Cedar v. Johnson

JENSEN, Justice

#28441, #28453-aff in pt & rev in pt-SRJ APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. SOMMERS Judge ROBERT A. CHRISTENSON
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney for plaintiff
and appellant. THOMAS J. COGLEY of
Ronayne and Cogley, P.C.
Aberdeen, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellee. JENSEN, Justice [¶1.] Jerry Cedar (Cedar) brought an action for alienation of affections against Bruce Johnson for causing the end of Cedar's marriage to Leslie Cedar (Leslie). At the close of Cedar's case-in-chief at trial, Johnson moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the motion determining that Cedar failed to present evidence of his damages. Cedar appealed the dismissal of the action. Johnson filed a notice of review, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his other grounds for dismissal as a matter of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] Cedar and Leslie were married in Kansas in 2000. Early in the marriage the couple conceived their only child, N.C. In 2006, the family moved to Wisconsin to help care for Leslie's father. In 2007, Leslie began an online relationship over Facebook. Cedar discovered the relationship, and the couple briefly attended couple's counseling to rehabilitate their marriage. [¶3.] The couple moved to Frederick, South Dakota in September 2014. In April 2015, Leslie began working at the Titan Bar, a local restaurant owned by Johnson. Johnson had recently purchased the restaurant after moving to Frederick. Cedar occasionally worked for Johnson in the evenings as a cook. All the parties agree that the relationship between Johnson and Leslie was initially purely professional. [¶4.] Johnson lost his wife to cancer around May 2015. Cedar testified that at some point thereafter, Johnson and Leslie began frequently texting one another night. Cedar also discussed the things they did together during the marriage, such as raising livestock and taking trips. Cedar explained that he had been "emotional" ever since he learned of her affair with Johnson and that losing Leslie had put him and their son "through heck." Cedar also testified that he regretted having to raise N.C. in a broken home. Cedar did not claim any pecuniary loss or testify to a specific dollar amount of damages. [¶12.] At the conclusion of Cedar's evidence, Johnson moved for judgment as a matter of law on several grounds. The circuit court granted the motion on the question of damages reasoning that Cedar had failed to provide testimony as to the amount of his damages. The court denied the other grounds for dismissal asserted by Johnson. On October 4, 2017, the court entered an order dismissing the claim for alienation of affections. [¶13.] Cedar filed a notice of appeal and, by way of notice of review, Johnson requested review of the circuit court's denial of his other grounds for dismissal as a matter of law. The parties' briefs raise the following issues:

1. Whether the circuit court erred by determining as a matter of law that Cedar failed to present sufficient evidence as to the amount of his damages.
2. Whether the circuit court erred in not granting Johnson's motion for judgment as a matter of law on liability and causation.
3. Whether SDCL 20-9-7 violates public policy.

Junior testified by deposition prior to trial, and his testimony matched Leslie's testimony about the two of them having a sexual relationship two times during a two-week affair in the fall of 2015. Junior claimed that Leslie initiated the sexual relationship with him. Junior also testified in the deposition that Leslie was not happy in the marriage to Cedar and planned to leave the marriage after N.C. turned eighteen. Junior claimed that Leslie confided to him that she was scared of Cedar, and felt Cedar was controlling. Junior also testified that during this time, both Leslie and Johnson told him they had feelings toward one another. Junior's deposition was presented as a part of the summary judgment motions, but his testimony was not presented during Cedar's case-in-chief at trial.

Standard of Review

[¶14.] Whether judgment as a matter of law was warranted is reviewed de novo. Center of Life Church v. Nelson, 2018 S.D. 42, ¶ 18, 913 N.W.2d 105, 110. For our review, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or to the nonmoving party[,]" then we determine whether the evidence supports the motion, without assessing the validity of the evidence. Id. (citations omitted). "If sufficient evidence exists so that reasonable minds could differ, judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate." Id.

Analysis & Decision

1. Whether the circuit court erred by determining as a matter of law that Cedar failed to present sufficient evidence of the amount of his damages. [¶15.] The tort for alienation of affection emanates from SDCL 20-9-7. "The gravamen of an action for alienation of affections is enticement." Rumpca v. Brenner, 2012 S.D. 33, ¶ 7, 814 N.W.2d 128, 129 (quoting Pankratz v. Miller, 401 N.W.2d 543, 549 (S.D. 1987)). "[T]he rights of personal relation forbid the enticement of a wife from her husband[.]" Id. (quoting SDCL 20-9-7(2)). We have consistently held three elements must be proven to show alienation of affections:

1. Wrongful conduct of the defendant with specific intent to alienate one spouse's affections from the other spouse (such intent may develop at any point during the adulterous relationship);
2. Loss of affection or consortium; and
3. A causal connection between such conduct and loss.

