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Ameren Transmission Co. of Ill. v. Hutchings
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Burke, Theis, and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion. Justice Kilbride concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
OPINION¶ 1 To facilitate the construction of a high-voltage transmission line, Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois (ATXI) filed eminent domain complaints against several landowners located in Edgar County, Illinois (Landowners). The Landowners filed a traverse and motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed every complaint on the grounds that section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/8-406.1 (West 2016)), as it existed at the time, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the Landowners. This direct appeal followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).
¶ 2 BACKGROUND¶ 3 The Public Utilities Act (Act) (220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2010)) requires a public utility to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) before transacting business or beginning new construction within Illinois. Section 8-406 of the Act sets forth the requirements for obtaining a certificate. Id. § 8-406. Effective July 28, 2010, the legislature enacted section 8-406.1 of the Act (id. § 8-406.1), which permits a public utility to apply for a certificate using an expedited procedure when seeking to construct a new high-voltage electric service line and related facilities. ¶ 4 On November 7, 2012, ATXI petitioned the Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity that would authorize ATXI "to construct, operate and maintain a new 345 kV electric transmission line *** and related facilities, including certain new or expanded substations, within *** Illinois." ATXI's proposed plan was designated the Illinois Rivers Project (Project), and portions of the Project were to be located within several Illinois counties, spanning 375 miles across the state. ATXI elected to file its petition pursuant to the expedited process set forth in section 8-406.1. ¶ 5 ATXI's proposal included both a primary route and an alternate route, and the Commission sent notice of the impending proceedings to several thousand potentially impacted landowners. After the notices went out, certain interested and affected parties sought and were granted leave to intervene. Some of these traditional traverse claims, they ultimately did not develop or defend those claims in the subsequent proceedings. Instead, the Landowners focused on their motion to dismiss, which argued that ATXI's eminent domain complaints must be dismissed because the Landowners' due process rights were violated during the proceeding in which the Commission granted the certificate of public convenience and necessity. More specifically, the Landowners argued that their due process rights were violated because they were never notified that their property would be affected by the route that the Commission ultimately approved. ¶ 9 On September 25, 2017, the circuit court of Edgar County entered a 24-page written order granting the Landowners' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the applicable version of section 8-406.1 was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the Landowners. In support of its conclusion that section 8-406.1 was unconstitutional on its face, the circuit court explained:
" 220 ILCS 5/8-406.1 as it existed at the time of these proceedings was facially unconstitutional. It failed to require personal notice by registered mail or other means which would ensure notice to any landowner whose property may be considered for primary or alternate routes proposed throughout the certification process.
By requiring such notice only to landowners identified in the application and at public hearing, it deprived landowners whose property was proposed in alternate routes later suggested by the utility or any intervenor, of the same opportunity to participate or object."
Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed all 35 of ATXI's eminent domain complaints. ¶ 10 ATXI appealed the circuit court's decision directly to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).
At the hearing on the Landowners' traverse and motion to dismiss, counsel for the Landowners conceded that ATXI had established a prima facie case for the propriety of the taking, that the Landowners had made no attempt to rebut that presumption, and that consequently, if the Landowners' motion to dismiss were denied, their traverse would also have to be denied. Likewise, in its order granting the Landowners' motion to dismiss, the circuit court stated that, "[a]lthough the [Landowners] refused to concede their claims contained in the Traverse were not supported by the record, they presented no evidence at the hearing in that regard." That being said, the trial court's order concludes by stating, "[h]aving granted the Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not need to address the Traverse."
Section 8-406.1 has since been amended. See Pub. Act 99-399 (eff. Aug. 18, 2015) (amending 220 ILCS 5/8-406.1). --------
¶ 11 ANALYSIS¶ 12 We need not reach the merits of the circuit court's due process analysis, as the circuit court clearly lacked the necessary jurisdiction to review the legality and constitutionality of the Commission's administrative proceedings. ¶ 13 Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and enjoy a presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 14. That presumption is inapplicable, however, where administrative proceedings are involved. Id. Illinois courts are empowered to review administrative actions only "as provided by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (appellate court), § 9 (circuit court). When the legislature has, through law, prescribed procedures for obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision, a court is said to exercise "special statutory jurisdiction" when it reviews an administrative decision pursuant to that statutory scheme. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 10. Special statutory jurisdiction is limited by the language of the act conferring it. Id. A court has no powers from any other source. Id. A party seeking to invoke a court's special statutory jurisdiction must therefore comply strictly with the procedures prescribed by the statute. Id. If the mode of procedure set forth in the statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court. Id. ¶ 14 This court has held that "[r]eview of final decisions of the Commission *** involves the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction and is constrained by the provisions of the Public Utilities Act." Illinois Landowners Alliance, NFP v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 2017 IL 121302, ¶ 29; see also People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 387 (2008). The relevant provision of the Act is section 10-201, and it states that a party affected by a rule, regulation, order, or decision of the Commission has 35 days to "appeal to the appellate court of the judicial district in which the subject matter of the hearing is circuit court's power to decide, its answer to that question cannot form the basis for dismissing the complaints in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is hereby reversed.
