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Bradford v. Marchak
Factual and Procedural Background
Raymond Alford Bradford, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sued prison officials alleging that false statements and testimony in Keyhea proceedings led to court-ordered involuntary medication that caused various injuries. [1][2]
Bradford filed multiple motions seeking a preliminary injunction or protective order to stay his involuntary medication. Defendants opposed the motions, and the motions were submitted without oral argument. [3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Bradford was entitled to a preliminary injunction staying his court-ordered involuntary medication under the applicable preliminary-injunction factors. [10][11][12]
- Whether the Court had jurisdiction to enjoin the nonparty officials administering Bradford’s medication at his current institution, and whether his claim against the defendants became moot after his transfer. [13][14]
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- Bradford asserted that his medication caused blurred vision, headaches, chest pain, and dizziness. [11]
- He argued that the prison grievance process could not provide relief because the medication was being administered pursuant to a court order issued by an Administrative Law Judge. [11]
- He contended that medication side effects could affect what he might say under oath if required to testify, including at a deposition. [11]
- He objected to Defendant Grewal’s opposition because she had not yet filed an answer. [15]
Defendants' Arguments
- Defendant Grewal argued that she could oppose the motion because it was directed at her and all defendants, she had appeared and submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction, and she intended to answer after resolution of her extension request. [15]
- Defendants opposed the requested injunction and submitted orders and decisions concerning the judicial determination of Bradford’s involuntary medication. [6][12]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 527 (1986) | State prisoners have a statutory right to refuse long-term psychotropic treatment absent a judicial determination of incompetence. | The case supplies the context for Bradford’s allegations concerning involuntary medication. [2] |
| Winter v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) | A preliminary injunction requires likelihood of success, likely irreparable harm, favorable equities, and consistency with the public interest. | The Court found Bradford had not made the clear showing required under these factors. [10][12] |
| Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) | A court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation without jurisdiction over the defendant. | The Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the unnamed nonparties administering Bradford’s medication. [13][14] |
| SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007) | A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation. | The principle supported the jurisdictional limitation on the requested injunction. [13][14] |
| Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009) | The pendency of an action does not confer jurisdiction over unrelated officials or litigation issues. | The Court’s jurisdiction was limited to the parties and cognizable claims in the action. [13] |
| Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) | The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the parties and claims properly before it. | The Court relied on this principle in defining the scope of its authority. [13] |
| Holt v. Stockman, 2012 WL 259938 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012) | A prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief becomes moot after transfer from the institution whose employees are to be enjoined. | Bradford’s transfer rendered moot any injunction against the former prison officials. [14] |
| Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) | The opinion cites the case in connection with the mootness consequence of a prisoner’s transfer. | The Court cited it alongside Holt in concluding that Bradford’s request against the former officials was moot. [14] |
| Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014) | Failure to object to findings and recommendations may waive the right to challenge factual findings on appeal. | The Court cited it in advising Bradford of the consequences of failing to object within fourteen days. [16] |
| Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991) | The opinion cites the case as authority concerning waiver of appellate challenges to factual findings. | It was cited by Wilkerson and referenced in the Court’s objection notice. [16] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first applied the rule that preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies and require a clear showing satisfying all four Winter factors. [10]
The Court then limited its jurisdiction to the parties and cognizable claims in the action. Because Bradford was housed at a different facility and his medication was administered by officials who were not parties, the Court could not enjoin those officials. Any requested injunction against the named defendants was also moot because they no longer participated in his medication after his transfer. [13][14]
Independently, the Court concluded that Bradford’s allegations, although sufficient to state a cognizable claim, did not establish a likelihood of success, irreparable harm, favorable equities, or the public interest. The documents submitted by defendants showed that the medication had been ordered by an Administrative Law Judge in a quasi-judicial proceeding; Bradford’s assertions that the proceeding was unfair were insufficient to establish likely success. [12]
The Court also found that Bradford’s vague concern that medication side effects might affect future testimony did not support injunctive relief. [17]
Holding and Implications
The magistrate judge recommended denial of all of Bradford’s motions for a preliminary injunction and protective order seeking to stay his involuntary medication. [18]
The recommendation was submitted to the assigned district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Bradford was given fourteen days to file objections and was warned that failure to do so could waive appellate challenges to the magistrate judge’s factual findings. [16] The direct effect was that the requested stay was not recommended, and the opinion set no new precedent.
Barbara A. McAuliffe UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [ECF Nos. 39, 51, 54, 70, 71]
I. IntroductionPlaintiff Raymond Alford Bradford is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds on Plaintiff's second amended complaint against Defendants Marchak, Grewal, Depovic, and Clausell for the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 21.) These claims arise out of allegations that Defendants false statements in multiple Keyhea petitions, and falsely testified at the proceedings on the petitions, which led to Plaintiff's court-order involuntary medication that has caused him various injuries.
Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 527, 527 (1986), in which the California Court of Appeal held that "state prisoners presently have a statutory right to refuse long-term treatment with psychotropic drugs absent a judicial determination that they are incompetent to do so."
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, filed on September 18, 2017, seeking to stay his court-ordered involuntary medication. (ECF No. 39.) Defendant Grewal filed an opposition on October 9, 2017, (ECF No. 50), along with a request for judicial notice in support of the opposition, (ECF No. 47).
Plaintiff objects to Defendant Grewal filing any opposition to his motion because she has not yet filed an answer. (ECF Nos. 58, 75.) Defendant Grewal responds that Plaintiff's motion is directed at her and all Defendants, that she has appeared and subjected herself to the Court's jurisdiction, and that she intends to answer when the Court rules upon her request for an extension of time to answer. (ECF Nos. 67, 95.) The Court finds no grounds to strike or disregard Defendant Grewal's opposition.
On October 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion entitled, "Motion for Protective Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)," with a declaration in support. (ECF No. 51.) In that motion, Plaintiff refers to and renews his request for an injunction staying his court-ordered involuntary medication, filed on September 18, 2017. (Id.)
On October 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed another motion entitled, "Motion for Protective Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)," with a declaration in support. (ECF No. 54.) Like the previous motion, it also refers to and renews his prior request to stay his court-ordered involuntary medication. (Id.)
On October 31, 2017, Defendant Grewal filed an opposition to Plaintiff's motions for protective orders seeking to stay or discontinue his court-ordered involuntary medication. (ECF No. 64.) On November 2, 2017, Defendants Clausell, Depovic, and Marchak joined in Defendant Grewal's opposition to Plaintiff's motion seeking a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 69.)
On November 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed another motion for a protective order, renewing his prior request to stay his court-ordered involuntary medication. (ECF No. 70.) On November 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction, with a declaration in support, again seeking to stay his court-ordered involuntary medication. (ECF No. 71.)
On November 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants Clausell, Depovic, and Marchak's joinder in Defendant Grewal's opposition to Plaintiff's motion seeking a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 73.) This motion essentially replies to the arguments raised by Defendants in opposition to his request for a preliminary injunction. ///
The request to strike was denied by a separate order, but in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, his arguments in reply are liberally construed and considered by the Court here. --------
On November 22, 2017, Defendant Grewal filed an opposition to Plaintiff's November 2, 2017 motion for a protective order. (ECF No. 88.) On November 27, 2017, Defendant Grewal filed an opposition to Plaintiff's November 6, 2017 motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 93.)
Plaintiff's motions are deemed submitted, without oral argument. Local Rule 230(l).
II. Discussion"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
"[A] court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969); SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2007). Similarly, the pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in general or over Plaintiff's litigation issues. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court's jurisdiction is limited to the parties in this action and to the cognizable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969.
In this case, Plaintiff seeks an injunction staying his involuntary medication while this case is pending. He asserts that he is harmed by suffering negative side effects from being medicated, including blurred-vision, headaches, chest pain, and dizziness. He further asserts that he cannot get the relief he seeks through his prison's administrative grievance process because he is being medicated under a 2602 court order by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Plaintiff also argues that if he is called upon to testify, such as in a deposition, there is "no way of telling what he might say under oath" due to his medication side effects.
Plaintiff is currently housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, and his medication is therefore being administered by persons who are not parties in this case at his current institution. Defendants in this case were employed at California State Prison, Corcoran, when he was housed there, and from which he has since been transferred. "[A] court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110, 89 S. Ct. 1562 (1969); S .E.C. v. Ross , 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction against the unnamed non-parties to this action who are currently involved in the administration of Plaintiff's medication. And, to the extent he seeks to enjoin Defendants, now that Plaintiff has been transferred, his request for injunctive relief against Defendants is now moot, as those officials are no longer involved in his involuntary medication. See Holt v. Stockman, 2012 WL 259938, *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012) (a prisoner's claim for injunctive relief is rendered moot when he is transferred from the institution whose employees he seeks to enjoin); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Court further finds that Plaintiff has not made the clear showing necessary to obtain injunctive relief in this matter. Although the Court has found that he has stated a cognizable claim based on his allegations, those allegations alone are insufficient to show a likelihood of success on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, that the balance of equities tip in his favor, or that the relief sought is in the public interest. In support of their opposition to this motion, Defendants submitted for judicial notice copies of orders and decisions on petitions for a judicial determination regarding Plaintiff's involuntary medication, and related documents. "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). At this time, the Court does not recommend taking judicial notice of these documents, but they inform the Court that Plaintiff's involuntary medication was issued by an ALJ pursuant to a quasi-judicial proceeding, and his assertions that the proceedings were unfair are insufficient to show his likelihood of success on the merits. /// ///
Finally, the Court does not find Plaintiff's vague assertions that his medication side effects may affect his ability to testify at some time in this matter sufficient to support his request for injunctive relief here.
III. ConclusionFurther, for the reasons explained above, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 39, 51, 54, 70, 71) be DENIED.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the "right to challenge the magistrate's factual findings" on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 2 , 2018
/s/ Barbara A . McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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