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State v. Dudley
PETTIGREW
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATIONAppealed from the 19th Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Trial Court No. 02-09-0670 Honorable Anthony Marabella, Judge
HON. HILLAR C. MOORE, III
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MELISSA MORVANT
STACY L. WRIGHT
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
BATON ROUGE, LA
ATTORNEYS FOR
STATE OF LOUISIANA
FREDERICK KROENKE
BATON ROUGE, LA
ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
MATTHEW JUAN DUDLEY
MATTHEW JUAN DUDLEY
ANGOLA, LA
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
PROSE
PETTIGREW, J .
The defendant, Matthew Juan Dudley, was charged by bill of information with two counts of armed robbery, violations of La. R.S. 14:64. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on both counts. The State filed a habitual offender bill of information. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court adjudicated the defendant a second-felony habitual offender and sentenced him, on each count, to fifty-one years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, designating one counseled assignment of error and two pro se assignments of error. We affirm the convictions, adjudication as a second-felony habitual offender, and sentences.
Co-defendant Roger Brown, charged with the same crimes, was tried with the defendant. The jury became deadlocked regarding Brown's charges, and the trial court declared a mistrial (as to Brown). According to defense counsel Scott Collier's written motion to reconsider sentence, Brown was not retried but instead pled guilty to felony theft.
FACTSOn October 21, 2008, two men wearing bandanas over their faces entered Baton Rouge Master Barbers & Stylist, a barber shop on Renoir Avenue. There were several customers in the shop. One of the men was armed with a handgun and robbed two of the barbers, Brent Sims and Theodore Chapman, at gunpoint. When money from the victims was thrown on the ground, the other perpetrator, presumably unarmed, picked up the money. The two men then fled the shop on foot.
Sims, also the owner of Master Barbers, testified that the person who robbed him at gunpoint of the cash in his pocket was the defendant. Even though the defendant had a bandana over the lower part of his face, he was a regular customer at Sims's shop and Sims recognized his eyes, nose, and mannerisms. Sims identified the defendant in a six-person photographic lineup as the person who robbed him and provided an accompanying photographic lineup statement. Chapman also testified that he immediately recognized the person who robbed him at gunpoint of the cash in his pocket as the defendant. Chapman identified the defendant in a six-person photographic lineup as the person who robbed him and provided an accompanying photographic lineup statement. The defendant did not testify at trial.
Sims recognized Brown as well, who was also a regular customer.
Chapman recognized the back of the head of Brown, a regular customer of Chapman. Chapman had just finished cutting Brown's hair prior to the robbery. Chapman testified that he knew the defendant as "Billy." At sentencing, the defendant's mother testified. She stated that the defendant also went by the name of "Billy."
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORIn his counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive sentence.
The trial court imposed two concurrent sentences for each count, so the net effect is a fifty-one-year sentence.
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The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, ยง 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Andrews, 94-0842, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 448, 454. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. See State v. Holts, 525 So.2d 1241, 1245 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Brown, 2002-2231, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 566, 569.
The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). The trial court should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. See State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049,1051-1052 (La. 1981). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Thomas, 98-1144, pp. 1-2 (La. 10/9/98), 719 So.2d 49, 50 (per curiam).
In the instant matter, the defendant faced a maximum sentence of one-hundred ninety-eight years. His minimum sentence exposure was forty-nine-and-one-half years. With consecutive sentences, the defendant faced a maximum sentence of three-hundred ninety-six years. See La. R.S. 14:64(B) & 15:529.1(A)(l)(a) (prior to the 2010 amendments). He was sentenced to fifty-one years imprisonment at hard labor.
The defendant notes in his brief that minimum sentences under the Habitual Offender Statute have been found to be constitutional. However, whether the sentence is too severe depends on the circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant. The defendant argues that the trial court did not consider his individual circumstances and, as such, his sentence is grossly out of proportion to the harm done in this case. It is clear in its reasons for the sentence that the trial court thoroughly considered Article 894.1, including the defendant's criminal history, in arriving at an appropriate sentence:
This Court sat through that robbery trial. The Court ordered a presentence investigation in this matter. I have reviewed that presentence investigation. The defendant was found guilty of armed robbery. He is classified in the department of corrections vernacular as a second offender. The State of Louisiana has filed a habitual offender bill of information against him, and I have ruled him to be a second offender under the habitual offender statute. In reviewing his presentence investigation while it is true the Court finds that he is at a young age of 24. The Court is amazed at his prior record beginning when he was 10 years old charged with simple battery. February
the 6th of 2000 at age 14 he was charged with simple burglary and simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling. On March the 9th of 2001 he was arrested for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling 12 separate counts. On February the 26th of 2001 he was arrested for 13 counts of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling. On March the 28th of 2001 he was charged at the age of 15 with armed robbery. On October the 17th of 2001 at the age of 15 he was charged with attempted theft, and on November the 20th at age 15 he was charged with theft. On March the 17th of '05 finally as an adult he was charged with attempted armed robbery, attempted aggravated burglary, possession of a firearm with an obliterated mark and he pled guilty to simple robbery which forms the basis of his habitual offender bill of information here. On December the 8th of 2007 he was arrested for second degree murder and second degree kidnapping although for whatever reason that bill was dropped. And, finally, the instant charge of November the 14th of 2008. This defendant has been on a long, long career of robbing and stealing and using guns and dangerous weapons, and it is just fortunate that no one yet has been killed. If this defendant were allowed to stay out of jail and, of course, the law doesn't allow that, he is not probation eligible, this Court would not allow that because very clearly this defendant needs incarceration. A lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of this offense and based upon his record from the time he was ten years old there is no question that if this defendant is let out he will commit additional crimes.
