or legal authority, we have chosen not to strike the brief in this appeal, and we address her appeal on the merits. ¶ 17 When leave to amend a complaint is requested before the entry of judgment, leave should be liberally granted. Tomm's Redemption, Inc. v. Hamer, 2014 IL App (1st) 131005, ¶ 13. This rule is consistent with section 2-616(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2016)), which provides that amendment before judgment should be allowed on "just and reasonable terms." When making a determination on a pre-judgment request for leave to amend, trial courts are to consider: (1) whether the amendment would cure the defects in the original pleading; (2) whether the other party would suffer prejudice or surprise as a result of the amendment; (3) the timeliness of the proposed amendment; and (4) whether the requesting party has had other opportunities to amend the pleading. Loyola Academy v. S&S Room Maintenance, 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1994). ¶ 18 However, when leave to amend is sought after judgment, those principles do not apply, and the determination of whether leave to amend should be granted is instead governed by section 2-616(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2016)). See Tomm's 2014 IL App (1st) 131005, ¶ 14 ("But these [Loyola Academy] factors apply only to amendments that have been proposed prior to final judgment."). As explained in Tomm's:

"After final judgment, a plaintiff has no statutory right to amend a complaint and a court commits no error by denying a motion for leave to amend. [Citation.] The reason is that although section 2-616(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure [citation] provides that '[a]t any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed on

just and reasonable terms,' there is no corresponding provision mandating similar latitude in amendments offered after final judgment has been entered. Following judgment, a complaint may only be amended in order to conform the pleadings to the proofs. 735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2010). A complaint cannot be amended after final judgment in order to add new claims and theories or to correct other deficiencies. [Citations.]" Tomm's, 2014 IL App (1st) 131005, ¶ 14.

¶ 19 Although amendment is to be liberally granted if the request to amend is made before the entry of judgment, if the plaintiff makes the request after judgment, amendment is not permitted for any purpose other than to conform the pleadings to the proofs. See, e.g., Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131, 136 (1971); FHP Tectonics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 2016 IL App (1st) 130291, ¶ 36; Tomm's, 2014 IL App (1st) 131005, ¶ 14. ¶ 20 The order dismissing the third amended complaint with prejudice was a final judgment. See Tomm's, 2014 IL App (1st) 131005, ¶ 15. Gillard filed her request for leave to amend the next day. At that point, she had no statutory right to amend the complaint and add a negligence claim. See id. ¶ 14 ("A complaint cannot be amended after final judgment in order to add new claims and theories or to correct other deficiencies.") The court's decision to deny leave to amend was not error. ¶ 21 Defendant Premier Security Corporation argues that this appeal is frivolous, that Gillard's serial litigation is egregious, and that this court should enter an order of sanctions against Gillard under Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (Ill. S.Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)). Rule 375(b) allows for "appropriate sanctions" against parties who file frivolous appeals. Id. "[T]he appeal is considered frivolous if it would not have been brought in good faith by a reasonable, prudent attorney." Dreisilker Electric Motors, Inc. v. Rainbow Electric Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 304, 312 College District No. 508, 393 Fed. Appx. 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2010) ("we remind [Gillard] that litigants who abuse the judicial process face sanctions and restrictions on future suits."); Gillard v. United States District Court for District of Massachusetts, 2016 WL 8716220, at *2 (D. Mass. July 22, 2016) ("[Gillard's] conduct is vexatious and an abuse of the processes of this Court for the administration of justice.") ¶ 24 Premier Security also alleges that, as of the filing of its October 18, 2018 brief, Gillard has no fewer than nine civil law suits pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County. We may take judicial notice of lawsuits before the circuit court. See, e.g., In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 32. Additionally, Gillard has recently filed a notice of appeal in a second lawsuit against the very same defendants as in this case. ¶ 25 The issue is close, but we find this appeal is not so frivolous as to warrant sanctions. Although Gillard's arguments are unconvincing and unstructured, they are not totally groundless. See In re Marriage of Sykes, 231 Ill. App. 3d 940, 950 (1992) (declining to impose sanctions upon appellant despite unconvincing arguments in her briefs.) However, given Gillard's litigious history and the number of her active cases and appeals involving stunningly similar fact patterns, we echo the warnings of the federal courts: if she pursues a pattern of frivolous appeals before this court, she will face sanctions under Rule 375(b). Along the same line, if a circuit court hears similarly meritless litigation brought by Gillard, it should recognize that she has now been given ample prior warnings regarding her persistent misuse of the court system.

Lisa Gillard v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, et al., No. 2016-L-9575, now before this court as No. 1-18-0922. --------

¶ 26 CONCLUSION

10 ¶ 27 We affirm the circuit court's denial of Gillard's motion for leave to amend. For the reasons stated above, we do not review the dismissal of the third amended complaint or any prior order by the circuit court. ¶ 28 Affirmed.