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Lyle v. Lyle

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
Jul 11, 2017
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2014 Christy Lyle filed a petition to modify a 2009 child support order under RCW 26.09.170, supported by declarations and financial documentation. Her former husband, Keith Lyle, opposed modification and submitted declarations and documentation. A superior court commissioner, after reviewing filings and hearing argument (no testimony), dismissed the petition for failure to show a substantial change in circumstances or severe economic hardship. Ms. Lyle filed a motion for revision. A superior court judge heard oral argument, considered the previously filed materials and the hearing transcript, granted revision, found Ms. Lyle had established grounds under RCW 26.09.170(5), (6) and (7) (children entering a new age category with increased expenses; severe economic hardship; change in income), adopted Ms. Lyle's proposed child support worksheet, and entered a child support award. Mr. Lyle appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a superior court judge, acting on a motion for revision of a commissioner's decision, is limited to affirming or reversing the commissioner's disposition or may enter alternate findings and relief (including a child support award) when the factual record is complete.
  2. Whether the superior court judge should have remanded to the commissioner to assess child support rather than entering the child support award directly.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Keith Lyle) Arguments

  • The superior court judge, upon revising the commissioner's decision, should have remanded the matter to the commissioner for assessment and entry of child support rather than entering child support orders directly.
  • He was deprived of an opportunity to argue for a deviation from the standard child support schedule (though he did not specifically request a deviation below).

Respondent's (Christy Lyle) Positions

  • She petitioned to modify child support under RCW 26.09.170 and supported her petition with declarations, financial and other documentation and a proposed child support worksheet.
  • She sought the child support award as set out in her petition and worksheet; she moved for revision after the commissioner's dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 280, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) Describing the role of court commissioners and that a party dissatisfied with a commissioner's ruling can seek revision. Supports that commissioners alleviate judges' caseloads and that the right to seek revision permits similar treatment to litigants appearing before judges.
State v. Espinoza, 112 Wn.2d 819, 829, 774 P.2d 1177 (1989) That superior court commissioners are not subject to affidavits of prejudice under RCW 4.12.050. Used to distinguish commissioners from judges and to explain the revision procedure as the remedy for dissatisfied parties.
State ex rel. Lockhart v. Claypool, 132 Wash. 374, 375, 232 P. 351 (1925) The constitution empowers commissioners to "perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers" and that judge-at-chambers powers extend to matters not requiring jury trial. Supports the scope of commissioners' authority and the nature of matters they may decide.
In re Olson, 12 Wn. App. 682, 685-87, 531 P.2d 508 (1975) Illustration that judge-at-chambers powers extend to non-jury matters. Reinforces the constitutional basis for commissioners' duties and limits.
State ex rel. Biddinger v. Griffiths, 137 Wash. 448, 451, 242 P. 969 (1926) When a judge receives a case on revision, the judge takes "jurisdiction of the entire case as heard before the commissioner." Supports that the superior court judge acquires full jurisdiction of the matter on revision.
State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d 132 (2004) The judge reviews law and evidence de novo on revision and may issue independent factual findings and legal conclusions; appeals review the judge's decision, not the commissioner. Establishes the de novo standard on revision and the judge's authority to enter independent findings and conclusions.
Iturribarria Perez v. Bazaldua Garcia, 148 Wn. App. 131, 138, 198 P.3d 539 (2009) Support for the proposition that a judge may issue independent factual findings and legal conclusions on revision. Used as authority for the judge's ability to make independent determinations when revising a commissioner.
Greico v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 877, 184 P.3d 668 (2008), aff'd by In re Custody of E.A.W.T., 168 Wn.2d 335, 227 P.3d 1284 (2010) Further support that a judge may enter independent factual findings and legal conclusions on revision. Reinforces the principle that the revising judge can make independent determinations.
In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999) Remand to the commissioner is appropriate when the factual record is incomplete. Used to explain that remand is available but not required when the factual record is complete.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court explained that superior court commissioners exercise powers derived from the state constitution and statute and that dissatisfied parties may seek revision. Upon a motion for revision the superior court judge takes jurisdiction of the entire case as heard before the commissioner, reviews law and evidence de novo (but may not consider new evidence per RCW 2.24.050), and may issue independent factual findings and legal conclusions. Given these principles, because the evidentiary record was complete the judge had plenary authority to reverse the commissioner's dismissal and enter an appropriate remedy — here, findings under RCW 26.09.170(5), (6), and (7) and adoption of Ms. Lyle's child support worksheet — rather than remanding to the commissioner. Remand would have been unnecessary and inefficient. The court also rejected Mr. Lyle's claim that he was deprived of an opportunity to argue for a deviation because he had not specifically requested a deviation and had ample opportunity to oppose Ms. Lyle's requested relief.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

