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IN RE COMMERCIAL SAVINGS LOAN CO., (N.D.Ohio 1930)

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, E.D.
Apr 24, 1930

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Commercial Savings Loan Company, bankrupt. Report of special master on motion for receiver.

Report approved.

The report of Special Master Friebolin is as follows:

To the Hon. Paul Jones, S.H. West, George P. Hahn, and John M. Killits, Judges of the District Court.

This matter is before me upon the motion of the petitioning creditors for an order appointing a receiver. An assignee for the benefit of creditors has possession of the property and is conducting the business.

The ground alleged is the only ground upon which a receiver can be appointed in bankruptcy proceedings:

"In case the Courts shall find it absolutely necessary for the preservation of the estate to take charge of the property of bankrupts after the filing of the petition and until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified." Section 2(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.

Section 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USCA § 11(15), provides that the court may "make such orders, issue such process and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act."

The narrow or liberal construction which courts have given to the words "absolutely necessary for the preservation of the estate" seems to have been influenced on the one hand by the extent to which they have taken into consideration the more inclusive words of section 2(15), see Gilbert's Collier, p. 71, and by their experience with receivers.

There is no decision of the United States Supreme Court upon the question nor by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. I find none, either, by the District Court of this district.

From a consideration of the cases, in view of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act just quoted, as well as having in mind the underlying purpose of the entire act — the intent of securing to creditors, as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, all of the property rights and powers of the bankrupt (section 70 [ 11 USCA § 110]), as well as rights and powers granted by other sections of the Act (sections 47, 60, 67 [11 USCA §§ 75, 96, 107]), — my conclusion is that the Bankruptcy Court may appoint a receiver when in the exercise of a sound discretion it finds that it is absolutely necessary to preserve, as of the date of the filing the petition, the estate, that is, the property of the bankrupt and all other rights, powers, and assets flowing to creditors by virtue of all of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.

Any consideration of the question of the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy should be undertaken, first, with a realization of the legal effect of the filing of a bankruptcy petition with regard to a bankrupt's property and the purpose and intent of a bankruptcy proceeding with reference to the rights of creditors in the property as of that date. Upon this the Supreme Court has spoken definitely a number of times. To quote only from a few comparatively recent cases:

Quoting from Acme Harvester v. Beekman Lumber Co. 222 U.S. 300, 32 S. Ct. 96, 56 L. Ed. 208, 27 A.B.R. 262:

"The filing of the petition is an assertion of jurisdiction with a view to the determination of the status of the bankrupt and a settlement and distribution of his estate. The exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is so far in rem that the estate is regarded as in custodia legis from the filing of the petition. It is true that under section 70a of the Act of 1898 the trustee of the estate, on his appointment and qualification, is vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudicated a bankrupt, but there are many provisions of the law which show its purpose to hold the property of the bankrupt intact from the time of the filing of the petition, in order that it may be administered under the law if an adjudication in bankruptcy shall follow the beginning of the proceedings. (Provisions cited.) These provisions, and others might be recited, show the policy and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to hold the estate in the custody of the Court for the benefit of creditors after the filing of the petition and until the question of adjudication is determined. * * * Pending the proceedings the law holds the property to abide the decision of the court upon the question of adjudication as effectively as if an attachment had been issued."

"These cases, taken as a whole, distinctly announce the doctrine that the jurisdiction of the federal courts in bankruptcy is paramount; that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a proceeding in rem, gives notice to all the world, is as effective to hold the property of the bankrupt as though a writ of attachment had been issued and served; that when the adjudication in bankruptcy has been made, it relates back to the filing of the petition, and holds the property of the bankrupt, not held adversely by another, as of the date of the filing of the petition, just as a judgment against a defendant in a case in which a writ of attachment has been issued holds the property attached as of the date when the attachment was made; and that an assignee for the benefit of creditors, who has not acquired an individual claim (as in Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U.S. 18, 7 A.B.R. 421, 22 S. Ct. 293, 46 L. Ed. 413) before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, may be compelled to account, in a summary proceeding, in the bankruptcy court."

