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Archetto v. Smith
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 29, 2013, alleging adverse possession of a portion of the defendants' property in Jamestown. The defendants answered on June 14, 2013, without asserting a counterclaim. After nearly three years, a trial was scheduled for September 8, 2016. Approximately one month after the trial date passed, plaintiffs orally moved to dismiss their complaint without prejudice. The defendants objected, arguing the dismissal should be with prejudice due to the lengthy delay. The hearing justice granted the dismissal without prejudice on October 11, 2016.
Subsequently, on October 20, 2016, defendants filed a motion to reconsider or vacate the dismissal order, which was denied on November 18, 2016. The defendants then appealed the denial of their motion to vacate. The Supreme Court reviewed the appeal concerning the denial of the motion to vacate, as defendants had not timely appealed the original dismissal order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the hearing justice abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to vacate the order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice.
- Whether the dismissal order was void or entered in violation of Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rules 6 and 7.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The dismissal order was entered in violation of Rules 6(c) and 7(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure because plaintiffs made an oral motion to dismiss without prior written notice.
- The hearing justice did not wait the required four days before entering the dismissal order, rendering it void.
- The case had been pending for three years, causing defendants substantial costs and a lack of finality, and therefore the dismissal should have been with prejudice.
- The hearing justice's granting of the dismissal without prejudice was a "plain usurpation of power."
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows dismissal without prejudice by court order.
- The defendants' remedy to protect their property rights was to initiate their own suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Neufville v. State, 172 A.3d 161, 167 (R.I. 2017) | No authority exists for motions to reconsider; motions to reconsider treated as motions to vacate under Rule 60(b). | Defendants' motion to reconsider was treated as a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b). |
| Yi Gu v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 38 A.3d 1093, 1099 (R.I. 2012) | Scope of Rule 60(b) motions and judicial discretion in granting or denying motions to vacate. | Standard of review applied: abuse of discretion standard for motion to vacate. |
| Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc., 139 A.3d 394, 398-399 (R.I. 2016) | Review limited to correctness of order on motion to vacate; Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances for relief. | Held that defendants failed to show extraordinary circumstances to justify vacating dismissal. |
| Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 160 A.3d 975, 980 (R.I. 2017) | Raise-or-waive rule: issues not raised below are waived on appeal. | Defendants' arguments not presented below were not considered on appeal. |
| Turacova v. DeThomas, 45 A.3d 509, 514 (R.I. 2012) | Abuse of discretion standard for reviewing denial of Rule 60(b) motions. | Confirmed the limited scope of appellate review on motion to vacate denial. |
| Allen ex rel. Allen v. South County Hospital, 945 A.2d 289, 297 (R.I. 2008) | Rule 60(b)(6) is not a catchall; extraordinary circumstances required for relief. | Applied to conclude defendants did not meet the high standard for relief. |
| Labossiere v. Berstein, 810 A.2d 210, 215 (R.I. 2002) | Interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6) and extraordinary circumstances standard. | Supported the conclusion that time and expense alone are insufficient for relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first limited its review to the order denying the motion to vacate because the defendants did not timely appeal the original dismissal order. The Court acknowledged that defendants raised arguments on appeal that were not presented below, including alleged violations of procedural rules and the claim that the dismissal order was void. Due to the raise-or-waive rule, these arguments were not considered.
Regarding the motion to vacate, the Court noted that defendants primarily argued the case had been pending for three years, causing them substantial costs and a lack of finality. However, these reasons did not clearly fit within the enumerated grounds of Rule 60(b). The Court considered Rule 60(b)(6), which allows relief for "any other reason justifying relief," but emphasized that this provision requires extraordinary circumstances.
The Court concluded that the defendants' complaints about delay and cost did not constitute extraordinary or unusual circumstances sufficient to justify relief from the dismissal order. Therefore, the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to vacate.
Holding and Implications
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying the defendants' motion to vacate the dismissal order.
This decision directly upholds the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice and confirms the finality of the Superior Court's order denying relief under Rule 60(b). The Court did not establish any new precedent beyond the application of existing procedural rules and standards for motions to vacate. The record was remanded to the Superior Court.
The defendants—Christian R. Smith and Roxalene E. Wadsworth—appeal from a Newport County Superior Court order denying their motion to vacate a previous order of the court that granted the motion of the plaintiffs—Henry W. Archetto, Maria A. Archetto, Paul H. Archetto, Linda C. Archetto, and Maria A. Archetto-Hickman—to dismiss their complaint, without prejudice. This matter came before the Supreme Court on February 14, 2018, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the arguments set forth in the parties' memoranda and at oral argument, we are convinced that cause has not been shown. Thus, further argument or briefing is not required to decide this matter. For the reasons outlined below, the Superior Court's judgment is affirmed.