Id
., 814 N.W.2d at 129-30. [¶16.] On the question of recoverable damages for alienation of affections, we have previously stated,

The plaintiff . . . may recover for all direct and proximate losses occasioned by the tort, including loss of love and consortium, and he or she may recover for any physical pain, mental agony, lacerated feelings, wounded sensibilities, humiliation, blow to honor, hurt to family life, suspicion cast on offspring, etc.

DeBoer, 2015 S.D. 49, ¶ 13, 865 N.W.2d 867, 871 (quoting Bakker v. Irvine, 519 N.W.2d 41, 48 (S.D. 1994)); see also, Hayes v. Northern Hills General Hosp., 1999 S.D. 28, ¶ 42, 590 N.W.2d 243, 252 (holding evidence of stress, humiliation, or mental anguish is enough for the issue of damages for emotional distress to go before a jury on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). [¶20.] Other jurisdictions in alienation of affections claims have not required a monetary figure to be presented to a jury. See Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1029 (Miss. 2007) (holding evidence that plaintiff lost his house, custody of his child, and the loss of his marriage and other noneconomic damages was sufficient for the jury to establish the loss suffered); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1217 (Utah 1983) (holding recovery for alienation of affections cannot be denied when the amount of that injury or loss is difficulty to determine and jury instructions and remittitur help regulate jury awards in such cases). [¶21.] Cedar testified that he wanted to be married to Leslie and missed her love and companionship. He further explained to the jury that he had suffered every day since the marriage ended and felt remorse for having to raise N.C. in a broken home. While the damage testimony was limited, there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's entry of judgment as a matter of law on damages.

Contrary to the circuit court's conclusion, evidence of the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injury is not a specific element we have recognized for alienation of affections. Veeder approved a jury instruction that set out three elements for alienation of affections as follows: (1) wrongful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or consortium; and (3) a causal connection between such loss and conduct. Veeder affirmed that this instruction "does not deviate at all from what we have declared to be the elements of alienation of affections." 1999 S.D. 23, ¶ 37, 589 N.W.2d 610, 619. Further, the issue in Veeder was not about damages, but whether the instruction should have included language requiring the plaintiff to prove that he intended to entice plaintiff's spouse. Indeed, our cases after Veeder have continued to recognize three elements to prove alienation of affections. See e.g. Richardson v. Richardson, 2017 S.D. 92, ¶ 29 n.9, 906 N.W.2d 369, 379; Rumpca, 2012 S.D. 33, ¶ 7, 814 N.W.2d 128, 129-30; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 2007 S.D. 107, ¶ 24, 741 N.W.2d 228, 236.

Schmidt explained that the term "extent" of damages is not synonymous with the "amount" of damages. Reviewing an instruction on damages, this Court stated, "[t]he confusion arises from the use of the word 'extent' in Instruction No. 10 and in the American Jurisprudence text. 'Extent' as used was intended to refer to the scope or degree of the injury, not the amount, but in the context used, the word 'extent' could be understood to be synonymous with 'amount'." Schmidt, Inc., 261 N.W.2d at 118-19. This Court further expounded that:

In reviewing the authorities cited by the original Am. Jur. text as authority, we find none which uses the phrase "to an extent so definite and certain." All of the decisions clearly indicate that it is the fact, cause, or existence of damage that must be definite and certain. See United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 121, 45 S. Ct. 451, 69 L. Ed. 876; County of Nelson v. Northcote, 6 Dak. 378, 43 N.W. 897, 6 L.R.A. 230; Dawe v. Morris, 149 Mass. 188, 21 N.E. 313, 4 L.R.A. 158, 14 Am. St. Rpts. 404; Wellington v. Small, 3 Cushing (Mass.) 145, 50 Am. Dec. 719; Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co., 113 Tex. 441, 251 S.W. 1034; 258 S.W. 462; 51 A.L.R. 1.

