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GREEN v. SUPERIOR COURT
Summary of Opinion: THOMAS GREEN et al. v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY (Court of Appeal of California, Third District, Sept. 12, 1963)
Factual and Procedural Background
This proceeding is a writ of certiorari reviewing an order of the Superior Court of San Joaquin County adjudging the petitioners, who are pharmacists, guilty of contempt. The underlying litigation was a divorce action brought by the wife in which the husband cross-complained. A primary contested issue at trial was custody of the children. The husband alleged the wife was unfit because of excessive use of narcotic drugs.
The husband's counsel caused subpoenas duces tecum to be issued to the petitioning pharmacists to produce their prescription records and to testify regarding the nature and strength of drugs dispensed. The pharmacists appeared but refused to testify regarding the nature and strength of the dispensed drugs. The respondent superior court found the pharmacists guilty of contempt, fined each $25, and stayed execution pending resolution of these proceedings. A writ of review was sought in this court to challenge the contempt order.
An interlocutory decree of divorce was later issued (according to the respondent court's answer), and the husband was awarded custody of the children; the facts underlying that custody award are not before the appellate court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under California law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 4), a pharmacist who dispenses a physician's prescription is included within the physician-patient privilege such that the pharmacist may refuse to testify about the nature and strength of drugs dispensed.
- Whether the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in adjudging the pharmacists in contempt for refusing to testify, i.e., whether the contempt order should be annulled on writ of review.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The information as to the nature and strength of drugs dispensed by a pharmacist on prescription is as much a part of the physician-patient privilege as would be testimony of the physician himself.
- Although Code of Civil Procedure section 1881(4) does not expressly name pharmacists, the privilege should be inferred and extended because (a) physicians frequently rely on pharmacists to dispense prescriptions, (b) knowledge of certain drugs necessarily reveals medical conditions (examples cited: antabuse for alcoholism, dilantin for epilepsy), and (c) disclosure of the drugs dispensed would reveal confidential communications between patient and physician and thereby undermine the privilege.
- Authorities recognizing that the privilege should be liberally construed and the requirements that only a registered pharmacist may dispense prescriptions (Bus. Prof. Code, §§ 4050–4051) and regulations requiring pharmacists to treat prescription contents as confidential support including pharmacists within the privilege.
- An analogy to the "intermediate agent" concept (as in City County of San Francisco v. Superior Court) and to other decisions recognizing confidentiality of medical records was urged in support of treating pharmacists as within the privilege.
Respondent's Arguments
- The pharmacist who dispenses a doctor's prescription is not within the physician-patient privilege; respondent cited out-of-state authorities holding the dispensing pharmacist is not privileged.
- The statute governing the physician-patient privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 4) does not expressly include pharmacists; therefore the privilege should not be judicially extended to them.
- The burden is on the party seeking to suppress evidence to show it falls within the express terms of the privilege statute; such a showing was not made.
- Where a litigant places his physical condition at issue (as with the wife's asserted fitness for custody), the litigant cannot invoke the privilege to block evidence material to that issue (the "patient-litigant" or "patient-litigant exception").
