- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Lago v. Kame by Design, LLC
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, Zaida Lago, Julio Lago, Juan Carlos Lago, and their counsel Alberto N. Moris, P.A., sought review of a final judgment awarding attorney's fees and costs against them pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court imposed sanctions on the appellants for filing a motion for attorney's fees that it found was unsupported by material facts or applicable law. The appellee, Kame By Design, LLC, filed two motions for sanctions under section 57.105. The first motion argued the appellants had no contractual or statutory basis to recover attorney's fees. The second motion included the same arguments and added that the appellants waived their right to fees by failing to request them in a pleading. The trial court granted the second motion and imposed sanctions, but this ruling was challenged on appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court erred in awarding sanctions under section 57.105(1) based on a motion that did not comply with the twenty-one-day “safe harbor” provision of section 57.105(4).
- Whether a subsequent or amended motion for sanctions raising new arguments must independently comply with the safe harbor provision.
- Whether the trial court may consider the appellee’s first motion for sanctions, which complied with the safe harbor provision but was never ruled upon.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ferere v. Shure, 65 So.3d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) | Standard of review for trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105(1): abuse of discretion, with de novo review for legal issues. | Applied to determine the appropriate standard of review for the trial court’s order awarding sanctions. |
| Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1991) | Waiver of right to recover attorney’s fees by failing to request fees in a pleading. | Referenced as a basis for appellee’s argument that appellants waived the right to fees. |
| Burgos v. Burgos, 948 So.2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) | Failure to comply with the 21-day safe harbor provision of section 57.105(4) mandates reversal of sanctions order. | Applied to support reversal of the trial court’s order granting sanctions based on the second motion. |
| Regions Bank v. Gad, 102 So.3d 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) | Trial court must state factual basis in its order when awarding fees under section 57.105. | Guided the court’s instruction for the trial court on remand regarding the findings required to support a sanctions award. |
| Rehman v. ECC Int'l Corp., 698 So.2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) | Withdrawal of a motion for attorney’s fees is tantamount to voluntary dismissal of the claim. | Used to conclude that appellants were the losing party on their fee motion by voluntarily withdrawing it. |
| Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So.3d 23 (Fla. 2013) | Voluntary dismissal after expiration of safe harbor period may still subject party to sanctions under section 57.105(1). | Referenced to explain that sanctions may still be appropriate despite appellants’ withdrawal of their fee motion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the procedural compliance of the appellee’s motions for sanctions under section 57.105(1). It found that the trial court erred by granting the second motion for sanctions because it did not comply with the mandatory twenty-one-day “safe harbor” notice and opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending claim as required by section 57.105(4). The court held that any subsequent or amended motion raising new grounds for sanctions must independently satisfy the safe harbor provision to ensure fairness and provide the opposing party an opportunity to respond. The court noted that the trial court never ruled on the appellee’s first motion, which did comply with the safe harbor provision, and thus remanded for consideration of only the first motion’s grounds. The court also clarified that appellants were considered the losing party on their attorney’s fees motion because they voluntarily withdrew it, which is equivalent to a dismissal and may justify sanctions if statutory requirements are met. Finally, the court instructed that if sanctions are awarded on remand, the trial court must explicitly state the factual basis for the award in its order.
Holding and Implications
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
The court reversed the final judgment awarding sanctions against the appellants because the trial court improperly granted a motion that failed to comply with the statutory safe harbor requirements. The case is remanded for further proceedings limited to the appellee’s first motion for sanctions, which complied with the safe harbor provision but was never ruled upon. The decision directly affects the parties by vacating the sanctions award and requiring reconsideration consistent with statutory procedural safeguards. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond clarifying the necessity of independent compliance with the safe harbor provision for subsequent motions under section 57.105.
PER CURIAM.
Ross D. Kulberg of Alberto N. Moris, P.A., Miami, for appellants. Lee B. Gartner of Lee B. Gartner, P.A., Coral Springs, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
The defendants below, Zaida Lago, Julio Lago, and Juan Carlos Lago, and their counsel, Alberto N. Moris, P.A., (collectively “appellants”) seek review of a final judgment awarding fees and costs against them pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. The final judgment imposed sanctions against appellants for filing a motion for attorney's fees that the trial court found was not supported by the material facts or the application of then-existing law to those material facts. We reverse the final judgment as to all appellants and remand for further proceedings.
Generally, the standard of review of a trial court's order awarding section 57.105(1) attorney's fees is abuse of discretion. Ferere v. Shure, 65 So.3d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). However, to the extent a trial court's order on fees is based on an issue of law, this court applies de novo review. Id.
Here, appellee's first motion for section 57.105 sanctions alleged that the Lagos's fee motion was frivolous because there was no contractual or statutory basis for the Lagos to recover an award of attorney's fees. Appellee's second motion for section 57.105 sanctions included the same arguments as the first motion, but also raised the additional argument that under Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835 (Fla.1991), the Lagos had waived any right to recover attorney's fees by failing to request attorney's fees in a pleading.
The trial court entered an order granting appellee's second motion for section 57.105 sanctions and imposing sanctions against appellants. However, because appellee's second motion for section 57.105 sanctions did not comply with the twenty-one-day “safe harbor” provision of section 57.105(4), the trial court erred in granting that motion. We must therefore reverse. See§ 57.105(4), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“A motion by a party seeking sanctions under this section must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” ); Burgos v. Burgos, 948 So.2d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (a party's failure to comply with the requirements of the 21–day “safe harbor” provision of section 57.105(4) requires reversal of an order granting a motion for sanctions under section 57.105).
We hold that if a party files a subsequent or amended motion for sanctions under section 57.105 and raises an argument that was not raised in the original motion for section 57.105 sanctions, the subsequent motion must independently comply with the twenty-one-day “safe harbor” provision of section 57.105(4). To hold otherwise would allow a party to raise a new ground for sanctions in a subsequent motion under section 57.105 without giving the other side the opportunity to withdraw the offending claim or defense within twenty-one days after receiving notice of the new ground for sanctions.
Nonetheless, on remand, the trial court may consider appellee's first motion for section 57.105 sanctions. That motion did comply with section 57.105(4)'s safe harbor provision, but the trial court never ruled on it. The trial court may consider only the grounds alleged in appellee's first motion for section 57.105 sanctions. Furthermore, if the trial court concludes that an award of fees under section 57.105 is an appropriate sanction, “it should recite in its order the facts upon which it bases that conclusion.” Regions Bank v. Gad, 102 So.3d 666, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
We conclude that the Lagos were “the losing party” on their fee motion, regardless of the fact that the trial court did not enter an order explicitly denying the motion. The Lagos voluntarily withdrew their fee motion at a hearing on appellee's request for section 57.105 sanctions. A withdrawal of a motion for attorney's fees is tantamount to a voluntary dismissal of the claim. Rehman v. ECC Int'l Corp., 698 So.2d 921, 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Moreover, a party's voluntary dismissal of a claim after the expiration of the 21–day safe harbor period may subject the party to sanctions under section 57.105(1) if the requirements of that statute are otherwise satisfied. Cf. Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So.3d 23, 2013 WL 452109 (Fla. Feb. 7, 2013) (“If the plaintiff does not file a notice of voluntary dismissal or withdraw the offending pleading within twenty-one days of a defendant's request for sanctions under section 57.105, the defendant may file the sanctions motion with the trial court, whereupon the trial court will have continuing jurisdiction to resolve the pending motion and to award attorney's fees under that provision if appropriate, regardless of the plaintiff's subsequent dismissal.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded. TAYLOR, LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur.
-------- Notes:
Alert