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Sciangula v. Montegut
Case Summary: Joan Sciangula v. Denyse Montegut et al. (Index No. 4488/05)
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion arises from competing proceedings concerning property allegedly owned by Agnes Ann English (also known as Ann Faulkner) on the date of her death in July 2004. Faulkner was survived by her husband, Joseph English, and three children from a prior marriage, including the appellant, Joan Sciangula (the plaintiff). Letters of administration for Faulkner's estate were issued to Joseph English in August 2006. Joseph English died in February 2011; in January 2012, Edward English and Denyse (Densye) Montegut (the respondents) were issued letters testamentary as fiduciaries of Joseph English's estate. In June 2014, letters of administration for Faulkner's estate were issued to the plaintiff.
As administrator of Faulkner's estate, the plaintiff commenced a Surrogate's Court proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2104(4) to recover personal and real property she alleged Faulkner owned at her death but which Joseph English withheld during administration and which was in the possession of Edward English and Montegut. The respondents moved for summary judgment dismissing that Surrogate's proceeding on the ground it was akin to replevin or conversion and therefore time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Surrogate's Court granted that motion on March 24, 2015, concluding the petition was time-barred and that the fraud allegation was first raised in opposition and failed to state a cause of action.
In June 2015 the plaintiff filed a new action in Supreme Court, both individually and as administrator of Faulkner's estate, against Montegut and Edward English in their individual and representative capacities. The complaint alleged that Joseph English intentionally and fraudulently omitted and concealed the same property and left it to his children, and asserted causes of action for fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The respondents moved to transfer the action to Surrogate's Court and to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on res judicata grounds, arguing the claims arose out of the same transaction(s) as the prior SCPA 2104(4) proceeding and that the prior dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds was on the merits for res judicata purposes. The action was transferred, and the Surrogate's Court granted dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as barred by res judicata on September 6, 2016. The plaintiff appealed that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Supreme Court complaint (asserting fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion) is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the same claims were raised or could have been raised in the prior SCPA 2104(4) proceeding.
- Whether the Surrogate's Court's dismissal of the SCPA 2104(4) petition as time-barred constitutes an adjudication on the merits for res judicata purposes.
- Whether judgments or dismissals entered in representative capacities can bar subsequent actions in the parties' individual capacities where individual interests were affected and the parties participated in the prior proceeding.
- Whether the co-executors of an estate are in privity with those same individuals when sued in their capacities as trustees of a family trust, for res judicata purposes.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff alleged in the Supreme Court complaint that Joseph English intentionally and fraudulently failed to include and concealed the same property at issue in the earlier SCPA 2104(4) proceeding, asserting causes of action for fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion.
- In the earlier SCPA 2104(4) proceeding the plaintiff had argued that the fraud-based limitations provision in CPLR 213(8) applied; she maintained the claims were not time-barred on that basis (although the Surrogate's Court found the fraud allegation was raised first in opposition and failed to state a cause of action).
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The respondents moved to transfer and to dismiss the Supreme Court action under CPLR 3211(a)(5) on res judicata grounds.
- They argued the instant action involves the same property as the SCPA 2104(4) proceeding and that all asserted causes of action arose out of the same transaction(s) or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.