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 467, 471 | Writ of review is the proper method to annul a contempt order if it is made in excess of jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068). | Cited to support that the present writ of review is the proper procedural method to challenge the contempt order. |
| Brown v. Hannibal St. Joseph R.R. Co., 66 Mo. 588 (1877) | Authority holding that a pharmacist dispensing a doctor's prescription is not within the physician-patient privilege (out-of-state precedent). | Offered by respondent to show precedent that pharmacists are not privileged; used to support refusal to extend privilege. |
| Deutschmann v. Third Ave. R. Co., 87 App. Div. 503, 84 N.Y.S. 887 | Held the statute in question did not apply to the situation of a druggist filling prescriptions; suggested legislature could address public policy but court would not. | Cited by respondent; court quoted the decision to show that filling prescriptions was not covered by the physician-patient privilege under the statute. |
| Turner v. Redwood Mutual Life Assn., 13 Cal.App.2d 573, 576 | Support for the proposition that the physician-patient privilege is to be liberally construed (as cited by petitioners). | Noted by the court as a cited authority for liberal construction, but the court emphasized contrary authority favoring strict construction when privileges suppress truth. |
| Kramer v. Policy Holders etc. Assn., 5 Cal.App.2d 380 | Another California case cited by petitioners for liberal construction of the privilege. | Cited by petitioners; the court referenced such authorities but relied on contrary precedent and statutory language to deny extension. |
| City County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227 | Discusses "intermediate agent" concept and a situation where a physician employed by plaintiff's attorney could not be compelled to testify — grounded in attorney-client privilege rather than physician-patient privilege. | Cited to explain that the cited decision involved attorney-client privilege rather than the physician-patient privilege, and thus is not analogous to compel extension of the medical privilege to pharmacists. |
| Samish v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.App.2d 685 | Supports the proposition that statutes protecting privileged communications are to be strictly construed and that the statute must expressly include the person or class claiming the privilege. | Quoted to support the requirement that the privilege must come within the express terms of the statutory section and cannot be judicially extended where not expressly provided. |
| Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal.2d 128 | Holds the burden is on the party seeking to suppress evidence to show that it falls within the statute; statements to be privileged must come within the express terms of the section. | Used to emphasize that petitioners bore the burden to show pharmacists fall within the statutory privilege, which they did not do. |
| Palmer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Misc. 670 (270 N.Y.S. 10) | One of the out-of-state authorities petitioners cited holding hospital records/X-rays within privilege. | Cited by petitioners as examples where records were regarded as privileged; court referenced them but distinguished and declined to expand privilege to pharmacists. |
| Hansen v. Sandvik, 128 Wn. 60 (222 P. 205) | Another case cited by petitioners as recognizing privileged hospital records or similar material. | Cited by petitioners; court noted such authorities but did not rely on them to extend the privilege to pharmacists under California law. |
| In re Nickel's Estate, 321 Mich. 519 (32 N.W.2d 733) | Also cited by petitioners as an authority recognizing confidentiality of medical records or related materials. | Mentioned by petitioners; court acknowledged but did not treat these out-of-state holdings as sufficient to expand the California statutory privilege. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the petitioners' contention that pharmacists who dispense prescriptions should be protected by the physician-patient privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 4). The analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, all grounded in the opinion's statements:
- Novelty and statutory language: The question was acknowledged as novel in California. The court emphasized that the statute does not expressly include pharmacists within the privileged class and that judicial extension of the statute would be required to accomplish petitioners' requested result.
- Confidential relationship is insufficient: The court reiterated the established legal principle that the mere existence of a confidential relationship does not automatically produce a testimonial privilege. The privilege must fall within the express terms of the statute.
- Precedent and burden of proof: The court relied on California authority (including Samish and Dwelly) that privileges are to be strictly construed because they suppress the truth and that the burden rests upon the party seeking to suppress evidence to demonstrate the applicability of the privilege under the statute's express terms.
- Examination of the petitioners' arguments: Petitioners urged analogies (e.g., "intermediate agent" concept from City County of San Francisco and liberal construction authorities) and pointed to statutes/regulations requiring pharmacists to treat prescription information as confidential. The court rejected these analogies as inapt (City County involved attorney-client privilege rather than physician-patient privilege) and noted that confidentiality rules or professional regulations do not themselves create a testimonial privilege.
- Public policy and use in litigation: The court evaluated the context of the controversy: the wife had placed her physical condition and fitness for custody directly in issue by asserting her fitness and thus by seeking custody. The court emphasized the "patient-litigant" principle: a party who places his or her physical condition at issue cannot invoke the privilege to prevent the opposing party and the court from obtaining relevant evidence on that issue. The court found that the wife was effectively attempting to use the privilege offensively to prevent testing of her asserted fitness.
- Practical considerations and expectation of confidentiality: The court observed that the large number of physicians and drugstores allegedly involved made it doubtful that the patient expected strict confidentiality in all communications; the statute requires confidence as a condition of the privilege.
- Legislative exceptions and limits: The court pointed out that the Legislature had created express exceptions to the physician-patient privilege (citing the statutory personal-injury litigant exception) and declined to judicially expand the privilege to include pharmacists where the statute does not expressly so provide. The court also noted that the Uniform Rules of Evidence had not been adopted in California and that it would not judicially impose policy choices properly for the Legislature to decide.