¶ 17 CONCLUSION¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Edgar County is reversed, and we remand the cause for further proceedings. ¶ 19 Reversed and remanded. ¶ 20 JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring: ¶ 21 Defendants are a group of landowners who claim that the Public Utilities Act instructed the Illinois Commerce Commission and the circuit court to transfer their property rights to plaintiff Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois (ATXI) without affording them due process of law. The majority does not address the substance of defendants' complaint but instead finds that the circuit court could not consider their argument because it lacked jurisdiction. I disagree with this reasoning, but I agree with the conclusion to reverse the circuit court's order.
¶ 22 A. The Circuit Court's Jurisdiction¶ 23 The Illinois Constitution of 1970 grants circuit courts general subject-matter jurisdiction over "all justiciable matters." Ill. Const., art. VI, § 9. One such justiciable matter is eminent domain (735 ILCS 30/10-5-10(a) (West 2010)). ATXI cannot plausibly claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over these proceedings; after all, ATXI is the plaintiff. In the course of those eminent domain proceedings, the circuit court found that section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/8-406.1 (West 2012)) and the Commission proceedings under that statute violated the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Section 8-406.1 established the Commission expedited procedure for granting certificates of public necessity, which in turn created the "rebuttable petitions the Commission for a certificate of public necessity to acquire two lots owned by Alice and Brian. Alice is not notified of the Commission proceedings and does not participate in them. Brian is notified of the proceedings and challenges them, including appealing the decision to the appellate court. The appellate court rejects Brian's challenge and upholds the Commission's order. The utility initiates eminent domain proceedings against both Alice and Brian. Alice argues that the statute that allowed the utility to petition for a certificate without notifying her unconstitutionally deprived her of due process of law. Under the majority's approach, the circuit court would lack jurisdiction to hear this argument but would retain jurisdiction over the eminent domain proceedings. Assuming for the moment that Alice had the right to participate in the Commission proceedings, the circuit court would authorize the utility to seize Alice's land even though Alice never had the opportunity to participate in those proceedings, regardless of the Public Utility Act's constitutionality. ¶ 39 If defendants were deprived of property rights during the Commission proceedings and if they did not participate in Adams County Property Owners & Tenant Farmers v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 2015 IL App (4th) 130907, then these eminent domain proceedings represent their first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Public Utilities Act. The majority finds that the circuit court had jurisdiction to take away defendants' property but lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants' constitutional challenge to that taking. The majority's opinion would leave some defendants without any opportunity to assert their constitutional rights.
¶ 40 B. Issue Preclusion¶ 41 I find the majority's approach especially problematic because we can reach the same result without issuing an opinion that has the potential to be so broadly applicable without being adequately explained. This case differs from the hypothetical with Alice and Brian because these eminent domain proceedings were not defendants' first opportunity to assert their challenge to the Public Utilities Act. They raised the same arguments in Adams County, and the appellate court rejected those arguments. Id. ¶ 76. 14 ¶ 42 Issue preclusion bars a litigant from raising an argument that the litigant has already raised in a prior case. Issue preclusion applies when there is (1) a final judgment on the merits from a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of the party to be bound by the prior litigation, and (3) an identical issue to the prior litigation. Gumma v. White, 216 Ill. 2d 23, 38 (2005). The issue must have been actually litigated and necessary for judgment. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2001). ¶ 43 After the Commission issued the certificate of public necessity to ATXI, a group of landowners—named Edgar County Citizens Are Entitled to Due Process (ECCDP)—participated in the appeal of that certificate to the Fourth District. Adams County, 2015 IL App (4th) 130907, ¶ 69. Although the appellate court discussed some procedural problems with ECCDP's petition to intervene, the court also found that the Commission had impliedly given ECCDP permission to intervene, so ultimately it concluded "we find it appropriate to address the merits of [ECCDP's] appeal." Id. ¶¶ 76, 78. This was a final adjudication on the merits. ¶ 44 ECCDP argued that the Commission had failed to notify them of the pending proceedings regarding the routing of the Illinois Rivers Project. Specifically they argued "that the lack of a clear notice requirement in section 8-406.1 of the Utilities Act renders the statute unconstitutional." Id. ¶ 69. The Adams County court rejected this argument, finding that the Commission proceedings did not convey any property rights, so no process was due to ECCDP. Id. ¶¶ 51, 69, 80. This argument was identical to the argument that defendants raised before the circuit court here. ¶ 45 ECCDP's due process rights argument was actually litigated. The appellate court expressly considered the same arguments that defendants raise in this case. It was also necessary for the