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WILLIAMS v. WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, Nos. 18604, 18605 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 1965) — Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company (appellee) sold household goods to appellants in the District of Columbia on installment contracts during 1957–1962. Each sale used a printed lease-purchase form that purported to lease the item for monthly rent and provided that title would not pass until total monthly payments equaled the stated value. A clause in the contracts required that payments be credited pro rata to all outstanding balances, effectively cross-collateralizing all purchases by a given buyer and allowing repossession of earlier purchases upon default on a later purchase.
Appellant Thorne purchased items on May 12, 1962, defaulted, and appellee sought to replevy all items purchased since 1958. Appellant Williams purchased a stereo on April 17, 1962, defaulted, and appellee sought to replevy all items purchased since December 1957. The Court of General Sessions entered judgment for appellee; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellants were granted leave to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the contracts at issue (or some of them) are unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
- Whether courts in the District of Columbia may refuse enforcement of unconscionable contracts as a matter of common law (including consideration of the Uniform Commercial Code's § 2-302 enacted by Congress and persuasive authority).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Appellants contended that the contract forms — in particular the cross-crediting clause that kept earlier purchases subject to later defaults — were unconscionable and should not be enforced.
- The Williams record suggested exploitation: appellee sold an expensive stereo to a purchaser whose financial situation (a small government stipend and dependents) was known to appellee, which appellants argued illustrated sharp practice relevant to unconscionability.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of appellee's legal arguments opposing unconscionability beyond the fact that appellee sought repossession and that the trial and intermediate appellate courts rejected appellants' unconscionability contention.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443 (1870) | Common-law recognition that courts may refuse to enforce an unreasonable and unconscionable contract and instead award relief on equitable terms. | Quoted to show historical common-law authority for judicial refusal to enforce unconscionable bargains. |
| Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) | Example of other jurisdictions treating unconscionable contracts as unenforceable. | Cited as one of several out-of-jurisdiction authorities demonstrating the rule's existence elsewhere. |
| Indianapolis Morris Plan Corporation v. Sparks, 172 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. App. 1961) | Another example of a decision recognizing unenforceability of unconscionable contracts. | Used as supporting authority that other courts have applied an unconscionability doctrine. |
| Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) | Illustrates unconscionability as including lack of meaningful choice and unfair contract terms; authority for inquiry into bargaining power. | Cited to define unconscionability and support factors the court should consider (bargaining inequality, deceptive practices, hidden terms). |
| District of Columbia v. Harlan Hollingsworth Co., 30 App.D.C. 270 (1908) | Prior D.C. decisions touching contract enforceability and liquidated damages principles; some statements might appear to reject unconscionability rule. | The majority observed that certain statements in this decision might appear to reject the unconscionability rule but noted the case actually applied usual liquidated damages analysis and did not preclude adopting the unconscionability rule. |
| Jaeger v. O'Donoghue, 57 App.D.C. 191, 18 F.2d 1013 (1927) | Comparable D.C. precedent referenced in the context of prior contract doctrines. | Cited as a comparative authority in discussing prior D.C. cases. |
| Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1890) (cited by reference) | English intrinsic-fraud cases where one party took advantage of the other's ignorance; used to illustrate fraud apparent from contract's face. | Referenced in discussion of intrinsic fraud and situations where grossly unfair terms can evidence lack of true consent. |
| Greer v. Tweed (cited) | Traditional test language for unenforceable bargains: terms such that no reasonable person would make or accept them. | Cited in support of traditional formulations of unconscionability. |
| Daley v. People's Building & Loan Savings Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N.E. 452 (1901) | Illustrates the rule that a signer may assume risk of not understanding terms, but courts are less inclined to interfere absent inequality of bargaining power. | Used to show the general principle that parties are ordinarily held to their signed agreements unless inequality negates meaningful consent. |
| Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 100 N.E.2d 149 (1951) | Authority referenced for formulations of unconscionability and related tests. | Cited as part of authorities supporting the court's adoption of the unconscionability standard. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The majority first described the contracts' salient provisions: a clause requiring payments to be credited pro rata against all outstanding balances, producing a continuing cross-collateral security interest that allowed repossession of earlier purchases upon later default. The lower courts had rejected appellants' unconscionability claims and made no factual findings on that issue.
The court observed that other jurisdictions had held unconscionable contracts unenforceable and quoted Scott v. United States to demonstrate a common-law basis for judicial refusal to enforce such bargains. Noting the absence of a controlling decision in this court's prior jurisprudence, the majority recognized the issue as one of first impression for the District of Columbia.
The court considered the recent congressional enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code's § 2-302 (28 D.C. CODE § 2-302), which allows courts to refuse enforcement of unconscionable contracts; although the UCC provision postdated the contracts here, the court treated the enactment as persuasive authority and consistent with the rationale of cases from which § 2-302 was derived.
