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Boyd v. United States
Factual and Procedural Background
Steven Boyd was indicted in 1998 on six drug-related counts, with a sentence enhancement notice filed based on two prior Georgia state felony drug convictions from 1989. Boyd was convicted on five counts and sentenced to life imprisonment on two counts and 360 months on the others, all concurrent. He filed his first § 2255 motion in 2001, which was denied and affirmed on appeal. In 2003, Boyd's state convictions were vacated due to the State's inability to prove the validity of his guilty pleas. Boyd filed a second § 2255 motion in 2004 seeking resentencing based on the vacatur, which was dismissed as successive. He filed a third § 2255 motion in 2005 raising the same claim, which was also dismissed as successive and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Boyd then filed a fourth § 2255 motion in 2011, which the district court dismissed as successive. The Eleventh Circuit granted Boyd a COA to review whether the district court erred in this dismissal and whether Boyd's motion is timely.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the district court erred in dismissing Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive.
- Whether Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion is timely under the applicable statute of limitations.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The district court erred in dismissing his fourth § 2255 motion as successive because none of his prior motions rendered the fourth motion successive.
- His fourth § 2255 motion is timely, as it is based on the vacatur of his prior state court convictions, which occurred after his initial § 2255 motion.
Respondent's Arguments
- The government concedes that Boyd's prior motions did not render the fourth motion successive.
- However, the government contends that the fourth § 2255 motion should be dismissed as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011) | Determining when a § 2255 motion is considered second or successive; holding that a vacatur of prior convictions after an initial § 2255 motion means a subsequent motion is not successive. | The court applied Stewart to conclude Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion was not successive because the factual basis (vacatur of state convictions) arose after his initial motion. |
| Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440 (11th Cir. 1999) | Clarifies that a habeas petition dismissed without prejudice is not second or successive. | Used to support that Boyd's second and third motions, dismissed as successive without merits review, do not render the fourth motion successive. |
| Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) | Defines the term "second or successive" in habeas corpus context as a term of art, not simply based on timing. | Referenced to explain the legal meaning of "second or successive" motions. |
| Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) | Explains "second or successive" is a habeas term of art. | Supports the court's interpretation of successive motions. |
| Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) | A habeas petition filed after an initial petition unadjudicated on merits is not second or successive. | Applied to conclude Boyd's second and third motions, dismissed without merits review, do not make the fourth motion successive. |
| Humphrey v. United States, 766 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1985) | A motion dismissed as second or successive has not been resolved on the merits. | Supported the conclusion that Boyd's prior motions dismissed as successive did not bar his fourth § 2255 motion. |
| Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005) | Vacatur of a predicate conviction is a new "fact" triggering a fresh one-year statute of limitations under § 2255(f)(4). | Used to analyze the timeliness of Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion based on the date of vacatur of his state convictions. |
| McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2002) | Standard of review for dismissal of § 2255 petitions as second or successive is de novo. | The court applied this standard in reviewing the district court's dismissal. |
| Drury v. United States, 507 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) | Standard of review for dismissal of § 2255 petitions for untimeliness is de novo. | The court applied this standard to assess timeliness issues. |
| Forehand v. Florida State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) | Declines to affirm a district court based on an alternative holding in a footnote; remands for clarification. | Guided the court's decision to remand for a clear determination on timeliness rather than affirm based on a footnote. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by clarifying that the term "second or successive" § 2255 motion is a legal term of art that does not automatically apply to all motions filed later in time. It applies when a petitioner could have raised a claim earlier but failed without a legitimate excuse. The court examined Boyd's prior § 2255 motions in light of this principle and precedent, particularly Stewart v. United States, which held that a subsequent motion based on vacated state convictions that did not exist at the time of the initial motion is not successive.
