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Taylor v. State

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
Dec 4, 2018

FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/20/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOEL SMITH NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 12/04/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT : ¶1. Dante Taylor was convicted of murder and sentenced to life without parole as a habitual offender. He appeals his conviction asserting that the jury was improperly instructed, entitling him to a new trial. In the alternative, he argues that the jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. On September 23, 2014, Dante was at a friend's house when his sister, Tiffany Taylor, of forensic pathology. He stated that Willie suffered a single gunshot wound to the abdomen, "right in the vicinity of the belly button." There was no exit wound. Dr. LeVaughn opined that the cause of Willie's death was the gunshot wound, and the manner of death was homicide. Dr. LeVaughn further testified that no stippling or "muzzle flash" was visible on Willie's body, which indicated that the barrel of the gun was more than two or three feet away. ¶18. The jury received instructions on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, imperfect self-defense manslaughter, and self-defense. After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Dante guilty of first-degree murder.

DISCUSSION

1. Weight of the Evidence ¶19. Dante did not raise the issue of weight of the evidence in his motion for a new trial. Instead, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's grant of instruction S-13 and denial of instructions D-10 and D-20. Consequently, his argument is procedurally barred. See Davis v. State, 43 So. 3d 1116, 1122 (¶19) (Miss. 2010) (finding that failure to present to the circuit court a motion for new trial regarding the weight of the evidence renders the issue procedurally barred).

2. Instruction S-13 ¶20. Dante argues that instruction S-13, a pre-arming instruction, should not have been given because pre-arming instructions have repeatedly been denounced by our supreme court. See, e.g., Boston v. State, 234 So. 3d 1231, 1234 (¶¶8-10) (Miss. 2017). Dante also argues that the granting of jury instruction S-13 was error because it prevented him from claiming self-defense. ¶21. The decision to give or refuse jury instructions is within the discretion of the trial court, and the well-settled standard of review is abuse of discretion. Moody v. State, 202 So. 3d 1235, 1236-37 (¶7) (Miss. 2016). We must review jury instructions as a whole to ascertain whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed regarding the applicable law. Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143, 149 (¶13) (Miss. 2014). "We will not find error if the instructions fairly, though not perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law." Id. at (¶14). "A criminal defendant is entitled to present his defense to the finder of fact." Keys v. State, 635 So. 2d 845, 848 (Miss. 1994). ¶22. Instruction S-13 reads:

The Court instructs the Jury that it is for the Jury to decide and if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Dante O'Bryan Taylor, armed himself with a deadly weapon and sought Willie Lee Taylor, with the formed felonious intention of invoking a difficulty with Willie Lee Taylor, or brought on, or voluntarily entered into any difficulty with Willie Lee Taylor with the design and felonious intent to cause serious bodily harm to Willie Lee Taylor, then the Defendant, Dante O'Bryan Taylor, cannot invoke the law of self-defense.

¶23. A pre-arming instruction should only be used in "extremely rare incidents where the instruction was supported by the evidence." Dew v. State, 748 So. 2d 751, 754 (Miss. 1999). see also Hart v. State, 637 So. 2d 1329, 1332 (Miss. 1994); Hall v. State, 420 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (Miss. 1982); Reid v. State, 301 So. 2d 561, 564 (Miss. 1974); Jobe v. State, 97 So. 3d next to Willie's house), sat in front of that house with a gun in his back pocket, and then shot Willie from at least two feet away. Dante's mother testified that, the night before the shooting, Dante had threatened to "punish" or "do" Willie. And Dante testified that he got a pistol that same night after talking to his mother. Based on Mississippi precedent, we find the evidence here supported the court's decision to give a pre-arming instruction. ¶27. The instruction given did not preempt Dante's self-defense claim but submitted the issue to the jury for its determination. See Hall, 420 So. 2d at 1385. Further, Dante also received an imperfect self-defense instruction. The jury rejected both of those theories. After review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the pre-arming instruction.

3. Instructions D-10 and D-20 ¶28. Dante argues that the trial judge's refusal to grant his proposed instructions D-19 and 20 was reversible error because both instructions supported an important theory of his defense—that Willie was much larger than Dante and "capable of causing serious bodily injury with his hands and fists." Testimony revealed that Willie was 5'10" tall and weighed 290 pounds when he was killed. During his interview with police, Dante reported that he weighed 160 pounds. Nothing in the record revealed Dante's height. ¶29. Instruction D-19 reads as follows:

The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence that the deceased Willie Lee Taylor was a larger man than the Defendant, DANTE O'BRYAN TAYLOR and was capable of inflicting great and serious bodily harm upon DANTE O'BRYAN TAYLOR with his hands or fists, and the

Defendant had a reason to believe as a man of ordinary reason that he was then and there in danger of such serious bodily harm at the hands of the deceased Willie Lee Taylor and the Defendant used a handgun, with which he fatally shot Willie Lee Taylor, to protect himself from such harm, then the Defendant was justified even though the deceased was not armed.