May v. Henderson (1925) 268 U.S. 111, 45 S. Ct. 456, 69 L. Ed. 870, 5 A.B.R. (N.S.):

"The several amounts debited to the account, with the assent or connivance of the assignee subsequent to the filing of the petition, fall clearly within the rule that as to property in the hands of the bankrupt, or held by others for his account, `The filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world and in effect an attachment and injunction.' * * *

"In consequence, any person acquiring an interest in property of the bankrupt or his assignees for the benefit of creditors adverse to the creditors, after the filing of a petition with notice of it, may be directed to surrender the property thus acquired by summary order of the bankruptcy court."

"The rule is the same when a creditor secures payment of his debt from the bankrupt's estate after the filing of the petition. A summary order may be made directing repayment of the money to the trustee in bankruptcy. Knapp Spencer Co. v. Drew [(C.C.A.) 160 F. 413]; In re Leigh [(D.C.) 208 F. 486]; Matter of R. W. Skirt Co., supra [(C.C.A.) 222 F. 256]; In re Columbia Shoe Co. (C.C.A.2d Cir.) 1 A.B.R. (N.S.) 233, 289 F. 465. A like rule has been applied where a bank secured payment of its debt by setting up its lien or right of counterclaim against a deposit account of the bankrupt or the bankrupt's assignee, created subsequent to the filing of the petition. Any other rule would leave the bankruptcy court powerless to deal in an effective way with those holding property for the bankrupt who, pending the bankruptcy proceedings, willfully dispose of it by placing it beyond the reach of the court."

The two latest decisions upon the question that I find are Higginbotham Co. v. International Shoe Co. (5 C.C.A. 1929) 29 F.2d 994, 995, 13 A.B.R. (N.S.) 324, and Matter of Hine-Watt Co. (7 C.C.A. 1923) 290 F. 902, 904, 3 A.B.R. (N.S.) 554.

In the first case just cited there was an assignee, and the District Court, after notice to the assignee, appointed a receiver, the bankrupt consenting. A creditor moved to vacate the receivership, the motion coming up after the trustee was chosen.

Pertinent upon the general subject, the court said:

"Conceding that standing alone the consent of the bankrupt is not sufficient grounds for the appointment of a receiver, nevertheless that appointment is in the sound discretion of the District Court."

In the case just cited in the Seventh Circuit, a creditor filed a motion to vacate the appointment of a receiver made upon application of petitioning creditors and consented to by bankrupt, there being then a state court receiver who had been appointed upon the same creditors' application succeeding an assignee. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's refusal to vacate the appointment of the federal receiver.

Upon the application to vacate it appeared that the creditor had filed answer to the involuntary petition denying the Act of Bankruptcy and denying the creditor status of the petitioning creditor.

After stating that receivers are not to be appointed unless absolutely necessary for the preservation of the estate to be established by satisfactory proof, the court said:

"Petitioners' [to vacate the appointment] position was far from enviable and cannot be ignored. While the propriety of appointing a receiver should rest upon the showing made in favor thereof, it must also be recognized that the court is generally exercising a discretionary power, and it may consider the presence or absence of good faith on the part of either party as well as the wishes of those vitally interested, in so far as such wishes are expressed. In fact, bankruptcy proceedings are for the benefit of creditors. It is really their estate that is being administered and distributed. * * *

"In addition thereto, irrespective of the expressed preference of creditors and bankrupt, the facts called for the appointment of a receiver. An early adjudication in bankruptcy and a meeting of the creditors to elect a trustee was made impossible by the interposition of petitioners' answer, putting in issue at least two material allegations. This answer * * * served to delay a hearing and to frustrate the plans of creditors to attain an early and satisfactory liquidation of the bankrupt's affairs. It also confirmed the belief that petitioners were more interested in continuing their receiver than in realizing on their claim."

It is to be noted that the court says nothing about the competency or honesty of the state court receiver; the emphasis is all upon securing to creditors the benefits that accrue through bankruptcy as against state court proceedings.

In Faulk Co. v. Steiner (5 C.C.A.) 165 F. 861, 867, 21 A.B.R. 623, the court says that in all cases, not only in bankruptcy, "the appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy, and is granted with great caution and only in cases of necessity."

In this case also the court stresses the interest of creditors in spite of the consent of the bankrupt to a receiver, saying: "The creditors, therefore, are the parties chiefly interested in avoiding the expenses of an unnecessary receivership."

