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FIFTH AVENUE BUILDING CO. v. KERNOCHAN
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, The Fifth Avenue Building Company, leased part of the first floor and basement of the Fifth Avenue Building in New York City to the defendant's testator. The lease included a vault beneath the sidewalk, maintained under a revocable license from the city. During the lease term, the city revoked this license and excluded the tenant first from the entire vault and later from part of it. The rent in dispute accrued during the period of exclusion. The tenant defended on the basis of partial eviction, seeking a proportional abatement of rent due to diminished rental value. The landlord argued that eviction was not a defense in the absence of an express covenant for quiet enjoyment in the lease.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether eviction, including partial eviction, is a defense to a claim for rent when the lease contains no express covenant for quiet enjoyment.
- Whether the Real Property Law prohibits the implication of a covenant for quiet enjoyment in leases creating estates for years.
- Whether the tenant’s knowledge of the revocable license to the landlord excludes the possibility of rent abatement due to eviction by the city.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The landlord contended that eviction cannot be a defense to rent payment absent an express covenant for quiet enjoyment in the lease.
- The landlord argued that the Real Property Law of 1896 prohibits implying a covenant for quiet enjoyment in conveyances, including leases.
- The landlord claimed that the tenant, having knowledge that the vault was held under a revocable license from the city, must accept the risk of eviction by the city and continue paying rent.
Respondent's Arguments
- The tenant asserted that eviction suspends the obligation to pay rent because it constitutes a failure of the consideration for which rent is paid, regardless of any express covenant.
- The tenant argued that the Real Property Law does not prohibit implying a covenant for quiet enjoyment in leases for estates for years, based on longstanding judicial interpretation distinguishing conveyances of real property from leases.
- The tenant maintained that the lease’s inclusion of the vault as part of the leased premises demonstrates the landlord's obligation to provide possession, and the eviction by the city suspends rent payment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 202 | Eviction as a defense to rent does not depend on a covenant for quiet enjoyment. | Supported the principle that eviction suspends rent payment as a failure of consideration. |
| Morse v. Goddard, 13 Metc. 179 | Same as above regarding eviction and rent obligation. | Reinforced the general rule that eviction suspends rent obligation. |
| O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28 | Eviction suspends rent even without express covenant. | Used to illustrate the point that eviction is a defense. |
| Lodge v. Martin, 31 App. Div. 13, 14 | Partial eviction suspends rent proportionally. | Confirmed that rent abatement applies for partial eviction. |
| Lawrence v. French, 25 Wend. 443 | Eviction suspends rent obligation. | Supported the eviction defense to rent claims. |
| Pendleton v. Dyett, 4 Cow. 581, 583; 8 Cow. 727, 730 | Eviction as a plea in bar to rent claims. | Demonstrated historical pleading practice recognizing eviction as defense. |
| Christopher v. Austin, 11 N.Y. 216 | Distinction between eviction by landlord and by stranger; apportionment of rent. | Applied to show landlord-caused eviction suspends entire rent; stranger-caused eviction leads to apportionment. |
| Blair v. Claxton, 18 N.Y. 529 | Same as above regarding eviction and rent apportionment. | Reinforced the principle of apportionment based on eviction source. |
| Duhain v. Mermod, J. K.J. Co., 211 N.Y. 364 | Eviction and rent apportionment principles. | Supported the distinction and application of rent suspension rules. |
| Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 619 | Right to rent abatement exists without breach of covenant. | Used to show abatement is independent of covenant breach. |
| Gillespie v. Thomas, 15 Wend. 464 | Rent abatement for eviction without covenant breach. | Supported the principle of rent suspension despite no covenant. |
| Mayor, etc., of N.Y. v. Mabie, 13 N.Y. 151, 153 | Statutory prohibition on implied covenants does not apply to leases for years. | Established that leases creating estates for years imply covenants despite statute. |
| Vernam v. Smith, 15 N.Y. 327 | Same as above regarding implied covenants in leases. | Reinforced the distinction between conveyances and leases. |
| Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498 | Same as above. | Supported the settled rule on implied covenants in leases. |