The superior court judge's decision granting Ms. Lyle's motion for revision and entering the child support modification and worksheet is affirmed. The court confirmed that a superior court judge acting on revision has plenary authority over the matter (except for admitting new evidence) and may enter findings and relief when the record is complete; remand to the commissioner is not required in such circumstances. The court also awarded reasonable appellate costs and attorney fees to Ms. Lyle under RCW 26.09.140, conditioned on compliance with RAP 18.1(d).

Show all summary ...

PENNELL, J.

PUBLISHED OPINION

PENNELL, J. —Superior court judges are authorized to review court commissioner decisions through a motion for revision. Although new evidence may not be considered, a judge acting on a motion for revision otherwise has plenary authority over the matter and may issue any findings or decisions that could have been entered by the commissioner.

The broad authority conferred on superior court judges warranted the actions taken by the judge in this case. After Christy Lyle filed a motion to revise a commissioner's decision dismissing her petition to modify child support, the superior court judge was not restricted to either affirming or reversing the commissioner's order. Instead, on finding dismissal unwarranted, the judge was empowered to enter a child support award as had been requested by Ms. Lyle in her petition. The decision of the superior court judge is therefore affirmed.

FACTS

In 2014, Christy Lyle filed a petition to modify a 2009 child support order. Ms. Lyle asserted various grounds for modification under RCW 26.09.170. The petition was supported by declarations, as well as financial and other documentation. Ms. Lyle's former husband, Keith Lyle, opposed modification. He contended Ms. Lyle had not established a change of circumstances that would warrant revisiting the 2009 order. Mr. Lyle also submitted declarations and documentation supporting his position.

A superior court commissioner heard argument on the petition after reviewing the parties' voluminous filings. No testimony was taken. The commissioner dismissed the petition for the reasons argued by Mr. Lyle, finding that Ms. Lyle had not shown a substantial change in circumstances or severe economic hardship as required for modification under RCW 26.09.170.

Ms. Lyle filed a motion for revision of the commissioner's decision. A superior court judge heard oral argument on the motion and considered the materials that had been previously filed in support of and opposition to the petition to modify, together with a transcript of the commissioner's hearing. The judge ultimately granted Ms. Lyle's motion for revision and petition for modification, finding that she had established the following circumstances under RCW 26.09.170(5), (6), and (7): (1) a substantial change in circumstances based on the children entering into a new age category and their significantly increased expenses, (2) severe economic hardship, and (3) change in income. The judge also adopted Ms. Lyle's proposed child support worksheet. Mr. Lyle appeals.

ANALYSIS

Mr. Lyle does not challenge the superior court judge's decision to revise the court commissioner. His complaint goes to the scope of the judge's order on revision. According to Mr. Lyle, once the superior court judge decided to revise the commissioner's ruling on whether there were grounds for modification, the matter should have been remanded to the commissioner for an assessment of applicable child support. We disagree with this restricted view of the superior court judge's power of revision.