I conclude from the cases that the absolute necessity of preservation of estates does not mean the necessity of protecting the assets from imminent destruction, but that receivers may be appointed when the court, exercising a sound discretion, finds that it is absolutely necessary for the purpose of preserving the estate, that is, preserving not only the property but the estate, which includes all rights, powers, and benefits accruing to creditors under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, as of the date of filing the petition.

The attorneys for the alleged bankrupt cite the two outstanding cases, both by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which give a rather narrow construction to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act pertaining to the appointment of receivers: In re Oakland Lumber Company (2 C.C.A. 1909) 174 F. 634, 635, 23 A.B.R. 181, and In re Walsh, Inc. (2 C.C.A. 1923) 295 F. 504, 506, 2 A.B.R. (N.S.) 137. Since these decisions, that court has, under a new general order promulgated by the Supreme Court at the instance of the New York bar, approved a rule that in that district, in all cases requiring the services of a receiver, the Irving Trust Company is to be appointed. I mention this merely to indicate the difficulties sometimes attendant upon the appointment of receivers in some districts.

In Re Oakland Lumber Co., supra, an assignee had charge of the property. The District Court appointed a receiver, and denied a motion to vacate, which came before the Court of Appeals on review. It is apparent that there was no testimony whatever before the District Court with regard to the conduct of the alleged bankrupt's business, either before or after the assignment. There was no notice to the alleged bankrupt or to the assignee.

"In short there was nothing presented to the District Judge but the ordinary creditors' petition supplemented by a statement of one of the petitioners that, in his judgment, a receiver was necessary. * * *

"The power to take from a man his property, without giving him an opportunity to be heard, is both arbitrary and drastic and should not be exercised except in the clearest cases. Congress recognized the necessity for caution by limiting the appointment of receivers to cases where it is `absolutely necessary' for the preservation of the estate. In other words the reason for such an interference with the rights of property must be clear, positive and certain. Of course cases frequently arise where this remedy may be necessary — cases where there is reason to believe that the property may be stolen or secreted or turned over to favored creditors. But fraud cannot be presumed, neither can danger to the property be predicated of acts which are honest and lawful. It cannot be presumed that an assignee under a state law intends to plunder the fund he is appointed to administer. Unless something be shown to the contrary the presumption is persuasive that during the interval between the filing of the petition and the appointment of a trustee, the property will be entirely safe in the hands of the assignee especially if he be enjoined from disposing of it pendente lite. We are informed that it has grown into a well established custom for the attorney for the petitioning creditors, when he files his petition, to apply at the same time for the appointment of a receiver and that the application is usually granted. If such a practice exists we see nothing in the law to warrant it. It seems to us that the rule which obtains in all other jurisdictions where receivers are appointed is equally applicable to courts of bankruptcy and that in no case should a remedy so far reaching in its effects be resorted to except upon clear and convincing proof. Cases have not infrequently come within the observation of the court where after a receiver was appointed the petitioning creditors were unable to establish their own status or to prove an act of bankruptcy and the petition was dismissed, leaving the court with a receiver on its hands with no proceeding in esse and no funds with which to pay him and the expenses incurred by him. Again the appointment of a receiver creates an additional official to be paid from the estate."

The court quotes in support of its conclusion from an unreported case In re Spalding (May, 1905), in which at bankruptcy a receiver was in charge appointed by a state court; those asking for a federal receiver offered no testimony. From that case (In re Spalding) the court quotes:

"The fundamental error in the argument for the receiver and of the learned court below seems to be that both regard it as proper that a receiver should be appointed, practically as a matter of course, in every case where a petition in bankruptcy is filed. That is not the law and it is not good sense.

"The Court has jurisdiction under the statute to appoint receivers only when it shall find it absolutely necessary for the preservation of estates. The petition upon which this receivership was granted not only fails to show that it was absolutely necessary, but shows affirmatively that it was absolutely unnecessary, as it shows the property to have been in the custody of a receiver appointed by the Supreme Court of the state of New York, and there is nothing in the record to show that the state court receiver is not an entirely proper and competent person to preserve the assets."

