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Culumber v. Culumber

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
Dec 4, 2018

LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/29/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SANFORD R. STECKLER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN R. REEVES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ALBEN NORRIS HOPKINS JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/04/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT : ¶1. In this appeal, we must determine whether the Harrison County Chancery Court, Second Judicial District, erred when it granted Robert Culumber a divorce from Toni Culumber on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness and declined to award Toni rehabilitative alimony. Finding the chancellor's decision was supported with substantial credible evidence, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Robert Culumber and Toni Miles Culumber were married on May 22, 2013, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Robert was nineteen years older than Toni and had one child from a previous relationship, but the parties had no children together. Sometime in July 2014, the ¶17. Toni now appeals, arguing that the chancery court erred when it (1) granted Robert a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness and (2) denied her request for rehabilitative alimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18. "It is well settled that appellate courts are bound by a limited standard of review in domestic-relations matters." White v. White, 208 So. 3d 587, 592 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). "This Court will not disturb the chancellor's opinion when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Farris v. Farris, 202 So. 3d 223, 230 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). "In the case of a divorce decree, facts will be viewed in a light most favorable to the appellee." White, 208 So. 3d at 592 (¶10) (internal quotation marks omitted). "For questions of law, our standard of review is de novo." Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Grounds for Divorce ¶19. The chancery court granted Robert a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. Toni appeals, arguing there was not substantial credible evidence to support a divorce on either of these grounds.

A. Habitual Cruel and Inhuman Treatment ¶20. Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is behavior that "(1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage testimony and sees the demeanor of the witnesses." Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). "This Court cannot, and will not, reweigh the evidence or reconsider the credibility of the witnesses." Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). As such, the chancellor here found that Robert had proved habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and we find that there was substantial credible evidence to support his decision. Toni's behavior was systematic and continuous to such a degree that it created a reasonable apprehension of danger, forcing Robert to leave the home on numerous occasions—evidencing the subjective effect that is to be considered. Toni's behavior was constant such that "its recurrence may be reasonably expected whenever occasion or opportunity presents itself." And Newman "provide[d] enough supporting facts for a court to conclude [Robert's] testimony [wa]s true." See Baggett, 246 So. 3d at 892 (¶13). Accordingly, we do not find that the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. We find that the chancellor's grant of the divorce on ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment was based on substantial credible evidence.

B. Habitual Drunkenness ¶25. Toni also argues that there was no evidence to support a divorce on the ground of habitual drunkenness. Specifically, she states there was no medical testimony or medical evidence to show she had any issues with alcohol. ¶26. "A court may grant a divorce on the ground of habitual drunkenness if the plaintiff proves that: (1) the defendant frequently abused alcohol; (2) the alcohol abuse negatively affected the marriage; and (3) the alcohol abuse continued at the time of the trial." Id. at 893 (¶15) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 154 So. 3d 904, 906 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)). ¶27. Robert's testimony, which the chancellor found credible, stated that Toni drank every night, drank excessively, mixed alcohol with contraindicated prescriptions, and was drunk five out of seven nights per week. Toni herself admitted that she had anger issues when she drank, that she was drinking on three of the four occasions police were called to the home, and that she drank while taking her prescription medications. Specific examples of Toni's drinking included Robert's testimony that on the last night of their honeymoon, security was called on them because Toni was passed out on the floor. Additionally, prior to trial proceedings, Robert and a notary went to Toni to have a property-settlement agreement signed, but when they arrived, Toni was passed out on the floor drunk. Drug testing during trial revealed alcohol in Toni's system along with the presence of her prescription drugs, which were contraindicated with alcohol use. As such, there was substantial credible evidence to support the chancellor's finding that Robert had proved Toni's habitual drunkenness. This issue is without merit.

II. Rehabilitative Alimony ¶28. Finally, Toni argues that in the event that the divorce was properly granted, then the chancery court improperly denied Toni's request for rehabilitative alimony. Toni alleges that even though the marriage was short, she is entitled to rehabilitative alimony payments because Robert paid all the bills and expenses in the marriage and that she needs assistance to become self supporting after the marriage. ¶29. We first note that alimony is considered only if after equitable division, one party is left with a deficit. Carney v. Carney, 201 So. 3d 432, 440 (¶28) (Miss. 2016). "The decision of whether to award alimony, and if so, what amount, is left to the chancellor's discretion." Hearn v. Hearn, 191 So. 3d 129, 132 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). When determining whether to award alimony, the chancellor is to consider the Armstrong factors:

(1) the income and expenses of the parties; (2) the health and earning capacities of the parties; (3) the needs of each party; (4) the obligations and assets of each party; (5) the length of the marriage; (6) the presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care; (7) the age of the parties; (8) the standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination; (9) the tax consequences of the spousal support order; (10) fault or misconduct; (11) wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or (12) any other factor deemed by the court to be "just and equitable" in connection with the setting of spousal support.

Larson v
. Larson, 192 So. 3d 1137, 1142 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993)). ¶30. In regard to the type of alimony Toni argues she is entitled to, we note that rehabilitative alimony is "an equitable mechanism which allows a party needing assistance to become self-supporting without becoming destitute in the interim." Serio v. Serio, 203 So. 3d 24, 30 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 849 (¶15) (Miss. 2003)). It is "awarded to parties who have put their career on hold while taking care of the marital home." Id. "Rehabilitative alimony allows the party to get back into the working world in order to become self-sufficient." Id. ¶31. The chancellor stated that there was no basis for alimony. Toni alleges that the chancellor placed too much emphasis on the length of the marriage and did not properly consider the other factors. The record indicates otherwise. As the chancellor noted, Toni was not working at all when she came into the marriage. Additionally, she brought approximately $30,000 of debt into the marriage which Robert paid off in full. It is true, as the chancellor noted, that the marriage was very short—barely one year. The parties had no children. Per the chancellor's findings, Toni was "actually better off by virtue of the marriage in terms of her education, having her student loan paid off and other things to help her further her career, rather than lose it." Career wise, Toni was relatively young—being in her late thirties, while Robert was approaching retirement—being in his late fifties. In December 2013, Toni became employed, making around $38,000, and this employment continued at the time of trial. Robert paid all of the bills and expenses during the short-term marriage and assumed responsibility for all marital debt. Toni received payment for her equitable share of marital assets in the amount of $13,442.00. As we now affirm, the chancellor found Toni at fault in the marriage on grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. We do not find that the chancellor abused his discretion in denying Toni an award of rehabilitative alimony. This issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶32. We affirm the decision of the chancery court to grant Robert a divorce from Toni on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. We also affirm the chancery court's decision to deny Toni's request for rehabilitative alimony. ¶33. AFFIRMED.

IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR. TINDELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.