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CONLEY v. GIBSON, (S.D.Tex. 1955)
Case Summary: J.D. Conley et al. v. Pat J. Gibson et al., Civ. A. No. 8443 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 1955)
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs J.D. Conley, Stanley Moore, Sr., George L. Carter and B.A. Watson filed suit under the National Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151. They allege they are Negro employees of the Texas New Orleans Railroad Company and/or the Southern Pacific Transport Company and members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees ("Brotherhood"). Plaintiffs assert that the Brotherhood has in Houston two local unions: Local 28 (composed of white men) and Local 6051 (composed of Negro men).
Plaintiffs sued Pat J. Gibson (General Chairman of Locals 6051 and 28), Raymond Dickerson (Division Chairman), and Local 28; the opinion notes it is not entirely clear whether the Brotherhood itself is sued, and the court states it is assuming the Brotherhood is a party defendant. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief declaring segregation of Negro employees into a separate local illegal under the National Labor Relations Act and contrary to a Union Shop Agreement of March 1, 1953; they seek to enjoin enforcement of membership in the segregated local (Local 6051), to compel equal bargaining and protection against racial discrimination, and to restrain the defendants from acting as exclusive collective bargaining agent unless equal representation is afforded. Plaintiffs also seek damages in the amount of $75,000.
The record reflects that a copy of the referenced bargaining agreement does not appear among the papers in the case. The hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss was held under Local Rule 25.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the federal district court has jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act to adjudicate and grant relief (declaratory, injunctive and monetary) for alleged discriminatory practices and segregation of union locals that plaintiffs contend violate the National Railway Labor Act and a union-shop agreement.
- Whether the plaintiffs' complaint presents a justiciable issue and states a claim upon which relief can be granted, particularly where plaintiffs do not challenge the lawfulness of the selection of Local 28 as bargaining agent or the validity of the bargaining agreement itself.
- Whether federal courts may provide relief for breaches in the performance of collective bargaining agreements or whether such disputes are to be left to quasi-judicial tribunals and the remedial scheme recognized in the cited authorities.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Plaintiffs assert that segregation of Negro employees into a separate local (Local 6051) is illegal under the National Railway Labor Act and contrary to the Union Shop Agreement of March 1, 1953.
- They seek a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction prohibiting the Brotherhood and its agents from requiring plaintiffs to join Local 6051, from refusing to bargain equally, and from engaging in race-based discrimination affecting jobs, discharges, or seniority; they also seek damages of $75,000.
- Plaintiffs rely on precedents such as Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co. and Tunstall v. Brotherhood as legal authority supporting federal relief for discrimination by union officials.
Defendants' Arguments
- Defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, defect of parties defendant, that the complaint does not present a justiciable issue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- They argued that plaintiffs do not question the lawfulness of the selection of Local 28 as bargaining agent nor the validity of the bargaining agreement, and therefore federal courts lack jurisdiction to police performance of collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor Act.
- Defendants relied on a series of authorities (listed in the opinion) to support the proposition that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to remedy breaches of collective bargaining agreements and that appropriate quasi-judicial forums exist for such disputes.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941) | Addressed judicial authority under the Railway Labor Act (cited by the parties). | The court observed Moore by itself "may throw some doubt" upon dismissal but held it has been modified and limited by other authorities and is not dispositive here. |
| Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946) | Cited among authorities concerning federal jurisdiction and remedies under the Railway Labor Act. | Listed by defendants as supporting lack of federal jurisdiction to provide remedies for collective bargaining disputes. |
| Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950) | Recognizes existence of appropriate quasi-judicial tribunals for disputes under the Railway Labor Act. | Used (via Hettenbaugh) to show that Congress established quasi-judicial fora and did not vest federal courts with general jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements. |
| Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255 (1950) | Cited among authorities on federal court jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act. | Included in the list of authorities cited by defendants to support dismissal for want of jurisdiction. |
| Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Intern., 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 319 (1951) | Articulates that Congress did not grant federal courts jurisdiction to afford relief for breaches of collective bargaining agreements; federal courts act only when agreements are unlawfully entered into or are themselves unlawful in terms or effect. | The court relied upon Hettenbaugh as controlling reasoning and quoted it directly to support dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Hayes v. Union Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 184 F.2d 337 (1950); D.C. 88 F. Supp. 108 | Examined the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act and differentiated prior decisions relied upon by plaintiffs. | The court referenced Hayes as distinguishing Steele and Tunstall, and as part of the body of precedent limiting federal jurisdiction. |