- They contended that the dismissal of the SCPA 2104(4) petition as time-barred was a disposition on the merits for res judicata purposes and therefore precludes relitigation of the same claims.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bayer v City of New York, 115 AD3d 897, 898 | Explication of res judicata: disposition on the merits bars later litigation of same cause of action. | Quoted and relied upon to state the general res judicata principle that dispositional merits bar subsequent suits arising from same transaction(s). |
| Abraham v Hermitage Ins. Co., 47 AD3d 855, 855 | Support for res judicata formulation. | Cited as authority for the principle that prior adjudication bars subsequent litigation of the same cause of action. |
| Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 | Authority discussing res judicata and its scope. | Referenced in support of the general res judicata rule applied to the facts. |
| Clerico v Pollack, 148 AD3d 769, 770 | Example of res judicata application. | Cited along with other authorities to support the court's res judicata analysis. |
| Pondview Corp v Blatt, 95 AD3d 980, 980 | Principle that different legal theories or relief do not avoid res judicata if arising from same facts. | Used to support the proposition that separate causes of action or different theories do not permit relitigation. |
| Perini v Leo, 147 AD3d 877, 878 | Authority for evaluating whether new claims arose from the same set of operative facts. | Cited to support the conclusion that the instant causes of action arose from the same operative facts as the prior petition. |
| 74 Eldert LLC v Sharp, 138 AD3d 819, 820 | Similar authority regarding causes of action arising from same facts. | Cited in the court's assessment that the instant claims were the same or could have been raised earlier. |
| Hoffer v Bank of Am., N.A., 136 AD3d 750, 750 | Authority on relatedness of claims to prior proceedings. | Included among cases supporting that the asserted claims arose from the same facts as the prior proceeding. |
| Sun Plaza Enters. Corp. v Crown Theatres, L.P., 307 AD2d 351, 351 | Supporting authority that claims arising from same facts are barred. | Cited in the court's consideration that the claims could have been raised previously. |
| Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 194 | Authority that dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds may be an adjudication on the merits for res judicata. | Cited to support that the Surrogate's Court's time-bar dismissal was on the merits for res judicata purposes. |
| Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc., 102 AD3d 251, 260 | Same as above—treatment of time-bar dismissals as merits adjudications. | Relied upon to conclude the SCPA dismissal was on the merits. |
| Nostrom v County of Suffolk, 100 AD3d 974, 975 | Same theme: time-bar dismissals as merits adjudications. | Cited in support of the Surrogate's Court determination being on the merits. |
| Hae Sheng Wang v Pao-Mei Wang, 96 AD3d 1005, 1007 | Authority that supports treating certain dismissals as on the merits. | Used to support that the prior dismissal was an adjudication on the merits. |
| Sosa v JP Morgan Chase Bank, 33 AD3d 609, 611 | Same as above—time-bar dismissal as merits adjudication. | Cited in the court's analysis of the prior dismissal's preclusive effect. |
| Matter of Sullivan, 289 NY 323, 326 | Rule that a judgment for or against a person in representative capacity is generally not res judicata against that person in personal capacity. | Cited to state the general rule distinguishing representative and personal capacity preclusion. |
| Leonard v Pierce, 182 NY 431, 432 | Same rule on representative vs. personal capacity judgments. | Used to articulate the general principle before applying the exception. |
| Magid v Sunrise Holdings Group, LLC, 155 AD3d 717 | Authority on representative-capacity judgments and personal capacity. | Cited with other cases to explain the general rule and its limits. |
| Specialized Realty Servs., LLC v Maikisch, 123 AD3d 801, 802 | Same as above regarding representative capacity and preclusion. | Included in the court's discussion of representative-capacity preclusion rules. |
| Tuper v Tuper, 34 AD3d 1280, 1281 | Additional authority on representative versus personal capacity res judicata effects. | Used in framing the general rule about representative judgments. |
| Matter of Clamp, 193 AD2d 601, 602 | Exception: res judicata can apply where an individual's interests were affected by prior litigation in which he/she participated in a representative capacity. | Cited to support application of res judicata here because the plaintiff's individual interests were affected as a distributee. |
| Weiner v Greyhound Bus Lines, 55 AD2d 189, 193-194 | Same exception to the representative-capacity rule. | Cited in support of applying res judicata where individual interests were affected by prior representative litigation. |
| Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36 | Doctrinal support for applying preclusion when representation affected individual's interests. | Referenced to reinforce the cited exception to the general representative-capacity rule. |
| Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d 746 | Authority on privity between parties in different representative capacities (e.g., executors and trustees). | Cited to support that co-executors were in privity with those individuals sued as trustees for res judicata purposes. |
| Parolisi v Slavin, 98 AD3d 488 | Support for privity between parties in different fiduciary capacities. | Cited as part of the court's privity analysis between co-executors and trustees. |
| Toscano v 4B's Realty VIII Southampton Brick & Tile LLC, 84 AD3d 780, 781 | Additional authority on privity and preclusion among related fiduciaries. | Used to conclude the co-executors and trustees were in privity for res judicata purposes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed whether the plaintiff's claims in the instant action were precluded by the prior SCPA 2104(4) proceeding. It proceeded in several analytical steps, each grounded in authority cited in the opinion:
- Relationship of claims to prior proceeding: The court determined that the causes of action pleaded in the instant complaint (fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion) arose out of the same set of operative facts as the allegations in the earlier SCPA 2104(4) proceeding and therefore either were or could have been raised in that prior proceeding. The court cited authorities addressing when claims arise from the same transaction or series of transactions to support this conclusion (see, e.g., Perini v Leo and related cases).