| Mack v. Patchin, 42 N.Y. 167 | Same as above. | Further confirmed the statutory interpretation. |
| Burr v. Stenton, 43 N.Y. 462 | Same as above. | Supported the principle that implied covenants apply to leases. |
| Davis v. Davis, 75 N.Y. 221 | Statutory construction principles regarding re-enactments and legislative intent. | Used to interpret the Real Property Law provisions narrowly. |
| Caesar v. Bernard, 156 App. Div. 724, 732 | Same as above on statutory interpretation. | Supported the court's understanding of legislative intent. |
| Jay v. Johnstone, 1893, 1 Q.B. 25, 28 | Principle that changes in statutory arrangement do not alter meaning absent clear intent. | Applied to reject the landlord's argument about statutory changes. |
| Comm. v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 450, 451 | Same as above. | Supported the court's construction of statutes. |
| Mitchell v. Simpson, 25 Q.B.D. 183, 190 | Consolidating statutes do not change legal effect absent manifest intent. | Reinforced the interpretation of statutory provisions. |
| Pabst Brewing Co. v. Thorley, 145 Fed. Rep. 117; 179 Fed. Rep. 338 | Lease subject-matter and covenant interpretation. | Supported the view that the vault was part of the leased premises and subject to landlord's covenant. |
| Markham v. Paget, 1908, 1 Ch. 697 | Implied covenant for quiet enjoyment arises from the relation of parties in oral leases. | Used to illustrate the inconsistency of landlord's argument about oral versus written leases. |
| Budd-Scott v. Daniell, 1902, 2 K.B. 351 | Same as above. | Supported the principle of implied covenants in oral leases. |
| Dexter v. Manley, 4 Cush. 14 | Same as above. | Further confirmed implied covenant principles. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court held that eviction, including partial eviction, suspends the obligation to pay rent because it constitutes a failure of the consideration for which rent is paid, independent of any express or implied covenant for quiet enjoyment. The court rejected the landlord’s argument that eviction is not a defense absent an express covenant, relying on longstanding legal principles and precedents demonstrating that eviction suspends rent obligations.
Regarding the Real Property Law of 1896, the court determined that the statutory prohibition on implied covenants applies only to conveyances of real property (lands, tenements, and hereditaments) and does not extend to leases creating estates for years. The court emphasized that the legislature’s re-enactment of statutes did not alter this settled judicial interpretation, and the implication of a covenant for quiet enjoyment remains a settled rule in leases.
The court also rejected the landlord’s argument that the tenant’s knowledge of the revocable license to the city excluded the possibility of rent abatement. The lease’s language indicated that the vault was part of the leased premises, and the landlord bore the risk of loss from revocation without warning the tenant. Thus, the tenant was entitled to the benefit of the lease’s terms without being charged for loss caused by the landlord’s failure to secure permanent possession.
Holding and Implications
The court's final decision was to affirm the order with costs and to answer the certified questions in the affirmative.
This holding means that a tenant may assert eviction, even partial eviction, as a defense to rent payment regardless of the presence or absence of an express covenant for quiet enjoyment in the lease. The court reaffirmed that implied covenants for quiet enjoyment continue to apply to leases for estates for years despite statutory provisions prohibiting implied covenants in conveyances of real property. The decision places the risk of loss from revocation of licenses or eviction by third parties on the landlord when the leased premises include such interests. No new precedent was created beyond clarifying and reaffirming existing principles in New York landlord-tenant law.
CARDOZO, J.
The action is for rent. The plaintiff leased to the defendant's testator part of the first floor and basement of the Fifth Avenue Building in the city of New York. By the terms of the lease, the basement included a vault beneath the sidewalk. This vault was in fact maintained under a revocable license from the city of New York. During the term of the lease, the city revoked the license, and excluded the tenant, at first from the whole vault, and later from part of it. The rent in suit accrued during the period of exclusion. The defense is a partial eviction with a demand that the rent abate in proportion to the diminished rental value. The lease contains no express covenant for quiet enjoyment. The landlord insists that in the absence of such a covenant, eviction is no defense. We do not share that view.