On that basis the court concluded that petitioners had not met the burden of showing they fell within the statute and that, in any event, the privilege could not be properly invoked under the facts of this case where the patient's condition was squarely at issue in the custody dispute.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The contempt order adjudging the petitioners guilty of contempt is affirmed.
Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):
- The court discharged the order to show cause previously issued by this court and affirmed the contempt order of the superior court.
- Each pharmacist had been fined $25 by the superior court (the fines had been stayed pending these proceedings); the contempt adjudication is affirmed by the appellate court.
- The court refused to extend the physician-patient privilege by judicial construction to include pharmacists dispensing prescriptions under the facts of this case and under the existing language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1881, subdivision 4.
- The court applied the principle that a party who places his or her physical condition in issue in litigation cannot invoke the physician-patient privilege to block testimony material to that issue (the "patient-litigant" principle), and found that principle decisive here.
- The opinion does not announce a broad, new statutory rule beyond the application here; rather, it declines to expand the statutory privilege by judicial fiat and relies on the statute's express terms and existing exceptions.
Additional procedural note from the opinion: Petitioners' application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied on November 6, 1963.
PIERCE, P.J.
In a divorce action instituted by the wife, the husband cross-complained. A main issue at the trial was custody of the children. The husband contended the wife was an unfit person because of her excessive use of narcotic drugs. During the trial there was evidence (according to the allegations of respondent court's answer in these proceedings) that the wife had obtained prescriptions from eight or ten physicians and that she had purchased prescription drugs from ten or more different drugstores. The husband's counsel caused subpoenas duces tecum to be issued to petitioners, who are pharmacists, to appear at the trial bringing with them their prescription records. They appeared but refused to testify as to the nature of the drugs dispensed and as to their strength. Respondent court found them guilty of contempt, fined each $25 and stayed execution pending the determination of the proceedings. [1] A writ of review, prayed for here, is the proper method to annul a contempt order if it is made in excess of jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068; State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 467, 471 [ 127 P.2d 4].)
Interlocutory decree of divorce was, according to the answer of respondent court, thereafter issued to both parties and the husband was awarded custody of the children. The facts upon which such award was based are not before us.
[2a] The grounds of petitioners' refusal to testify were that information as to the nature and strength of the drugs dispensed by a pharmacist on prescription by a licensed physician is as much a part of the physician-patient privilege as would be the testimony of the physician himself.
Petitioners' contention may be summarized thusly: Although the statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 4) does not expressly mention a pharmacist dispensing a doctor's prescription as falling within the privileged class, such should be inferred because (a) physicians do not usually dispense their own prescribed drugs but must rely upon pharmacists, (b) use of some drugs is exclusively for the treatment or cure of specific ailments, e.g., use of antabuse for alcoholism, dilantin for epilepsy; (c) in such cases knowledge of the drug dispensed would reveal the patient's confidentially communicated information to the doctor, and therefore (d) to protect the communication the privilege must be extended to the dispensing pharmacist.
The question is novel in California and petitioners cite no case bringing the pharmacist within the physician-patient privilege in any other jurisdiction. Respondent cites two cases from other states holding that the pharmacist dispensing a doctor's prescription is not within the privilege. ( Brown v. Hannibal St. Joseph R.R. Co. (1877) 66 Mo. 588; Deutschmann v. Third Ave. R. Co., 87 App. Div. 503 [84 N.Y.S. 887].) In the latter case the court says (on p. 894 [84 N.Y.S.]):
". . . The necessity of having physicians' prescriptions filled by druggists may furnish a reason for the Legislature to say that public policy will interpose to prevent them from making disclosures of the information thus obtained, but we are not now dealing with such question. It is enough now to say that the statute in question has no application to such a situation."
Petitioners urge that California authorities hold that the privilege is to be liberally construed in favor of the patient. ( Turner v. Redwood Mutual Life Assn., 13 Cal.App.2d 573, 576 [ 57 P.2d 222]; Kramer v. Policy Holders etc. Assn., 5 Cal.App.2d 380 [ 42 P.2d 665].) They point to the fact that prescriptions of a medical practitioner may be dispensed or compounded only by a registered pharmacist (Bus. Prof. Code, § 4050) or by the physician himself (id., § 4051) and that a pharmacist is required to treat the contents and effect of a prescription and the nature of the patient's illness as being confidential. (Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 16, ch. 17, art. 9, § 1764.) It is not contended, and could not be, that this latter section in and of itself creates a privilege.
