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Corbin v. State

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Oct 31, 2018

Riley, Judge.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Marc Lopez
Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Appeal from the Montgomery Superior Court The Honorable Peggy Q. Lohorn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 54D02-1704-CM-1083 Riley, Judge.



STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Brittanie Corbin (Corbin), appeals her conviction for operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (ACE) of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b) (2017).

We held oral argument on October 9, 2018, at the Winchester Community High School, Winchester, Indiana. We commend counsel for their excellent presentations and thank Winchester Community High School for their hospitality in hosting this oral argument. --------

ISSUES

[2] Corbin presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Corbin's conviction for operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more.



FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[3] On April 8, 2017, at approximately 11:36 p.m., two deputy sheriffs with the Montgomery County Sherriff's Department, Mathew Riddle (Deputy Riddle) and Ethan Redmon (Deputy Redmon), received a dispatch concerning a "disabled vehicle eastbound on I-74." (Transcript Vol. II, p. 15). The deputies arrived at the scene at approximately 11:43 p.m. and observed a "silver Chevy Cobalt on the right-hand shoulder." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 16). Deputy Riddle consented. Corbin was then handcuffed and transported to Montgomery County Jail. Corbin cried "throughout" her transportation to jail. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 29). At approximately 12:20 a.m., Deputy Redmon administered Corbin's chemical breath test. Prior to administering the test, Deputy Redmon ensured that Corbin had not eaten, drunk, smoked, or put any foreign objects in her mouth. The test revealed that Corbin had 0.152 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. [7] On April 19, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Corbin with Count I, operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor and Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor. On December 5, 2017, a bench trial was conducted. At the end of Corbin's bench trial, the trial court found her guilty of Count I, operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor; however, it dismissed Count II. On the same day, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Corbin to a term of 180 days, all which, except time served, was suspended to probation. [8] Corbin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Admission of the Evidence

[9] The admission or exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). [10] Corbin argues that the trial court should have granted her motion to suppress the statements she made to the deputies prior to her arrest. We note that once a case proceeds to trial, the question of whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress is no longer viable. Baird v. State, 854 N.E.2d 398, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Instead, we review whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence at trial. Id.

A. Miranda

[11] Corbin contends that while being questioned by deputies about drinking alcohol after she displayed signs of intoxication, the interrogation was custodial in nature and she should have been advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

In Miranda [] the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. These procedural safeguards include an advisement to the accused that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him, that he has the right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. However, these warnings are only required where a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation.

State v
. Necessary, 800 N.E.2d 667, 669-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citation marks omitted). A law enforcement officer's duty to give Miranda warnings does not attach unless there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody. Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995). The Indiana Supreme Court has held:
Whether a person was in custody at a given time depends not upon the subjective views of either the interrogating officers or the subject being questioned but upon the "objective circumstances." An officer's knowledge and beliefs are only relevant to the question of custody if conveyed—through either words or actions—to the individual being questioned. Likewise, a police officer's "unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question" of custody. The test is how a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would understand the situation.

Meriwether v
. State, 984 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). [12] Corbin maintains that when the deputies initially spoke with her, and both formed the opinion that she was intoxicated and had driven the vehicle before it became disabled, the deputies' concern had shifted from a 'welfare check' to a potential criminal investigation. Corbin therefore contends that, at that moment, she was in a custodial-type situation, and the deputies should have given her Miranda warnings prior to questioning her. [13] Corbin relies on Moore v. State, 723 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) for the broad proposition that an interrogation is necessarily custodial once an officer knows or should know that he is investigating a potential crime and questioning a suspect. In Moore, police responded to the report of a pedestrian being struck whole discloses that the erroneously admitted evidence was likely to have had a prejudicial impact on the fact-finder, thereby contributing to the judgment." Ground v. State, 702 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). "To determine whether the erroneous admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence . . . is harmless, we judge whether the jury's verdict was substantially swayed. If the error had substantial influence, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand." Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 666-67 (Ind. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [18] Here, Deputy Riddle testified that after meeting Corbin, he observed that she had blood-shot eyes and slow, slurred speech. Deputy Riddle also saw that Corbin was unsteady on her feet when she exited her vehicle. Further, Deputy Redmon smelled an odor of alcohol when he approached Corbin. Corbin failed the field sobriety tests, she was handcuffed and transported to jail. While in jail, Corbin was administered a standardized chemical breath test after being booked in jail. Corbin's ACE was 0.152. Even without the admission of Corbin's inculpatory statements, Corbin's conviction for Class A misdemeanor driving while intoxicated with an ACE of 0.15 or more was supported by independent evidence, and there is no substantial likelihood that Corbin's statements to the deputies contributed to her conviction. As such, any error in the admission of Corbin's statements was harmless.