Court commissioners play an important role in our state's court system. They help alleviate the large caseloads facing superior court judges and facilitate the efficient administration of justice. State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 280, 814 P.2d 652 (1991). Superior court commissioners derive their powers from our state's constitution and statute. WASH. CONST., art. IV, § 23; ch. 2.24 RCW. They are conferred with most of the powers of a superior court judge, but may not preside over jury trials. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 23. While superior court commissioners operate largely like their judicial counterparts, they are not subject to affidavits of prejudice under RCW 4.12.050. State v. Espinoza, 112 Wn.2d 819, 829, 774 P.2d 1177 (1989). Instead, a party dissatisfied with a commissioner's ruling can seek relief through a motion for revision. Smith, 117 Wn.2d at 280. The right to seek revision permits a litigant appearing before a commissioner to be treated similarly to one appearing before a superior court judge. Id. at 276.

The constitution states commissioners are empowered to "perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers." WASH. CONST., art. IV, § 23. The powers of a judge "at chambers" extend to all matters not requiring a jury trial. See State ex rel. Lockhart v. Claypool, 132 Wash. 374, 375, 232 P. 351 (1925); In re Olson, 12 Wn. App. 682, 685-87, 531 P.2d 508 (1975).

When a superior court judge receives a case through a motion for revision, the judge takes "jurisdiction of the entire case as heard before the commissioner." State ex rel. Biddinger v. Griffiths, 137 Wash. 448, 451, 242 P. 969 (1926). Although the superior court judge cannot accept new evidence, RCW 2.24.050, a motion on revision is in all other respects equal to any other matter on the court's docket. The judge reviews the law and evidence de novo. State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 116-17, 86 P.3d 132 (2004) (de novo standard applied even when commissioner heard live testimony). Should the judge disagree with the commissioner's disposition, the judge may issue his or her own independent factual findings and legal conclusions. Id. at 113; Iturribarria Perez v. Bazaldua Garcia, 148 Wn. App. 131, 138, 198 P.3d 539 (2009); Greico v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 877, 184 P.3d 668 (2008), aff'd by In re Custody of E.A.W.T., 168 Wn.2d 335, 227 P.3d 1284 (2010). Any subsequent appeal to this court is one that reviews the decision of the superior court judge, not the commissioner. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d at 113.

Given the foregoing analysis, it is apparent the superior court judge had authority to not only reverse the commissioner's decision regarding whether Ms. Lyle had established grounds for modification, but also to provide an appropriate remedy. The judge could have remanded the case to the commissioner had the factual record been incomplete. In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). But doing so was not required. Because the factual record was complete, the superior court judge had full jurisdiction to decide Ms. Lyle's child support modification petition in its entirety. By exercising complete authority over the matter, the judge appropriately placed Ms. Lyle on equal footing with litigants whose cases are handled by superior court judges in their entirety. Remand to the commissioner for entry of child support orders would have been inefficient and contrary to the fundamental goals of the court commissioner process.

Mr. Lyle complains that the superior court judge's determination deprived him of an opportunity to argue for a deviation from the standard child support schedule. We are unpersuaded. The ultimate issue before both the commissioner and the judge was Ms. Lyle's request for child support payments based on her proposed child support worksheet. Mr. Lyle was provided ample opportunity to resist Ms. Lyle's request in its entirety. Yet he never specifically requested a deviation. Instead, he focused on the foundational issue of whether Ms. Lyle had presented a sufficient basis for modification. The fact that Mr. Lyle's litigation strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful does not now require that he receive a new hearing. The procedure employed by the superior court judge was appropriate, and the court's decision on revision is affirmed in full.

Prior to modification, neither parent had been obliged to make support payments as the parents had entered into a shared parenting plan. --------

APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES

Ms. Lyle requests a discretionary award of attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140. She has filed a financial declaration in compliance with RAP 18.1, indicating her monthly expenses exceed her net income. Mr. Lyle has not filed an answer to the financial declaration. Based on Ms. Lyle's successful defense of this appeal, her limited income, and the parties' disparate resources, we award reasonable costs and fees for this appeal to Ms. Lyle, provided she complies with RAP 18.1(d).

/s/_________


Pennell, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Fearing, C.J. /s/_________
Korsmo, J.