Aldridge v. State

ALLARD

NOTICE

Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Jane F. Kauvar, Judge.

Appearances: Robert John, Law Office of Robert John, Fairbanks, for the Appellant. David Buettner, Assistant District Attorney, Fairbanks, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Coats, Senior Judge.

Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).

Judge ALLARD.

James M. Aldridge was convicted of driving while under the influence (DUI). On appeal, he claims: (1) that the trooper who stopped him relied on a traffic regulation that did not apply to Aldridge's conduct; (2) that even if the regulation did apply, Aldridge did not violate it; (3) that the traffic stop was pretextual; (4) that the trooper improperly extended the traffic stop to investigate whether Aldridge was driving while under the influence; (5) that the police should be required to have probable cause (as opposed to reasonable suspicion) to believe that a driver is impaired before administering field sobriety tests; and (6) that, here, the trooper did not even have reasonable suspicion that Aldridge was impaired, hence it was unlawful to ask Aldridge to perform field sobriety tests.

Aldridge also claims that the district court wrongly denied his two motions to compel discovery. He asked the State for any written polices that addressed how soon troopers were to conduct a traffic stop after observing an infraction, and he asked the State for any information that might have been recorded by a GPS or any similar devices in the trooper's vehicle or equipment. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that Aldridge's claims lack merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

Background

On May 30, 2009, at about 10:30 p.m., Aldridge drove out of the parking lot of RJ's Lounge, a bar in Fairbanks. Alaska State Trooper Brian T. Zeisel stopped Aldridge because he witnessed Aldridge drive out of the RJ parking lot without stopping "immediately prior" to driving onto the roadway, in violation of 13 AAC 02.257.

Aldridge was the only person in the vehicle. Upon contacting Aldridge, Zeisel noticed a strong odor of alcohol, and saw that Aldridge had bloodshot and watery eyes. When asked, Aldridge denied having had anything to drink.

After securing Aldridge's driver's license, Trooper Zeisel returned to his vehicle and, in addition to checking the status of the driver's license and checking for warrants, he also checked Aldridge's criminal history. He discovered that Aldridge had prior DUI convictions.

Zeisel had Aldridge perform several field sobriety tests. After Aldridge failed all of the field sobriety tests, Aldridge was arrested for a DUI. A DataMaster test later showed that Aldridge's blood alcohol content was .116 percent, and an independent chemical test showed that his blood alcohol content was .122 percent.

Aldridge filed a number of pre-trial motions to suppress evidence and to compel discovery. His motions challenged the lawfulness of the traffic stop and sought to compel the State to provide trooper policies and GPS information. District Court Judge Jane F. Kauvar denied all of Aldridge's motions. Judge Kauvar later found Aldridge guilty of DUI following a bench trial.

AS 28.35.030(a).

The traffic regulation 13 AAC 02.257 applies to parking lots

Aldridge's first claim is that the traffic stop was unlawful because the traffic regulation for which he was stopped does not apply to his circumstances. Aldridge was stopped for violating 13 AAC 02.257, which — among other things — requires a driver who is entering a roadway from "an alley, building, private road, or driveway" to stop "immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley, building entrance, private road, or driveway."

Aldridge contends that because the regulation does not mention "parking lot," it does not apply to his case. He argues that a different regulation, 13 AAC 02.135, is applicable. This regulation provides that "[t]he driver of a vehicle about to enter a roadway from a place other than another roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway closely enough to present a hazard." This regulation does not require that a driver stop; instead, it requires only that the driver enter the roadway safely, yielding to any traffic already on the road.

13 AAC 02.135.

Judge Kauvar rejected this claim, ruling that 13 AAC 02.257 applies in this case. She found that parking lots have driveways and that Aldridge used the parking lot's driveway when he entered the roadway. The record supports this finding. A defense exhibit used at trial shows that the parking lot at RJ's Lounge has a curb cut and slightly-sloped paved area - i.e., a "driveway"- providing vehicular access from the street into and out of the main parking lot.

Additionally, we have already decided in a somewhat similar situation that "parking lots" are included in the definition of "private road or driveway." In Conner v. State, we had to decide whether the statute that prohibited driving with a suspended license applied when the person was driving in a parking lot. To do so, we also had to interpret 13 AAC 40.010(a)(37) which defined "private road or driveway" as follows:

696 P.2d 680, 682 (Alaska App. 1985).

(a) Unless otherwise provided or the context requires otherwise, in AS 28 [or] 13 AAC 02 ...
(37) "private road or driveway" means a way or place in private ownership used for vehicular travel by the owner or those having express or implied permission from the owner[.]