B. Results of the Chemical Breath Test

[19] Corbin argues that pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-6-5(d), the results of her chemical breath test were inadmissible because the State was unable to certify that the chemical test was properly administered. We note that the results of a chemical breath test are inadmissible in a prosecution for operating while intoxicated unless the test operator, test equipment, chemicals used in the test, and test techniques have been approved in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Indiana University School of Medicine Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology. Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. [20] Accordingly, for the results of a chemical breath test to be admissible, three foundational requirements must be satisfied: (1) the person who administered the test must be certified by the Department of Toxicology, (2) the equipment used in the test must have been inspected and approved by the Department of Toxicology, and (3) the operator must have followed the procedures approved by the Department of Toxicology. State v. Lloyd, 800 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Corbin challenges the third foundational requirement. [21] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-6-5(a)(3), the state department of toxicology has promulgated an approved method for administering breath tests using the BAC DataMaster. 260 Ind. Admin. Code 2-4-1. In relevant part, the administrative rule contains the following steps:

STEP ONE: The person to be tested must:
(A) have had nothing to eat or drink;
(B) not have put any foreign substance into his or her mouth or respiratory tract; and


(C) not smoke;
within fifteen (15) minutes before the time a breath sample is taken.


260 I.A.C. 2-4-1(a). "The concern over foreign substances [placed in] a person's mouth is the potential for the substances to absorb and retain alcohol in the mouth, which could falsely elevate the breath alcohol concentration." Guy v. State, 823 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2005). Corbin maintains that the results of her chemical breath test were inadmissible because part of 'STEP ONE' was not strictly adhered to. In particular, Corbin alleges that the
Video evidence of Corbin's encounter with police shows her sobbing . . . . Deputy Redmon testified that she was crying all the way to the Montgomery County Jail, but he was unable to confirm that no tears found their way into Corbin's mouth in the 15 minutes just prior to her certified breath test.

(Appellant's Br. p. 20). Corbin relies on Deputy Redmon's testimony that she cried "throughout" her transportation to jail, and because Deputy Redmon could not "accurately tell" if her tears "got in her mouth" within fifteen minutes before her breath sample was taken, the test was invalid and inadmissible at her bench trial. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 29) (Appellant's Br. p. 21). [22] Corbin then argues that the facts of this case are "diametrically opposed to those in" Guy v. State, 823 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 2005), and we should, therefore, reverse her conviction. In Guy, our supreme court held that the presence of a tongue stud placed in the defendant's mouth more than twenty minutes before a Corbin had been booked in jail, Deputy Redmon administered the chemical breath test. Prior to administering the test, he ensured that Corbin had not eaten, drunk, or smoked anything. Deputy Redmon testified that although Corbin cried on her way to jail, he could not tell if the tears entered Corbin's mouth. Because there is no evidence that Corbin's tears entered her mouth within fifteen minutes of her chemical breath test, and Corbin failed to present any scientific evidence in support of her claim, we conclude that the test was properly administered, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the test results.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[25] Corbin also contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated with an ACE of 0.15 or more. Specifically, she claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove that she operated the vehicle, and (2) the chemical breath test was not administered within three hours of when she operated her vehicle. [26] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). "We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence." Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. [27] In order to convict Corbin of a Class A misdemeanor, the State was obligated to prove that she "operate[d] a vehicle with an [ACE] to at least fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per: (1) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person's blood; or (2) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath." I.C. § 9-30-5-1(b). In this case, the results of Corbin's chemical breath test showed that her ACE was 0.152—well above the statutory threshold.

A. Operation of the Vehicle

[28] Corbin alleges that the State presented insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to show that she operated the vehicle. The word "operate" means to "navigate or otherwise be in actual physical control of a vehicle, motorboat, off-road vehicle, or snowmobile." I.C. § 9-13-2-117.5(a). In Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, we listed four factors that could be used to determine whether a person "operated" a vehicle: "(1) the location of the vehicle when it is discovered; (2) whether the car was moving when discovered; (3) any additional evidence indicating that the defendant was observed operating the vehicle before he or she was discovered; and (4) the position of the automatic transmission." In addition to these four factors, "[a]ny evidence that leads to a reasonable inference should be considered." Id. [29] Corbin relies on Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), arguing that the State did not establish that she operated her disabled vehicle before encountering the deputies. language of Indiana Code section 9-13-2-117.5 to this case, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude from this evidence that Corbin was in "actual physical control" of her vehicle and met the statutory definition of the word "operate."