- Preclusive effect of the prior dismissal: The court held that the Surrogate's Court's dismissal of the SCPA 2104(4) petition as akin to replevin and time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations constituted a disposition on the merits for res judicata purposes. The court relied on cases holding that dismissals on statute-of-limitations grounds operate as adjudications on the merits for preclusion (e.g., Smith v Russell Sage Coll. and other cited authority).
- Representative-capacity considerations: The court acknowledged the general rule that a judgment for or against a person in a representative capacity is not res judicata against that person in his or her personal capacity. However, it then invoked the recognized exception: where an individual's personal interests were affected by the prior representative litigation in which the individual participated, res judicata can apply in a later personal-capacity suit. The court applied that exception here, finding the plaintiff's individual interests would have been affected had she prevailed in the prior proceeding because she was a distributee of Faulkner's estate.
- Privity among defendants: The court analyzed privity and concluded that Edward English and Montegut, as co-executors of Joseph English's estate, were in privity with Edward English and Montegut as trustees of the Joseph A. English Family Trust. The court cited authorities supporting privity among related fiduciaries to justify preclusion of claims against the individuals in their trustee capacities.
- Conclusion from steps above: Because the instant causes of action arose from the same operative facts, the prior dismissal was a merits disposition for preclusion, the plaintiff's individual interests were affected in the prior proceeding (invoking the representative-capacity exception), and the defendants/representatives were in privity with the defendants sued in other fiduciary capacities, res judicata barred the plaintiff's current complaint.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate's Court order insofar as appealed from. The court granted dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and affirmed the Surrogate's Court order dated September 6, 2016 (the opinion also notes the appellate directive "ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs").
Consequences and implications:
- The direct effect is that the plaintiff's complaint asserting fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion was dismissed as precluded by res judicata based on the prior SCPA 2104(4) proceeding's dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds.
- The court applied established res judicata principles and recognized exceptions concerning representative-capacity judgments and privity; the opinion does not announce a novel rule beyond applying those existing doctrines to the facts presented.
- The opinion notes that the plaintiff's remaining contentions were not properly before the court and therefore were not reached.
This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the opinion's text.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN JEFFREY A. COHEN COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ. (Index No. 4488/05)
Warren S. Dank, Syosset, NY, for appellant.
Thomas A. Toscano, P.C., Mineola, NY (Cecilia E. O'Connell of counsel), for respondents.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Surrogate's Court, Kings County (Margarita Lopez Torres, S.), dated September 6, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In July 2004, Agnes Ann English, also known as Ann Faulkner (hereinafter Faulkner), died intestate. Faulkner was survived by her husband, Joseph English (hereinafter English), and her three children from a prior marriage, including the plaintiff, Joan Sciangula. In August 2006, letters of administration were issued to English to administer Faulkner's estate. In February 2011, English died. In January 2012, two of English's surviving children from a prior marriage, Edward English and Denyse Montegut (hereinafter Montegut), were issued letters testamentary appointing them as fiduciaries of English's estate. In June 2014, the Surrogate's Court issued letters of administration to the plaintiff for Faulkner's estate.
Thereafter, the plaintiff, as administrator of Faulkner's estate, commenced a proceeding in the Surrogate's Court pursuant to SCPA 2104(4) against Edward English and Montegut, as co-executors of English's estate, to recover certain personal and real property. The plaintiff alleged that the property was owned by Faulkner on the date of her death, withheld by English in administering Faulkner's estate, and in the possession of Edward English and Montegut. Edward English and Montegut moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the petition on the grounds that the proceeding was akin to an action in replevin or conversion, and was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. In opposition, the plaintiff argued that the proceeding was not time-barred because the proceeding sounded in fraud and the limitations period set forth in CPLR 213(8) applied. In an order dated March 24, 2015, the court granted the motion, determining that the proceeding sounded in replevin and was time-barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations. The court further noted that the plaintiff's allegation of fraud was raised for the first time in opposition to the motion by Edward English and Montegut, and concluded that the petition failed to state a cause of action alleging fraud.
In June 2015, the plaintiff, individually and as administrator of Faulkner's estate, commenced the instant action in the Supreme Court against Montegut individually, as co-executor of English's estate, and as trustee of the Joseph A. English Family Trust, and against Edward English individually, as co-executor of English's estate, and as trustee of the Joseph A. English Family Trust. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that while English was acting as administrator of Faulkner's estate, he intentionally and fraudulently failed to include in Faulkner's estate essentially the same property that was at issue in the SCPA 2104(4) proceeding. The complaint alleged that English concealed the property from the plaintiff, and left the property to his children from a prior marriage, including Montegut and Edward English. The plaintiff asserted causes of action to recover damages for fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion.
