State v. Eaglin

McCLENDON, J.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana
No. 519994
Honorable Scott Gardner, Judge Presiding Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
and
Kathryn W. Landry
Attorney for the State
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Katherine M. Franks
Abita Springs, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Keefer Lamar Eaglin
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ. McCLENDON, J.

Defendant, Keefer Lamar Eaglin, was charged by bill of information with forcible rape, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42.1, and he entered a plea of not guilty. After a trial by jury, defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court denied his motion for new trial and motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal. Defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:529.1A(1), and sentenced to eighty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant now appeals, assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.

The State presented predicate convictions consisting of a 1999 conviction of possession of cocaine in the 27th Judicial District Court, and 2009 convictions of identity theft at a value of five hundred dollars or more and theft at a value of three hundred or more, but less than five hundred dollars, in the 22nd Judicial District Court (the district of the current case). The trial court granted the motion to quash the 1999 predicate.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 16, 2012, C.B. (the thirteen-year-old victim) left her New Orleans home by taxicab without the knowledge or permission of her mother, who was at home when she left, but did not see her leave. When the victim's mother realized she was not at home, she contacted the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). Defendant, whom the victim started communicating with after she created a profile on a social network, made arrangements with the victim for them to meet in person for the first time at his residence in Slidell that day. According to the victim, shortly after her arrival at defendant's residence, he forced her to engage in sexual intercourse without her consent. After sexual acts took place, including vaginal and oral intercourse, the victim left defendant's residence, initially on foot. Defendant followed her in his vehicle and told her to get into the vehicle and that he would give her a ride. When defendant stopped at a gas station in New Orleans East, the victim got out of the car and ran to a nearby hotel. The victim called her family and reported the incident. Her family then informed the police of the victim's whereabouts. The victim was interviewed by the police and taken to Children's Hospital in New Orleans where an examination revealed vaginal trauma. The victim was subsequently interviewed at Children's Hospital and at the Children's Advocacy Center (CAC). During her interviews, the victim indicated that defendant repeatedly pushed her onto his bed, would not allow her to get up or leave the room, forced her legs open, and repeatedly forced her to engage in sexual acts. Defendant was interviewed after his arrest and denied having sex with the victim. Thereafter, in a subsequent interview, defendant admitted to sexual intercourse, but contended that it was consensual. Defendant maintained that he was unaware of the victim's actual age.

In reference to the victim and her family members, only initials or "the victim" will be used herein. See LSA-R.S. 46:1844W.

Based on the date of birth provided in the bill of information (October 12, 1979), defendant was thirty-two years old at the time of the offense.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In the first assignment of error, defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Defendant notes that after weeks of communication by texts and emails, the victim arranged to meet with him in person, packed a bag to bring with her, and arrived by taxicab. He further notes that he had sex with the victim when she arrived, but contends that it was consensual. Defendant further contends that the victim never seemed concerned for her safety, did not use the cell phone that she had with her, and never stated that he threatened her with any physical violence. Contending that the State used the victim's vaginal injuries as evidence of force, defendant notes that Nurse Lupin agreed that the vaginal tears could have been the result of inadequate lubrication. In arguing that there was no showing of violence, defendant notes that he did not kidnap, beat, or threaten the victim, and that the bedroom door was not locked. Defendant further argues while the victim stated that he pushed her down onto the bed, that fact did not rise to the force necessary to justify the verdict.

In the summary of his arguments, defendant indicated that the victim gave inconsistent statements that should have caused the jury to be suspicious as to her trial testimony with regard to the lack of consent.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; LSA-Const. art. I, § 2. The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as adopted by the legislature in enacting LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821, requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The Jackson standard of review is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the trier of fact must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Graham, 02-1492 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 416, 420.

In accordance with LSA-R.S. 14:41, the elements of rape include: 1) the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse; 2) with a male or female person; 3) without lawful consent of the victim; 4) emission is not necessary and any sexual penetration, vaginal or anal, however slight is sufficient to complete the rape. In accordance with LSA-R.S. 14:42.1, in pertinent part, forcible rape is rape committed when the victim is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably believes such resistance would not prevent the rape. LSA-R.S. 14:42.1A(1).