judgment against ECCDP. The Adams County court moved past the factual disagreement over whether notice was actually mailed because it found that no notice was necessary. Id. ¶ 76. The majority opinion here seems to acknowledge all of this when it comments that the Adams County court "considered and rejected the very same due process challenge at issue here." Supra ¶ 15. ¶ 46 The only remotely contestable component of issue preclusion here is the "identity of the parties" prong. ATXI concedes that, although the majority of defendants here participated in the Adams County decision, some of the defendants 15 in this eminent domain proceeding were not named parties in Adams County. Nevertheless, defendants here stipulated to be treated as parties to that earlier litigation. The stipulation states that "the defendants—appearing under the title 'Edgar County Citizens are Entitled to Due Process'—filed a motion to strike the certificate proceedings" in Adams County. This stipulation indicates that defendants here considered themselves to have at least an identity of interests with the ECCDP in Adams County, which is all that is required to satisfy this component of issue preclusion. Agolf, LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 409 Ill. App. 3d 211, 220 (2011). ¶ 47 All of the components of issue preclusion are satisfied in this case. Rather than rely on this basis to resolve the appeal, the majority adopts a controversial and unwarranted approach to the circuit court's jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of a statute of the General Assembly. It adopts this unwarranted approach with insufficient discussion. I respectfully disagree with the majority's analysis, but for the reasons stated I would also reverse the circuit court's decision. ¶ 48 JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: ¶ 49 I partially concur with the majority's conclusion to reverse the circuit court's order, but I disagree with its reasoning, and in that respect, I join Part A of Justice Garman's special concurrence on the circuit court's jurisdiction. I agree with Justice Garman that the majority's flawed jurisdictional analysis raises significant threats to individual rights. Supra ¶ 38 (Garman, J., specially concurring). I disagree, in part, with Part B of Justice Garman's special concurrence and her conclusion that all of the landowners are barred from challenging the constitutionality of section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/8-406.1 (West 2016)), based on the appellate court rejecting the same arguments in Adams County Property Owners & Tenant Farmers v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 2015 IL App (4th) 130907, ¶ 76. I would hold that issue preclusion does not bar those landowners who were not parties to Adams County from challenging the constitutionality of section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act in the eminent domain proceedings. ¶ 50 I agree with Justice Garman that the landowners' due process rights argument was actually litigated in Adams County. Unfortunately, this court denied the 16 landowners' petition for leave to appeal in that case. Justice Garman notes in her special concurrence, "[t]he only remotely contestable component of issue preclusion here is the 'identity of the parties' prong." Supra ¶ 46. The special concurrence acknowledges that "some of the defendants in this eminent domain proceeding were not named parties in Adams County." Supra ¶ 46. However, Justice Garman concludes that the landowners who were not named in Adams County "have at least an identity of interests with the ECCDP in Adams County, which is all that is required to satisfy this component of issue preclusion," based on the landowners stipulating to be treated as parties to the Adams County litigation. Supra ¶ 46. Nevertheless, I would hold that the requirements of due process prohibit the application of res judicata and issue preclusion to bar a claim by the landowners who were not parties in Adams County because the right sought to be enforced is personal in nature. ¶ 51 In Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 794-95 (1996), the United States Supreme Court considered whether an action challenging the validity of a tax was barred by a judgment upholding the validity of the tax in a previous suit involving different taxpayers. The Supreme Court held that application of res judicata was inconsistent with principles of due process where the taxpayers in the former action "did not sue on behalf of a class; their pleadings did not purport to assert any claim against or on behalf of any nonparties; and the judgment they received did not purport to bind any *** taxpayers who were nonparties." Richards, 517 U.S. at 801. The Supreme Court specifically noted that the underlying right asserted by the taxpayers was "personal in nature." Richards, 517 U.S. at 802 n.6. Here, it is undisputed that many of the landowners in this eminent domain action were not parties in the Adams County appeal. Because the rights of the landowners who did not participate in Adams County are "personal in nature," I believe that applying the doctrine of res judicata to them results in a denial of due process. Res judicata is an equitable doctrine and "will not be applied where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so." Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2001). In my view it would be fundamentally unfair and inequitable to apply res judicata in a manner that results in the denial of due process for the landowners who did not participate in Adams County. 17 ¶ 52 For these reasons, I believe the court should address the claim by the landowners who were not parties in Adams County that section 8-606.1 of the Public Utilities Act is unconstitutional both facially and as applied.
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