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Elway Co. v. Champlain Capital Partners, L.P.
Bailey, Judge.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS Richard A. Kempf
Paul T. Deignan
Thomas F. O'Gara
TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jenny R. Buchheit
Eileen P.H. Moore
Adam D. Zacher
ICE MILLER LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court The Honorable Brian H. Williams, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 55D02-1105-CC-1032 Bailey, Judge.
[1] Elway Company, LLP, ("Elway Company") and siblings Dale K. Elrod ("Dale"), Jeffrey L. Elrod ("Jeffrey"), and Mary Ann Waymire ("Mary Ann") (collectively and at times taken together with Elway Company, "the Elrod Plaintiffs") appeal a grant of summary judgment in favor of Champlain Capital Partners, L.P. ("Champlain") upon remand from an appeal of prior litigation related to eight construction projects ("the Bonded Projects") covered by a Bonding Collateral Agreement ("the Agreement") executed by the Elrod Plaintiffs and Safeco Surety ("Safeco"), now Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. We remand "to permit the introduction of evidence so that the trial court may consider and rule on whether the various projects from which bond claims arose ... were completed within the scope of the meaning of completion as set forth by the Agreement." Champlain Capital Partners, L.P. v. Elway Co., LLP, 58 N.E.3d 180, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied ("Champlain I").
Issues[2] The Elrod Plaintiffs present for our review three consolidated and restated issues:
I. Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine should be discarded under the circumstances of this case;
II. Whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment upon its determination that all bonded projects
were complete, thereby triggering the reimbursement provision of the Agreement; and
III. Whether prejudgment interest was properly awarded.
Because we remand for a predicate factual determination, we do not address the third issue.
[3] In 2004, Dale, Jeffrey, and Mary Ann were majority shareholders in the John K. Elrod Company ("JKE"), a business involved in construction of stadium seating and safety barriers. See Champlain I. In 2005, Champlain, a Delaware investment firm focused on small business acquisition and growth, acquired JKE in a leveraged buyout. The Elrod siblings were then minority shareholders. [4] Before and after the leveraged buyout, JKE obtained its performance, payment, and supply bonds from Safeco. After the buyout, Safeco determined that it would no longer accept personal indemnities from a family member and instead demanded $3.5 million collateral in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit ("ILOC"). See id. The Elrod siblings agreed to loan $3.5 million to JKE from the proceeds of the sale of the business to Champlain. The ILOC was placed with Fifth Third Bank. "provide that Safeco's refusal to continue to underwrite JKE's bonds amounted to a reduction of collateral that would first inure to Champlain's benefit or otherwise require that the Elrod Plaintiffs replace the Substitute LOC with a $3.5 million contribution of their own." Id. As such, the trial court did not err when it found no breach on this basis. [11] Turning to whether the Agreement established a reimbursement obligation on the part of the Elrod Plaintiffs, we quoted the relevant portion of the Agreement ("the Reimbursement Provision"):
Notwithstanding any documentation to the contrary setting forth the legal effect, rights, obligations, and priority of Safeco as against (i) Champlain under the Substitute LOC and (ii) [the Elrod Plaintiffs] under the Elrod/Elway Guaranty, but subject to section D.2 below, both Champlain and [the Elrod Plaintiffs] agree that they will share and incur ultimate liability and financial out-of-pocket exposure to Safeco on a pro rata and pari passu basis with respect to the $7 Million aggregate Safeco Collateral Commitment, which is being made under the Substitute LOC and the Elrod/Elway Guaranty.
(App'x at 59.) [12] Examining the Agreement as a whole, we concluded that the parties' intent was "to ensure that the risk of loss of funds to Safeco bond claims would not rest solely with Champlain." Champlain, 58 N.E.3d at 196. Having determined that the trial court erred in concluding that Champlain was not entitled to reimbursement unless the Elrod Plaintiffs had also contributed collateral, we turned to consider the extent of the reimbursement obligation. The parties disputed the proper interpretation of language in Section D.2 of the Agreement, specifically:
To the extent that an LOC Draw does not result in a commensurate and concurrent request from Safeco for the Elrods and/or Elway to fund under the Elrod/Elway Guaranty, the Elrods and/or Elway (as applicable) will reimburse Champlain fifty percent (50%) of any and all amounts drawn down ... according to the following procedure: (a) if at any time, there is only one Bonded Project in which the Customer or Safeco has declared a default and Safeco has made an LOC Draw, then [the Elrod Plaintiffs] will pay or reimburse Champlain, in accordance with Sections C and D hereof, on or before 30 days after such Bonded Project is "Completed." ("Completed" is defined as either (I) acceptance by the customer, or (II) issuance of an occupancy permit by the applicable governmental authority); (b) if at any time, more than one Bonded Project is the subject of a notice of default .. then the payment or reimbursement obligation of [the Elrod Plaintiffs] hereunder will not occur until 30 days after the last one of all such Bonded Projects are Completed; moreover, for purposes of calculating the amount to be paid or reimbursed [by the Elrod Plaintiffs], all LOC Draws will be aggregated and "netted," such that any credits or payments by the customer or Safeco in respect of any Bonded Project that serves to mitigate the amount of any LOC Draw will reduce such payment or reimbursement obligation of [the Elrod Plaintiffs].