While the facts begetting this case give rise to a claim that plaintiffs adversely possessed defendants' parcel of land in Jamestown, this case's procedural posture is what is significant on appeal, and we therefore proceed accordingly. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in Newport County Superior Court on March 29, 2013, alleging that they adversely possessed a portion of defendants' property. On June 14, 2013, defendants responded by filing their answer, without asserting a counterclaim. After three years, the hearing justice scheduled a date-certain trial for September 8, 2016. On October 6, 2016, approximately a month after the date-certain trial day had passed, plaintiffs and defendants appeared before the hearing justice, and plaintiffs made an oral motion to dismiss their complaint, without prejudice. The defendants strenuously objected to plaintiffs' motion, arguing that the case should be dismissed with prejudice based on the significant length of time—roughly three years—that had elapsed since plaintiffs filed suit. Nonetheless, on that date, the hearing justice granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss, without prejudice, directing the parties to prepare an order. On October 11, 2016, an order entered that dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, without prejudice.
Although not explicitly cited, plaintiffs' motion was made pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows plaintiffs to dismiss an action by order of the court, without prejudice unless otherwise specified.
While defendants filed an objection to the order, they did not file a notice of appeal to this Court.
On October 20, 2016, defendants filed a motion to reconsider or to vacate the October 11, 2016 order, in response to which plaintiffs filed an objection. The hearing justice heard argument on the motion to vacate on November 4, 2016, ultimately denying it on November 18, 2016. On November 30, 2016, defendants appealed the order denying the motion to vacate the October 11, 2016 order.
"[N]o authority exists for the filing of a motion to reconsider." Neufville v. State, 172 A.3d 161, 167 (R.I. 2017). But this Court has "allowed motions to reconsider to be treated as motions to vacate under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure * * *." Yi Gu v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 38 A.3d 1093, 1099 (R.I. 2012) (quoting School Committee of Cranston v. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d 629, 649 (R.I. 2009)). Accordingly, we will refer to defendants' motion as a motion to vacate.
In reviewing a Superior Court justice's decision granting or denying a motion to vacate, we are "limited to examining the correctness of the order granting or denying the motion, not the correctness of the original judgment." Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc., 139 A.3d 394, 398 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 187 (R.I. 2008)). We have held that "[a] Rule 60(b) motion to vacate is addressed to the [hearing] justice's sound judicial discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of abuse of discretion." Turacova v. DeThomas, 45 A.3d 509, 514 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Yi Gu v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 38 A.3d 1093, 1099 (R.I. 2012)).
The defendants' failure to appeal the October 11, 2016 order dismissing the case limits their current appeal to only the November 18, 2016 order denying their motion to vacate. Thus, the sole question properly before us is whether the hearing justice abused his discretion in denying defendants' motion to vacate. See Turacova, 45 A.3d at 514.
Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure permits a Superior Court justice to discharge a judgment for a number of reasons. Citing that rule, defendants argue before this Court that the dismissal order was (1) entered in violation of Rules 6 and 7 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) void; and (3) an exhibition of the hearing justice's "plain usurpation of power." However, these arguments were not presented below. "In accordance with this Court's longstanding 'raise-or-waive' rule, if an issue was not properly asserted, and thereby preserved, in the lower tribunals, this Court will not consider the issue on appeal." Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 160 A.3d 975, 980 (R.I. 2017).
Specifically, defendants argue that the dismissal order was entered in violation of Rules 6(c) and 7(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 6(c) provides, in relevant part: "A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court." Rule 7(b)(1) provides, in relevant part: "An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial or during the course of a deposition, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." The defendants argue that plaintiffs made their oral motion to dismiss at the pretrial conference, without any prior notice, as required under Rule 7(b)(1), and therefore the dismissal order is void.
The defendants also argue that the hearing justice did not wait the requisite four days before entering the dismissal order, which likewise rendered it void. See Super R. Civ. P. 77(f) ("If only one (1) order is filed and no objection thereto be filed within four (4) days thereafter, the clerk shall enter the order.").
As a result, we are confined to consider only those arguments that defendants made before the hearing justice. In defendants' motion to vacate, they argued that the hearing justice erred in granting the motion to dismiss, without prejudice, because the case had been pending for three years, during which time defendants had incurred "substantial cost," and defendants were entitled to finality. The defendants quarrel with the hearing justice's remarks expressing that their available remedy to stop plaintiffs from utilizing their land would be to initiate a suit of their own.
However, the defendants' assertions do not clearly articulate any of the enumerated reasons set out in Rule 60(b). The most relevant provision with which these arguments comport is Rule 60(b)(6), which empowers a Superior Court justice to grant a motion to vacate for "[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Nevertheless, "we have said that Rule 60(b)(6) is 'not intended to constitute a catchall and * * * that circumstances must be extraordinary to justify relief.'" Santos, 139 A.3d at 399 (quoting Allen ex rel. Allen v. South County Hospital, 945 A.2d 289, 297 (R.I. 2008)). Because we do not believe that the time and expense expended or the defendants' claimed lack of finality are "extraordinary and unusual factors" particular to this case, we hold that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to vacate. Id. (quoting Labossiere v. Berstein, 810 A.2d 210, 215 (R.I. 2002)).
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record shall be returned to that tribunal.
Entered as an Order of this Court this 2nd day of March, 2018.
By Order,
/s/_________
Clerk Justice Flaherty did not participate.
For Plaintiffs: Robert E. Flaherty, Esq. For Defendants: G. Quentin Anthony, Esq.
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