Boyd's initial § 2255 motion did not address the vacatur of his state convictions because it had not yet occurred. Therefore, the fourth § 2255 motion, which is based on that vacatur, is not successive. Additionally, Boyd's second and third § 2255 motions were dismissed as successive without merits review, so they do not bar the fourth motion from being considered on the merits.
Regarding timeliness, the court noted that the district court's dismissal was based on the motion being successive, but a footnote in the Report and Recommendation suggested the motion might also be untimely under the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations, which runs from the date of the vacatur of the state convictions. The court found it unclear whether the district court would have dismissed the motion solely on timeliness grounds and declined to affirm on that basis. Instead, the court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion is timely.
Holding and Implications
The court REVERSED the district court's dismissal of Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive and REMANDED the case for a determination on the timeliness of the motion.
This decision directly affects the parties by allowing Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion to proceed to the merits phase if the district court finds it timely. The court did not establish new precedent beyond applying existing case law to the facts of this case.
MOORE
Steven Boyd, Atlanta, GA, pro se. Brian Tanner, James C. Stuchell, Edward J. Tarver, U.S. Attorney's Office, Savannah, GA, Nancy Greenwood, U.S. Attorney's Office, Augusta, GA, for Respondent–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11–cv–00136–DHB–WLB; 1:98–cr–00012–DHB–WLB–3.
Before TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and MOORE and SCHLESINGER, District Judges.
MOORE, District Judge:
Appellant Steven Boyd (“Boyd”), a federal prisoner, is appealing the denial of his fourth-in-time 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence from the Southern District of Georgia. The district court dismissed Boyd's motion finding that it was barred from review “by virtue of the successive motion restrictions enacted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and now contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2244(b).” See Report and Recommendation at 3 (internal citation omitted). Boyd argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion as successive. Boyd further argues that his motion is timely. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive and remand the case to the district court for a determination as to whether Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion is timely.
For the sake of clarity and brevity, hereinafter Boyd's fourth-in-time § 2255 motion, the district court's dismissal of which forms the basis for the instant appeal, will be referred to as Boyd's “fourth § 2255 motion.” Boyd's first-in-time § 2255 motion will be referred to as Boyd's “first § 2255 motion” or his “initial § 2255 motion,” Boyd's second-in-time § 2255 motion will be referred to as Boyd's “second § 2255 motion,” and Boyd's third-in-time § 2255 motion will be referred to as Boyd's “third § 2255 motion.”
On March 6, 1998, a grand jury returned a six-count indictment against Boyd and two co-defendants. All of the charges were drug-related. Prior to trial the government filed a sentence enhancement notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 based on Boyd's two prior Georgia state felony drug convictions from 1989.
On June 26, 1998, Boyd was convicted of five of the six counts in the indictment. Specifically, Boyd was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and three counts of distributing cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
In September 1998, the district court sentenced Boyd to life imprisonment on two counts, and 360 months imprisonment on the other three counts, all to be served concurrently. Boyd directly appealed his conviction and we affirmed.
In April 2001, Boyd filed his first § 2255 motion. Boyd made a variety of constitutional claims but did not argue against the validity of his state court convictions. The district court denied the motion and Boyd unsuccessfully appealed the denial to this Court.
In September 2003, the Superior Court of Richmond County vacated Boyd's 1989 state convictions on the basis that the State was unable to make an affirmative showing that Boyd's guilty pleas were valid on account of its inability to obtain the plea transcripts. Subsequently, in March 2004, Boyd filed a second § 2255 motion seeking to be resentenced in light of the vacatur of his state court convictions. The district court dismissed Boyd's motion as successive. Boyd did not appeal the judgment.
In April 1999, about seven months after Boyd was sentenced in the federal case, Boyd filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Richmond County to challenge his two prior state court convictions.
In December 2005, Boyd filed his third § 2255 motion, raising the same claim, which was dismissed as successive in February 2006. This Court denied Boyd's request for a certificate of appealability finding that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his successive § 2255 petition without prior authorization from this Court....” Boyd v. United States, No. 06–11271 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006).