(App'x at 59-60). We concluded that the Reimbursement Provision did not include an express requirement for an accounting; thus, Champlain did not forfeit reimbursement rights for failure to provide a detailed accounting. Champlain, 58 N.E.3d at 199. We also concluded that the Reimbursement Provision "does not limit the scope of the reimbursement obligation only to amounts drawn down due to performance bond defaults." Id. at 200. [13] We then examined the Agreement's criteria for project completion and ultimately reversed solely on the matter of reimbursement and remanded to permit the introduction of evidence of completion:
For a project to be deemed completed and thereby to create a reimbursement obligation on the part of the Elrod Plaintiffs, the Agreement in Section D.2(a) required "either (I) acceptance by the customer, or (II) issuance of an occupancy permit by the applicable governmental authority." (App'x at 60.) The trial court construed this provision to require that "Champlain must produce certificates of occupancy or acceptance to confirm completion ... in order to trigger any liability." (App'x at 20.)
We again conclude that the trial court erred in its construction of the agreement. There simply is no expressed requirement for certificates of acceptance in the Agreement. The Agreement calls for either acceptance by the customer or an occupancy permit from an applicable governing authority.
The trial court's misconstruction of this provision affected not only its legal reasoning, but also its fact-finding. The trial court found that only one project could be considered completed - the Rialto School Corporation project, for which Champlain produced a certificate of acceptance. The trial court concluded, however, that there was no acceptance of another project, at Michigan International Speedway, because though the customer had entered into a settlement agreement with respect to bond liability, "[n]o evidence was submitted that these repairs were ever completed or, if completed, when the completion was certified." (App'x at 20.) This finding, of course, was premised on the erroneous conclusion that proof of completion could come only through a certificate of occupancy or completion.
The trial court's erroneous construction of these provisions resulted in litigation that limited the scope of the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, upon remand, we instruct the trial court to conduct appropriate proceedings to permit the introduction of evidence so that the trial court may consider and rule on whether the various projects from which bond claims arose - related to either performance or payment bonds - were completed within the scope of the meaning of completion as set forth by the Agreement, and in conformance with the interpretation of the Agreement set forth above.
Id. at 200-201. The Elrod Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied on October 4, 2016. On January 19, 2017, the Indiana Supreme Court denied a petition for transfer. On January 26, 2017, the opinion of this Court was certified, and the matter was remanded to the trial court. Anticipating no further bond claims, Safeco conditionally returned $554,537.00 to Champlain. [14] On September 22, 2017, Champlain filed a motion for summary judgment. After some discovery disputes and extensions of time in which to conduct Speedway had accepted the Project" and that the law of the case prevented re-examination. (Appealed Order at 11.) [19] Judgment was entered against the Elway Company, Dale, Jeffrey, and Mary Ann, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,472,731.30. The trial court concluded that the final bonded project was completed no later than March 26, 2013, when Safeco settled the claim related to the MIS Project, and awarded prejudgment interest calculable from thirty days later, April 25, 2013. This appeal ensued.
Two types were involved in the parties' dispute: performance bonds (ensuring JKE customers of project completion) and payment bonds (ensuring JKE's subcontractors of payment).
The Elway Corporation is a limited liability corporation owned by Dale, Jeffrey, and Mary Ann.
The Agreement included a choice-of-law clause providing that the Agreement should be governed under Delaware law.
Champlain asked that the Agreement be reformed to refer to all surety bonds as opposed to performance bonds and refer to $3.5 million as a fixed amount rather than a cap.
We also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that there was no breach by the Elrod Plaintiffs of the Agreement's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Pro rata terms require proportional allocation, "according to an exact rate, measure, or interest." Black's Law Dictionary 1415 (10th ed. 2014). Pari passu terms require proportionality of pace, that is, compensation "without preference." Id. at 1290.
We also instructed the trial court to consider the Safeco-retained LOC funds in its decision on remand. Id. at 201.