In the Walsh Case, supra, the property was in the hands of state court receivers who, while appointed by the court, had the support of a creditors committee and the vast majority of creditors. The appointment of a federal receiver was opposed by the creditors. The Court of Appeals, in holding that no receiver should have been appointed, quotes the language from In re Spalding, supra, saying in conclusion:

"The power to appoint receivers is one to be exercised, not as a matter of course, but only upon proof that the appointment `is absolutely necessary.' And, as we think the receivers herein were inadvertently appointed, their appointment not appearing as absolutely necessary for the preservation of the estate, the order is reversed, without costs."

It is to be noted in this case that the court, in coming to a conclusion that the District Court erred, took into consideration, not only that another court (state court) had appointed a receiver, but that creditors overwhelmingly were opposed, pending bankruptcy proceedings, to remove him and substitute another officer.

While the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in these cases emphasizes the fact that receivers in bankruptcy are not to be appointed as of course — of which there can be no doubt — and seemingly lays no stress upon the rights of creditors to have the estate preserved as of the date of bankruptcy, when confined to the facts in each case, these two decisions are not essentially in conflict with the conclusion stated by me. After all, it is a question to be determined upon the facts appearing in each particular case.

The attorney for the petitioner herein cites and quotes at length from two cases decided by the District Court of New York, both of them decided since the Oakland Lumber Company Case. The words of Judge Augustus Hand, now on the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, in one of these cases, seem to me to be particularly pertinent. Matter of Federal Mail Express Company (1916) 233 F. 691, 692, 37 A.B.R. 240:

"In this case I have discovered nothing which indicates a fraudulent assignment, but it well illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of administration of estates of insolvents through general assignments, which has increased rapidly in this district during the past year. The ordinary method of proceeding is for the bankrupt to choose his assignee, who is frequently some one connected with him by business or family ties, and thus in a measure, to control the administration of his estate until the creditors have elected a trustee. In fraudulent cases this method of administration affords the greatest facility for concealment of assets. A person chosen by the bankrupt, even if honest, is not as likely to be as zealous in uncovering wrongful acts of the bankrupt as a stranger chosen by the court, or at the instance of creditors. * * *

"In the present case I am making no personal criticism of either the assignee, or the bankrupt, or his counsel, but adverting solely to what has become, in my opinion, a most undesirable practice in this community. It must be obvious to any one, and it is certainly becoming evident to any judge of this court, that it is not desirable for a bankrupt to have the choice of the man who is to administer his estate. * * *

"In that case [In re Oakland Lumber Company] a receiver was appointed without notice, and without any proof before the court that the property of the lumber company was perishable or that it was being dissipated or improvidently cared for, or that the assignee was not a careful, prudent, or responsible person. The court went upon the ground that the appointment of a receiver without notice should only be made in the clearest case, and cited the case of In re Spaulding, * * * where an oral opinion was delivered that is followed in the Oakland Lumber Company decision. That was a proceeding where a receiver had been appointed in the state court who had the custody of the property. * * * That receiver is the choice of a court acting independently of the insolvent, and not of the insolvent himself. * * *

"In other words, the objection of the Circuit Court of Appeals was not a jurisdictional one, but was made to the appointment of a receiver in the particular case in question. * * * The question is, not what the state court requires of the assignee upon his accounting, but what is the inevitable result of the administration of the estates of people who are subjected to all kinds of temptations growing out of financial embarrassment by persons of their own choice."

Similarly pertinent the words of the judge in Matter of D. E. Dress Co., Inc. (1916) 244 F. 885, 886, 40 A.B.R. 360:

"I am satisfied that, in view of the Gutwillig Case (D.C.) 90 F. 475, and 92 F. 337, 34 C.C.A. 377, 1 Am. B.R. 78, and the expression in In re Watts Sachs, Petitioner, 190 U.S. 1, 23 S. Ct. 718, 47 L. Ed. 933, 10 A.B.R. 113, and the purpose, intent, and structure of the Bankruptcy Act, this court has power to remove an assignee under a general assignment, entirely irrespective of the personnel of the assignee, and has power to appoint a receiver, if, in its opinion, such course will be a better assurance of a satisfactory administration. * * *

"Where an assignee is selected by the assignor, it is but natural that the creditors should not have the same confidence in the administration of the estate as they would independent appointee of the court, or some one appointed as the result of a practically unanimous recommendation of reliable credi-have if the administrator were either an tors."

