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Murphy v. State
Pyle, Judge.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Robert J. Little
Lafayette, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana Andrew Kobe
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Laura W. Zeman, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D04-1608-CM-2925 Pyle, Judge.
[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Damien Murphy ("Murphy") appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss two petitions to revoke his probation, which were both filed after his probationary period had ended. He argues that the trial court does not have authority to hold a revocation hearing and make a final determination on any allegation within the revocation petitions because the trial court did not toll his probation pursuant to the tolling provision in the probation revocation statute. [2] We conclude that the tolling provision in the revocation statute does not apply to the facts of this case and note that the probation revocation statute sets out the trial court's authority for holding a revocation hearing and entering a determination on a probation allegation in a timely-filed revocation petition. Because the first revocation petition was timely filed and the second revocation petition was not, we affirm the trial court's denial of Murphy's motion to dismiss the first revocation petition, reverse the trial court's denial of Murphy's motion to dismiss the second revocation petition, and remand for further proceedings on the first revocation petition. [3] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Murphy's motion to dismiss the two probation revocation petitions.
Facts
[4] On October 11, 2016, Murphy entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty as charged to Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. That same day, the trial court, pursuant to the plea agreement, sentenced Murphy to "180 days, suspended upon timely and satisfactory completion of all terms and conditions period of probation is tolled only when a summons or warrant is issued." (App. Vol. 2 at 35) (emphasis in original). [8] On July 27, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Murphy's motion to dismiss. During the hearing, the trial court determined that: (1) the First Probation Revocation Petition was timely filed because the State had filed it within forty-five days of receiving notice of the violation on May 25, 2017; (2) the filing of the First Probation Revocation Petition "toll[ed] the probationary period[;]" and (3) the Second Probation Revocation Petition was timely filed because Murphy's probation had been tolled by the filing of the First Probation Revocation Petition. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). The trial court then issued an order denying Murphy's motion to dismiss both revocation petitions. [9] Thereafter, upon Murphy's motion, the trial court certified its order for an interlocutory appeal. Murphy then sought and was granted permission by our Court to file an interlocutory appeal. Murphy now appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss.
The transcript of the probation review hearing is not included in the record on appeal.
Decision[10] Murphy appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the two probation revocation petitions. "We review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion, and we reverse only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Frink v. State, 52 N.E.3d 842, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 6 [11] Resolution of this appeal requires us to review and interpret INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: (a) The court may revoke a person's probation if: (1) the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period; and (2) the petition to revoke probation is filed during the probationary period or before the earlier of the following: (A) One (1) year after the termination of probation. (B) Forty-five (45) days after the state receives notice of the violation. (b) When a petition is filed charging a violation of a condition of probation, the court may: (1) order a summons to be issued to the person to appear; or (2) order a warrant for the person's arrest if there is a risk of the person's fleeing the jurisdiction or causing harm to others. (c) The issuance of a summons or warrant tolls the period of probation until the final determination of the charge. (d) Except as provided in subsection (e), the court shall conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation. . . . * * * * * (j) If the court finds that the person has violated a condition during any time before the termination of the period, and the petition is filed under subsection (a) after the probationary period has expired, the court may: 7 (1) reinstate the person's probationary period, with or without enlarging the conditions, if the sum of the length of the original probationary period and the reinstated probationary period does not exceed the length of the maximum sentence allowable for the offense that is the basis of the probation; or (2) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing. [12] The crux of Murphy's appellate argument, however, is that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hold a probation revocation hearing on the First and Second Probation Revocation Petitions because it did not toll his probation pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(c). He contends that, in order for the trial court to have authority to hold a revocation hearing and make a final determination on an allegation within a revocation petition, the trial court was required to toll his probation under subsection (c) by issuing a summons or a warrant. The State, on the other hand, recognizes the language of subsection (c) but contends that the First Probation Revocation Petition "served the same purpose as a summons or warrant" and, as a result, tolled Murphy's probation and would allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction to hold a revocation hearing on both revocation petitions. (State's Br. 12). 