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United States v. Duncan
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 13, 2011, a Grand Jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Defendant Keith Brent Duncan for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Defendant was arrested on February 22, 2012, and has remained in federal custody since then. He initially appeared before a Magistrate Judge on March 9, 2012. At his scheduled arraignment on March 15, 2012, Defendant requested a mental evaluation, delaying arraignment until after the evaluation. Pursuant to Rule 12.2 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(a) and (b), the Court ordered a competency examination.
On June 11, 2012, after a hearing and Defendant’s testimony, the Court found Defendant incompetent to stand trial due to a mental disease or defect and committed him for psychiatric evaluation. The Federal Medical Center in Butner diagnosed Defendant with Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type. The Government moved to forcibly medicate Defendant to restore competency, but Defendant opposed. The Court allowed Defendant to voluntarily undergo treatment, but he failed to comply. Subsequently, the Court denied the Government’s motion for forced medication and ordered the Defendant to remain in custody while the parties submitted further motions regarding the case's disposition.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on his incompetency, which the Court denied. On October 11, 2013, the Court committed Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 to assess whether release posed a substantial risk of harm. On October 9, 2013, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss based on his right to a speedy trial.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the indictment based on his statutory right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., should be granted despite his failure to enter a plea of not guilty.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 1995) | Speedy Trial Act protections are triggered only upon entry of a not guilty plea. | The Court relied on this case to hold that because Defendant has not entered a plea, the Speedy Trial Act’s seventy-day trial commencement requirement has not been triggered. |
| United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011) | The Speedy Trial Act applies only when a not guilty plea has been entered. | The Court cited this precedent to support the interpretation that without a plea, the Act’s timing provisions do not apply. |
| United States v. O'Dell, 154 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1998) | Entry of a not guilty plea is necessary to trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s clock, to conserve judicial resources and avoid unnecessary trial scheduling. | The Court used this precedent to reinforce that since Defendant never entered a plea, the Act’s speedy trial protections are not activated. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed Defendant’s reliance on the Speedy Trial Act, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), which mandates trial commencement within seventy days following the filing of an indictment or a defendant’s initial court appearance, whichever is later. However, the provision applies only to cases where a defendant has entered a not guilty plea. Because Defendant has not been arraigned or entered any plea—due to his mental competency issues and pending evaluation—the statutory speedy trial clock has not begun to run. The Court referenced binding and persuasive precedent from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which uniformly hold that the Speedy Trial Act protections are not triggered absent a not guilty plea. The Court declined to address constitutional speedy trial claims because Defendant’s memorandum focused solely on the statutory framework and did not cite Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Holding and Implications
DENIED: The Court denied Defendant Keith Brent Duncan’s Motion to Dismiss based on the Speedy Trial Act.
The direct effect of this ruling is that the indictment remains pending and the Government is not barred by the Speedy Trial Act from proceeding once Defendant becomes competent or enters a plea. The decision does not establish new legal precedent but applies existing law strictly to the facts, emphasizing that the Speedy Trial Act’s protections are contingent upon the entry of a plea, which has not occurred here.
Raymond A. Jackson
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERBefore the Court is Defendant Keith Brent Duncan's Motion to Dismiss Based on Defendant's Right to a Speedy Trial. Defendant filed his motion on October 9, 2013, and the Government filed its Response on October 21, 2013. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUNDOn December 13, 2011, an Eastern District of Virginia Grand Jury filed a Criminal Indictment against Defendant, charging him with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Defendant was arrested on February 22, 2012, and has been the custody of the United States since that date. On March 9, 2012, Defendant initially appeared before a United States Magistrate Judge. On March 15, 2012, Defendant appeared for arraignment, but a Magistrate Judge granted Defendant's motion for a mental evaluation and noted that arraignment would be set after the evaluation was received. On March 19, 2012, the Magistrate Judge ordered that the Defendant undergo examination to determine whether he may be suffering from a mental disease or defect under Rule 12.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 4241 (a) and (b).
On June 11, 2012, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's criminal responsibility and competency to stand trial, during which Defendant testified. The Court found that Defendant is suffering from a mental disease or defect that renders him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to properly assist in his defense. As such, the Court committed the Defendant to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and determination of the probability of future mental competency. On September 17, 2012, the staff at the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina ("Butner") diagnosed Defendant with Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type. On October 26, 2012, the Government filed its motion to forcibly medicate the Defendant in order to restore his mental competency to stand trial. On November 6, 2012, Defendant filed his Reply to that Motion. On December 17, 2012, Butner filed a treatment plan for Defendant and reaffirmed its belief that involuntary medical treatment is necessary.
On February 4, 2013, the Court held a hearing to consider the Government's Motion. Prior to the hearing, Defendant, through counsel, informed the Court and the Government that he wished to voluntarily submit to medical treatment so that he could be returned to competency and stand trial. The Court issued an order on February 7, 2013 directing that Defendant be returned to Butner for treatment for not more than four months in accordance with his own wishes. However, the Court warned that if the Defendant failed to comply with his treatment plan, the Court would schedule a hearing on the Government's motion. Upon returning to Butner, the Defendant failed to comply with the course of treatment and the Court held a hearing on May 21, 2013. On July 22, 2013, the Court entered an Order denying the Government's motion. In that Order, the Court ordered the Defendant to remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and directed the parties to submit motions relevant to the further disposition of the case in light of Defendant's lack of competence to stand trial within forty-five days.
On August 15, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment based on his lack of competency to stand trial. On October 11, 2013, the Court denied the Motion. On the same day, the Court ordered the Defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) and (b) to determine whether the Defendant's "release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another." On October 9, 2013, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.
II. DISCUSSIONAlthough Defendant states that he is relying on both his constitutional and statutory Speedy Trial rights, Mot. to Dismiss 2, Defendant's memorandum only discusses the statutory requirements and legal framework. It does not reference the Sixth Amendment or any of the relevant case law. Accordingly, the Court will address only Defendant's statutory Speedy Trial rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.
Defendant relies upon § 3161(c)(1) of the Act, which provides:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Defendant, however, has yet to be arraigned, because as noted above, when he appeared for arraignment he requested a mental evaluation. This provision, therefore, does not apply at all, as this is not a "case in which a plea of not guilty is entered" because Defendant has yet to make a plea. In United Slates v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 1995), the court held that Speedy Trial protections had not been triggered for a Defendant who was scheduled to be arraigned at the same time that he was to enter a plea of guilty or go to trial. Before that could occur, however, the district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss based on § 3161(c)(1). The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that "unless a defendant has entered a plea of not guilty, the provisions of that section have not been triggered." Other circuits have held the same. See, e.g., United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589, 594 (6th Cir. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011) ("[T]hc Speedy Trial Act applies only to cases in which the defendant has entered a not guilty plea."); United States v. O'Dell, 154 F.3d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The plain meaning of the language of the [Act] requires a not guilty plea to begin the clock running," a requirement whosc purpose "is to conserve judicial resources by avoiding unnecessary trial scheduling in cases where it is more likely that the defendant will plead guilty or nolo contendere."). IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to counsel for the Defendant, the United States Attorney, and Federal Bureau of Prisons.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Raymond A. Jackson
United States District Judge
Norfolk, Virginia
November 8, 2013
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