Boyd has also filed an application for permission to file a successive § 2255 motion in this Court, which was denied. Boyd filed a petition for “Writ of Mandamus” in this Court and the district court, both of which were denied. In addition, Boyd filed a “Motion for Resentencing,” a “Motion for Sentence Reduction,” and a “Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction,” in the district court, all of which were denied.
Boyd filed his fourth § 2255 motion in August 2011, which the district court dismissed as successive. We granted Boyd a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on the following issue:
Whether the district court erred in finding Boyd's arguably meritorious motion to vacate successive, see Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 865 (11th Cir.2011); Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 441 (11th Cir.1999), and, if so, whether the following circumstances have any effect on the propriety of a federal court now considering the merits of Boyd's claim: (1) that Boyd failed to appeal to this Court the district court's dismissal, as successive, of his second § 2255 motion, which raised the same claim as the instant § 2255 motion; and (2) that this Court previously denied Boyd a COA in his appeal from the district court's dismissal, as successive, of his third § 2255 motion, which raised the same claim as the instant § 2255 motion.
We limit our analysis to the issue of whether the district court erred in dismissing Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive and remand the case to the district court for a determination on the merits of Boyd's argument that his fourth § 2255 motion is timely.
Review of a district court's dismissal of a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as “second or successive” is de novo. McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir.2002). Likewise, this Court reviews de novo the dismissal of a § 2255 petition for untimeliness. Drury v. United States, 507 F.3d 1295, 1296 (11th Cir.2007).
III. DISCUSSIONThe questions before us are: (1) whether the district court erred in dismissing Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive and (2) whether Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion is timely.
a. Did the district court err in dismissing Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive?A federal prisoner typically must collaterally attack his conviction and sentence through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Only a single § 2255 motion is authorized and successive attempts at relief are limited. See Stewart, 646 F.3d at 859. If a court determines that a § 2255 motion is “second or successive,” the motion must be certified by the court of appeals before the district court may reach the merits of the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
However, the phrase second or successive is not self-defining and it does not refer to all habeas petitions filed second or successively in time. See Stewart, 646 F.3d at 859 (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943–44, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2853, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007)); see also Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir.2003) (the term “second or successive” is a habeas term of art). Instead, the bar on second or successive motions applies when, for example, a petitioner could have raised his or her claim for relief in an earlier filed motion, but without a legitimate excuse, failed to do so. Stewart, 646 F.3d at 859.
Under the facts of the instant case, the district court erred when it dismissed Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive. This is because, as the government concedes, none of Boyd's prior § 2255 motions rendered his fourth § 2255 motion successive.
The government contends, however, that the district court's dismissal of Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion should still be affirmed because Boyd's motion is untimely.
Boyd's initial § 2255 motion did not render Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion successive. In Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir.2011), we addressed the issue of whether Stewart's second-in-time § 2255 motion, which challenged his sentence based on the vacatur of his prior state court convictions that did not exist at the time that he filed his initial § 2255 motion, was second or successive. Stewart's judgment became final in May 2003. Id. at 857. He filed a “Motion for Equitable Tolling of the Time Period for the Filing of a § 2255 [Motion],” which was denied, and a § 2255 motion, which was dismissed as time-barred, in 2004. Id. In 2008, Stewart's state court convictions were vacated. The following month Stewart filed a second § 2255 motion, requesting the vacatur of his career offender enhancement pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 125 S.Ct. 1571, 161 L.Ed.2d 542 (2005). Stewart, 646 F.3d at 858. The district court dismissed Stewart's second § 2255 motion as successive. Id. We reversed and held that because the factual basis for Stewart's claim did not exist before his proceedings on his initial § 2255 motion concluded, Stewart's numerically second motion was not second or successive and § 2255(h)'s gatekeeping provision did not apply. Id. at 865.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the state court vacatur of a predicate conviction is a new “fact” that forms the basis of a challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and triggers a fresh one-year statute of limitations under § 2255(f)(4), so long as the petitioner exercised due diligence in seeking that order. See id. at 301–311, 125 S.Ct. at 1577–82; see also Stewart, 646 F.3d at 858–860.