B. Administration of the Chemical Breath Test

[32] Corbin argues that the State did not prove that the chemical breath test was completed within the requisite period of time. Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2 (c) provides that a chemical breath test "must be administered within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person committed an offense under [I.C. §] 9-30-5 or a violation under [I.C. §] 9-30-15." [33] Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15(b) provides:

If, in a prosecution for an offense under [Indiana Code chapter] 9-30-5, evidence establishes that:
(1) a chemical test was performed on a test sample taken from the person charged with the offense within the period of time allowed for testing under section 2 of this chapter; and
(2) the person charged with the offense had an [ACE] to at least eight-hundredth (0.08) gram of alcohol per:
(A) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person's blood at the time the test sample was taken; or
(B) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath; the trier of fact shall presume that the person charged with the offense had an [ACE] to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per




one hundred (100) milliliters of the person's blood or per two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath at the time the person operated the vehicle. However, this presumption is rebuttable.

This statute allows a jury to relate the driver's ACE at the time of the chemical test back to the time the driver operated the vehicle. See Disbro v. State, 791 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. If the State fails to prove that the chemical test occurred within three hours of when the defendant last operated her vehicle, it is not allowed to rely on the presumption. Allman v. State, 728 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Even if the test is not conducted within the three-hour time period, that affects only the presumption and not the test's admissibility. Mannix v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [34] Among the cases that Corbin cites to is Mordacq v. State, 585 N.E.2d 22, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), where this court discussed whether the chemical breath test can "presumptively relate back to an act of operating a vehicle that occurred before an officer encountered the defendant . . . ." Analyzing this issue, we determined that
[I]n a case where the officer did not observe the defendant operating the vehicle, the statutes could be read to impose no limit on the relation back test, provided the test was performed within three hours of the time an officer investigated the defendant. Such an interpretation would distinguish between those defendants stopped (1) by the police while driving, and (2) those who stop of their own accord or by accident. This could lead to absurd and illogical results unintended by the legislature,

and would operate to the disadvantage of those who, realizing their continued driving posed a threat to public safety, chose to stop. In our view, the three-hour limit expressed in I.C. [§ ] 9-30-6-2(c) begins not from the moment an officer ideates probable cause, but rather from the moment at which the vehicle was operated in violation of I.C. [§ ] 9-30-5.

Id
. The State argues that Corbin's reliance on Mordacq is misplaced. [35] In Mordacq, at approximately 2:30 a.m., an officer observed a vehicle parked alongside the road with its engine running. Id. An hour later, the officer returned to find that the vehicle was still there, and the defendant was asleep in the driver's seat. Id. After rousing the defendant and smelling alcohol on her breath, the police officer administered a breathalyzer test at 3:55 a.m., which demonstrated that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of 0.10. Id. Other than the defendant's own estimate that she had parked her vehicle along the street at least two hours earlier, there was no evidence indicating whether she had operated the vehicle within the three hours preceding the breathalyzer test. Id. Accordingly, we held that the "State's failure to prove the time [the defendant] operated her vehicle, to a degree precise enough to trigger a statutory presumption that incorporates a precise time limit, precludes evidentiary use of the presumption." Id. at 27. [36] A few years after Mordacq, this court reached a similar conclusion in Allman v. State, 728 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). There, a police officer was dispatched to a car accident at approximately 10:00 p.m. Id. at 231. When the officer arrived, he observed a driver sitting in her vehicle off the side of the road, statutory threshold. Our role on appeal is to consider "the probative evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn [therefrom.]" Dorsett v. State, 921 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). [39] Here, the fact finder was allowed to deduce that Corbin's last alcoholic beverage was consumed at 10:30 p.m. and after that, Corbin got behind the wheel and drove her vehicle before it broke down on I-74. Since Corbin's chemical breath test was administered at 12:20 a.m., it may be inferred from the evidence that a presumption existed that Corbin had an ACE of at least 0.15 at the time she operated the vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm Corbin's conviction for operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor.

CONCLUSION

[40] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Corbin's statements to the deputies or the results of the chemical breath test. Also, the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Corbin of Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more. [41] Affirmed. [42] Kirsch, J. and May, J. concur