N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.L. (In re Guardianship of K.L.)

PER CURIAM

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Haas.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-178-11.

Gregory K. Byrd, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant S.L. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Byrd, on the brief).

Larry Leung, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant J.G. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Leung, on the brief).

Christian A. Arnold, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Arnold, on the brief).

Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minors K.L. and S.L. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. Black, on the brief). PER CURIAM

In these two consolidated cases, defendants J.G. and S.L. appeal from the March 18, 2013 judgment of guardianship, which terminated their parental rights to their daughter, K.L., born in July 2008, and their son, S.L., Jr., born in November 2009. Defendants contend that plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a by clear and convincing evidence. After reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court, and in light of prevailing legal standards and the arguments presented, we affirm.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with defendants. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Elaine Davis's March 18, 2013 oral opinion. We add only the following comments.

We are satisfied that commencing with the Division's first contact with defendants in July 2008, and continuing up to and including the start of trial in October 2012, defendants were unable to overcome the deficiencies that rendered them unable to safely parent their children. J.G. admitted to using cocaine within forty-eight hours prior to J.G.'s premature birth. Three days after the child was released from the hospital into defendants' care, S.L. assaulted J.G., who stated she was taking Xanax and drinking alcohol while caring for the child. The Division then removed K.L. from the home. When S.L., Jr. was born sixteen months later, J.G. tested positive for opiates and S.L. threatened the hospital's social workers. Accordingly, the Division also removed S.L., Jr. from defendants' care. The primary goal at that time was family reunification. The Division provided multiple opportunities for defendants to reunify with their children and address their drug, alcohol, and domestic violence issues. However, when none of these interventions proved successful, the Division sought to terminate defendants' parental rights so that the children could achieve permanency through adoption.

Judge Davis carefully reviewed the evidence presented and thereafter concluded that the Division had met by clear and convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship. The judge found that the children had been exposed to harm by defendants' drug and alcohol use and S.L.'s violent behavior. Although the Division referred defendants to the appropriate local agencies to assist them in securing stable housing, defendants continued to be unable to maintain a home for the children or to care for their special needs. They also continued to test positive for drugs. Thus, the judge found that defendants were "unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the . . . children and have continued to do so for a very long period of time."

The judge also determined that "the Division has made reasonable efforts to provide services" to assist defendants, "some of which were taken advantage of, some of which were not." While the children had developed a relationship with defendants, the experts agreed that K.L. and S.L., Jr. relied upon their foster parent for their day-to-day care and nurturing. Thus, the judge concluded

that the termination of the parental rights will not do more harm. It will actually do
more good, because both of these children are in a situation now where they are stable, they are safe, they have permanency, and they have a loving and caring foster parent who certainly at this point in time understands their problems. This particular person has [tended] to their deficiencies and is in a position to mitigate any harm that could come from the loss of the parents.

Judge Davis's opinion tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a, accords with In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We affirm substantially for the reasons the judge expressed in her comprehensive and well-reasoned oral opinion.

Affirmed.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION