- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
FERNANDEZ v. GARZA
Factual and Procedural Background
Emma Garza filed suit against Maria Zorrilla Fernandez, administratrix of the estate of Gerardo Zorrilla, deceased, seeking recovery of property based on an alleged agreement with the deceased. The trial court found in favor of Garza, awarding her $17,476.12, and Fernandez appealed. Garza cross-appealed certain aspects of the judgment. The case had been previously before the court twice.
Material facts include that Garza and Zorrilla entered into an agreement in 1938 to work together managing and acquiring property and to share equally in the profits. Garza moved into Zorrilla's home and later entered into a meretricious relationship with him until his death in 1949. Both parties acquired property and collected rents, which were deposited into Zorrilla's bank account. The trial court found the accumulated property under their agreement at $34,952.25 and awarded Garza half of that as her share.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter given the statutory requirement that claims against an estate be presented within a certain time.
- Whether the evidence supported the trial court's finding of a partnership agreement between Garza and Zorrilla.
- Whether the partnership agreement was based on an illegal consideration due to the meretricious relationship.
- Whether the trial court properly determined the amount of accumulated property despite evidentiary uncertainties.
- Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment to clarify the source of the awarded funds.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to present her claim against the estate within the statutory time limit under A.R.S. § 14-570.
- The evidence was insufficient to support the finding of a partnership agreement.
- The partnership agreement was illegal because it was based on the meretricious relationship between Garza and Zorrilla.
- The judgment amount was uncertain and could not be sustained due to nebulous evidence on the accumulation of property.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The claim is not barred by the statute of non-claims because the subject matter involved partnership assets held in trust, not estate assets.
- The evidence, including witness testimony, supports the existence of a valid partnership agreement to share profits equally.
- The partnership agreement did not include the meretricious relationship as consideration and is enforceable despite that relationship.
- The trial court correctly fixed the accumulated property amount as the best possible estimate given the commingling of funds and lack of complete records.
- The motion to amend the judgment was based on Rule 60 to correct a clerical mistake, seeking to clarify that the awarded sum was from partnership property, not estate assets.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Latham v. McClenny, 36 Ariz. 337, 285 P. 684 | Claims against estates must be presented within statutory time limits or be barred. | Referenced to explain the defendant's jurisdictional argument and statutory claim bar. |
| Franklin v. Trickey, 9 Ariz. 282, 80 P. 352 | Partnership assets held by administrator are trust funds, not estate assets. | Supported the court’s view that statute of non-claims did not apply to partnership assets. |
| In re Baxter's Estate, 22 Ariz. 91, 194 P. 333 | Same principle as Franklin regarding partnership assets and trust relationship. | Reinforced the trust nature of partnership assets held by the estate administrator. |
| Smith v. Connor, 87 Ariz. 6, 347 P.2d 568 | Appellate review requires evidence sufficient for a reasonable mind to reach the trial court’s conclusion. | Supported affirmance of the partnership finding based on sufficient evidence. |
| Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 281 P.2d 786 | Same standard as Smith v. Connor for appellate review of evidence. | Further supported sufficiency of evidence for partnership finding. |
| York v. Beck, Cal.App., 118 P.2d 316 | Action lies against estate representative for conversion of partnership assets. | Supported plaintiff’s right to recover from the estate for partnership assets. |
| Algeo v. Algeo, 125 Kan. 245, 263 P. 1077 | Same principle as York regarding recovery from estate for partnership assets. | Reinforced plaintiff’s right to an accounting and recovery. |
| A.R.S. § 29-222 | Partner’s right to an accounting when just and reasonable. | Statutory basis for plaintiff’s claim for accounting of partnership affairs. |
| Mollohan v. Christy, 80 Ariz. 141, 294 P.2d 375 | Burden on managing partner to support disbursements; plaintiff entitled to accounting. | Applied to shift burden of proof to defendant controlling partnership funds. |
| Bass v. Daetwyler, Mo. App., 305 S.W.2d 339 | Managing partner’s fiduciary duty to make a true accounting. | Supported fiduciary duty of defendant as managing partner of partnership assets. |
| Wilson v. Moline, 229 Minn. 164, 38 N.W.2d 201 | Burden of producing evidence shifts when defendant has exclusive control of accounts. | Supported trial court’s approach to evidentiary burden in this case. |
| Sweatt v. Johnson, 97 Vt. 177, 122 A. 501 | General rule on burden of proof in partnership accounting and fiduciary duties of managing partner. | Guided the court’s analysis of evidentiary burdens and resolution of ambiguities against defendant. |
| Glazer v. Kurman, 384 Pa. 283, 120 A.2d 892 | Commingling of partnership and personal funds breaches fiduciary duty; ambiguities resolved against fiduciary. | Applied to support the court’s resolution of evidentiary uncertainties against defendant. |
| Fernandez v. Garza, 83 Ariz. 318, 320 P.2d 948 | Meretricious relationship does not bar enforceable claims arising from agreements between parties. | Reaffirmed that the meretricious relationship did not invalidate the partnership agreement. |
| Jent v. Brown, Okla., 280 P.2d 1005 | Decree of distribution including property not belonging to the estate is null and subject to correction. | Referenced regarding plaintiff’s remedy for correcting the judgment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first addressed the defendant's jurisdictional challenge, concluding that the claim was not barred by the statute of non-claims because the subject matter involved partnership assets held in trust, not estate assets, citing prior Arizona cases establishing this principle.
The court then analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the partnership agreement. It found the evidence, including witness testimony, sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding that the parties had an agreement to work together and share property equally. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the partnership was illegal due to the meretricious relationship, relying on the trial court’s factual finding that the partnership agreement predated the relationship and was enforceable.
Regarding the amount of property accumulated, the court acknowledged the evidentiary difficulties due to commingling of funds and lack of complete records but held that the trial court’s figure of $34,952.25 was a reasonable approximation. The court applied established principles that a managing partner, as a fiduciary, bears the burden of accounting for partnership funds, and ambiguities are resolved against the fiduciary. The court cited multiple precedents supporting this fiduciary duty and burden shifting.
Finally, the court addressed the cross-appeal concerning the requested amendment of the judgment. It ruled that the motion to amend was untimely under Rule 59(1) because it was filed more than ten days after entry of judgment. The court noted that the requested change was substantive rather than a clerical correction, so Rule 60 was inapplicable. The court affirmed the judgment as entered but acknowledged the plaintiff’s potential remedy through other appropriate proceedings.
Holding and Implications
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
The direct effect is that Emma Garza is entitled to half of the partnership property accumulated under the agreement with Gerardo Zorrilla, amounting to $17,476.12, to be paid from the estate assets held by the administratrix. The court clarified that the partnership assets are held in trust and not subject to the statute of non-claims. The court denied the motion to amend the judgment for procedural reasons but indicated other remedies remain available. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing partnership and fiduciary principles.
HERBERT F. KRUCKER, Superior Court Judge.
Emma Garza, plaintiff in the court below, brought suit against Maria Zorrilla Fernandez, administratrix of the estate of Gerardo Zorrilla, to recover certain property from the defendant, predicated on an alleged agreement with the deceased Zorrilla. Judgment was entered against the defendant, fixing the plaintiff's recovery in the sum of $17,476.12, and from such judgment defendant appeals. Plaintiff also cross-appeals to correct the judgment in certain particulars hereinafter stated. Both the subject-matter and the parties to the present appeal are not new, the same having been twice before the court in Garza v. Fernandez, 74 Ariz. 312, 248 P.2d 869, and Fernandez v. Garza, 83 Ariz. 318, 320 P.2d 948.
The facts material to the determination may be stated as follows: Plaintiff's husband died in 1921, leaving her a house and $3,000. In 1938, she entered into an agreement with Gerardo Zorrilla that she would take care of his property, including collecting the rents, cleaning when tenants moved and keeping the houses in repair, and that they would divide equally all rents collected and everything else. Thereafter, plaintiff moved into Zorrilla's home and shortly afterward entered into a meretricious relationship which continued until Zorrilla's death on August 14, 1949.
In 1941, when plaintiff moved in with Zorrilla, she rented her own home for $25 a month for three months; then with her own funds remodeled it into two apartments, thereafter renting them for $30 a month each. In June of 1943, she purchased a house on Sixth Street in Clifton, Arizona, for $3,251.50, using her own money. Zorrilla purchased four houses in Clifton in 1941 with his individual funds, and title was taken in his name. In December of 1941, four apartments were added to the house in which they lived. These were completed in January or February of 1942. In that same year, Zorrilla built another house at a cost of $2,900. The rental money from all these houses was placed in Zorrilla's account in a bank in Safford, Arizona.
At the time of Zorrilla's death, the accumulation of the property of the deceased and the plaintiff, under their agreement, was found by the trial court to be $34,952.25, one half of which by its judgment the court directed to be paid over to the plaintiff from the assets of the Zorrilla estate. This sum amounted to $17,476.12.
Defendant advances five assignments of error supported by three propositions of law. Proposition of Law No. 1 in essence urges that the court below lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, and accordingly the action should have been dismissed. This proposition is bottomed on A.R.S. § 14-570, formerly § 38-1003, A.C.A. 1939, which provides that all claims arising upon contract shall be presented to the executor or administrator within the time limited in the notice and any claim not so presented shall be barred forever. It is, of course, true that if a claim against an estate is not presented in the time and in the manner prescribed by the statute, it is barred. Latham v. McClenny, 36 Ariz. 337, 285 P. 684.
