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Nolan v. LaBree

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 3, 2012

Judgment

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Case Summary: Robert Nolan & Celia Nolan v. Kristen LaBree & Jeffrey LaBree

Factual and Procedural Background

Kristen LaBree gave birth to a child on December 9, 2010. The child is genetically related to Robert Nolan (father) and Celia Nolan (egg provider/mother), but was gestated and born to Kristen LaBree (gestational carrier). Approximately nine months before the birth, a zygote created by in vitro fertilization using Celia Nolan's egg and Robert Nolan's sperm was implanted in Kristen. Despite the genetic parentage, a birth certificate listing Kristen and Jeffrey LaBree as the child's parents was filed with the Department of Health and Human Services.

On the day of the child's birth the Nolans filed a complaint in the District Court (Bangor) requesting an order declaring them the child's parents. After a testimonial, uncontested hearing, the District Court (Gunther, J.) declared Robert Nolan to be the father, but declined to declare Celia Nolan the child's mother, concluding it lacked statutory authority to declare maternity. The District Court did declare Celia to be the de facto mother and awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to the Nolans. The Nolans appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded the District Court erred in finding it lacked authority to declare maternity, vacated the judgment in part, and remanded for a judgment that Celia Nolan is the mother and that the LaBrees are not the parents of the child.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the District Court had statutory authority to declare maternity (legal parentage/motherhood) in this case where the genetic mother sought a judicial declaration despite the child having been gestationally carried and born to another woman.
Whether, in an uncontested proceeding in which the genetic parents seek a judgment of parentage and the gestational carrier and her husband expressly do not wish to be recognized as the child's parents, the court may determine that the genetic parents are the child's legal parents without additional proceedings.
Whether the Nolans were required to join the Department of Health and Human Services as a party to their action seeking a judgment of parentage (i.e., whether a judgment of parentage requires naming the Department as a defendant when the relief sought is a judicial determination, not an order directing the Department to act).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 2011 ME 123, 32 A.3d 1030	Supports the presumption that the Legislature's choice of plain, gender-neutral statutory language (here, "parentage") is intentional and that statutory analysis ends with the plain language when it is clear and not absurd.	The court invoked Russell to justify interpreting 19-A M.R.S. § 1556's use of the gender-neutral term "parentage" to include both paternity and maternity, concluding that the Legislature's word choice was intentional and dispositive.
Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 12 A.3d 783 (2011)	Cited for the principle that, under that state's law, a gestational carrier who lacks parental rights does not require termination of nonexistent rights before another's parental status can be determined.	The court cited Raftopol by analogy to support the proposition that in an undisputed case where genetic parents seek a declaration and the gestational carrier and her husband do not wish to be parents, the court may determine parentage without additional proceedings to terminate parental rights of the gestational carrier.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, relying only on the statutes and authorities referenced in the opinion:

Statutory authority for paternity: The court recognized that 19-A M.R.S. § 1553 provides clear statutory authority for the District Court to declare legal paternity, which supported the District Court's declaration that Robert Nolan is the child's father.
Statutory authority for parentage (including maternity): The court examined 19-A M.R.S. § 1556, which grants the District Court jurisdiction over actions to determine "parentage." The court concluded that the Legislature's use of the gender-neutral term "parentage" was intentional and that this term encompasses both paternity and maternity.
Titles vs. statutory text: The court noted that although § 1556 appears in the chapter titled the "Uniform Act on Paternity," chapter and section titles are not legal provisions; thus the chapter title did not limit the meaning of "parentage" in § 1556.
Application to the undisputed facts: Given the undisputed facts (the genetic relationship of the Nolans and the LaBrees' explicit position that they do not wish to be recognized as the child's parents), the court reasoned that the District Court had statutory authority to declare Celia Nolan to be the child's mother and to determine that the LaBrees are not the child's parents. The court explained there was no need for additional proceedings in such an uncontested case.
Analogous authority: The court cited Raftopol v. Ramey as a comparative authority supporting the view that where a gestational carrier lacks parental rights under applicable law, it is not necessary to terminate rights that do not exist before declaring another's parental status.
Limitations and procedural posture: The court emphasized that its decision addresses legal parentage in the context of an uncontested case in which all interested parties have been afforded due process and that the parties in this action agreed that the requested declaration was appropriate. The court therefore did not consider contested scenarios or the Nolans' constitutional arguments.
Department of Health and Human Services: The court explained that the Nolans were not required to join the Department as a defendant because they were seeking a judicial judgment of parentage (which they planned to submit to the Department to request correction of the birth certificate), not an order directing the Department to act; the Department would need to be named only if it later refused to correct the record and judicial relief was sought.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Judgment vacated in part. Remanded to the District Court for a judgment that Celia Nolan is the mother of the child, and that the LaBrees are not the parents of the child.