Our cases have not addressed whether a plaintiff may recover economic or pecuniary damages in an alienation of affections claim. Since Cedar only presented evidence of noneconomic damages, we limit our discussion to those damages.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in not granting Johnson's motion for judgment as a matter of law on liability and causation. [¶22.] Johnson argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence to show that he had the specific intent to alienate Leslie's affections or that he caused Leslie's alienated affections. Cedar claims that the circuit court properly determined that questions of fact existed for the jury on these issues. [¶23.] On a claim for alienation of affections, the plaintiff must show the defendant's wrongful conduct was performed with the specific intent to alienate one spouse's affections from the other spouse. Richardson, 2017 S.D. 92, ¶ 29 n.9, 906 N.W.2d 369, 380 n.9; Harbert, 2007 S.D. 107, ¶ 22, 741 N.W.2d at 235; Veeder, 1999 S.D. 23, ¶ 39 n.14, 589 N.W.2d at 619 n.14; Pankratz, 401 N.W.2d at 549. The plaintiff must also prove a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the loss. Veeder, 1999 S.D. 23, ¶ 14, 589 N.W.2d at 615. So that "if there are no affections to alienate, there is no cause of action." Id. ¶ 27, 589 N.W.2d at 617. [¶24.] In addressing the specific intent element, this Court stated in Pankratz:

The acts must have been done for the very purpose of accomplishing this result. It is not enough that [defendant] should have known that continuing the affair might contribute to the diminution of [wife's] affections, where her affections for [husband] were alienated before she initiated the relationship with [defendant].

401 N.W.2d at 548. Although the tort of alienation of affections requires specific intent, we clarified in Harbert that this intent may develop any time during the relationship:

Additionally, under the modern decisions of this Court, the specific intent to alienate affections is not required to be present "from the outset" of the affair. Rather, the specific intent to alienate one spouse's affections from the other spouse may develop at any point during the adulterous relationship.

2007 S.D. 107, ¶ 23, 741 N.W.2d at 235 (internal citations omitted). [¶27.] Johnson also claims that causation was also lacking because of Leslie's testimony about her sexual relationship with Junior shortly before starting the relationship with Johnson. Cedar disputed that the affair took place, but Johnson counters that Leslie and Junior both admitted the affair occurred and Cedar had no actual knowledge whether the affair took place. An admission by a party admitting a fact to be true may dispense with required evidentiary proof. Tunender v. Minnaert, 1997 S.D. 62, ¶ 21, 563 N.W.2d 849, 853. However, neither Leslie nor Junior are parties to this action. Accordingly, the question of witness credibility is generally one for the jury. State v. Buchholtz, 2013 S.D. 96, ¶¶ 24, 28, 841 N.W.2d 449, 457. [¶28.] On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the circuit court must consider the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and "must indulge all legitimate inferences therefrom in his favor." Osman v. Karlen & Assocs., 2008 S.D. 16, ¶ 14, 746 N.W.2d 437, 442. Based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that Johnson engaged in intentional and wrongful conduct to alienate Leslie's affections for Cedar. Likewise, the question of causation also presented questions of fact for the jury. [¶29.] The circuit court did not err in denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law as to specific intent and causation.

Leslie testified that the text messages on her phone were provided to Cedar in discovery. However, none of the contents of the messages were introduced into evidence

3. Whether SDCL 20-9-7 violates public policy. [¶30.] Johnson argues that the tort of alienation of affections has become anachronistic from contemporary societal norms because it arose from the notion that a husband has a property right in his wife and is entitled to compensation for we are prevented from considering its validity unless it conflicts with legislative intent or presents a constitutional question. Johnson's arguments make no such claim. [¶33.] In rejecting the defendant's public policy arguments in Veeder, the Court stated, "we are compelled to leave the cause of action intact and instead defer to the legislature's ability to decide if there is a need for its elimination." Indeed, following our decision in Veeder, the Legislature saw fit to not only leave the cause of action in place, but even strengthen the underlying policy. In 2002, the Legislature reviewed SDCL 20-9-7 and included gender neutral language. 2002 S.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 97, § 1 (amending SDCL 20-9-7 to be gender neutral). Therefore, in keeping with our prior decisions, we decline to repudiate a cause of action for alienation of affections arising from SDCL 20-9-7. We affirm the circuit court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss. [¶34.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KERN and SALTER, Justices, concur.

SDCL 20-9-7 provides:

The rights of personal relation forbid:

(1) The abduction or enticement of a husband from his wife or of a parent from a child;
(2) The abduction or enticement of a wife from her husband, of a child form a parent, or form a guardian entitled to its custody;
(3) The seduction of a wife, daughter, or orphan sister;
(4) The seduction of a husband, son, or orphan brother.

--------

Id
. at 118 n.9.