[3] Existence of a confidential relationship does not ipso facto cause communications between the confidants to be privileged. Petitioners cite cases from other jurisdictions holding that hospital records and X-rays are within the privilege. ( Palmer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Misc. 670 [270 N.Y.S. 10]; Hansen v. Sandvik, 128 Wn. 60 [222 P. 205]; In re Nickel's Estate, 321 Mich. 519 [ 32 N.W.2d 733].)
They also argue that the "intermediate agent" concept as applied in City County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227 [ 231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418], in relation to the attorney-client privilege, should, by analogy, be said to apply here. In City County of San Francisco it was held that a physician employed by a plaintiff's attorney in an action for personal injuries to examine the plaintiff and evaluate her complaints could not be compelled by the defendant to testify, but this was not because of the physician-patient privilege, it was because of the attorney-client privilege. Petitioners urge the cases are analogous. As has been stated by Dean Wigmore (8 Wigmore on Evidence (Mc Naughton rev.) § 2380a, p. 831):
"Nothing is more fallible than an argument from analogy . . . [T]he answer is that the services of an attorney are sought primarily for aid in litigation, actual or expected, while those of the physician are sought for physical cure; that hence the rendering of that legal advice would result directly and surely in the disclosure of the client's admissions if the attorney's privilege did not exist, while the physician's curative aid can be and commonly is rendered irrespective of making disclosure; and, finally, that thus the absence of the privilege would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer for the benefit of the opponent, while the physician, being called upon only rarely to make disclosures, is not consciously affected in his relation with the patient. The function of the two professions being entirely distinct, the moral effect upon them of the absence of the privilege is different."
The distinct nature of the attorney-client relationship is also pointed out by Justice Traynor in City County of San Francisco, supra, at page 235, where a portion of the above statement by Dean Wigmore is quoted.
The physician-patient privilege did not exist at common law and it has been roundly criticized by common-law scholars. (See, e.g., 8 Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton rev.) §§ 2380, 2380a, pp. 818, 829; McCormick on Evidence, § 101, p. 212; Dean Hale in Codification of the Law of Evidence (1937) p. 111 — as quoted in 2 Hastings L.J., p. 39.)
Its birth was statutory, in New York in 1828, seemingly engendered by the lawmakers' entrapment in the fallacy of "argument by analogy" discussed above, comparing the doctor-patient privilege to the statements of Buller, J., in 1792, in a case involving confidential communications to a lawyer. (McCormick, p. 221.)
The doctor-patient privilege appears to have been adopted in two-thirds of the states. (8 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 625.) In California it is venerable. (Stats. 1851, ch. 1, § 398, p. 114.) The language of the original statute, "A licensed physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient, be examined as a witness, as to any information acquired in attending the patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient" has not been materially altered throughout the years except to limit the privilege to civil cases. However, a number of exceptions have been written into the code section (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 4), one of which will be noted below.
The purpose of the privilege has been described as dual: (1) to encourage free disclosure of facts by the patient to the doctor which otherwise might be withheld and which may aid the doctor in diagnosis and treatment (8 Wigmore (McNaughton rev.) § 2380a, p. 828); and, carrying this "to its next logical step," (2) to "prevent the humiliation of the patient which might occur by disclosure of his ailments." (8 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. p. 625; City County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, p. 232.)
Criticism of the doctrine may be epitomized:
Dean Wigmore opines that few communications by a patient to a doctor are intended to be confidential and that even where they are the patient is not deterred from making them by the possibility of their disclosure. (8 Wigmore, supra, p. 829.)
It has also been stated: "Professional ethics give the patient broad and efficient protection against the disclosure of confidences by the doctor outside of the courtroom. There is a grave doubt whether it is in the public interest to extend the right of the patient to the closing of the doctor's lips as a witness in an action where the condition of the patient is a material and relevant matter. All privileges are blockades to the ascertainment of the truth and should be conservatively and reluctantly granted." (Italics added.) (Witkin, California Evidence, § 430, p. 481, quoting the Comment on Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 27.)