The trial court also stated that "there was a Certificate of Occupancy issued for the Michigan International Speedway Project" and "[t]he fact that it was issued before the Bonding Collateral Agreement was signed or before Michigan International Speedway made a claim on the performance bond is immaterial to the determination of whether the Project was completed." (Appealed Order at 11.) The judgment in the bench trial states: "The parties stipulated that on June 13, 2015, Champlain first produced to the Elrods (via counsel) ... a certificate of occupancy from MIS dated June 13, 2005, which was over one year before the execution of the Bonding Collateral Agreement." (Judgment, para. 106.) (emphasis added). The trial court may have intended to reference the year of 2006, as opposed to 2005, consistent with Goetz's deposition testimony. However, the trial court did not assign a completion date based upon the Certificate of Occupancy.
Discussion and Decision Law of the Case[20] The Elrod Plaintiffs ask that we revisit the determinations that the Agreement was intended to allocate the risk of loss between parties and that the Agreement applies to both performance and payment bonds. Champlain responds that, rule on whether the various projects from which bond claims arose - related to either performance or payment bonds - were completed within the scope of the meaning of completion as set forth by the Agreement, and in conformance with the interpretation of the Agreement as set forth above." Id. [23] The Elrod Plaintiffs claim that they presented new evidence relative to the parties' understanding of contract terms. "[W]here new facts are elicited upon remand that materially affect the questions at issue, the court upon remand may apply the law to the new facts as subsequently found." In re Change to Established Water Level of Lake of Woods in Marshall Cty., 822 N.E.2d 1032, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. [24] However, the Elrod Plaintiffs have essentially renewed the legal arguments rejected by this Court in the first appeal and on rehearing. The trial court was not required, on remand, to elicit facts necessary to interpret the Agreement. Rather, the trial court was instructed to act in conformance with the interpretation of the Agreement as set forth in the opinion. Because we remanded only to permit the introduction of evidence of completion of Bonded Projects, if indeed the Elrod Plaintiffs presented new evidence of contractual intent, it was not relevant to an issue for the trial court upon remand. We discern no basis upon which to find the law-of-the-case inapplicable.
Grant of Summary Judgment[25] Upon review of a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply a well-settled standard:
We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences. The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact. And [a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (citations omitted). [26] In Champlain I, we acknowledged that the trial court, as the fact-finder in a bench trial, was to determine whether each of the Bonded Projects had been completed. As of the first appeal, this fact-finding had been made - by the trial court - as to one bonded project, Rialto. We remanded and "instruct[ed] the trial court to conduct appropriate proceedings to permit the introduction of evidence so that the trial court may consider and rule on whether the various projects ... were completed." [27] The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, but rather considered designated materials. In conducting our review of the designated materials, it is MIS. However, it was not the only contract between JKE and MIS. Although the summary judgment order states in Paragraph 41 that a Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the MIS project, and the trial court considered it immaterial that the issuance of that certificate predated the Agreement, the trial court did not assign a completion date for the MIS project based upon that certificate of occupancy, as it did with some other projects. Nor can we do so. Even if we assume that the Certificate of Occupancy was issued by the appropriate governmental authority, without further evidentiary development, the question remains as to whether it referenced work that was within the scope of the Agreement. And even if the facts in designated materials are undisputed, summary judgment is inappropriate if there is a good faith dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Long v. Durnil, 697 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. [33] The existence of the certificate does not give rise to a single inference. Designated materials - specifically, the deposition testimony of Dennis Leary and Goetz - indicate that more than one bond had been issued relative to MIS and that MIS had owned twelve to fourteen racetracks where JKE had performed work. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the pre-Agreement certificate, whatever its origin, without dispute satisfied the contractual requirement of completion under the Agreement. Nor do we conclude, as a matter of law, that there was customer acceptance of the MIS Bonded Project. We conclude that the trial court improvidently granted summary judgment to Champlain.
Goetz explained that Safeco considered a project tendered if it was turned over to a new contractor for completion or repairs.
The Release indicates that the Parties [Michigan International Speedway, also "MIS", and Safeco] "desire to compromise and settle the claims and disputes between them." (App. Vol. V, pg. 127.) Safeco released MIS from liability to pay the contract balance. MIS released Safeco from claims of any kind and assigned to Safeco its "claims against Elrod." See id. at pg. 129. --------
Conclusion[34] The Elrod Plaintiffs have provided no basis for disregarding the law of the case. However, because we conclude that the designated materials do not establish that each of the Bonded Projects was completed "within the scope of the meaning of completion as set forth by the Agreement," Champlain I at 201, we remand to permit the introduction of evidence. [35] Reversed and remanded. Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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