8 [13] The overriding issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court has jurisdiction or authority to hold a revocation hearing and enter a disposition on the First and Second Probation Revocation Petitions. To resolve this issue, the parties focus on whether the trial court had tolled Murphy's probation pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(c). That focus, however, is misplaced because Murphy's probationary period had already ended prior to the State's filing of the two probation revocation petitions. We have explained that "tolling [under INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(c)] does not apply to violations filed after the probationary period ends." Davis v. State, 35 N.E.3d 261, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing IND. CODE § 35-38-2-3(b)-(c)). If the State files a notice of probation violation after a defendant's probation has ended, as the State did here pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of the revocation statute, then "there [i]s no period of probation to be tolled, which means the trial court c[an] not continue [a defendant's] terms of probation pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(c)." Id. Because Murphy's probationary period had already ended, it could not be tolled. 9 [14] Therefore, we turn to the relevant focus in this interlocutory appeal, which is whether the trial court has authority to hold a revocation hearing and enter a disposition on the revocation petitions. We recognize that "once a probationer's term of probation has expired, the court loses jurisdiction over that person." Hayes v. State, 590 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Nevertheless, "[t]he disposition regarding a violation of probation may occur after the probationary period has ended, but the violation must have occurred within the probationary period." Trammell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1212, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Dawson v. State, 751 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). [15] Indeed, the probation revocation statute sets out the trial court's authority for holding a revocation hearing and entering a determination on a probation revocation allegation in a timely-filed revocation petition. "A statute must be held to mean what is clearly and plainly expressed therein." Hayes, 590 N.E.2d at 1118. Subsection (a) makes clear that a trial court "may revoke a person's probation" only "if the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period" and the revocation petition is filed either during the probationary period or after probation has ended but within the time periods contained in the statute. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(a). If there is a timely-filed revocation petition under subsection (a), subsection (d) mandates that a trial "court shall conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation." I.C. § 35-38-2-3(d) (emphasis added). At such hearing, the State is required to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f). Additionally, 10 subsection (j) sets forth the dispositional options a trial court has when it "finds that a person has violated a condition during any time before the termination of the period, and the petition is filed under subsection (a) after the probationary period has expired[.]" I.C. § 35-38-2-3(j). Thus, the trial court has the authority to hold a revocation hearing and enter a determination on a probation allegation but only if the two revocation petitions have met the timely-filing requirements of subsection (a). [16] Here, the trial court sentenced Murphy and placed him on probation on October 11, 2016. Therefore, his probationary period ended 180 days later on April 9, 2017. The State filed the First Probation Revocation Petition on May 25, 2017, which Murphy does not dispute was within forty-five days of the State receiving notice that Murphy had allegedly failed to complete all of his probation requirements during his probationary period. Thus, the First Probation Revocation Petition complied with the requirements of subsection (a) and was timely filed. Pursuant to subsection (d), the trial court is required to "conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation[s]." I.C. § 35-38-2-3(d). Because the trial court has authority pursuant to the revocation statute to hold a revocation hearing and to enter a determination on this timely-filed petition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Murphy's motion to dismiss 11 the First Probation Revocation Petition. We affirm the trial court's judgment on the First Probation Revocation Petition and remand for further proceedings. [17] The trial court, however, abused its discretion by denying Murphy's motion to dismiss the Second Probation Revocation Petition. This second petition did not comply with the requirements of subsection (a)(1) because it alleged that Murphy had violated a condition of probation on June 28, 2017, which was after Murphy's probationary period had already ended. Because this Second Probation Revocation Petition was not timely filed, the trial court does not have authority to hold a revocation hearing on it. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Murphy's motion to dismiss the Second Probation Revocation Petition, and we reverse the trial court's judgment on this Second Probation Revocation Petition. See, e.g., Dawson, 751 N.E.2d at 815-16 (holding that the trial court improperly revoked a defendant's probation where the allegation was based on an offense alleged to have occurred after the expiration of his probationary term). [18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.
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