Defining unconscionability, the court stated it generally includes both (1) an absence of meaningful choice by one party and (2) contract terms unreasonably favorable to the other. The presence or absence of meaningful choice requires consideration of all circumstances surrounding the transaction, including relative bargaining power, the manner of contracting, whether important terms were hidden in fine print, and whether deceptive sales practices were used. The court adopted a contextual test — whether terms are "so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place" — as the correct inquiry when no meaningful choice was exercised.
Because the trial court and the intermediate appellate court had not made findings on unconscionability (the lower courts felt enforcement could not be refused), the record was insufficient for the appellate court to decide the unconscionability issue as a matter of law. Accordingly, the majority held that the contracts may be refused enforcement if unconscionability is proved and remanded the cases to the trial court for further proceedings and factual findings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that where the element of unconscionability is present at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced. The cases were remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the contracts are unconscionable.
Implications:
- The majority adopted the principle — consistent with authorities cited and persuasive statutory developments (UCC § 2-302) — that courts in the District of Columbia may refuse to enforce contracts found unconscionable at their formation.
- Because the lower courts made no findings on unconscionability, the direct effect is a remand for fact-finding on whether appellants' contracts were unconscionable; the appellate court did not itself set aside the contracts on the present record.
- The opinion announces a judicially adoptable standard for unconscionability (absence of meaningful choice plus unreasonably one-sided terms examined in the context of prevailing commercial mores) but leaves the application to the trial court on remand. The majority viewed the UCC enactment as persuasive support; the dissent urged caution given the potential broad impact and the absence of lower-court findings.
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
Appellee, Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, operates a retail furniture store in the District of Columbia. During the period from 1957 to 1962 each appellant in these cases purchased a number of household items from Walker-Thomas, for which payment was to be made in installments. The terms of each purchase were contained in a printed form contract which set forth the value of the purchased item and purported to lease the item to appellant for a stipulated monthly rent payment. The contract then provided, in substance, that title would remain in Walker-Thomas until the total of all the monthly payments made equaled the stated value of the item, at which time appellants could take title. In the event of a default in the payment of any monthly installment, Walker-Thomas could repossess the item.
The contract further provided that "the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser] to the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made by [purchaser] under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by [purchaser] at the time each such payment is made." Emphasis added.) The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance due on every item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was liquidated. As a result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item was secured by the right to repossess all the items previously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased automatically became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous dealings.
On May 12, 1962, appellant Thorne purchased an item described as a Daveno, three tables, and two lamps, having total stated value of $391.10. Shortly thereafter, he defaulted on his monthly payments and appellee sought to replevy all the items purchased since the first transaction in 1958. Similarly, on April 17, 1962, appellant Williams bought a stereo set of stated value of $514.95. She too defaulted shortly thereafter, and appellee sought to replevy all the items purchased since December, 1957. The Court of General Sessions granted judgment for appellee. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted appellants' motion for leave to appeal to this court.
At the time of this purchase her account showed a balance of $164 still owing from her prior purchases. The total of all the purchases made over the years in question came to $1,800. The total payments amounted to $1,400.
Appellants' principal contention, rejected by both the trial and the appellate courts below, is that these contracts, or at least some of them, are unconscionable and, hence, not enforceable. In its opinion in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 198 A.2d 914, 916 (1964), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained its rejection of this contention as follows:
"Appellant's second argument presents a more serious question. The record reveals that prior to the last purchase appellant had reduced the balance in her account to $164. The last purchase, a stereo set, raised the balance due to $678. Significantly, at the time of this and the preceding purchases, appellee was aware of appellant's financial position. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of appellant's social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that appellant had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount, appellee sold her a $514 stereo set.
"We cannot condemn too strongly appellee's conduct. It raises serious questions of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings. A review of the legislation in the District of Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest court in this jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which this court can declare the contracts in question contrary to public policy. We note that were the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, Art. 83 §§ 128-153, or its equivalent, in force in the District of Columbia, we could grant appellant appropriate relief. We think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar."
We do not agree that the court lacked the power to refuse enforcement to contracts found to be unconscionable. In other jurisdictions, it has been held as a matter of common law that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable. While no decision of this court so holding has been found, the notion that an unconscionable bargain should not be given full enforcement is by no means novel. In Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445, 20 L.Ed. 438 (1870), the Supreme Court stated:
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 3 Cir., 172 F.2d 80 (1948); Indianapolis Morris Plan Corporation v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 84-96, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960). Cf. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963).
"* * * If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to. * * *"
Since we have never adopted or rejected such a rule, the question here presented is actually one of first impression.