| Kendall v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C. Ohio, 94 F. Supp. 875 | Cited among district court decisions concerning jurisdictional limits under the Railway Labor Act. | Listed by defendants in support of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Van Zandt v. Railway Express Agency, D.C. N.Y., 99 F. Supp. 520 | Cited among district court decisions on jurisdictional questions under the Act. | Included in the list of authorities supporting dismissal for want of jurisdiction. |
| Butler v. Thompson, 8 Cir., 192 F.2d 831 (1951) | Cited for the proposition that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain collective bargaining disputes. | Listed by defendants to support dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction. |
| Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) | Authority relied upon by plaintiffs for federal relief where union action discriminates against members. | The court noted plaintiffs relied on Steele but observed that later authorities (especially Hayes) have considered and differentiated Steele in the context of jurisdictional limits; the court did not accept Steele as controlling here. |
| Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) | Authority relied upon by plaintiffs regarding federal relief for discrimination by union officials. | The court noted plaintiffs relied on Tunstall; Hayes and other authorities were said to have distinguished Tunstall, and the district court found those distinctions dispositive of jurisdiction here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first recited the factual allegations and the remedies sought by plaintiffs: declaratory relief condemning racial segregation of the Brotherhood's locals, injunctions against compelling membership in the segregated local, injunctions to secure equal bargaining and protection, and a claim for monetary damages. Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting lack of jurisdiction, defects in parties, nonjusticiability, and failure to state a claim.
The central analytical focus was jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act. The court observed that plaintiffs did not challenge the lawfulness of the selection of Local 28 as bargaining agent nor the validity of the bargaining agreement (a copy of which was not in the record). The court agreed with defendants that federal courts are not generally charged with policing the performance of collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor Act.
The opinion acknowledged Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co. might "throw some doubt" on dismissal, but concluded that Moore has been "modified and limited" by a body of other authority. The court relied particularly on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hettenbaugh (which itself cites Slocum) for the proposition that Congress did not grant federal courts general jurisdiction to grant relief for breaches of collective bargaining agreements — that such disputes are addressed in appropriate quasi-judicial forums — and that federal courts act only when agreements are unlawfully entered into or when the agreements themselves are unlawful in terms or effect.
The opinion further notes that plaintiffs relied on Steele and Tunstall, but that those cases were "fully considered and differentiated" by the Ninth Circuit in Hayes v. Union Pacific R. Co., which undercuts plaintiffs' reliance on them here. Because the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, it found it unnecessary to address other questions raised by the parties.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered an appropriate dismissal to be entered. The direct consequence is that plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction; no relief (declaratory, injunctive, or monetary) was awarded by this court.
The opinion states no broader precedent beyond applying the existing body of case law limiting federal judicial intervention in disputes over collective bargaining performance under the Railway Labor Act. The court explicitly declined to address other issues because the lack of jurisdiction was dispositive. The opinion does not announce a new legal rule; it applies and relies upon prior decisions (particularly Hettenbaugh and related authorities) to support dismissal.
KENNERLY, District Judge.
Plaintiffs J.D. Conley, Stanley Moore, Sr., George L. Carter and B.A. Watson allege in their complaint that they bring this suit under the National Railway Labor Act, Title 45 U.S.C.A. § 151.
They say they are citizens of the United States and of the State of Texas, and that they are Negro employees of the Texas New Orleans Railroad Company and/or the Southern Pacific Transport Company, corporations doing business in Houston, Harris County, Texas. That they are members of a national labor union or organizations known as the Brotherhood of Railroad Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (for brevity called "Brotherhood"). That the Brotherhood has in Houston, Texas, a local union or subsidiary composed of white men and known as Local 28, and a similar local union or subsidiary composed of Negro men known as Local 6051.
Plaintiffs sue Pat J. Gibson as General Chairman of Locals 6051 and 28, and Raymond Dickerson, Division Chairman thereof. They also sue Local 28. Whether the Brotherhood is sued is not entirely clear, but I am assuming that it is a party defendant herein.
Defendants have moved to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, defect of parties defendant, that plaintiffs do not in their complaint present a justiciable issue and that such complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This is a hearing under Local Rule 25 of such motion.
1. Plaintiffs allege that Local No. 28 is the bargaining agent of the members of the Brotherhood and has been so designated in pursuance of such Act. That Local 28 has negotiated with such Railroad Company, et al., a working agreement to which plaintiffs refer in their complaint.
A copy of such agreement does not appear to be among the papers in the case.
Reference is made to plaintiffs' complaint as a whole. While plaintiffs' allegations are not at all clear, the nature of plaintiffs' case and the relief sought appears to be stated in paragraph three of plaintiffs' complaint (their prayer) in which they pray that the Court enter a final decree
"(a) Declaring that the segregation of Negro employees of the craft represented by the Brotherhood into a separate local is illegal under the National Labor Relations Act, and is contrary to the Union Shop Agreement of March 1, 1953, and permanently and perpetually enjoin the Brotherhood, its agents, officers, representatives or any of them from requiring plaintiffs to maintain membership in the Union by joining Local 6051, the segregated local —
"(b) That the defendants, and each of them, their servants, agents, members and officers are permanently and perpetually restrained and enjoined from refusing to bargain for plaintiffs and those whom they represent on a basis equal to that afforded to white employees, clerks, who are also represented by the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks —
"(c) That the defendants, and each of them, their servants, agents, members and officers, are permanently and perpetually restrained from refusing to protect plaintiffs and those whom they represent from discriminatory action because of race or color from whatever quarter emanating."
In paragraph four of their prayer they also pray —
"That this Court issue a permanent injunction forever restraining the defendants, and each of them, their agents, servants, officers and members from permitting, or engaging in any discrimination toward plaintiffs and those whom they represent, from allowing plaintiffs jobs to be abolished summarily, and from allowing the discharge of plaintiffs and those whom they represent, the termination of their seniority on account of race or color when employees of the white race, clerks, are not so affected; and that the defendants be restrained from being or purporting to act as exclusive collective bargaining agent with the T. N.O. Railroad Company concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, and hours of employment so long as any acts of discrimination continue, and unless and until the defendant Labor Union, its agents, servants, officers and members give these plaintiffs and all of the other Negro employees whom they represent, equality of representation on any phase of labor negotiations."
In paragraph five of their prayer they also pray —
"Plaintiffs further pray that this Court award them judgment for damages in the amount of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00)."
Citing Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089; Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 66 S.Ct. 322, 90 L.Ed. 318; Slocum v. Delaware, L. W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795; Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255, 70 S.Ct. 585, 94 L.Ed. 811; Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Intern., 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 319; Hayes v. Union Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 184 F.2d 337, certiorari denied 340 U.S. 942, 71 S.Ct. 506, 95 L.Ed. 680; Id., D.C., 88 F. Supp. 108; Kendall v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.Ohio, 94 F. Supp. 875; Van Zandt v. Railway Exp. Agency, D.C.N.Y., 99 F. Supp. 520; Butler v. Thompson, 8 Cir., 192 F.2d 831, defendants say in support of their Motion to Dismiss and their claim that this Court is without jurisdiction. That since plaintiffs raise no question of the lawfulness of the selection of Local 28 as a bargaining agent, nor of the validity of such bargaining agreement, jurisdiction is not here. That the Federal Courts are not charged with the duty of policing parties in the performance of collective bargaining agreements under such Act. They press the point that this case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. I think and conclude that defendants' position is well taken and their Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
The case of Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., supra, standing alone may throw some doubt upon this conclusion, but that case does not stand alone. It has been modified and limited by the many cases cited. The present ruling is well stated by the Court of Appeals for this circuit in Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, supra, where it is said [ 189 F.2d 321]:
"The Congress did not, by the Railway Labor Act, grant jurisdiction to the federal courts to afford relief for breaches of performance of collective bargaining agreements. Appropriate quasi-judicial tribunals have been established for that purpose. Slocum v. Delaware, L. W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795. It is only when collective bargaining agreements are unlawfully entered into, or when the agreements themselves are unlawful in terms or effect, that federal courts may act. The question of federal jurisdiction being decisive, it is not necessary to consider the other contentions made by the parties. The dismissal of the cause for want of jurisdiction was correct."
Plaintiffs apparently stand upon Steele v. Louisville N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 193, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173, and Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 211, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187, but those cases are fully considered and differentiated by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in Hayes v. Union Pacific R. Co., cited above.
Because of my conclusion that this Court is without jurisdiction, it is not necessary to discuss the other question presented.
Let an order be drawn and presented dismissing the case.
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