Here, Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion seeks resentencing in light of the vacatur of his prior state court convictions, which enhanced his sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. The proceedings on his initial § 2255 motion took place in 2001. His state court convictions were not vacated until 2003. Accordingly, Boyd's vacatur-based claim did not exist until after the proceedings on his initial § 2255 motion concluded. Therefore, pursuant to our holding in Stewart, Boyd's initial § 2255 motion did not render his fourth § 2255 motion successive.
Boyd's second and third § 2255 motions also did not render Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion successive. This is because second or successive status only attaches to a judgment on the merits. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485–86, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604–05, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (“A habeas petition filed in the district court after an initial habeas petition was unadjudicated on its merits ... is not a second or successive petition.”); see also Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 441 (11th Cir.1999) (“When an earlier habeas corpus petition was dismissed without prejudice, a later petition is not “second or successive” for purposes of § 2244(b).”). A § 2255 motion that is dismissed as second or successive has not been resolved on the merits. See Humphrey v. United States, 766 F.2d 1522, 1524–25 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Consequently, a motion that is dismissed as second or successive cannot render a later motion second or successive. Id. Boyd's second and third § 2255 motions were dismissed as successive pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). As such, Boyd's requested relief, based on the vacatur of his state court convictions, has never been reviewed on the merits. Thus, Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion is not successive based on his second and third § 2255 motions.
Since Boyd's initial § 2255 motion did not render his fourth § 2255 motion successive because the underlying facts giving rise to his claim did not exist at the conclusion of his initial § 2255 motion, and Boyd's second and third § 2255 motions did not render his fourth § 2255 motion successive because they were both dismissed as successive without a review of the merits, the district court erred when it dismissed Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion as successive. See Stewart, 646 F.3d at 865; see also Dunn, 168 F.3d at 441.
b. Is Boyd's fourth § 2255 motion timely?Having determined that the district court erred in dismissing Boyd's § 2255 motion as successive, we turn to the issue of whether Boyd's motion is timely. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Barfield, which the district court adopted, recommends dismissing Boyd's § 2255 motion because it is successive. However, in a footnote of the Report, Magistrate Judge Barfield states:
Even if the instant petition were not successive, it appears to be subject to dismissal for untimeliness. The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). For claims based on the successful vacatur of state law convictions used to enhance a petitioner's sentence, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the state court's order of vacatur. See Stewart, 646 F.3d at 858 (“[T]he state court vacatur of a predicate conviction is a new ‘fact’ that triggers a fresh one-year statute of limitations under § 2255(f)(4)....”)[.] Here, the state court vacated Petitioner's convictions on September 25, 2003, approximately eight years before he filed the instant § 2255 motion. Moreover, prior to the filing of his current § 2255 motion, the last activity regarding Petitioner's convictions occurred in October of 2009. See CR 198–012, doc. No. 258.
Report and Recommendation at 7, n. 1.
While we recognize that the Report discusses the issue of timeliness and we could construe the footnote as an alternative holding, it is unclear whether the district court would have relied on this ground alone in dismissing the petition. See Forehand v. Florida State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir.1996) (declining to affirm the district court based on what could have been construed as an alternative holding located in a footnote and remanding the case to the district court). The Report states only that the petition “ appears to be subject to dismissal for untimeliness.” Report and Recommendation at 7, n. 1 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the footnote is included after a three page discussion regarding whether the motion is successive, and before a conclusion that states that the motion is successive and should be dismissed. The timeliness of the motion is not discussed anywhere in the body of the Report. Accordingly, we prefer to remand the case to the district court for a determination as to whether the instant motion is timely.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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