Duke v. State

Tommy Wayne Defer, Water Valley, attorney for appellant. Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
Before LEE, C.J., CARLTON and MAXWELL, JJ.

¶ 1. A jury convicted Patrick Duke of aggravated assault after he shot Howard Taper. On appeal, Duke challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. As he sees it, the jury got it wrong by not buying his version that he shot Taper in self-defense. But weight and credibility issues are for jurors to decide, not appellate judges. And here, the jury sifted through the conflicting testimony and resolved it against Duke.

¶ 2. Upon review, we find the evidence—which included Duke's admission that he shot Taper after going to the park to confront him—was sufficient to support that he committed a nonjustified aggravated assault and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We thus affirm Duke's conviction and sentence.

The jury was also given Instruction C–12:

[O]ne who claims self-defense to his actions may not use excessive force to repel the attack, but may only use such force as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Duke] caused bodily injury to [Taper] by shooting him and that said shooting was a use of more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case, then the defense of self-defense would not apply to this case.

¶ 17. Our review shows the jury was properly instructed on these three elements, and there was proof offered on each element. While Duke argues discrepancies in the evidence made it untrustworthy, “weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury.” Renfro v. State, 118 So.3d 560, 564 (¶ 14) (Miss.2013). And in the case of multiple witnesses, it is also the jury's call as to which of the witnesses to believe. Id.

¶ 18. To support his claim, Duke highlights some conflicts in testimony. For example, he points to Clyde's testimony that Taper was drunk and had been swigging Calvert whiskey from the bottle, which Taper denied. And he also mentions Taper's denial that he had threatened Duke earlier with a shotgun, when Duke and Butts testified he had. Though these are no doubt testimonial conflicts, appellate courts typically “do not reverse criminal cases where there is a straight issue of fact, or a conflict in the facts [.]” Hales v. State, 933 So.2d 962, 968–69 (¶ 24) (Miss.2006). Conflicts like these are the very purpose for which juries are empaneled—to pass upon questions of disputed fact. Id.

¶ 19. Still, these discrepancies aside, the fact remains that after his run-in with Taper at the stop sign—whether a gun was pulled or not—Duke could have simply let it go or called the police. But he did not. Instead, he admitted he went home, changed vehicles, then drove around town in an “enraged” state before going to the park armed with a pistol, intent on confronting Taper. Then he ended up shooting Taper. This much is not in dispute.

¶ 20. While Duke understandably hoped the jury would buy his version that Taper was running for a gun so the shooting was justified, the jury rejected his defense. Perhaps the jurors believed Taper's version that Duke shot him without provocation. Or maybe the jury felt Duke was not in imminent danger, or simply used more force than necessary to repel his older adversary. Any of these possible findings would be objectively reasonable based on the evidence—particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. But we need not speculate about the jurors' specific reasoning, since we are satisfied there was sufficient evidence to support a nonjustified aggravated-assault conviction.

¶ 21. Duke next challenges the weight of the evidence. His argument mirrors his attack on the sufficiency of the evidence—contradictions in witness testimony.

¶ 22. When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict[.]” Grossley, 127 So.3d at 1149 (¶ 19) (citing Bush, 895 So.2d at 844 (¶ 18)). To disturb a verdict on this ground, we would have to find it was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and an unconscionable injustice. Id. Our review requires we accept all evidence consistent with the defendant's guilt as true “together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” Crook, 105 So.3d at 364 (¶ 33) (quoting Young v. State, 891 So.2d 813, 821 (¶ 21) (Miss.2005)). “Any factual disputes are properly resolved by the jury and do not mandate a new trial.” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 859 So.2d 379, 385 (¶ 26) (Miss.2003)).

¶ 23. Again, we agree there were some inconsistencies in witness testimony, but these conflicts are simply not enough to warrant a new trial. Grossley, 127 So.3d at 1149 (¶ 20). Since the weight of the evidence is challenged, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. And considering Duke's admission that he was driving around “enraged” before going to the park to confront and fight Taper, and Taper's testimony that he did not provoke the shooting, we cannot say the weight of the evidence heavily preponderates against the verdict. The conflicting evidence Duke mentions was for the jury to decide as it saw fit, and the jurors decided the conflicts against Duke. Because the inferences the jury made were not unreasonable, and the verdict is not unconscionable, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

¶ 24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE QUITMAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN YEARS, WITH FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED AND TEN YEARS TO SERVE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO QUITMAN COUNTY.

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