Implications:

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that the District Court erred in holding it lacked statutory authority to declare maternity and parentage under 19-A M.R.S. § 1556; the District Court must enter a judgment declaring Celia Nolan to be the child's mother and that the LaBrees are not the child's parents.
The court's ruling is limited to the undisputed procedural posture presented: genetic parents seeking a judgment of parentage and the gestational carrier and her husband expressly not seeking recognition as the child's parents. The court expressly declined to address how to proceed in contested cases where the parties do not agree.
The opinion does not resolve or address any constitutional arguments the Nolans raised, because the court awarded the relief sought on statutory grounds.
Procedurally, the Nolans were not required to name the Department of Health and Human Services as a defendant in this action because they sought only a judicial judgment of parentage to submit to the Department; the Department would become a necessary party only if it refused to correct the birth certificate and further judicial relief were sought.
The court noted that its decision addresses legal parentage and assumes that all interested parties have been afforded due process; it did not purport to establish broader rules for contested parental-rights disputes beyond the facts and posture of this case.

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GORMAN

Christopher M. Berry, Esq. (orally), and Judith M. Berry, Esq., The Law Office of Judith Berry, Gorham, on the briefs, for appellants Robert and Celia Nolan. Charles W. Hodsdon II, Esq., Bangor, on the briefs, for appellees Kristen and Jeffrey LaBree.
Patricia A. Peard, Esq., and Kai W. McGintee, Esq., Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer, & Nelson; Mary L. Bonauto, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Boston, Massachusetts; and Donald C. Cofsky, Esq., and Judith Sperling–Newton, Esq., American Academy of Reproductive Technology Attorneys, Washington, District of Columbia, for amici curiae American Society for Reproductive Medicine, American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology Attorneys, RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, American Fertility Association, New England Fertility Society, Reproductive Science Center of New England, Boston IVF, and Society, on the briefs, for Assisted Reproductive Technology.
William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Justin B. Barnard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, on the briefs, for amicus curiae Attorney General.
Catherine R. Connors, Esq., Nolan L. Reichl, Esq., and Kyle N. Kirby, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, on the briefs, for amicus curiae Concerned Maine Attorneys.

John C. Sheldon, Esq., Westbrook, on the briefs, amicus curiae pro se.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Robert Nolan and Celia Nolan appeal from a judgment of the District Court (Bangor, Gunther, J.) declaring Robert to be the father and Celia to be the de facto mother of a child. The child is genetically related to Robert and Celia but was born to Kristen LaBree, a gestational carrier. The Nolans contend that the court erred in refusing to declare the maternity of Celia. Kristen and her husband, Jeffrey LaBree, join the Nolans in their argument. We hold that the District Court erred in concluding that it lacked statutory authority to declare maternity and vacate the judgment accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Kristen LaBree gave birth to a child on December 9, 2010. Neither Kristen nor her husband, Jeffrey LaBree, is genetically related to the child. Approximately nine months before the birth, a zygote created through the in vitro fertilization of Celia Nolan's egg cell with sperm from her husband, Robert Nolan, was implanted in Kristen. Despite these facts, accepted by all parties, a birth certificate listing the LaBrees as the child's parents was filed with the Department of Health and Human Services.