We concluded that this definition was broad enough to include the commercial parking lot at Carrs.

Id. at 681-82.

We likewise conclude that the parking lot at RJ's Lounge is included in the regulatory definition of a "private road or driveway." Accordingly, when Aldridge left the parking lot and entered the roadway, he was subject to the provisions of 13 AAC 02.257.

There was probable cause for the traffic stop

Aldridge next argues that even if the traffic regulation applies in his case, he did not violate the regulation because he did stop "prior" to crossing the sidewalk, even though he did not stop right before driving across the sidewalk. Aldridge argues that the term "immediately prior" should be understood as referring to "when" the driver must stop, not "where," and therefore his actions complied with the regulation even though he stopped his vehicle some distance from the sidewalk.

Judge Kauvar rejected Aldridge's argument below. She found that the trooper's vehicle was properly positioned to determine whether a driver complied with his or her obligation under the regulation and that the trooper's testimony that Aldridge had failed to comply was credible. Judge Kauvar was willing to credit Aldridge's own testimony that he had stopped earlier, outside of the trooper's vision, but she ruled that the earlier stop did not satisfy the regulation's requirements because Aldridge did not stop at the sidewalk. She also found that Aldridge would not have been able to determine whether it was safe to proceed from that earlier vantage point.

Our goal when interpreting a statute or regulation "is to ascertain and implement the intent of the legislature or agency that promulgated the statute or regulation." We conclude, as did Judge Kauvar, that the intent of the regulation is to protect the safety of others who are using the sidewalks. Looking at the term "immediately prior" in the context of 13 AAC 02.257, we conclude that the regulation requires a driver entering a roadway from a driveway to come to a stop at the sidewalk, not some distance away from it, as Aldridge argues.

Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992); see also State, Dep't of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 603 n.24 (Alaska 1978) ("Administrative regulations which are legislative in character are interpreted using the same principles applicable to statutes.").

Moreover, the real issue here is not whether Aldridge violated 13 AAC 02.257, but rather whether Trooper Zeisel had probable cause to believe that Aldridge violated the regulation. Probable cause exists when police have reasonably trustworthy information to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. In other words, it is not necessary for a police officer's observations to conclusively establish that a driver had violated a traffic ordinance. Rather, the question is whether the officer's observations would warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that the driver had done so. Based on Judge Kauvar's findings, which Aldridge does not challenge as clearly erroneous on appeal, we conclude that Trooper Zeisel had probable cause to stop Aldridge for violating 13 AAC 02.257.

State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 631 (Alaska App. 1990).

See Saucier v. State, 869 P.2d 483, 484 (Alaska App. 1994) (existence of probable cause is mixed question of law and fact and this Court accepts the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous).

The traffic stop was not an unlawful pretext to search for evidence that Aldridge was driving under the influence

Aldridge claims that Trooper Zeisel "used an unreasonable police procedure and followed Aldridge onto several different roadways" before stopping Aldridge for the traffic violation. He contends that the delay demonstrated the traffic stop was merely a pretext to search for evidence that Aldridge was driving under the influence.

Prior to trial, Aldridge moved to suppress all evidence obtained through the stop on these grounds. He also moved to compel discovery on any written State Trooper policies concerning traffic stops.

At the later hearing, Trooper Zeisel testified that he had stopped Aldridge as soon as it was practical to do so. He explained at some length why he was unable to stop Aldridge right after he saw the traffic violation.

Trooper Zeisel also testified that there was no written policy that he was aware of on how to specifically conduct a traffic stop. Nor was there a policy telling troopers that they had to conduct a traffic stop within a particular time frame or distance after a trooper observes a traffic violation. Rather, troopers are trained to make the traffic stop as soon as it is practical and safe to do so.

Judge Kauvar found Trooper Zeisel's explanations for the delay were credible and she further found that he had stopped Aldridge "not very far down the road." Based on the testimony at the hearing, she ruled that any delay in making the traffic stop was not an unreasonable police practice. She therefore denied Aldridge's motion to suppress and also denied his motion to compel, finding that there was no evidence any such written policies existed or that they would be relevant in this case given her factual determination that Trooper Zeisel had stopped Aldridge as soon as it was safe and practical to do so.

The record supports Judge Kauvar's findings, and we find no error in the denial of either of Aldridge's motions.

The trooper did not unlawfully extend the duration of the stop

Aldridge also claims that Trooper Zeisel unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop when he checked for Aldridge's prior DUI history while checking the status of Aldridge's driver's license. Aldridge relies on Brown v. State, where this Court explained that a traffic stop must "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."

182 P.3d 624, 625 (Alaska App. 2008) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1219, 1325-26, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).

But we have also held that police conducting a lawful traffic stop may properly investigate a potential DUI if, during their contact with the driver, evidence of a DUI comes to light. Here, Trooper Zeisel testified that, upon contacting Aldridge for the traffic violation, he noticed a strong odor of alcohol, and saw that Aldridge had bloodshot and watery eyes. Trooper Zeisel said at that moment, he believed Aldridge might be driving under the influence. Trooper Zeisel then returned to his vehicle to check the status of Aldridge's driver's license and vehicle registration and to see if he had any outstanding warrants.

Russell v. Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687, 689 (Alaska App. 1985) ("[A]dditional facts warranted the officers' shift of focus from the obscured rear window to the risk that Russell might be driving while intoxicated.").

In his brief, Aldridge concedes that checking the status of a driver's license and registration and for proof of insurance and outstanding warrants is within the proper scope of a traffic stop. He also concedes that these checks usually take just a matter of minutes, and are "well-established as a part of the 'routine.'" But he claims that Trooper Zeisel's check of Aldridge's history for prior DUIs was completely irrelevant to the purpose of the traffic stop in his case and therefore inappropriate.

But by the time the criminal history check occurred, the stop had already expanded into a DUI investigation. Trooper Zeisel testified that his suspicion that Aldridge was driving under the influence preceded his check of Aldridge's history and that his decision to conduct field sobriety tests was based on his initial contact with Aldridge, not the later criminal history check. Here, unlike Brown, the check of Aldridge's DUI history was reasonably related to evidence Zeisel lawfully observed during the traffic stop - evidence indicating that Aldridge was driving under the influence.

Aldridge relies on Professor LaFave's treatise on search and seizure for the proposition that criminal history checks should be disfavored in the context of simple traffic stops. But Professor LaFave's treatise recognizes that checking a driver's criminal history for "prior convictions, prior arrests, and the like" has - like checking for warrants - "become a part of a routine computer check performed incident to the traffic stop" and is generally upheld by most courts. Additionally, while Professor LaFave supports limiting this practice because of the concerns that it may unlawfully extend otherwise routine traffic stops, he would permit the practice in situations such as here where "there also exists a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal conduct."

5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.3(c), at 517-18 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Id. at 519.

Aldridge has provided no authority supporting his claim that under the circumstances of this case, Trooper Zeisel's check of his criminal history was unlawful or that the check unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop.

Trooper Zeisel had reasonable suspicion to investigate Aldridge for driving under the influence

Aldridge contends that Trooper Zeisel's initial contact with Aldridge did not give the trooper reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation.

An investigative stop must be supported by "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." The test is an objective one: did the facts known to the officer at the time reasonably warrant the investigative stop? Because the test is objective, it does not matter how the officer was subjectively analyzing the situation at the time. As we recognized in Hamilton v. State, "the State is allowed to rely on an after-the-fact justification, so long as the facts known to the officers at the time of the investigative stop are sufficient to establish the legal foundation for this justification."

Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 45 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed 2d 889, 906 (1968)).

Id.

59 P.3d 760, 764 (Alaska App. 2002) (citing Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska App. 1992)).

Here, Trooper Zeisel observed Aldridge commit a moving traffic violation after leaving a bar. Upon contacting Aldridge, Zeisel perceived a strong odor of alcohol in Aldridge's vehicle, and Aldridge was the only person in the vehicle. Zeisel also observed that Aldridge had bloodshot and watery eyes.

On appeal, Aldridge argues that the State is barred from relying on all of these facts because the district court did not expressly rely on all of these facts when the district court denied Aldridge's suppression motion.