Eviction as a defense to a claim for rent does not depend upon a covenant for quiet enjoyment, either express or implied. It suspends the obligation of payment either in whole or in part, because it involves a failure of the consideration for which rent is paid ( Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 202; Morse v. Goddard, 13 Metc. 179; O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28; Lodge v. Martin, 31 App. Div. 13, 14; Lawrence v. French, 25 Wend. 443; Pendleton v. Dyett, 4 Cow. 581, 583; 8 Cow. 727, 730; 18 Halsbury Laws of England, Landlord and Tenant, 479, 480, 482; Cruise Dig., title 28, ch. 3, sec. 1; Bacon Abridg., Rent L.; Woodfall Landlord T. [19th ed.] 478, 486). We are dealing now with an eviction which is actual and not constructive. If such an eviction, though partial only, is the act of the landlord, it suspends the entire rent because the landlord is not permitted to apportion his own wrong. If the eviction is the act of a stranger by force of paramount title, the rent will be apportioned, and a recovery permitted for the value of the land retained ( Christopher v. Austin, 11 N.Y. 216; Blair v. Claxton, 18 N.Y. 529; Duhain v. Mermod, J. K.J. Co., 211 N.Y. 364; Royce v. Guggenheim, supra). The right to an abatement of the rent in such circumstances does not grow out of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. It has been enforced in cases where there was no breach of any covenant ( Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 619; Gillespie v. Thomas, 15 Wend. 464; Lodge v. Martin, supra, and cases there cited). In the days of common law pleading, it was the subject of a plea in bar ( Pendleton v. Dyett, supra; Smith v. Shepard, 15 Pick. 147, 149). A covenant for quiet enjoyment, either express or implied, is essential where eviction by title paramount is the subject of a claim for damages. It is not essential where the tenant asserts a failure, either complete or partial, of the consideration for the rent. Carter v. Burr (39 Barb. 59) neatly illustrates the distinction. There a lease had been made in fee. Such a lease, unlike one for years, was held to be a conveyance of real estate, and no covenant was implied. For that reason, the tenant's claim for damages as the result of a partial eviction was rejected, but none the less he was held to be entitled to an abatement of the rent.
The landlord is also in error in its contention that the implication of a covenant for quiet enjoyment is now prohibited by law. At the date of this lease, the Real Property Law of 1896 (L. 1896, ch. 547) was in force. By section 216 (now section 251; Cons. Laws, ch. 50), "a covenant is not implied in a conveyance of real property, whether the conveyance contains any special covenant or not." This provision is a re-enactment with immaterial verbal changes of a provision of the Revised Statutes (1 R.S. 738, sec. 140). The Statutory Revision Commission state in their notes that the section is unchanged in substance. It is settled law that the corresponding section of the Revised Statutes was not applicable to leases which created estates for years ( Mayor, etc., of N.Y. v. Mabie, 13 N.Y. 151, 153; Vernam v. Smith, 15 N.Y. 327; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498; Mack v. Patchin, 42 N.Y. 167; Burr v. Stenton, 43 N.Y. 462) It was restricted to conveyances of real estate, and real estate was defined in the same chapter as equivalent to lands, tenements and hereditaments. Those words, it was held, did not include a chattel real ( Mayor, etc., of N.Y. v. Mabie, supra). That definition of real estate is preserved in the present statute (Real Prop. Law, sec. 2). The argument is made, however, that the Real Property Law has established a new definition of a "conveyance." By section 205 of the act of 1896 (sec. 240 of the present act, L. 1909, ch. 52; Cons. Laws, ch. 50), "the term `conveyance,' as used in this article, includes every instrument, in writing, except a will, by which any estate or interest in real property is created, transferred, assigned or surrendered," and "the terms `estate' and `interest in real property' include every such estate and interest, freehold or chattel, legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent." This definition, however, is not new. All that is new about it is its location. In its substance it is a re-enactment of a provision of the Revised Statutes (2 R.S. 137, secs. 6, 7). It is there included in the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, which in the Revised Statutes made up a separate article, has now been transposed and consolidated with other articles. The result has been to place its provisions, including its definition of a conveyance, in the same article which forbids the implication of a covenant in a conveyance of real property.
