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RIDENOUR v. H.C. DEXTER CHAIR CO
Practice, Civil, New trial, Exceptions, Requests and rulings. Frauds, Statute of. Payment. Accord and Satisfaction. Pleading, Civil, Answer. Practice, Civil, Exceptions.
The denial, by the judge who presided at a trial, of a motion for a new trial where the party who made the motion contended that the jury must have disregarded the judge's instructions, is discretionary and is not subject to exception.
A request for a ruling, that upon all the evidence at a trial a verdict for the plaintiff is unwarranted, comes too late, when made at the hearing of a motion for a new trial after a verdict has been returned for the plaintiff, because such a question should have been raised before the verdict.
In an action for the value of services as a salesman, rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant, the defendant filed a declaration in set-off for a sum largely in excess of the amount claimed by the plaintiff. At the trial the items of the declaration and of the declaration in set-off were conceded to be true, and the plaintiff contended and, without objection on the part of the defendant, introduced evidence tending to show that he had made an oral agreement with the defendant by which his salary as salesman was increased during a certain period of a number of years then passed, the increase being applied in payment of the amount claimed in the declaration in set-off. The defendant contended that the agreement, not being in writing, was void because of the statute of frauds. Held, that under the circumstances the statute could not be relied on and did not operate to prevent the plaintiff from receiving, for services which he had rendered under the agreement, the discharge of the defendant's claim, although such an agreement had not been made in writing.
At the trial of an action against a corporation for services as a salesman, the defendant filed a declaration in set-off. It appeared that the plaintiff had purchased shares of the capital stock of the defendant and had given therefor his note payable to the defendant's acting treasurer, who was at the same time its president, a member of its board of directors, the owner of a majority of its capital stock and practically in sole control of the corporation. The treasurer indorsed the note and thereafter the amount of interest that was paid thereon was charged to the plaintiff in his account with the company. These payments of interest constituted the items in the declaration in set-off. There was evidence that thereafter the plaintiff made an agreement with the company whereby he was to receive an increase of salary, the increase to be applied toward payment of the note, and that after several years, in an accounting between the plaintiff and the treasurer, acting for the defendant, it was agreed that a small balance due from the plaintiff to the defendant in his general account should be cancelled, that the plaintiff should be credited with the amount due to him on account of the reserved increase of salary, which amount exceeded the amount of the note and the interest items, and that the note should be returned to him discharged. The note was returned to him. Held, that a finding, that a settlement was made between the plaintiff and the defendant by which the note and all of the items of the declaration in set-off were paid, was warranted.
If, at the trial of an action of contract where the plaintiff, in defense to a declaration in set-off, his answer to which has been merely general denial and payment, introduces in evidence an auditor's report which states that the items in the declaration in set-off had been included in a settlement between the parties and were discharged thereby, and the defendant does not object to the report on the ground that the plaintiff had not pleaded an accord and satisfaction and does not call that defect in the pleadings to the attention of the presiding judge, the defendant cannot rely upon such defect in this court for the first time on exceptions to the refusal of the trial judge to give certain rulings which did not in terms mention it.
BRALEY, J.
The refusal to grant a new trial on the defendant's motion, that the jury must have disregarded the instructions, was discretionary, and cannot be reviewed on exceptions. Lord v. Rowse, 195 Mass. 216, 219, 220. Its further request, that upon all the evidence the verdict was unwarranted, sought to raise a question which was not open, as it should have been raised before verdict. Loveland v. Rand, 200 Mass. 142, 144.
The exceptions taken at the trial relate to the refusal to rule as requested, and to the instructions.
It was conceded, that the amount found by the auditor, to whom the case was referred, was due the plaintiff, but the defendant having declared in set-off for a much larger sum, the items of which were admitted to be correct, the controversy before the jury was confined to the single issue, as to whether the counter claim had been discharged by payment.