The appellee answers, however, that the subject-matter of the suit is not such a claim as is contemplated by the statute for the reason that the trial court found an agreement between plaintiff and decedent to work together to acquire property for their joint benefit and to divide all the profits made therefrom equally. Clearly, this finding establishes the essential elements of a partnership. As to partnership assets in the hands of the administrator of a deceased partner, this court has followed the theory that they are trust funds and therefore not part of the assets of an estate; they are held not as part of the estate, but in trust for the surviving partner. Franklin v. Trickey, 9 Ariz. 282, 80 P. 352; In re Baxter's Estate, 22 Ariz. 91, 194 P. 333. No presentation of a claim is necessary and the statute of non-claims has no application.
Defendant contends by her second and third propositions of law that where there is no evidence to sustain the plaintiff's case, the court should enter judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the jury for the reason that the court may not assume facts upon which to base its judgment. It is argued that there was no evidence to support the finding of a partnership agreement. We think the evidence is sufficient to support such a finding. For example, Mrs. Rufina Mota testified:
"Q. What did Mr. Zorrilla say, in the presence of Mrs. Garza, what she was to receive? A. He told me about how good she was in managing their business but that it would be eventually her own interest because she was to receive half of what they made.
"Q. Half of what they made from what? A. From the business of the rentals.
"Q. He tell you that more than once? A. Yes."
Other evidence supports such a finding:
It has been said repeatedly by this court,
"`* * * Our duty, on appeal, begins and ends with the inquiry whether the trial court had before it evidence upon which an unprejudiced mind might reasonably have reached the same conclusion which was reached.'" Smith v. Connor, 87 Ariz. 6, 347 P.2d 568, 570; Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 281 P.2d 786.
But defendant argues that the partnership agreement was based on an illegal consideration in that as part of the agreement Mrs. Garza was to live with Zorrilla as man and wife. The trial court found that the partnership agreement did not include as part of the consideration that Mrs. Garza and Zorrilla would live and cohabit together as man and wife. This finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence, as for example, Mrs. Garza's testimony that the agreement to work together and divide the property was made before the meretricious relationship was established. It is the established law of the case that the fact that the parties engaged in a meretricious relationship does not bar either from asserting against the other such claims as would be otherwise enforceable. Garza v. Fernandez, 74 Ariz. 312, 248 P.2d 869.
Appellant attacks the court's finding "that the sum of $34,952.25 was accumulated by the parties under the terms of the agreement and was in existence at the time of the death of the said Gerardo Zorrilla." The evidence of the actual accumulation during the existence of the partnership is so nebulous in some respects that it is impossible to arrive at a certain figure. This does not mean, however, that Mrs. Garza is to be denied all relief. The evidence does show that all the money from the rentals was initially turned over to Zorrilla and deposited to his account in a bank. Accordingly, he had exclusive control of the partnership funds which he invested and reinvested. The evidence also shows that from time to time he gave Mrs. Garza money for payment of utilities and other household expenses.
It is, of course, the commonly accepted rule that an action lies in favor of one member of a partnership against another who receives and refuses to account for proceeds of the partnership property. 1 Am.Jur., Accounts and Accounting, 294, § 45. An action also lies to recover an amount due from the estate of a deceased partner by reason of the conversion of the assets by the representative of the deceased partner. York v. Beck, Cal.App., 118 P.2d 316; Algeo v. Algeo, 125 Kan. 245, 263 P. 1077. In this state, specifically by statute, A.R.S. § 29-222, a partner has the right to an accounting as to partnership affairs whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable. In the instant case, Fernandez, as administratrix, defended this action primarily on the ground of a want of partnership relation. No attempt was made to render an accounting, although, as stated, she was called upon to do so in the pleadings. Mrs. Garza established that the total partnership receipts over the years could have been $43,500. The jury found in answer to a special interrogatory that the parties accumulated under the agreement $39,181. However, in moving for judgment according to the verdict of the jury, it was the opinion of the plaintiff that the proof reflected no more than the sum of $34,952.25. The trial court accepted this amount as the accumulation of the parties under the agreement, and ordered the sum of $17,476.12 set over to Mrs. Garza as her share of the property held in the hands of Fernandez as administratrix of the estate of Gerardo Zorrilla.