When the district court issued its ruling, the court noted that Aldridge had committed a traffic violation as he was leaving a bar, and that Trooper Zeisel detected the smell of alcoholic beverages in the vehicle when he contacted Aldridge. Aldridge emphasizes that the district court never made specific findings as to whether Aldridge had bloodshot and watery eyes, or whether the odor of alcohol in Aldridge's vehicle was strong or faint. Because the district court neglected to mention these things, Aldridge argues that we must ignore these facts when we assess whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to investigate Aldridge for driving under the influence.

But Aldridge's argument ignores the principle that, even when disputed factual issues are not expressly resolved by the lower court when it announces its findings, an appellate court must nevertheless view the evidence in the light most favorable to the lower court's ruling.

State v. Joubert, 20 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 2001); Stumbaugh v. State, 599 P.2d 166, 173 n.15 (Alaska 1979); Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App. 1991); Hubert v. State, 638 P.2d 677, 683 (Alaska App. 1981).

Here, the district court obviously credited Trooper Zeisel's testimony when the court gave its reasons for denying Aldridge's suppression motion. Aldridge did not ask the district court to expressly resolve the issues that he now declares were still in dispute (e.g., how strong the odor of alcohol was inside Aldridge's vehicle or whether Aldridge's eyes were bloodshot and watery). Nor did Aldridge ask the court to clarify whether the court accepted all of Trooper Zeisel's testimony or only some of it.

Because Aldridge failed to request rulings on (or clarifications of) these issues in the district court, we apply the normal assumption that the district court resolved these factual disputes in accord with its ruling. And viewing the evidence in this light, the facts known to Trooper Zeisel gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Aldridge was driving under the influence.

Should this Court reverse its decision in McCormick v. Anchorage?

Aldridge asserts that police should need probable cause, not just reasonable suspicion, before they can ask a driver to do field sobriety tests, and that we wrongly decided this issue in McCormick v. Anchorage.

999 P.2d 155, 161-62 (Alaska App. 2000).

But in Erickson v. State, we said that

[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, a litigant who asks an appellate court to overrule a prior decision must demonstrate convincing reasons why the existing rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions. The litigant must also demonstrate that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent.

Aldridge supports his assertion that the McCormick decision was wrongly decided by relying on Oregon and Colorado cases construing their respective state constitutions. But in McCormick, we found these same cases unpersuasive. And in Galimba v. Anchorage, we again rejected a similar argument.

999 P.2d at 160-61.

19 P.3d 609, 611-12 (Alaska App. 2001).

Aldridge has not shown that McCormick was wrong when it was decided, that it is no longer sound because of changed conditions, or that "more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent." In short, Aldridge has not carried his burden of showing why this Court should overrule our decision in McCormick.

Erickson, 950 P.2d at 587.
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Aldridge's motion to compel disclosure of the GPS monitor

Aldridge claims that Judge Kauvar should have compelled the State to provide him with electronic data indicating the precise whereabouts of Trooper Zeisel's vehicle at the time he saw Aldridge's traffic violation. He argues that this information would have addressed "one of the key issues related to the legality or illegality of the stop." He also claims that this information would have allowed him to impeach Trooper Zeisel's credibility because it could have shown that his testimony was erroneous.

Aldridge made his motion to compel long after the first evidentiary hearing occurred. At that hearing, Aldridge did not contest the trooper's testimony as to his location when he observed Aldridge's traffic violation.

After presenting evidence at the initial hearing, the parties agreed to allow Judge Kauvar to view the scene to determine whether Trooper Zeisel's location allowed him to see the area where he said the violation occurred. Judge Kauvar, relying on the testimony of both Trooper Zeisel and Aldridge, spent "considerable time" viewing the scene. She found that Zeisel was positioned where he could see the traffic offense.

Based on this finding, Judge Kauvar denied the motion to compel GPS-type information (if any such information actually existed) because she found that Aldridge had not shown that the information was relevant to his case. She ruled that Aldridge had not provided any good reason to reopen the evidentiary hearing to re-litigate the trooper's location at the time he saw the traffic violation.

Under Criminal Rule 16(b)(7), a court has the discretion to require disclosure to defense counsel of "relevant material" not covered by other subsections of Rule 16. Here, Judge Kauvar found that the information was not relevant because Aldridge had never contested the trooper's location or Judge Kauvar's own findings. We conclude that Judge Kauvar did not abuse her discretion when she denied the motion to compel.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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