The auditor states at length the business transactions between the parties. In the year of the defendant's corporate organization, the plaintiff, who was in its employment as a salesman, became the owner of fifty shares of the capital stock, which was sold and issued to him by the company. To obtain the money to pay for the stock, he gave two promissory notes, payable on demand to the order of the president, who acted as treasurer and general manager. The notes were discounted by the treasurer at a national bank, who paid the interest as it became due, and charged the payments to the plaintiff in his general account in the company's books. It was the plaintiff's contention, that while the notes were outstanding, it was agreed that his salary should be increased, the excess to be reserved and applied in payment of the notes, and the auditor so found. If the memorandum in writing of the agreement was not signed by the parties, and the contract was oral, and not to be performed within one year from its date, the defendant did not object to the admission of the unsigned agreement or of the auditor's report in evidence, but only sought to control and rebut the report by the evidence of its treasurer, that no agreement was ever made. The question at the trial was not whether the plaintiff could have enforced the contract by an independent action, if the statute of frauds of the State of New York or our own statute had been pleaded in bar. It was, whether the defendant agreed to apply in liquidation the reserved salary, even if the agreement might be unenforceable. The contract moreover had been executed and nothing remained to be done except to apply the money in payment. The first and second requests were rightly refused.
It appears from the report, that after much correspondence, and many interviews between the plaintiff and the treasurer as to the plaintiff's contractual relations with the company, his liability on the general account, and the disposition which should be made of the notes, the plaintiff and the defendant's treasurer met to adjust the indebtedness, and settle their differences. If the jury accepted the report, they were warranted in finding that the conclusions reached by the auditor, that the general account which is the subject of the set-off was adjusted in connection with the settlement of the notes, were right, and that there was nothing due the defendant. We find no error in the refusal to give the third, fourth and fifth requests. The sum reserved appears to have been largely in excess of the amount required to pay the notes and the general account after the partial payments made by the plaintiff upon the first note were properly credited, and the authority of the treasurer to bind the defendant does not seem to have been disputed. Indeed from his own evidence he had practically the sole control of the company, and if the company's books did not show the reserved salary, which the report states had accrued at the date of settlement, the plaintiff could not be deprived of what the treasurer is found to have conceded was justly due him. If the plaintiff had admitted the correctness of the general statement, he was indebted to the defendant for the balance then shown to be due on the account. But he did not admit that he owed anything. The offer of the treasurer to settle the notes and the general account by waiving the balance, which the auditor finds the plaintiff accepted, accordingly operated as a liquidation and discharge of the debt. Donohue v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 148. Tompkins v. Hill, 145 Mass. 379.
It is now contended that the settlement could not be shown, as an accord and satisfaction had not been pleaded. But the defendant neither objected to the report which was the only evidence of the settlement, nor suggested that the defense was not open under the answer. If relied upon, it should have been called to the attention of the presiding judge, when the plaintiff doubtless would have been given an opportunity to amend. Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 289. It cannot for the first time raise a question of pleading in this court on exceptions to the refusal of the presiding judge to give requests which, without calling his attention to the point required him in effect to rule, that the plaintiff's defense was not open on the evidence. Burnett v. Smith, 4 Gray, 50, 52, 53. Jones v. Sisson, 5 Gray, 288, 294. Jones v. Wolcott, 15 Gray, 541, 542. Wall v. Provident Institution for Savings, 3 Allen, 96, 98. McLean v. Richardson, 127 Mass. 339, 344. Carpenter v. Fisher, 175 Mass. 9, 14. Nor is it material that the exceptions state that reference may be had to the pleadings. Bass v. Edwards, 126 Mass. 445. It, moreover, may be said of the ninth request, that it ignored the explicit finding of the auditor, and the judge was not required to instruct on a part of the evidence. American Tube Works v. Tucker, 185 Mass. 236. The sixth and ninth requests could not properly have been given.
No error appears in the instructions to the jury so far as argued. The charge is not fully reported, but the expression that the jury "had the right to find an increase from all the facts as they were developed at the trial" should be read with the preceding statement, that there was no increase of salary unless the jury found a mutual agreement of the parties. The province of the jury was not invaded by any expression of opinion by the judge which disclosed a bias in favor of the plaintiff. Whitney v. Wellesley Boston Street Railway, 197 Mass. 495.
Exceptions overruled.
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