¶30. Instruction D-20 similarly reads:
The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence that the deceased Willie Lee Taylor was capable of inflicting great and serious bodily harm upon DANTE O'BRYAN TAYLOR with his hands or fists, and the Defendant had a reason to believe as a man of ordinary reason that he was then and there in danger of such serious bodily harm at the hands of the deceased Willie Lee Taylor and the Defendant used a handgun, with which he fatally shot Willie Lee Taylor, to protect himself from such harm, then the Defendant was justified even though the deceased was not armed.

The trial court denied D-19 and D-20, finding that Dante's theories of self-defense were adequately covered elsewhere. Dante's proposed instructions have been approved in other cases only "when supported by evidence and [when] no other instruction properly presents the defendant's theory." Robinson v. State, 858 So. 2d 887, 897 (¶42) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). In Robinson, the court affirmed a similar self-defense instruction based on evidence that Robinson and his victim were actually engaged in a physical struggle when the victim was stabbed. Id. at 891. Here, there was no physical struggle between Dante and Willie; the evidence showed that Dante shot Willie from at least two feet away. Further, Dante's theory of self-defense was properly presented in Instruction S-10:
The Court instructs the jury that to make a killing justifiable on the ground of self-defense, the danger to the defendant must be either actual, present and urgent, or the defendant must have reasonable grounds to believe the victim intended to kill the defendant or to do him some great bodily harm, and in addition to this, he must have reasonable grounds to believe there is imminent

danger of such act being accomplished . . . .

Reviewing jury instructions as a whole, we find that the jury was fully and fairly instructed regarding the applicable law. ¶31. AFFIRMED.


LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ.

CARLTON, J., DISSENTING: ¶32. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm Taylor's conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of life without eligibility for parole in the custody of the MDOC. I find that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by giving jury instruction S-13, the "pre-arming" instruction. I would therefore reverse Taylor's conviction and remand this case for a new trial. ¶33. It is well-settled that "[j]ury instructions are generally within the discretion of the trial court, and the . . . standard of review is abuse of discretion." Boston v. State, 234 So. 3d 1231, 1233 (¶7) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Moody v. State, 202 So. 3d 1235, 1236-37 (¶7) (Miss. 2016)). "Jury instructions must fairly announce the law of the case and not create an injustice against the defendant." Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (¶14) (Miss. 2009)). The supreme court "has condemned outright the granting of any [jury] instruction that precludes a defendant from asserting a claim of self-defense[,]" explaining that "[a] criminal defendant is entitled to present his defense to the finder of fact." Johnson v. State, 908 So. 2d 758, 762 (¶15) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Keys v. State, 635 So. 2d 845, 848 (Miss. 1984)). ¶34. In the present case, the State submitted jury instruction S-3, which provided as follows:

The Court instructs the Jury that it [is] for the Jury to decide and if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Dante O'Bryan Taylor, armed himself with a deadly weapon and sought Willie Lee Taylor, with the formed felonious intention of invoking a difficulty with Willie Lee Taylor, or brought on, or voluntarily entered into any difficulty with Willie Lee Taylor with the design and felonious intent to cause serious bodily harm to Willie Lee Taylor, then the Defendant, Dante O'Bryan Taylor, cannot invoke the law of self-defense.

Taylor's defense counsel argued that a pre-arming instruction impermissibly commented on the evidence and was unsupported by the evidence. However, the trial court granted instruction, explaining that:
there's conflicting testimony or it can be inferentially argued based upon the mother's testimony about what [Taylor] told her about his . . . intent or plans to go punish [Willie] or set it right, whatever the testimony was, which my appreciation was that there was some malice aforethought going on, perhaps. Which a jury could make a legal inference that that's why he had that weapon.

¶35. The supreme court has held that "even if the great weight of evidence against the defendant supports a contrary view, the defendant is still entitled to present his defense to the jury unimpaired by instructions that preclude his right to self-defense." Boston, 234 So. 3d at 1234 (¶11) (quoting Dew, 748 So. 2d at 754 (¶19)). Additionally, in Boston, the supreme court explained that a pre-arming instruction is appropriate only where "[t]he record [is] uncontradicted that the defendants armed themselves with the intent to initiate a confrontation." Id. at 1235 (¶12). Here, the record reflects that the evidence presented at trial created a conflict as to whether Dante armed himself with the intention of initiating a confrontation with Willie and as to whether Dante was the initial aggressor. Dante testified at trial that his mother called him the night before the shooting and warned him that Willie had come to her house looking for Dante and that Willie had threatened to kill him. ¶36. I therefore find that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in granting jury instruction S-3. I would therefore reverse Taylor's conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.