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Commonwealth v. Anderson

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.
Nov 2, 2012

By the Court (MEADE, SIKORA & WOLOHOJIAN, JJ.).


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

A judge convicted the defendant of violating art. 3–11, § 2, of the town of Hanson's bylaws, which states that “[n]o junked, disabled or more than one unregistered motor vehicle, or parts thereof, shall be stored, parked on, placed on any premises unless the same shall be within a building or area unexposed to the view of the public abutters.” Town of Hanson General Bylaws, art. 3–11, § 2 (bylaw). Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676–678 (1979), the evidence permitted the judge to find the following. Responding to a report that the bylaw was being violated, a police officer went on April 27, 2009, to the defendant's property at 62 Ocean Avenue. The property consisted of a single-family house and a driveway. Four vehicles in what appeared to be inoperable condition were on the property: a red car, a camper, and two additional vehicles. All four vehicles were in poor condition and could be seen from the public street. None had front or rear license plates. This was not the first time these vehicles had been observed on the property; in fact, a photograph showed them on the property on April 2, when the defendant also received a citation. The defendant, as trustee for Crystal Realty Trust, owns the property. He purchased the house and two additional lots at one point in time. At a different time, he purchased two additional adjacent lots. The combined area of the five lots is only 14,200 square feet, about one-third of an acre. In 1955, when the town adopted its own zoning bylaws, all contiguously-owned lots in identical ownership (such as the lots owned by the defendant) were merged into one until they reached the maximum zoning requirement (which the defendant's lots did not meet). Accordingly, since 1955, the defendant's five lots have been treated as one by the town, and have been taxed in a single bill.

The defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; second, he contends that the term “premises” in the bylaw is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm.

The evidence amply satisfied the elements of the offense: (1) that more than one unregistered vehicle, (2) was parked on the premises of 62 Ocean Avenue, and (3) was visible to public abutters. At trial, the defendant did not contest that unregistered cars had been stored on the property. He also acknowledged in closing argument that “they've all [the town] been on me with the by-law” and that he had had “numerous complaints from the lady down the street.” In short, the evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant had knowingly stored unregistered vehicles on his property in violation of the town's bylaw, and that this was part of a continuing problem.

We are equally unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the term “premises” is unconstitutionally vague. Although the bylaws do not define the term, the absence of a definition does not make the law so vague that a person “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 522 (1986) (citation omitted). When a term is not defined, we look to its ordinary meaning, as understood from its dictionary definition. Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 709 (2011). Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed.1999) defines “premises” as a “house or building, along with its grounds.” Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as “[a] house or building with its grounds or other appurtenances.” VIII Oxford English Dictionary 1281 (1978). These definitions are well within the knowledge of an ordinary person and we perceive no unconstitutional vagueness in the bylaw. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the drafters of the bylaw intended “premises” to be synonymous with “lot.” It would have been a simple matter to use “lot” instead of “premises” if that had been the intent. Nor is there any reason to think that anyone reading the bylaw would confuse “premises” with “lot.”

For the reasons set out above, the conviction is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.