The defendants moved, inter alia, to transfer the action from the Supreme Court to the Surrogate's Court and to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The defendants argued that the instant action involved the same property as the SCPA 2104(4) proceeding, that all of the causes of action alleged in the instant action arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the allegations that were raised, or could have been raised, in the SCPA 2104(4) proceeding, and that the dismissal of the SCPA 2104(4) proceeding on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations was on the merits for the purpose of res judicata. The instant action was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Surrogate's Court. In an order dated September 6, 2016, the Surrogate's Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff appeals.
" Under the doctrine of res judicata, a disposition on the merits bars litigation between the same parties, or those in privity with them, of a cause of action arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions as a cause of action that either was raised or could have been raised in the prior proceeding'" (Bayer v City of New York, 115 AD3d 897, 898, quoting Abraham v Hermitage Ins. Co., 47 AD3d 855, 855; see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269; Clerico v Pollack, 148 AD3d 769, 770). " The fact that causes of action may be stated separately, invoke different legal theories, or seek different relief will not permit relitigation of claims'" (Bayer v City of New York, 115 AD3d at 898, quoting Pondview Corp. v Blatt, 95 AD3d 980, 980; see Abraham v Hermitage Ins. Co., 47 AD3d at 855).
Here, the causes of action alleging fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion in the instant action arose out of the same set of operative facts as the allegations asserted in the SCPA 2104(4) proceeding, and either were or could have been raised in that proceeding (see generally Perini v Leo, 147 AD3d 877, 878; 74 Eldert, LLC v Sharp, 138 AD3d 819, 820; Hoffer v Bank of Am., N.A., 136 AD3d 750, 750; Sun Plaza Enters. Corp. v Crown Theatres, L.P., 307 AD2d 351, 351). The Surrogate's Court's determination that the proceeding was akin to an action in replevin and was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations was on the merits for the purpose of res judicata (see Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 194; Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc., 102 AD3d 251, 260; Nostrom v County of Suffolk, 100 AD3d 974, 975; Hae Sheng Wang v Pao-Mei Wang, 96 AD3d 1005, 1007; Sosa v JP Morgan Chase Bank, 33 AD3d 609, 611).
Additionally, the order granting the motion for summary judgment dismissing the SCPA 2104(4) petition is binding against the plaintiff, even though the proceeding was commenced by the plaintiff in her representative capacity on behalf of Faulkner's estate, and the instant action was commenced by the plaintiff both individually and in her representative capacity. In general, a judgment for or against a person in his or her representative capacity is not res judicata against that person in his or her personal capacity (see Matter of Sullivan, 289 NY 323, 326; Leonard v Pierce, 182 NY 431, 432; Magid v Sunrise Holdings Group, LLC, 155 AD3d 717; Specialized Realty Servs., LLC v Maikisch, 123 AD3d 801, 802; Tuper v Tuper, 34 AD3d 1280, 1281). However, where an individual's interests are affected by prior litigation in which he or she participated in a representative capacity, res judicata will apply in a subsequent action commenced in the individual's personal capacity (see Matter of Clamp, 193 AD2d 601, 602; Weiner v Greyhound Bus Lines, 55 AD2d 189, 193-194; Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 36). Here, the plaintiff's individual interests would have been affected had she prevailed in the proceeding because she was a distributee of Faulkner's estate. Similarly, although the proceeding was commenced against Edward English and Montegut in their representative capacities on behalf of English's estate, and the instant action was commenced against Edward English and Montegut both individually and in their representative capacities on behalf of English's estate, as beneficiaries of English's estate, Edward English's and Montegut's individual interests were affected in the proceeding. Further, under the circumstances, Edward English and Montegut, as co-executors of English's estate, were in privity with Edward English and Montegut, as trustees of the Joseph A. English Family Trust (see generally Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d 746; Bayer v City of New York, 115 AD3d at 899; Parolisi v Slavin, 98 AD3d 488; Toscano v 4B's Realty VIII Southampton Brick & Tile, LLC, 84 AD3d 780, 781).
Accordingly, we agree with the Surrogate's Court's determination to grant that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are not properly before this Court.
CHAMBERS, J.P., AUSTIN, COHEN and DUFFY, JJ., concur. ENTER: Aprilanne Agostino Clerk of the Court
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