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John A. Hutter Et Ux. v. Bernard J. Korzen, Etc
Our Rules are only guidelines for litigants and we do disservice to the administration of justice by exalting them as Baron Parke doubtless would have done. Our experience with our Rules shows that lateness in docketing may be due to slow delivery of the mail (which is even worse today than it was 10 years ago), to snowstorms that stop or slow up all traffic, to sickness of counsel, or to other accidents that make untimely docketing that normally would be on time. Before we penalize litigants for late docketing of appeals we should have a case that shows palpable neglect.
Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs, 394 U.S. 977, 984, 89 S. Ct. 1457, 22 L. Ed. 2d 756, was a case in which a petition for certiorari was filed two days after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed, the delay being caused by a snowstorm. Justice Black wrote in dissent:
'It might be well to imagine for a moment what would have happened if some Senator or Representative had suggested an amendment to 'clarify' the proposed ยง 2101(c) by stating that a petition filed after the 90-day period will not be out of time 'when the delay is caused solely by an interruption of the mail service due to snow storms.' It is conceivable that more than a few members of Congress would consider such an amendment an insult to this Court's intelligence and would feel it unnecessary to lead this Court by the hand on such matters of elementary common sense. It is impossible, however, to believe that any of them would have regarded an amendment to the opposite effect as properly reflecting the purpose of the statute, and yet this opposite amendment, ruling a petition out of time under these circumstances, is precisely the amendment that the Court today tacitly engrafts unto ยง 2101(c).
'I would not adopt any such pointlessly harsh interpretation of the statute, one that furthers no congressional objective whatsoever and denies litigants their opportunity to seek review in this Court on the basis of atmospheric events wholly beyond their control. This is a return to all the cruel technicalities of common-law pleading, and then some. . . .'
In many of our cases we have entertained petitions, though docketed after expiration of the time prescribed in our Rules: Smith v. Mississippi, 373 U.S. 238, 83 S. Ct. 1265, 10 L. Ed. 2d 321; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 84 S. Ct. 1032, 12 L. Ed. 2d 77; Mazzie v. United States, 375 U.S. 32, 84 S. Ct. 24, 11 L. Ed. 2d 106; Robison v. United States, 390 U.S. 198, 88 S. Ct. 903, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1040; Nelson v. United States, 392 U.S. 303, 88 S. Ct. 2062, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1109; Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 89 S. Ct. 61, 21 L. Ed. 2d 212; Banks v. California, 382 U.S. 420, 86 S. Ct. 622, 15 L. Ed. 2d 499; Long v. Parker, 384 U.S. 32, 86 S. Ct. 1285, 16 L. Ed. 2d 333; Serio v. United States, 392 U.S. 305, 88 S. Ct. 2063, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1111.
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