That the appointment of a receiver, in other words, what constitutes absolute necessity of preservation, is within the discretion of the court, is recognized by this court in Matter of Cash (2 C.C.A. 1913) 210 F. 24, 31 A.B.R. 709.

In determining, within a sound discretion, whether the absolute necessity of preserving estates exists, courts consider a number of elements:

Who is in charge? The alleged bankrupt, a custodian, an agent of creditors, an assignee chosen by the bankrupt, a receiver appointed by a court.

The relation of the one in charge to the alleged bankrupt, whether related by family ties or close former association in business.

The character and competence of the one in charge, his efficiency in handling the estate.

The actions of the one in charge with regard to conserving the estate, conduct of the business, favoritism to particular persons or creditors.

The attitude of creditors towards the one in charge, whether they have confidence in him and prefer to leave him in charge pending bankruptcy proceedings and the election of their own trustee, or whether they prefer to make an immediate change in view of possible waste involved in the change.

The probability of eventual adjudication upon the petition as it may appear at the time. If it could be determined that no adjudication would result, no receiver should be appointed. In cases where an assignment has been made, the act of bankruptcy is so evident that adjudication usually follows.

The attitude of the alleged bankrupt with regard to immediate hearing of the issue upon the petition, if there is an issue.

The attitude, in a case like the present, of the assignee and his attorneys with regard to proposed use of the assets or disposition of them, his method of operation, whether expensive or efficient, which, although subject to future reconsideration upon adjudication, would entail future expense and labor on the part of the trustee.

The evident advantage, all other things being equal, of having in charge of the estate an officer subject to the control of the court where the bankruptcy proceedings are pending, thus controlling the expense as well as the use of the property. Courts for this reason not infrequently appoint the assignee or state court receiver as federal receiver.

Having the above elements in mind, what should the court, in exercising a sound discretion, conclude in this case with regard to the necessity of a federal receiver?

The testimony shows by every reasonable inference that the company has been guilty of acts which demand investigation and prompt action, civil action certainly. The third vice president and director of the alleged bankrupt, in answer to question after question pertaining to the conduct of its business in which he had a part, refused to answer, relying upon his right so to do on the ground that it might incriminate him. Rec. p. 7 to 12.

Mr. Brodbeck, the assignee, also testified he was appointed pursuant to resolution of the board of directors of the alleged bankrupt on March 11, 1930. Mr. Brodbeck is the secretary of the City Savings Loan Company, a creditor of the alleged bankrupt in the sum of $79,000 Rec. p. 17. He is the brother-in-law of Mr. L.E. Weitz, the secretary of the alleged bankrupt. On the books a credit to Mr. Weitz of over $15,000 was entered as "inspection fees," about four or five days prior to the assignment, with apparently no decision as to its propriety or impropriety. Rec. p. 20.

About a week before the assignment, a sale of property was made for about $142,000, Liberty bonds were sold for $51,000, making a total of $193,000. At the time of the assignment about $1,100 in cash was on hand. Rec. p. 21.

Within a short period before the assignment, a Mr. Cardinal and a Mr. Yost, friends of Mr. Weitz, withdrew substantial sums; in the case of Cardinal $17,000 or $18,000. Rec. p. 22. Within the week about 25 depositors withdrew about $60,000, among whom were Mr. Yost and Mr. Cardinal. Rec. p. 23, 24.

On March 12, the day after the assignment, the assignee filed an application for authority to employ office help, among them Mr. Weitz at a salary of $400 the month, it being alleged that he (Mr. Weitz) "has on hand a large number of unfinished business transactions for the company which have for some time past been in the contemplation of being closed such as the sale of office fixtures, the disposition of certain other properties belonging to the Commercial Savings Loan Company and your assignee respectfully represents to the Court that it would be for the best interest of the estate to employ said L.E. Weitz to assist in the liquidation of said company."

The application was granted on that date, March 12, but on March 20, 1930, upon application of the assignee and Mr. Weitz's offer to do the work free of charge, the previous order was canceled.