We do not think that this transposition of sections has effected a change of meaning (Fowler Real Prop. L. sec. 251, note). The Revised Statutes distinguished sharply between conveyances of real estate and conveyances of interests in real estate. We find the distinction emphasized in the very sections from which the present definition of conveyances has been borrowed (2 R.S. 137, secs. 6, 7): "lands" were coextensive in meaning with "lands, tenements and hereditaments;" "estates and interests in lands" might embrace a chattel real. The same distinction is preserved to-day (Real Prop. Law of 1896, secs. 2 and 205; Real Prop. Law of 1909, secs. 2 and 240). When this distinction is kept in mind, the meaning of the statute is no longer doubtful. The prohibition of implied covenants is still applicable, not to conveyances generally, nor to conveyances of "interests in real property," but solely to conveyances of real property, i.e., of lands, tenements and hereditaments. If the purpose had been to extend the prohibition to implied covenants in leases, it would have been very easy to say so in terms too clear for misconstruction. The re-enactment of the old section was an adoption of the meaning which it had acquired by judicial construction for more than half a century ( Davis v. Davis, 75 N.Y. 221; Caesar v. Bernard, 156 App. Div. 724, 732; 209 N.Y. 570; Jay v. Johnstone, 1893, 1 Q.B. 25, 28; Comm. v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 450, 451). Changes in arrangement or in the division of sections will not work a change of meaning unless the intent to change is manifest ( Davis v. Davis, supra). That principle applies with special force to consolidating statutes ( Mitchell v. Simpson, 25 Q.B.D. 183, 190). It finds its proper application here. The rule that a covenant for quiet enjoyment will be read into a lease has become a settled rule of property. We cannot believe that the legislature would have over-thrown such a rule without clearer token of its purpose. It would not have retained the old phrases, and left a change of meaning to be gathered by doubtful inference from the order of the sections. More significant than anything which it did change are the things which it omitted to change. The ancient landmarks have been preserved.
Any other conclusion would lead indeed to strange anomalies. A covenant for quiet enjoyment will be implied in oral leases. It results from the mere relation of the parties ( Markham v. Paget, 1908, 1 Ch. 697; Budd-Scott v. Daniell, 1902, 2 K.B. 351; Dexter v. Manley, 4 Cush. 14; Rawle Covenants of Title, sec. 274). But the statutory definition of conveyances is limited to instruments in writing (Real Prop. L. sec. 205, now sec. 240). The landlord, therefore, would have us hold that the covenant is implied when the lease is oral and rejected when the lease is written. Such a distinction, if it is to be made, must rest upon a clearer manifestation of the legislature's purpose.
One other argument in support of the landlord's claim remains to be considered. The tenant, it is said, was chargeable with knowledge that the landlord's occupation of the highway was by force of a revocable license ( Deshong v. City of N.Y., 176 N.Y. 475). From this imputed knowledge, the consequence is deduced that ouster by the city was by implication excepted from the covenant, and that the tenant, having taken his chances, must continue to pay the rent. But the language of the lease repels that view of the relation. It is all a question of intention, and here the intention is unmistakable. The vault and the rest of the basement are joined in a single description; and the whole is leased to the tenant for a term of ten years. Nothing in the lease suggests a distinction between the landlord's duties in respect of one part and his duties in respect of others. We cannot doubt that the enjoyment of the whole was the consideration for the rent. The purpose could hardly have been clearer if the vault had been leased alone. The space within the highway was more than an incident or an appurtenance. It was the subject-matter of the grant. Being the subject-matter of the grant, it was also the subject-matter of the covenant ( Pabst Brewing Co. v. Thorley, 145 Fed. Rep. 117; 179 Fed. Rep. 338).
In thus holding, we place the incidence of loss where justice requires it to fall. Without warning the tenant of the chance of revocation, the landlord undertook to make a lease which should continue for a fixed term. We will not whittle down the consequences that normally attach to such a letting by nice assumptions of constructive notice. The tenant had the right to take the landlord at his word. Whether the paramount title be public or private, the consequence of ouster is a suspension of the rent.
The order should be affirmed with costs, and the questions certified answered in the affirmative.
HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, HOGAN, McLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed.
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