The victim's mother, E.B., formally adopted the victim when she was a toddler and has had custody of her since infancy. E.B. testified that she bought the victim a laptop computer for Christmas in 2011, less than a month before the instant offense. She recalled that she was participating in a Martin Luther King Day parade on the day of the offense. She noted that the victim left their home in New Orleans that morning despite the fact that she instructed her daughter to stay inside until it was time to leave for the parade. E.B. testified that she initially drove around the block to look for the victim and considered giving her time to return home before she called the NOPD, noting that the victim was only thirteen years old and had never left the home on her own without permission before this incident. She filed a missing person's report and provided the police with a photograph of the victim. As the police were filling out the report, one of E.B.'s other daughters informed her that the victim called screaming and hollering before the phone abruptly disconnected. Once the victim called another sister who lived in Virginia, E.B. learned that the victim was at a hotel in New Orleans East. E.B. notified the police and a unit was sent to the victim's location. E.B. noted that when she met the victim at the police station, the victim was sad, had been crying, and was afraid that she had disappointed her mother by being disobedient. Before the information was revealed at the police station, E.B. was unaware of the fact that the victim had created a profile for a social website. On cross-examination, E.B. confirmed that the victim took cash and a debit card from her purse before the victim left the home on the morning of the incident. After the victim gave a statement to the police, E.B. was instructed to take her to Children's Hospital, and E.B. complied.

E.B. noted that the victim was initially outgoing, but that her behavior changed after the offense, specifically stating that she no longer cared about her appearance, had gained a lot of weight, was often depressed, and would often get upset and cry while at school and request to be checked out early. She noted that the victim had been briefly hospitalized for depression after the incident.

Lisa Lupin, a registered nurse at Children's Hospital (an expert witness in the field of pediatric nursing and execution of child sexual assault kits) conducted a sexual assault examination of the victim when she was brought to the hospital on the day of the offense. She noted that the victim was very quiet when she arrived. Along with Nurse Lupin, the examination was conducted by Dr. Lucinda McClaslin, a pediatrician at the hospital. Nurse Lupin testified as follows regarding the findings documented in the physician notes: "Hymenal ring is torn. Lacerations extend from the post -- which would be posterior -- fourchette into the vagina approximately 6.5 centimeters into the vaginal orifice at six o'clock." The victim's clothing was collected and the victim's blood was drawn. Noting that she was not a forensic physician, during cross-examination, Nurse Lupin confirmed that she could not testify as to the cause of the victim's vaginal trauma. After being questioned regarding the possibility of trauma being caused by a child victim having intercourse for the first time or engaging in multiple sex acts, she stated that any sex act could have caused the trauma. On re-direct examination, Nurse Lupin noted that the victim's vaginal trauma may have looked different the next day after the incident, confirming that bruising can become more observable during the days after the trauma is endured.

Detective Alvin Hotard of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office major crimes unit was notified of the reported rape late that afternoon. The victim was still at Children's Hospital in New Orleans when he and another detective arrived, and he interviewed the victim. He noted that the victim was sitting very quietly. During the interview, the victim stated that defendant had sex with her against her will after she arrived at his residence. She stated that she wanted to watch a movie and that defendant started to remove her clothing against her will and raped her. She indicated that he forcefully inserted his penis into her vagina, that it was painful, and that she wanted him to stop. She stated that defendant stopped and went outside when a car horn was blown outside. At that point, she put her clothes on and tried to leave, but he came back inside and raped her again. She stated that when she got dressed again and exited the residence on foot, defendant followed her in his vehicle and told her he would drive her home. Arrangements were made for the victim to be interviewed at the CAC. During cross-examination, Detective Hotard confirmed that the police report showed that the victim initially stated that she was kidnapped by three people from the porch of her home.