Mr. Brodbeck testifies that, through a Mr. Pollack of a creditor's committee, deeds to thirteen or fourteen pieces of property have been delivered by the Marquette Realty Company, which property apparently had been transferred to the latter by the alleged bank-this court are to be paid by the appellant.

He testifies that he had demanded an accounting from Mr. Tillis; that he had received none, but that he had taken over 20 of the properties managed by him (Rec. 18, 19); that he had not taken definite steps for the recovery of money pending his analysing the records and securing an audit of the books just received from certified accountant (Rec. pp. 26, 27).

Mr. Brodbeck, so far as the record shows, and so far as I know, bears a spotless reputation. His attitude on the stand was frank and candid. He testified that he took the appointment at the request of the State Association of Building Loan Companies, a voluntary organization, I believe, of similar companies. Rec. p. 28.

I should say also that, off the record, Mr. Brodbeck and his attorneys stated that they intended to do nothing which meant the disposition of any property of the alleged bankrupt pending these proceedings.

It seems to me quite clear, taking all of the circumstances into consideration as I have summarized them, and in view of the rule as I have stated it that should guide the court in the appointment of a receiver, that either a receiver should be appointed or a restraining order should issue restraining the assignee from disposing of any property, making settlement of any claims, or doing anything except the routine matters of receiving money on account and paying the ordinary expense, such as rent, light, and heat, and those of necessary employees in connection therewith.

If no court officer were in charge, I think it would be clear that a receiver should be appointed, and one having no connection whatever with the company or its officers.

1. In recommending the appointment of a receiver, I do so chiefly for the reasons announced by Judge Hand and Judge Mayer in the cases In the Matter of Federal Mail Express Co., supra, and Matter of D. E. Dress Co., supra. If the committee of creditors mentioned in the record is representative of a substantial body of creditors, and it had expressed itself before me, it would have largely influenced my action, since there is no testimony impugning the character of Mr. Brodbeck, the assignee, and it is quite possible that they should prefer him to remain temporarily. Knowing of this motion, it would seem that, if opposed to the granting of it, they would have expressed their opposition. They have been otherwise active, as the testimony shows.

For reasons that might be called sound policy, the person in charge of an insolvent estate should not, no matter how reputable he be, be related to the insolvent by family or business ties. To quote Judge Hand again (233 F. 691, 692):

"A person chosen by the bankrupt, even if honest, is not as likely to be as zealous in uncovering wrongful acts * * * as a stranger chosen by the court, or at the instance of creditors."

2. If it be said that the necessity for a receiver does not exist, then I find that the interests of creditors require an injunction restraining the assignee from disposing of any assets in his hands, compromising any claims, paying out any funds coming into his hands except the ordinary current expenses necessary in the liquidation.

I say this, although the assignee and his attorneys are apparently willing to refrain from the actions that I recommend be enjoined. It will avoid complications and misunderstandings later, as evidenced by other cases which have come before me in which a state court officer has remained in possession.

Judge, later Chief Justice, Taft, while on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, said in Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 95 F. 637, 645, 2 A.B.R. 383:

"* * * As between district courts sitting in bankruptcy and state courts for the administration of insolvent estates, there is no concurrent jurisdiction. The constitution of the United States * * * gives to the courts in which congress shall vest this power paramount jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings. The orders in bankruptcy are therefore superior to those of a state insolvency court. Section 720, which forbids a court of the United States from enjoining proceedings in a state court, expressly excepts bankruptcy proceedings. This is the plain intimation by federal and paramount law, that where a federal bankruptcy court shall take jurisdiction, there the state insolvency court must yield. Hence it is that the assignee for the benefit of creditors of the defendant company, the grantee in the deed which is by the Federal Law, an act of bankruptcy, may be made a party in the bankruptcy court, and may be required to hold the assets of the bankrupt subject to the order of the district court."

And see Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy, p. 71.

For the reasons stated, I recommend: (1) That the motion for Receiver be granted; (2) that, if it be found by the District Court that no receiver should be appointed, an injunction issue restraining the assignee, pending these proceedings, from disposing of any property, settling any claims, and disbursing and funds except the usual current expenses for employees and the upkeep of the place of business.

I transmit herewith: (1) Order of reference; (2) transcript of testimony; (3) motion for receiver.

JONES, District Judge.

Exceptions waived in open court.

Report approved.