The court's original and amended parental rights and responsibilities orders state that the child was born in February 2011. The court's findings, however, list the birthdate as December 9, 2010, which is consistent with the birth certificate in the record. On remand, the District Court's judgment should reflect the correct date of birth.

[¶ 3] On the day the child was born, the Nolans filed a complaint in the District Court in Bangor that requested that the court “order” that they were the parents of the child. Following a testimonial, uncontested hearing, the trial court determined that Robert Nolan is the father of the child and declared his paternity, but declined to declare Celia's maternity, holding that there was no statutory authority for such a determination. The court did declare that Celia Nolan is the de facto mother of the child and awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to the Nolans. The Nolans timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 4] Title 19–A M.R.S. § 1553 (2011) provides the District Court with clear statutory authority to declare legal paternity, and the court recognized that authority in granting Robert the relief that he requested. In addition, 19–A M.R.S. § 1556 (2011) provides a statutory basis for the District Court to declare “parentage,” a term that includes both paternity and maternity. We must presume that the Legislature's use of the gender-neutral word “parentage,” see P.L.1999, ch. 704, § 1, was intentional, see Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 2011 ME 123, ¶ 16, 32 A.3d 1030 (noting that our analysis of a statute ends with its plain language when the statute's meaning is clear and the result is not illogical or absurd). Although this section appears within the “Uniform Act on Paternity,” 19–A M.R.S. §§ 1551– 1570 (2011), the titles of chapters and sections are not legal provisions. See1 M.R.S. § 71(10) (2011). Based on this statute, therefore, the District Court did have authority to declare the maternity of Celia Nolan.

.Title 19–A M.R.S. § 1556 (2011) reads:
The District Court has jurisdiction over an action to determine parentage. There is no right to demand a jury trial in an action to determine parentage. The District Court has jurisdiction for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, support or funeral expenses for legitimate children and all remedies for the enforcement of these judgments apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for future education and support. All remedies under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act are available for enforcement of duties of support under this subchapter.

(footnote omitted).

[¶ 5] In the context of an undisputed case like this one, when individuals—here, the genetic parents—seek a judgment declaring their legal parentage, and the other parties—the gestational carrier and her husband—have specifically asserted that they do not wish to be recognized as the child's parents, the court is authorized to determine that the individuals are the parents of the child and thereby that the gestational carrier and her husband are not the parents of the child. There is no need for additional proceedings. Cf. Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 12 A.3d 783, 787–791 (2011) (holding that, pursuant to Connecticut law, a gestational carrier lacked parental rights such that termination of those nonexistent rights was not a prerequisite to determining another's parental status). The combined effect of declaring Celia Nolan to be the mother and Robert Nolan to be the father of the child will be that the LaBrees are not the parents of the child.

Our decision in this regard addresses only legal parentage, and assumes that all interested parties have been afforded due process.

[¶ 6] The parties to this action agree that such a declaration is the appropriate relief. We therefore have no occasion to consider here how to analyze a case in which the parties do not agree.

Because we grant the Nolans the relief they seek, we do not consider or address their constitutional argument.

[¶ 7] Finally, the Nolans were not required to join the Department of Health and Human Services as a defendant because they are not requesting an order directing the Department to act. Through this action, the Nolans sought a judgment of parentage, which they intend to submit to the Department with a request that the child's birth certificate, which currently lists the LaBrees as the parents, be corrected. Only if the Department refuses to do so, and the Nolans seek judicial relief, will the Department need to be named as a party.

The entry is:

Judgment vacated in part. Remanded to the District Court for a judgment that Celia Nolan is the mother of the child, and that the LaBrees are not the parents of the child.
-------- Notes: