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Commonwealth v. Santiago

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Jun 11, 2015

By the Court (Grainger, Brown & Milkey, JJ.), Clerk

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The defendant appeals from the denial of a motion for new trial and from his conviction by a jury in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. A judge, who was not the trial judge, ruled on the motion in a written memorandum of decision without an evidentiary hearing. The defendant argues that the motion, which was based on a claim that his attorney failed (a) to anticipate and refute the Commonwealth's use of a pretrial statement he made in Spanish, and to hire a linguistics expert; (b) to file a motion to suppress; and (c) to advise him not to testify, should have been allowed after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant also argues that his statement to police was improperly admitted over his objection at trial.

The docket does not appear to have been included in the record appendix of either party.

Each of the defendant's arguments on appeal relate to his statement to police. That statement -- that the defendant "wanted to confront [the victim] and that he did confront him on Washington Street which [sic] a fight broke out" -- was put in evidence through Detective Harris when he testified, over objection, to a Spanish-speaking officer, Israel Marrero's translation of the defendant's statements.

Discussion. The defense was self-defense. The defendant claimed that Maria Peralta, the victim's girlfriend, signaled him to pull over, not the other way around. The defendant testified that after both vehicles stopped he got out of his car to seek permission from Peralta to speak to the victim. The defendant admitted being a "little" "mad" about the texted photographs. He said he wanted to "talk things over" to resolve "this problem." Peralta gave him permission to speak to the victim and the defendant approached the passenger side of the vehicle. According to the defendant, the victim then attacked him.

The defendant claimed he was only able to get away by biting the victim's finger after the victim grabbed his neck and put his hands in the defendant's mouth. The defendant admitted hitting the victim while they were wrestling on the ground, but he denied having a weapon. He testified he left the scene when a witness told him to get medical help. No evidence of injury to the defendant was introduced. The defendant acknowledged using the word "confrontar" during the interview with Detective Harris, but testified that the word means to "dialogue, to have a conversation."

First, the defendant argues that counsel should have hired a linguistics expert because he used the term "confrontar" in his statement, a term that is not the equivalent of "confront." Even if we assume that a linguistics expert could have established that the correct translation of the defendant's statement was that he only wanted to talk to the victim, rather than to confront him, such testimony would have added nothing material to the case, as neither the dictionary definition, nor the common usage of the term, sweeps within its reach physically attacking or striking someone, a point with which even the defendant's linguistics expert agreed. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 477 (1993). Therefore, regardless of which meaning is attributed to the defendant's statement, neither provides evidence of who threw the first punch. Absent such proof, the proffered linguistics evidence adds nothing to the only factual question substantially at dispute at trial, which was who started the fight.

The defendant admitted on the witness stand that he hit the victim while they wrestled on the ground -- thus, the defendant essentially conceded an assault and battery. He, however, contended it was justified.

Moreover, even if we assume that an expert might have been able to mitigate the purported implication of hostility connoted by the term "confront," the difficulty with the defense was not a poor translation of the defendant's statement, but rather the independent evidence of guilt. Specifically, the evidence showed that Peralta and the victim saw the defendant approach the car with a weighted sock. They testified the defendant struck the victim with that sock; the victim's injuries were consistent with being struck with such a weapon, which was found by police at the scene. In addition, other witnesses testified the defendant did not want to abandon the beating, and evidence of his motive for the attack was strong. That the defendant failed to offer any credible explanation for the victim's injuries, the sock being located at the scene, or his having left the area, only further impugned his claim of justification.

For the same reasons, the claim that defense counsel did not prepare or anticipate the Commonwealth's use of the defendant's statements fails for lack of showing better work could have accomplished something material for the defense.

Next, the defendant argues that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress his statement to police because there was no evidence the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In a somewhat related claim, the defendant argues that the statement should have been excluded upon his objection at trial because Detective Harris's recitation of the translation of the defendant's statement by a fellow police officer (who was not called as a witness) was inadmissible hearsay. Assuming without deciding that the statement should have been excluded, we consider whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 279-280 (2013) (regardless of whether Miranda claims were renewed at trial, review is to determine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

We pretermit consideration of whether an individual can testify to what an interpreter said the defendant had stated, as his agent or otherwise. See and compare United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1985).

As we assume the admission of the statement was error, there is no need to discuss the defendant's claim that the use of his statement deprived him of the opportunity to cross-examine the officer who translated his statement to Detective Harris.

When analyzing whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, "we ask whether, on the totality of the record before us, weighing the properly admitted and the improperly admitted evidence together, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the tainted evidence did not have an effect on the jury and did not contribute to the jury's verdicts." Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010). "Factors the court considers in determining whether the erroneous admission of particular evidence is harmless include the importance of the evidence to the prosecution's case as well as to the premise of the defense; the frequency of reference to that evidence; and the weight of evidence of the defendant's guilt." Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 79 (2014). A conviction is most susceptible to being overturned when the "strength of the Commonwealth's case radiates from a core of tainted evidence." Tyree, supra at 702.

As stated previously, the defendant's statement added virtually nothing to the only live issue at trial, namely who started the fight or threw the first punch. We add that the challenged evidence, standing alone, could support an inference that the victim responded violently to being confronted as well as the opposite inference, that the defendant intended to strike the victim. What is clear is the evidence adduced at trial and discussed above, independent of the defendant's statement, left no doubt that the defendant brutally attacked the victim. We therefore conclude that any error in the admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him not to testify. To the extent the claim is based on the linguistics expert's assertion that the defendant lacked the cognitive ability to communicate effectively, we agree with the Commonwealth that the expert's ability to render such opinion lacks the appropriate foundation. Moreover, we have reviewed the transcript and it reflects that the defendant was capable of effectively communicating. As the Commonwealth notes, the defendant's answers became vague or unresponsive in those instances where it appears he was trying to avoid making an incriminating statement. In any event, given that the claim was self-defense, the defendant appears to have been the only witness who could testify to his version of events and therefore his testimony was crucial to his defense. In these circumstances, defense counsel was not ineffective for advising the defendant to testify. Commonwealth v. Zagrodny, 443 Mass. 93, 102-103 (2004).

Finally, for the reasons stated above, we conclude the defendant did not raise a substantial issue in his motion for new trial. Accordingly, it has not been made to appear that the judge abused her discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing on his motion for new trial. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 556-557 (2011).

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.

By the Court (Grainger, Brown & Milkey, JJ.),

The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: June 11, 2015.