Considering the trial court's careful review of the circumstances, the defendant's criminal history, and the nature of the crimes, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The trial court provided ample justification in imposing a fifty-one-year sentence on the defendant. The defendant suggests in his brief that whether a sentence is constitutional is determined by a review of the individual case and the individual defendant. To the extent the defendant is suggesting he is exceptional, he has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional such that the sentence would not be meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. See State v. Johnson, 97-1906, p. 8, (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive. The counseled assignment of error is without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1In his first pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defendant contends defense counsel failed to challenge his prior invalid guilty plea, which was used to adjudicate him a second-felony habitual offender.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 LEd.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court enunciated the test for evaluating the competence of trial counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
In evaluating the performance of counsel, the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. State v. Morgan, 472 So.2d 934, 937 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1985). Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. State v. Robinson, 471 So.2d 1035, 1038-1039 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 476 So.2d 350 (La. 1985).
A habitual offender hearing was held on November 2, 2011, and, after the State presented and submitted its evidence into the record, the trial court adjudicated the defendant a second-felony habitual offender based on a previous conviction for attempted simple robbery. The evidence introduced at the habitual offender hearing was not made a part of the appellate record.
The defendant argues in his pro se brief that defense counsel failed to file a timely motion to quash "the defective" habitual offender bill of information so he could attack his prior guilty plea at the habitual offender hearing. According to the defendant, his prior guilty plea was defective because there was no adequate advice of his privilege against self-incrimination.
We note initially that the defendant's assertion of a defective habitual offender bill is baseless. Our review reveals nothing defective about the habitual offender bill; furthermore, the defendant provides no explanation in his brief of how or why the bill is defective. We find meritless, as well, the defendant's assertion that he was not advised of his right against self-incrimination during the guilty plea colloquy regarding his attempted simple robbery predicate conviction. To establish the defendant's predicate conviction, the State provided in discovery the habitual offender bill of information, along with a copy of the minute entry of the defendant's guilty plea. The minute entry, which indicates the defendant was represented by counsel, states in pertinent part:
The accused was advised that the accused possessed certain constitutional rights that would be surrendered upon acceptance of a guilty plea, namely: the right to a trial by jury or by the Court, the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses testifying on behalf of the State, the right to compulsory process, and the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
In response to examination by the Court, the accused indicated an understanding of these rights and waived said rights.
At the defendant's habitual offender hearing, the State introduced into evidence as Exhibit S-1A the "court minutes" of the defendant's guilty plea to attempted simple robbery. Accordingly, the State carried its burden at the habitual offender hearing of proving the existence of the defendant's prior guilty plea and his representation by counsel (or waiver thereof). The burden shifted to the defendant to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. See State v. Clesi, 2007-0564, pp. 1-2 (La. 11/2/07), 967 So.2d 488, 489 (per curiam). The defendant has produced no evidence to show any constitutional deficiency in his prior conviction. Accordingly, the defendant has established neither deficient performance nor sufficient prejudice in defense counsel's failure to file a motion to quash. See Robinson, 471 So.2d at 1038-1039.
Because the defendant has made no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, this pro se assignment of error is without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2In his second pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues his guilty verdicts are fatally defective because the bill of information charged him with only one count of armed robbery.
The bill of information in the record before us states (in typed format) that the defendant and Roger Brown committed the offense(s) of "Armed Robbery (Felony)." It further states "on or about October 21, 2008, the defendants, while armed with a dangerous weapon, robbed Master Barber & Stylist[.]" The following was handwritten on the bill of information: "(2 Cts)" written next to the typed "Armed Robbery (Felony)"; "Brent Sims, an employee" written under the typed ''Master Barber & Stylist"; and "On or about October 21, 2008, the defendants, while armed with a dangerous weapon, robbed Theodore Chapman, an employee of Master Barber & Stylist" written toward the bottom of the bill, but above the assistant district attorney's signature.
The foregoing clearly indicates the bill of information informed the defendant he was charged with two separate counts of armed robbery involving two separate victims. We note as well that the prosecutor concluded her opening statement as follows: "I ask that you find both of the defendants, Matthew Dudley and Roger Brown, guilty of two counts of armed robbery." Also, the verdict sheet indicates the defendant was found guilty on two counts of armed robbery; and at the conclusion of the trial, the clerk read aloud in open court in the presence of the defendant the following verdicts: "As to the charge of two counts of armed robbery, State of Louisiana versus Matthew Dudley, we, the jury, find the defendant, Matthew Dudley: Count I, armed robbery, guilty; Count II, armed robbery, guilty." The jury was polled, and the defendant made no objections as to the verdicts.
The bill of information was in proper form, and the defendant was clearly aware of the two charges of armed robbery against him. Accordingly, this pro se assignment of error is without merit.
CONVICTIONS, ADJUDICATION AS A SECOND-FELONY HABITUAL OFFENDER, AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.Alert