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Rufus Junior Mincey v. State of Arizona
Mincey v. Arizona — Summary of Opinion (Oct. 6, 1977)
Factual and Procedural Background
Applicant Rufus Junior Mincey was convicted of murder, assault, and related drug offenses arising from an incident at an apartment he leased in Tucson, Arizona. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the murder and assault convictions because of erroneous jury instructions, but affirmed the convictions on the drug counts. A retrial on the murder and assault counts was scheduled for November 4. Applicant sought a stay of that retrial on the ground that evidence he claims was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution would be admitted at the retrial. The Supreme Court of Arizona had held that the evidence was properly admitted in the first trial; applicant filed a petition for certiorari in this Court challenging that determination and requested that any stay extend until the petition for certiorari was finally resolved.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a stay of a state-court retrial on reversed counts should be granted pending this Court's disposition of a petition for certiorari challenging the admissibility of evidence used at the prior trial.
- Whether constitutional claims regarding admission of evidence may justify halting a subsequent state retrial when those claims are also the subject of a petition for certiorari directed at convictions that were affirmed by the state court (the drug counts).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971) | Support for the principle that certain constitutional claims should be pursued through normal post-trial avenues rather than by staying state-court proceedings. | The Court cited Younger as authority consistent with the view that challenges to the admission of evidence are to be vindicated through post-conviction relief rather than by preventing a state retrial. |
| Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951) | Support for the proposition that federal review of trial matters ordinarily follows the normal post-trial process and does not automatically forestall state proceedings. | The Court relied on Stefanelli to reinforce the conclusion that the asserted constitutional claims did not entitle applicant to a stay of the state retrial and should be addressed through ordinary post-trial review. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Circuit Justice first observed that the petition for certiorari was imprecise as to which parts of the Arizona judgment applicant sought to have reviewed. He concluded that constitutional review by this Court could meaningfully proceed only for convictions that were affirmed by the state court (the drug counts), because the reversed murder and assault convictions were not final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. For purposes of the stay motion he assumed arguendo that a reversal by this Court of the drug-count convictions would require reversal of a murder conviction obtained on retrial if the same evidence were admitted there.
Despite that assumption, the Justice denied the stay. He explained that the federal constitutional right asserted by applicant—challenges to the admissibility of certain evidence—is not the kind of right protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause, which can bar a second trial altogether. Instead, the asserted rights concern the proper admission of evidence at trial and are vindicated by relief from incarceration following a conviction that relied on improperly admitted evidence. Accordingly, those claims must be pursued through normal post-trial avenues of review rather than by stopping a state retrial in advance. The opinion explicitly stated that it was unnecessary to speculate whether four Justices would grant certiorari because, even if certiorari were granted, a stay of the state retrial would not be warranted on these grounds.
Holding and Implications
DENIAL OF STAY
Holding: The Circuit Justice denied applicant's motion to stay the Arizona retrial on the murder and assault counts pending disposition of his petition for certiorari in this Court.
Implications: The immediate practical effect is that the state-court retrial scheduled for November 4 may proceed. The opinion indicates that the applicant's constitutional claims regarding evidence admissibility are to be pursued through normal post-trial remedies; the Court did not announce or establish a new rule altering the availability of stays in similar circumstances.
Applicant was convicted of murder, assault, and related drug offenses growing out of an incident which occurred at an apartment leased by him in Tucson, Ariz. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the murder and assault convictions because of erroneous jury instructions, but affirmed the judgments of conviction on the drug counts. Applicant now requests a stay of his second trial on the murder and assault counts, presently scheduled to take place on November 4, for the reason that evidence which he claims was obtained in violation of his rights under the United States Constitution will be admitted at that trial. The evidence in question was found by the Supreme Court of Arizona to have been properly admitted in his first trial, but applicant is seeking review of that determination in a petition for certiorari presently pending before this Court. He asks that the stay of his retrial be effective until his petition for certiorari is finally disposed of here.
The petition for certiorari is less than precise as to how much of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona applicant wishes this Court to review. I think his constitutional claims with respect to the admission of evidence at his trial can be reviewed here only insofar as they pertain to those convictions affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona (the drug counts). Indeed, the application does not seek a stay of the judgments affirming those convictions, but refers only to the murder and assault counts. Since the judgments of conviction on those counts have been reversed by the Supreme Court of Arizona, they are not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. But the constitutional claims which applicant seeks to assert in his petition for certiorari are, so far as I can tell, common to all counts. I assume for purposes of this motion that reversal by this Court of applicant's convictions on the drug counts would require reversal of a conviction obtained on the retrial of the murder count if the same evidence were admitted in that proceeding.
I find it unnecessary to engage in the usual speculation as to whether the petition will commend itself to four Justices of this Court, because I think that even if the petition is granted the present application should be denied. The federal constitutional right asserted by applicant is not one such as is conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment where the protection extends not only to incarceration following trial in violation of the prohibition but to the subjection of the defendant to a second trial at all. Applicant's constitutional claims are based on constitutional prohibitions against the admission of certain evidence at trial, and will be sufficiently vindicated if he be freed from incarceration as a result of a conviction had in reliance on such evidence. Such claims must be asserted through normal post-trial avenues of review. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951).
I therefore conclude that even though this Court were to grant the petition for certiorari to review applicant's conviction on the drug counts, he would not be entitled to have his presently scheduled trial in the Arizona court stayed pending our determination of the merits of the claims made in the petition. I accordingly deny his motion to stay the trial.
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