Jamie Evans & Evans Billboards LLC v. Utah Dep't of Transp.

ORME, Judge

Opinion Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Lynn W. Davis
No. 130400213 Troy L. Booher, Julie J. Nelson, and Steve K. Gordon, Attorneys for Appellants Sean D. Reyes, Stanford E. Purser, Mark E. Burns, and Renee Spooner, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred. ORME, Judge: ¶1 Appellants Jamie Evans and Evans Billboards LLC (collectively, Evans) appeal the district court's decision upholding the denial of two outdoor advertising applications by the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). We reverse.

¶2 In 2008, Evans submitted applications to construct two advertising signs near Exit 257 on Interstate 15 (I-15) in Spanish Fork, Utah. Because the sign locations were within 500 feet of an interchange, violating the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017), UDOT denied both applications. Evans nevertheless erected the two signs. The district court ordered Evans to remove them, and Evans appealed that decision to this court. See Spanish Fork City v. Evans Grader & Paving, Inc., 2014 UT App 178, 332 P.3d 980. We affirmed, holding that both signs were "illegal and . . . subject to removal" because they were constructed without a permit. Id. ¶ 6. ¶3 Following UDOT's 2008 denial of Evans's applications, UDOT reconfigured Exit 257 as part of its I-15 Core Project. Exit 257 now gives drivers the option of leaving I-15 southbound to connect to either U.S. Highway 6 (US-6) or Spanish Fork Main Street (SR-156). It has three exit lanes: two of those lanes form a bridge to cross over I-15 and connect to US-6 eastbound, and the other lane continues parallel to I-15 until it connects to SR-156. ¶4 In 2012, following this reconfiguration, Evans once again applied for two sign permits for essentially the same locations. UDOT denied those applications because it determined that the proposed signs were still within 500 feet of the interchange at Exit 257. Evans challenged this decision in the district court. Affirming UDOT's denial of the applications, the district court determined that the signs violated the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act because the Act's purpose "is to protect the 500 foot area around an interchange from advertising signs." Evans appeals.

¶5 Evans's primary contention is that the district court misinterpreted the meaning of an "intersecting highway" under the statutory definition of "pavement widening" in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. "We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 7, 391 P.3d 196 (quotation simplified).

¶6 The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act (the Act) is "the statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor advertising," balancing concerns of "public safety" and preservation of "the natural scenic beauty of lands bordering on highways," with the goal of ensuring that outdoor advertising remains "a standardized medium of communication throughout the state." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-501(1) (LexisNexis 2009). The Act fulfills the Utah-Federal Agreement, which conditions the grant of federal highway funds to Utah on "Utah agree[ing] to manage and regulate outdoor advertising along the federal highway system." Utah Admin. Code R933-5-1. See generally 23 U.S.C. § 131 (2012) (The Highway Beautification Act); Utah Admin. Code R933-5-2 (The Utah-Federal Agreement). ¶7 Under the Act, signs are prohibited within 500 feet of an interchange. Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). An interchange is an area "where traffic is channeled off or onto an interstate route." Id. § 72-7-502(11). The 500-foot prohibition around the interchange is "measured along the interstate highway or freeway from the sign to the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way." Id. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A). The pavement widening is (1) the point of the gore or (2) "where the intersecting lane begins to parallel the other lanes of traffic." Id. § 72-7-502(22). See also Young Elec. Sign Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2005 UT App 169, ¶ 7, 110 P.3d 1118 (stating that "pavement widening" is synonymous with the definition of "point of widening"). ¶8 Both sides in this case agree that the pavement widening occurs at the point of the gore, which is the point of the triangular area, defined by two solid white lines, where Exit 257 diverges from I-15. See Utah Admin. Code R933-2-2(21) ("'Point the gore, but insists that allowing Evans's signs would "violate the letter and spirit of [the Act] and the Utah-Federal Agreement." The district court agreed, concluding that, "for the purposes of interpreting the statutes," the point where Exit 257 crosses over I-15 (the Bridge) is an intersecting highway. And because the Bridge is 2,549 feet from the point of the gore, the court concluded that Evans's signs were within 500 feet of an interchange and therefore prohibited. ¶10 On appeal, Evans argues that the Bridge is not an "intersecting highway" and that, because there is no intersecting highway within 2,640 feet of the point of the gore at Exit 257, the signs should be allowed.

