Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

SHERRY RADACK

Vacated.
Alphonsus O. Ezeoke, Ezeoke & Ezeoke, P.C., Stafford, TX, for Appellants. David Christopher Romness, Selim Hassan Taherzadeh, Rebecca Kendall Yow, Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Appellee.

SHERRY RADACK, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a county court judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in a forcible-detainer action. We vacate the judgment and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Whether an existing title dispute in another court deprives the justice and county courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate possession in forcible-detainer actions generally turns on whether there is a basis—independent of the claimed right to title—for the plaintiff's claim of superior possession rights in the property.

In Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., we held that a pending title dispute in state district court deprived the justice courts, county courts, and our Court of jurisdiction over a claimed right of possession flowing from rights as the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. 911 S.W.2d at 169. In that case, title to the property owner's home was burdened with a Builder's and Mechanic's Lien Contract securing payment on a promissory note to Armstrong Capital Corporation for repairs. Id. at 170. After the property owner defaulted, Armstrong Capital requested enforcement of the lien and it purchased the property at the resulting substitute trustee's sale. Id. After the property owner refused a demand to vacate, Armstrong Capital filed a forcible-detainer action. Id. Among other defenses, the property owners asserted that the lower courts, and this Court, lacked jurisdiction because they had requested abatement of the forcible-detainer action pending the outcome of a lawsuit they filed in state district court seeking to set aside the foreclosure. Id. at 170–71. We agreed, explaining that “[b]ecause a ‘title issue’ was involved in the courts below, they had no subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” Id. at 170.

In contrast, just last year in Morris v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, we addressed jurisdictional arguments identical to those made by appellants in Mitchell, but held that the justice court, county court, and this Court did have jurisdiction. 360 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). There we noted that, unlike in Mitchell, “the original deed of trust contained language establishing a landlord-tenant relationship between the borrower and the purchaser.” Id. We concluded this was a dispositive difference because it provided a basis to resolve rights to possession without resolving the ultimate title dispute.

The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship provides a basis for the court to determine the right to immediate possession without resolving the question of title. See Villalon [ v. Bank One ], 176 S.W.3d [66,] 71 [ (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ]. When, however, the right to possession depends upon the resolution of a question of title, neither the justice court nor the county court has jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

....

Because the plaintiff in a forcible detainer action is only required to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession, the county court can determine possession without quieting title if the deed establishes a landlord-tenant relationship between the borrower and the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale. See Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 71; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712–13 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). At the hearing, AHMS introduced the substitute trustee's deed, showing that Wells Fargo was the successor in interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation, and that it, through its servicing agent, AHMS had purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Evidence presented in the county court also established that the original deed of trust contained language establishing a landlord-tenant relationship between the borrower and the purchaser. AHMS also introduced the notice to vacate, which named it as the successor in interest, as a servicing agent, to Option One Mortgage Corporation. Because the evidence in the county court showed that AHMS was the service agent for Wells Fargo, and there was a landlord tenant-relationship between Morris and Wells Fargo, the county court could determine possession without quieting title. Accordingly, we hold that the justice and county courts were not deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Morris, 360 S.W.3d at 34–35; see also Yarto & DTRJ Invs., L.P. v. Gilliland, 287 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (“In most situations, the parties in a forcible detainer suit are in a landlord-tenant relationship. One indication that a justice court, and a county court on appeal, is called on to adjudicate title to real estate in a forcible detainer case—and, thus exceed its jurisdiction—is when a landlord-tenant relationship is lacking.”).

Courts have consistently followed or distinguished Mitchell on the same basis. Compare Yarto, 287 S.W.3d at 89–90 (concluding justice court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in forcible-detainer action because determining who had a superior right of possession required immediate resolution of title dispute) and Hopes v. Buckeye Ret. Co., LLC, No. 13–07–00058–CV, 2009 WL 866794, at *5 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, Apr. 2, 2009, no pet.) (“Without a landlord-tenant relationship or other basis independent of the Community Improvements contract, the justice court could not determine the issue of immediate possession without determining ownership of the property.”), with Bruce v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 352 S.W.3d 891, 893–94 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (agreeing that “title determination was not required to determine the right to possession because the landlord-tenant relationship [found within the deed] provided an independent basis for possession” such that justice court had jurisdiction over forcible-detainer claim); Elwell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 267 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (holding justice and county courts had jurisdiction in forcible-detainer action because deed of trust rendered appellant a “tenant at sufferance,” giving rise to landlord-tenant relationship between parties and, thus, “it was not necessary for the trial court to determine whether the foreclosure was valid before awarding possession to Countrywide”); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709–10 (holding justice and county courts had jurisdiction in forcible-detainer action because deed of trust established a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship, which, unlike in Mitchell, provided an “independent basis on which the trial court could determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title to the property”); Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 559 (holding justice and county courts had jurisdiction in forcible-detainer action, observing that the situation in Mitchell was “not the situation in this case where a landlord-tenant relationship is established in the original deed of trust” that “provides a basis for determining the right to immediate possession without resolving the ultimate issue of title to the property.”)

We have examined both the Deed of Trust and the Substitute Trustee's Deed in the underlying dispute and neither one contains language creating a landlord-tenant relationship. Moreover, Wells Fargo has not argued that there is any basis for its claimed possession rights other than the title rights it gained through the disputed foreclosure. Thus, in this case—unlike the Morris, Bruce, Elwell, Rice and Dormady cases cited above—there is no independent basis aside from Wells Fargo's claim that it has superior title rights. Rather, like in Mitchell, Yarto, and Hopes, Wells Fargo's claim to possession in the underlying proceedings rests solely on its claim to title. Accordingly, the lower courts “had no subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” Mitchell, 911 S.W.2d at 171. We sustain appellant's first issue.

Given our resolution of appellant's first issue, we need not address his second issue. We vacate the lower courts' judgments and dismiss the case. Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(e).