Detective Hotard used information retrieved from the victim's cell phone and computer to obtain a photograph of defendant and verified his identity with the victim. After defendant's full name and address were ascertained, an arrest warrant was obtained, and defendant was arrested on January 17, 2012, the day after the offense. After being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, defendant gave a statement. He indicated that he believed the victim was younger than nineteen years old. He confirmed that the victim ran away when he stopped at the gas station. Defendant denied having any sexual contact with the victim. On January 19, 2012, Sergeant Bryan Ocull of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office obtained a search warrant to secure DNA samples from defendant. He retrieved a saliva sample after meeting defendant at the St. Tammany Parish Jail where he was being housed.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Tara Brown, a forensic DNA analyst and expert in forensic DNA science, performed the DNA analysis in this case on the sex crime kits from the victim and defendant. Defendant was found to be a minor DNA donor in the pubic hair combings taken from the victim during her sexual assault examination (the victim was the major DNA donor of the profile). The results confirmed that defendant's DNA came into contact with the victim's pubic hair.
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After the DNA sample was taken from defendant, Sergeant Ocull was notified that defendant wished to give another statement. After being re-Mirandized, defendant gave a recorded statement. Defendant noted that after the victim arrived in a taxicab, he paid the driver, and they went into his bedroom. He further stated that they watched television for a while. Defendant noted that when they were arranging the meeting, he told the victim to bring pajamas and an outfit to wear on a date. As they watched television, he asked her if she wanted to wear her pajamas so she could be comfortable. He noted that the victim started undressing and that they had sex. He stated that the victim never said no and did not complain about pain while they were having sex. Defendant stated that afterwards he left the room to smoke a cigarette, and when he came back, the victim stated that her stomach was hurting. He offered her food and something to drink, but she declined. He left the room again to go outside to smoke, and when he returned, the victim was dressed and wanted to use the bathroom. He noted that she then went outside and started walking down the street. He asked her where she was going and told her he would take her to get something to eat. Defendant stated that after the victim got into his vehicle, he kept asking her what was wrong because she was "fidgety" and moving around, and she told him that she felt bad about lying to her mother. Defendant further stated that he was puzzled by her explanation because he thought the victim was nineteen years old. He further noted that the victim told him she was in college. He stated that he asked her if she wanted him to take her home, but she told him she did not want to go home. He stated that the victim told him to let her out on the highway. When the vehicle's low-gas light came on, defendant stopped at a gas station, and the victim left on foot. He stated that he later learned that the victim was only thirteen years old. He noted that when the victim was at his house, his wife was at work, and his teenage son was in the opposite end of the house and had not yet gotten up for the day. He denied ever hitting or forcing the victim to have sex.

On January 26, 2012, Joshua Long, a CAC forensic interviewer, conducted the interview of the victim at Audrey Hepburn Care Center. During the interview, the victim noted that her mother did not allow her to go places, and while trying to find someone she could relate to, she began communicating with defendant on a social network website called "Tagged" a couple of weeks before the offense in early January. She stated that shortly after they began communicating, defendant told her that it would be nice if they met in person. The morning of the offense, she called a taxicab to take her to Slidell to meet defendant, and he paid the driver when she arrived at his residence. Upon arrival, she noticed that defendant was older than she thought he would be. She stated that she wanted to watch a movie, and defendant initially agreed. After a while, however, defendant began trying to remove the victim's shirt, and she told him to stop, but he continued to try to remove her clothes. As she repeatedly told him no, he told her to just listen to him and pushed her onto his bed and removed her clothing. She stated that when defendant "started raping" her, she told him it hurt, but he kept "doing it." Defendant began kissing her and repeatedly told her to calm down, as she continued to tell him to stop. He would not allow her to get off the bed as she repeatedly attempted to get up. She stated that defendant did not want to stop, despite the fact that she was in pain. She ultimately stopped resisting after repeated failed attempts to stop defendant.

When asked what she meant by rape, the victim specified that defendant "kept trying to have sex" with her and ultimately did so. She noted that every time she told him no, he would not stop, but instead kept trying to open her legs and kept trying to get her to be still. She noted that at one point when she tried to get up, he turned her over and continued to try to have sex with her. She clarified that when she used the term sex, she meant that defendant put his penis in her vagina. She stated that as she repeatedly told defendant no and that she wasn't ready, he kept trying and pulling her legs open. She stated that after a while, he was able to open her legs enough to put his penis in her vagina. She stated that it hurt and that although she told him to stop, he kept going. Defendant told her to calm down or it was just going to hurt worse.

The victim also stated that defendant tried to make her "suck on his penis" and ultimately put his penis in her mouth. She noted that defendant stopped when someone pulled up outside of his home. When defendant walked outside to bring something to the visitor, she put her clothes on and tried to leave. Before she could exit the house, defendant came back inside and began trying to remove her clothes again. She stated that he was ultimately able to pull her clothes "half-way down" and again tried to penetrate her. She stated that he ultimately put his penis in her vagina again. The victim further stated that defendant "tried his best to keep me still as possible" and told her that if she wanted it to hurt less, she had to do what he told her to do. She noted that every time she tried to get up, he would push her back down. She noted that he rolled her over more than once and started pulling her hair as she tried to move. She further stated that defendant was "hit[ting] me on my back" and repeatedly told her that she would have to listen to him. She stated that she was in continuous pain as defendant put his penis in her vagina "over and over." As she started crying, defendant eventually allowed her to leave the room. She noted that when she got dressed and left the home on foot, defendant approached her in his vehicle, stated that he would give her a ride and told her to get into his vehicle. When he stopped at a gas station, she ran to a nearby hotel and made contact with her sister. She admitted that she initially indicated that she was kidnapped by three men and did not want her family to know about the incident.