¶11 The Act does not define an "intersecting highway," and the parties offer competing interpretations of this term. UDOT contends that the Bridge is an intersecting highway because Title 72 of the Utah Code (the Transportation Code) defines "highway" as "any public road, street, alley, lane, court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or structure laid out or erected for public use," Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-102(7) (LexisNexis 2009), and the Bridge is "both a public bridge and a public road that crosses over Interstate 15." This interpretation would support the district court's conclusion that, although I-15 and US-6 do not intersect, the interchange does intersect with I-15 "for the purposes of interpreting the statutes." ¶12 In contrast, Evans contends that, because an interchange is defined as an area channeling traffic off and onto "another federal, state, county, city, or other route," the Legislature intended "intersecting highway" to mean that "other route." Id. § 72-7-502(11) (Supp. 2017). But the Act does not support either of these interpretations. ¶13 When interpreting a statute, "our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Davis, 2011 UT 57, ¶ 21, 266 P.3d 765 (quotation simplified). "The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statutes themselves," and "[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4, ¶ 10, 390 P.3d 307 (quotation simplified). "Finally, we avoid any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous in order to give effect to every word of a statute." Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11, 368 P.3d 846 (quotation simplified). ¶14 UDOT's interpretation fails to give effect to every word of the statute. Because the Bridge is an off-ramp and therefore part of the interchange, see Utah Admin. Code R933-2-2(2), UDOT contends that an "intersecting highway" can include the interchange itself. But such an interpretation would render the entire 2,640-foot limit unnecessary because the interchange would always intersect the interstate highway at the exit. The statute clearly states that the distance is to be measured from the pavement widening to "the center line of the intersecting highway of the interchange." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(22) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). We recognize that the preposition "of" is susceptible to varying interpretations, see generally Of, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1565 (1993), but, to give effect to every word of the statute, the only reasonable interpretation of this statutory provision is that the pavement widening must be within 2,640 feet from the centerline of the highway intersecting the interchange—not components of the interchange intersecting each other. ¶15 Furthermore, the language of the Act does not support such an expansive interpretation of "highway" for this purpose. Section 505 uses the phrase, "streets, roads, or highways" several times, demonstrating that "highway" is not considered a street or road. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2009). Because "intersecting highway" does not have the same expansive meaning as "highway" in section 102 of the Transportation Code, UDOT's interpretation is incorrect. ¶16 Evans also incorrectly interprets the statute, arguing that by inserting the statutory definitions of "interchange" and "pavement widening" into the 500-foot prohibition statute, the Legislature clearly intended "intersecting highway" to mean "other route." While this view is logical, Evans fails to point to anything in the statute that supports the claim the Legislature intended such a meaning.

¶17 Because the Act provides no specialized meaning for "intersecting highway," we turn to the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms. See State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 43, 356 P.3d 1258 (Lee, J., concurring). But, in doing so, we interpret "the meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute (including, particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme)." Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248 P.3d 465. And we "read and interpret statutory provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other related statutes." State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 9, 217 P.3d 265. ¶18 "Intersect" is defined as "to meet and cross at a point." Intersect, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1183 (1993). See also Intersect, New Oxford American Dictionary 909 (3d ed. 2010) (to "divide (something) by passing or lying across it"); Intersection, Black's Law Dictionary 896 (9th ed. 2009) ("A place where two roads meet or form a junction."). "Highway" is defined as "a main road," connecting towns or cities. Highway, New Oxford American Dictionary 821 (3d ed. 2010). See also Highway, Black's Law Dictionary 798 (9th ed. 2009) ("The main public road connecting towns or cities."); Highway, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1069 (1993) ("[A] main direct road (as between one town or city and another.")). Thus, federal-aid primary system as of June 1, 1991, or on the NHS. Interpreting this term otherwise would put the Act at odds with legislative intent to adhere to the terms of the Agreement, which states that only streets, roads, and highways that directly intersect the main-traveled way of a primary highway are considered intersecting. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-515(2) (stating that provisions of the Act "shall be superseded by conflicting provisions of the Utah-Federal Agreement"). ¶26 Accordingly, we conclude that an "intersecting highway" under section 505 of the Act is a primary highway that directly intersects the interchange in question.

¶27 Because US-6 is a federal-aid primary highway and SR-156 is part of the NHS system of highways, they are both primary highways. But neither primary highway intersects the interchange within 2,640 feet of the pavement widening at Exit 257. ¶28 UDOT calculated the distances to the intersecting highways by measuring from the point of the gore to the intersections of US-6 and SR-156 with I-15. This calculation is incorrect because a pavement widening is measured from the center line of the primary highway intersecting the interchange—not from where the primary highway intersects the interstate. In any event, neither US-6 nor SR-156 intersect the interchange within 2,640 feet of the point of the gore. US-6 begins at the "Moark Connection Interchange of Route 15 easterly through Spanish Fork Canyon," Utah Code Ann. §-72-4-106(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017), which is more than four miles from the interchange at I-15. UDOT also determined that "[a]t no point does [the] legislative definition of [US]-6 include the southbound ramps off of the I-15 mainline in this area." And SR-156 intersects I-15 more than 4,400 feet beyond the point of the gore. Because this intersection is proximate to the intersection of SR-156 and the interchange, it intersects more than 2,640 feet from the pavement widening. ¶29 Because there is no "intersecting highway" within 2,640 feet of the point of the gore at Exit 257 and, consequently, no 500-foot prohibition around the interchange, the district court erred in its conclusion that Evans's signs are prohibited.

¶30 We conclude that an "intersecting highway" under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act is a primary highway that 15 directly intersects the relevant interstate interchange, and that the district court erred in its conclusion that there is an intersecting highway within 2,640 feet of the pavement widening at Exit 257. We therefore reverse its decision to uphold UDOT's denial of Evans's applications and remand with instructions that UDOT grant the applications.