State v. Taylor

Affirmed.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant. Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

{1} This is another Sixth Amendment speedy trial case. The central question presented is whether a defendant permanently waives his constitutional right to a speedy trial because his attorney moves for a trial setting to be vacated due to a scheduling conflict with another trial setting and stipulates that the resulting delay will not be attributable to the State. The district court concluded, “it is not reasonable to say that this ‘waiver’ would allow a one (1) year, three (3) months and six (6) days delay” and dismissed the criminal information with prejudice on grounds that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We agree and affirm.

{23} As in Garza, “[t]he primary issue raised by the facts of [the] case is whether a court can find a violation of a defendant's speedy trial right without a particularized showing of prejudice.” 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 38, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. In Garza, the Court noted that a showing of actual prejudice may not always be possible and adopted the position of the United States Supreme Court in Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, and many other lower courts that a showing of particularized prejudice is not necessary in cases in which the other Barker factors weigh heavily in the defendant's favor and the defendant has not acquiesced in the delay. Garza states:

We similarly hold [as in Doggett and many other lower courts] that generally a defendant must show particularized prejudice of the kind against which the speedy trial right is intended to protect. However, if the length of delay and the reasons for the delay weigh heavily in [the] defendant's favor and [the] defendant has asserted his right and not acquiesced to the delay, then the defendant need not show prejudice for a court to conclude that the defendant's right has been violated.
2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 39, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{24} This holding in Garza reiterates that we are engaged in balancing the Barker factors, none of which is itself dispositive, to determine whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. See Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280–81 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (“Thus, the greater the [s]tate's bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less [a] defendant must show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial.”); State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.Super. 425, 727 A.2d 501, 518 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1999) (“As a matter of logic and decency, given that the four factors of Barker call for a balancing of considerations, when the delay in concluding a trial is excessively long by any measure, as here, the burden upon a defendant to satisfy the other factors is correspondingly diminished.”).

{25} The length of the delay here was excessively long. All parties agree that this is a simple case, and almost two years elapsed from Defendant's arrest on January 25, 2010, to the trial setting of January 11, 2012. This is twice the amount of time to presume prejudice in a simple case. The State is responsible for 463 days of this delay, and because the delay resulted from the State's inexcusable neglect and complete lack of diligence in seeking a trial setting, the period of delay weighs heavily against the State. Defendant adequately asserted his right to a speedy trial, and in moving to vacate the initial trial setting, Defendant did not permanently waive or abandon that right. We therefore hold that notwithstanding Defendant's failure to make a particularized showing of prejudice resulting from the delay, he is entitled to relief. See Farrell, 727 A.2d at 518 (concluding that because the delay was far beyond what was reasonable, and the reasons for the delay were the prosecutions “clear inattention to its responsibilities” together with the court's failure to prepare itself to try the matter, no showing of prejudice was required for the defendant to succeed on his argument that he was denied his adequately asserted right to a speedy trial). We therefore affirm.

{26} The order of the district court dismissing this case on speedy trial grounds is affirmed.

{27}