The defendant urges that since it cannot be ascertained exactly how the sum of $34,952.25 was derived, the judgment cannot stand; but we do not think that is a sufficient reason to upset the judgment. In Mollohan v. Christy, 80 Ariz. 141, 294 P.2d 375, where the parties were joint adventurers, we said that the plaintiff who had placed his affairs in the hands of the defendant was entitled to an accounting and the burden was on the defendant to support with competent evidence the disbursements made. This is in accordance with the rule that since a managing partner occupies a position analogous to that of trustee, he is charged with the burden of making a faithful and true accounting. Bass v. Daetwyler, Mo. App., 305 S.W.2d 339. It has also been held that the burden of producing evidence at a trial should be shifted once it is shown that the defendant's control over the accounts was exclusive. Wilson v. Moline, 229 Minn. 164, 38 N.W.2d 201.
We believe that the correct rule of law to apply in the instant case is stated in Sweatt v. Johnson, 97 Vt. 177, 122 A. 501, 503-504:
"* * * in the absence of special circumstances taking the case out of the ordinary rule, the plaintiff had the burden of furnishing sufficient evidence to enable the court to state the account.
"Coupled with this general rule, * * is the rule that it is the duty of each partner to keep an accurate account of his transactions with or for the partnership. This duty rests primarily on a partner having the management of the partnership business. * * * If a party to an action for a partnership accounting has failed to perform his duty in this regard, all doubts respecting particular items will ordinarily be resolved against him."
There were seemingly no complete books of account and no records kept. Zorrilla had but the one bank account, and if he had property separate and distinct from that of the partnership as it is argued, it was so hopelessly commingled by investing and reinvesting the funds deposited in the account that no certain determination can be presently made. The statement of the Court in Glazer v. Kurman, 384 Pa. 283, 120 A.2d 892, 894, is applicable here:
"`Defendant kept the books of the company and he alone had the power to draw checks. He mingled partnership funds and personal funds in one bank account and, on this one account, drew checks to pay both partnership obligations and his own personal obligations. It requires no citation of authority to support the proposition that defendant's conduct amounted to a breach of the fiduciary duty which one partner owes to another. Because the tangled financial state of the partnership was brought about by defendant's wrongful conduct the chancellor should and will resolve all financial ambiguities against the defendant.'"
Here, where the plaintiff, Garza, established that the rentals from the properties totalled a possible $43,500, and that certain deductions would necessarily occur by virtue of vacancies and expenses in re-renting, it was not improper for the trial court to fix the total accumulation at $34,852.25 as the best possible calculation of the amount due.
What has been said up to this point is sufficient to dispose of the appeal; the only further question concerns the cross-appeal. The issue on the cross-appeal is whether the court should have granted plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment. The portion of the judgment under consideration reads:
"It Is, Therefore, by the Court, Ordered, Considered, Adjudged and Decreed that there be set over to the plaintiff as her share of the property of said estate the sum of $17,476.12 and that Maria Z. Fernandez, Administratrix of the Estate of Gerardo Zorrilla, deceased, be and she is hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff from the assets of said estate said sum of $17,476.12; that the plaintiff have a judgment against said Administratrix for said sum of $17,476.12, and said plaintiff is hereby given a lien on all the assets of said estate to secure her in the payment of said sum of $17,476.12 together with her costs." (Emphasis supplied.)
The amendment asked for reads:
"* * * that there be set over to the plaintiff as her share of the money or property accumulated by the parties under the terms of the agreement the sum of $17,476.12, now held by the defendant, and that Maria Z. Fernandez, Administratrix of the Estate of Gerardo Zorrilla, deceased, be and she is hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff said sum of $17,476.12, and that plaintiff have judgment against the said defendant-administratrix for said sum of $17,476.12, and that said plaintiff is hereby given a lien on all of the assets of said estate to secure her in the payment of said sum of $17,476.12, together with her costs." (Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiff based her motion on Rule 60, Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., which permits the correction of clerical mistakes. We do not see how Rule 60 applies in this case where the change in the judgment would hardly be called "clerical". Rule 59(1) allows motions to alter or amend judgments, but such motions must be made within 10 days "after entry of judgment". The lower court entered its judgment on July 12, 1957, and the plaintiff made this motion on October 1, 1957. Rule 59(1) serves the cause of justice by requiring an end to litigation, and must be strictly followed. We observe that Mrs. Garza is not without a remedy. We said in Fernandez v. Garza, 83 Ariz. 318, 320 P.2d 948, 950:
"* * * If in fact some of appellee's [Mrs. Garza's] property is embodied in the decree of distribution, to that extent it is a nullity, Jent v. Brown, Okla., 280 P.2d 1005, and through the appropriate remedy in a court of general jurisdiction proper relief may be had."
The judgment of the court below is in all respects affirmed.
STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and PHELPS and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, J., having disqualified himself, the Honorable HERBERT F. KRUCKER, Judge of the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this appeal.
UDALL, J., who originally participated in the determination of this appeal is deceased.
Alert