On January 31, 2012, Ann Troy, a CAC nurse practitioner at the Audrey Hepburn Care Center, interviewed the victim when she was brought to Children's Hospital for a follow-up visit. The victim was experiencing her menstrual cycle that day and was not physically examined. During the interview, the victim described the incident consistent with her CAC interview. She again described forced, painful, unwanted sexual and oral intercourse. She again stated that she told defendant no and that he kept trying until he was able to remove her clothing and rape her. She also consistently described how defendant stopped when someone came to his house and walked outside, but reentered and raped her again. She stated that she initially tried to walk home, but defendant followed her and told her to get into his vehicle, and that she ran to a hotel when he stopped at a gas station. She noted that she experienced bleeding along with the pain from the intercourse.

Although Nurse Troy was not present during the physical examination of the victim on the day of the offense, she reviewed the evaluations with her peers and testified as an expert in the field of child sexual abuse. Nurse Troy testified that the victim's injury was highly suggestive of penetrating blunt trauma. She noted that despite the finding of trauma in this case, it was normal for there to be no bleeding or trauma when female virgins have sexual intercourse for the first time, specifically noting that ninety-five percent of the children she examined in child sexual abuse cases did not have any trauma. She noted that the laceration in this case was located beyond the hymen in the floor of the vaginal wall, between the victim's anus and vagina, consistent with vaginal penetration.

The victim was fifteen years old by the time of the trial. She testified that without the knowledge of her mother, who she described as strict, she started using a website called "Tagged" at the end of 2011 in an attempt to meet new friends. She provided an older age when setting up her profile in order to bypass the parental authorization that was required based on her actual age. She noted that shortly after she created the profile, defendant "tagged" her, and they began communicating back and forth electronically. They ultimately made plans to see each other in person, and she arranged for a taxicab to bring her to defendant's residence on the day in question. She noted that she grabbed the bag that she packed and took her mother's credit card from the counter without her permission before leaving home. Defendant sent her a text message with his address in Slidell, and she gave the information to the taxicab driver.

When she arrived at defendant's residence, she used her cell phone to call him, and he came outside and paid the taxicab fee. The victim testified that after entering the home she was raped by defendant, which she defined as being "forced to have sex." She stated that she did not go there with the intention to have sex and that she told defendant that she did not want to have sex. She stated that defendant pulled her clothes off without her permission and forced her to do something that she was not ready to do. She specifically stated that defendant put his penis inside her vagina. She stated that defendant repeatedly pushed her down as she tried to get off of his bed. Consistent with her pretrial interviews, the victim confirmed that defendant penetrated her more than once, that he stopped and walked outside when a car pulled up, that she got dressed and tried to leave, and that defendant reentered the home before she could leave, removed her clothing, and raped her again. Her trial testimony also consistently indicated that defendant ultimately drove her to New Orleans and that she ran to a hotel when he stopped at a gas station. When specifically questioned as to what happened while defendant was driving on the interstate, the victim testified that she tried to open the car door. Regarding defendant's actions in response to her attempt to open the car door, she stated he "[p]ulled me back."

The victim admitted that she lied when she initially told the police that she was kidnapped and explained that she did so because she did not want her family to know what happened and thought that they would no longer be proud of her. During cross-examination, she confirmed that defendant did not verbally threaten her and stated that she did not know if there were any bruises on her body.

As indicated, defendant ultimately admitted to having sexual intercourse with the victim. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Gordon, 582 So.2d 285, 292-93 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. State v. Hampton, 97-2096 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 716 So.2d 417, 418; State v. Orgeron, 512 So.2d 467, 469 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 113 (La. 1988). In finding defendant guilty of forcible rape, it is obvious that the jury believed the testimony and pretrial statements of the victim and rejected the defense's claim of consensual sexual intercourse. While, as defendant notes, the victim initially gave inconsistent statements about being kidnapped, as opposed to taking a taxicab to defendant's residence, she consistently indicated that defendant physically forced her to engage in sexual intercourse.

Defendant cites on appeal the case of State v. Powell, 438 So.2d 1306, 1308 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 443 So.2d 585 (La. 1983), wherein our brethren of the third circuit reversed a defendant's forcible rape conviction after finding that the evidence therein was insufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was prevented from resisting the act by threats of force or physical violence under the circumstances. Therein, the victim testified that she entered the defendant's car after he agreed to bring her to her cousin's residence located nearby. The defendant then allegedly brought the victim to a secluded area and threatened to kill her when she refused to have sexual intercourse with him. The victim stated that the defendant slapped her in the face three or four times while threatening to kill her. He allegedly threatened to use a weapon which, he had indicated, was under the seat of the car. The victim admitted that she never saw the weapon (or an object of any type) which the defendant threatened to kill her with. The victim testified that following these incidents, they each removed their own pants, and the defendant had intercourse with her on the front seat of the car. Thereafter, the defendant brought the victim to where she initially approached him that evening, and the victim sought help from nearby friends, who in turn contacted the police. In reversing the conviction, the majority reasoned, "There was no showing, however, of resistance on the part of the victim and very little evidence that she was prevented from resisting by force or threats of physical violence under the circumstances." Powell, 438 So.2d at 1307-08.

We note that this court is not persuaded by the reasoning in Powell, and previously rejected that case in State v. Savario, 97-2614 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 721 So.2d 1084, 1088, writ denied, 98-3032 (La. 4/1/99), 741 So.2d 1280. This Court has held that a victim need not suffer physical harm to constitute the degree of physical force or threat of physical violence necessary to support a conviction of forcible rape. State v. Montana, 533 So.2d 983, 988 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 541 So.2d 852 (La. 1989). The showing of resistance and force was strong in this case. The victim herein indicated that defendant ignored her repeated verbal rejections, pulled off her clothes against her will, pushed her every time she attempted to get away, forcefully pried her legs open, and was ultimately able to overcome her resistance and have unwanted sexual intercourse with her. The credibility of the witnesses' testimony is a matter of the weight of the evidence. A determination of the weight to be given evidence is a question of fact for the trier of fact not subject to appellate review. State v. Tate, 506 So.2d 546, 551 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 511 So.2d 1152 (La. 1987).

In this case, defendant has contended that the sexual acts were consensual and that the evidence of the use of force was insufficient. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied. 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). Under the circumstances herein, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the victim did believe, and believed reasonably, that further resistance would be futile and would not prevent the rape. In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State, we are convinced that any rational trier of fact could find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of the hypotheses of innocence raised by defendant as to the instant offense, all of the elements of forcible rape. Based on the foregoing, we find that the first assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In the second assignment of error, defendant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive under the circumstances of this case. Defendant also notes that the imposed sentence is five times longer than the sentence offered as a part of a plea agreement that he did not accept. Defendant notes that his criminal history did not involve sexual offenses and he is not a sexual predator. He argues that the maximum sentence is not supported by the record. In this regard, he contends that he did not know the victim's age until after the offense, and notes that the sentences imposed in other cases for egregious offenders were not as severe as the sentence imposed in this case. Defendant also notes that he never threatened the victim or displayed a weapon to compel her to have sex. Defendant argues that the imposition of imprisonment for a period that exceeds his natural life span is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. Noting that the victim misrepresented her age, packed a bag, and took a taxicab to his residence, defendant contends that the trial court failed to consider that the victim's own actions may have induced or facilitated the commission of the offense. Defendant also argues that it does not appear from the record that the victim gave a clear signal that she did not want to engage in sex. Finally, Defendant notes that he suffers from diabetes and glaucoma.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive or cruel punishment. Although a sentence may fall within statutory limits, it may nevertheless violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm caused to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982).

The Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth, in Article 894.1, items which must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of factors, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the guidelines. In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review of individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. Tate, 506 So.2d at 552.

Whoever commits the crime of forcible rape shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and not more than forty years. At least two years of the sentence shall be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. LSA-R.S. 14:42.1B. As noted, defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender. He was subjected to a sentence of twenty to eighty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. See LSA-R.S. 15:529.1A(1) ("for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction"). See also State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La. 1981) ("It is not a crime to be an habitual offender. The statute increases the sentence for a recidivist. The penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the reference statute."). As noted, after being adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender, defendant was sentenced to eighty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

The determination and definition of acts that are punishable as crimes is purely a legislative function. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1278 (La. 1993). It is the legislature's prerogative to determine the length of the sentence imposed for crimes classified as felonies. Moreover, courts are charged with applying these punishments unless they are found to be unconstitutional. Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1278. Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for cases involving the most serious violations of the offense charged and the worst type of offender. However, a trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). See also State v. Savario, 97-2614 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 721 So.2d 1084, 1089, writ denied, 98-3032 (La. 4/1/99), 741 So.2d 1280.

In imposing the sentence herein, the trial court considered the testimony presented at the trial concerning the vulnerability and extreme youth of the victim and defendant's actions in luring her to his residence. A thorough review of the record reveals that the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence. We find that the record, including the facts of the offense and the effect of defendant's actions on the victim, support the imposition of the maximum sentence in this case. The sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, and thus, is not unconstitutionally excessive. The second assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.

CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.