While some of the statements in the court's opinion in District of Columbia v. Harlan Hollingsworth Co., 30 App.D.C. 270 (1908), may appear to reject the rule, in reaching its decision upholding the liquidated damages clause in that case the court considered the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made, see 30 App.D.C. at 279, and applied the usual rule on liquidated damages. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1054-1075 (1964); Note, 72 YALE L.J. 723, 746-755 (1963). Compare Jaeger v. O'Donoghue, 57 App.D.C. 191, 18 F.2d 1013 (1927).
Congress has recently enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, which specifically provides that the court may refuse to enforce a contract which it finds to be unconscionable at the time it was made. 28 D.C. CODE § 2-302 (Supp. IV 1965). The enactment of this section, which occurred subsequent to the contracts here in suit, does not mean that the common law of the District of Columbia was otherwise at the time of enactment, nor does it preclude the court from adopting a similar rule in the exercise of its powers to develop the common law for the District of Columbia. In fact, in view of the absence of prior authority on the point, we consider the congressional adoption of § 2-302 persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which the section is explicitly derived. Accordingly, we hold that where the element of unconscionability is present at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.
See Comment, § 2-302, Uniform Commercial Code (1962). Compare Note, 45 VA.L.REV. 583, 590 (1959), where it is predicted that the rule of § 2-302 will be followed by analogy in cases which involve contracts not specifically covered by the section. Cf. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 108-110 (1954) (remarks of Professor Llewellyn).
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra Note 2; Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, supra Note 2.
See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra Note 2, 161 A.2d at 86, and authorities there cited. Inquiry into the relative bargaining power of the two parties is not an inquiry wholly divorced from the general question of unconscionability, since a one-sided bargain is itself evidence of the inequality of the bargaining parties. This fact was vaguely recognized in the common law doctrine of intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which can be presumed from the grossly unfair nature of the terms of the contract. See the oft-quoted statement of Lord Hardwicke in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1751):
"* * * [Fraud] may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make * * *."
And cf. Hume v. United States, supra Note 3, 132 U.S. at 413, 10 S.Ct. at 137, where the Court characterized the English cases as "cases in which one party took advantage of the other's ignorance of arithmetic to impose upon him, and the fraud was apparent from the face of the contracts." See also Greer v. Tweed, supra Note 3.
See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932); Note, 63 HARV.L.REV. 494 (1950). See also Daley v. People's Building, Loan Savings Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N.E. 452, 453 (1901), in which Mr. Justice Holmes, while sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, made this observation:
"* * * Courts are less and less disposed to interfere with parties making such contracts as they choose, so long as they interfere with no one's welfare but their own. * * * It will be understood that we are speaking of parties standing in an equal position where neither has any oppressive advantage or power * * *."
This rule has never been without exception. In cases involving merely the transfer of unequal amounts of the same commodity, the courts have held the bargain unenforceable for the reason that "in such a case, it is clear, that the law cannot indulge in the presumption of equivalence between the consideration and the promise." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 115 (3d ed. 1957).
See the general discussion of "Boiler-Plate Agreements" in LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362-371 (1960).
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple, nor can it be mechanically applied. The terms are to be considered "in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case." Corbin suggests the test as being whether the terms are "so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place." 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra Note 2. We think this formulation correctly states the test to be applied in those cases where no meaningful choice was exercised upon entering the contract.
Comment, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-307.
See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra Note 2; Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 100 N.E.2d 149 (1951). The traditional test as stated in Greer v. Tweed, supra Note 3, 13 Abb.Pr., N.S., at 429, is "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept, on the other."
Because the trial court and the appellate court did not feel that enforcement could be refused, no findings were made on the possible unconscionability of the contracts in these cases. Since the record is not sufficient for our deciding the issue as a matter of law, the cases must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
So ordered.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals obviously was as unhappy about the situation here presented as any of us can possibly be. Its opinion in the Williams case, quoted in the majority text, concludes: "We think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar."
My view is thus summed up by an able court which made no finding that there had actually been sharp practice. Rather the appellant seems to have known precisely where she stood.
There are many aspects of public policy here involved. What is a luxury to some may seem an outright necessity to others. Is public oversight to be required of the expenditures of relief funds? A washing machine, e.g., in the hands of a relief client might become a fruitful source of income. Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain business establishments will take long chances on the sale of items, expecting their pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate with the risk. Perhaps a remedy when necessary will be found within the provisions of the "Loan Shark" law, D.C. CODE §§ 26-601 et seq. (1961).
I mention such matters only to emphasize the desirability of a cautious approach to any such problem, particularly since the law for so long has allowed parties such great latitude in making their own contracts. I dare say there must annually be thousands upon thousands of installment credit transactions in this jurisdiction, and one can only speculate as to the effect the decision in these cases will have.
However the provision ultimately may be applied or in what circumstances, D.C. CODE § 28-2-301 (Supp. IV, 1965) did not become effective until January 1, 1965.
I join the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in its disposition of the issues.
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