[2b] The Uniform Rules of Evidence have not been adopted in California. We do have the rule of privilege embodied in Code of Civil Procedure section 1881, subdivision 4, as expressing the policy of the California Legislature. Therefore the criticisms expressed above by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by other legal scholars would be academic if we had before us a case where the statute expressly or by necessary implication included pharmacists within the cloak of the protective privilege. The statute here does neither.
[4] And, while, as we have noted, petitioners have cited cases saying that the privilege is to be liberally construed, this court, speaking through Justice Thompson in Samish v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.App.2d 685, has stated, at page 695 [ 83 P.2d 305]:
"Since the protection against privileged communications often leads to a suppression of the truth and to a defeat of justice, the tendency of the courts is toward a strict construction of such statutes. ( Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal.2d 128, 131 [ 56 P.2d 1232]; 27 Cal.Jur. § 30, p. 44.) Unless the statute expressly extends the privilege to specific persons or classes, the law will not justify such individuals in refusing to disclose facts contained in documents which would otherwise be competent evidence in a particular proceeding.
[5] In the Dwelly case, supra, the court said:
"`The burden is upon the party seeking to suppress the evidence to show that it is within the terms of the statute.' [Citations.] The statements to be privileged and hence inadmissible must come within the express terms of the section. [Citations.]" (Italics added.)
[2c] Here petitioners are asking us not merely to extend the privilege to a class not expressly included in the statute and without assuming the burden of showing necessity for its inclusion; they also ask us to do so where the privilege is invoked not generally but in a case where its use would block the ascertainment of truth on a vital issue.
The husband has alleged, as proof of unfitness of the wife to be custodian of the children, her excessive use of narcotic drugs. Numerous physicians consulted and pharmacists visited are said to have important evidence material on this issue.
In the first place, from the very fact of the numbers of both doctors and drugstores involved, it may be seriously doubted whether this patient ever contemplated that her disclosures were in confidence and by the express language of the statute confidence is the sine qua non of privilege. Yet the wife here would bar from a court of justice information which she is alleged to have freely imparted to more than a dozen persons, including perhaps a miscellany of drug clerks.
But, secondly, and this seems to us to cinch the problem's determination, the wife here seeks to use the privilege not as a shield but as a sword. By bringing this action in which the welfare of the children of the marriage is a vital factor, the wife has placed her fitness as a custodial parent on the line. In fact her position in invoking the privilege is really this: I assert that the welfare of the children will be best served by placing them with me because I am a normal, well and stable parent fit to have them, but the court, nevertheless, cannot be allowed to test these assertions by examining my doctors (or their agents, the pharmacists) as witnesses, notwithstanding that they are the persons best able to confirm my fitness!
Therefore, even were we inclined to extend the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1881, subdivision 4, to create a privilege in a prescription-dispensing druggist generally, which we are by no means disposed to do, we still could not reasonably do so under the facts of this case.
Supplementing our reasons, we point out that even in the case where the testimony of the doctor himself is involved the Legislature has created an express exception stating: ". . . [W]here any person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed for or treated such person and whose testimony is material in said action shall testify."
[6] Justice Traynor in commenting on this in City County of San Francisco, supra, at page 232, says: ". . . The patient-litigant exception precludes one who has placed in issue his physical condition from invoking the privilege on the ground that disclosure of his condition would cause him humiliation. He cannot have his cake and eat it too." (Italics added.)
That language is equally appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
We also note that Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 27 (4), contains an exception denying the privileges in a proceeding in which the condition of the patient "is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the patient. . . ." We cannot of course, prophesy that the Legislature will ultimately accept the recommendations of the Conference of Commissioners as the policy of this state where the testimony of the doctor himself is concerned. We can and do, however, refuse to exercise the judicial power of statutory interpretation to give the present statute a meaning not expressed therein and which, if inferred, would produce a result hostile to sound legal principles.
The order to show cause heretofore issued by this court is discharged and the contempt order is affirmed.
Schottky, J., and Friedman, J., concurred.
Petitioners' application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 6, 1963.
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