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MONELL v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF CITY OF N.Y., (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
Factual and Procedural Background
This action was brought by female employees of the New York City Board of Education and the New York City Department of Social Services, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated female employees in other city agencies. The plaintiffs challenged certain rules and regulations of the defendant city agencies that allegedly compelled pregnant women employees to take unpaid leaves of absence at arbitrary points during their pregnancies, even when they wished to and were capable of continuing to work beyond the mandatory leave period. Specifically, the agency policy permitted pregnant employees to work through the seventh month of pregnancy with approval of an agency physician, but city-wide regulations limited work to the completion of the fifth month unless further approvals were obtained. An exception applied only to women in the school system whose eighth month of pregnancy occurred during the last month of the school term. Plaintiffs asserted that the mandatory leave policy violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty, property, and equal protection.
Defendants moved to dismiss the action on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment and for class certification. The court granted class certification but denied summary judgment due to disputed factual issues.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) to hear plaintiffs' claim challenging mandatory maternity leave policies as a deprivation of constitutional rights.
- Whether the mandatory maternity leave regulations violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of pregnant women employees by arbitrarily compelling unpaid leave, thus denying equal protection and infringing on liberty and property interests.
- Whether plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment based on the alleged arbitrariness and lack of medical foundation for the mandatory leave policies.
- Whether the action is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claim is essentially an injury to personal liberty dependent upon infringement of a property right, which is not cognizable under civil rights statutes.
- The mandatory maternity leave policies are reasonable and not arbitrary, as evidenced by agency medical approvals and individualized medical judgments.
- The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The mandatory maternity leave policy is arbitrary, lacks medical foundation, and violates Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty, property, and equal protection.
- The policy discriminates against women, particularly pregnant women, by imposing an unconstitutional limitation on their employment.
- Equal protection principles require that pregnancy be treated like other medical disabilities, with individualized medical decisions left to the woman and her doctor.
- The action should be certified as a class action because the class is numerous, claims are typical, and common legal and factual questions predominate.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969) | Held that jurisdiction under civil rights statutes could not be predicated on infringement of property rights alone. | Defendants relied on this to argue lack of jurisdiction; court rejected this reliance in light of subsequent Supreme Court ruling. |
| Tichon v. Harder, 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971) | Followed Eisen's jurisdictional analysis. | Referenced by defendants in jurisdictional argument; court found it superseded by later Supreme Court decision. |
| Canty v. Board of Education, 448 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971) | Applied Eisen's reasoning on civil rights jurisdiction. | Defendants cited in support of jurisdictional argument; court declined to follow due to Supreme Court precedent. |
| Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) | Rejected distinction between personal liberties and property rights for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) jurisdiction. | Supreme Court ruling that compelled the court to deny defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) | Applied heightened scrutiny to sex-based discrimination under Fourteenth Amendment. | Referenced to illustrate evolving judicial sensitivity to sex discrimination claims. |
| Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) | Declared sex-based classifications unconstitutional under equal protection clause. | Used to support plaintiffs' claim that sex-based employment restrictions are subject to constitutional challenge. |
| White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) | Invalidated jury discrimination against women. | Illustrative precedent cited for sex discrimination jurisprudence. |
| United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) | Addressed unequal sentencing based on sex. | Referenced as part of the broader trend against sex discrimination. |
| Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) | Challenged exclusion of women from state higher education. | Used to demonstrate judicial rejection of sex-based exclusions. |
| Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1 (1971) | Invalidated exclusion of women from bartender employment. | Part of cited authority against sex discrimination in employment. |
| Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School District, 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969) | Challenged exclusion of mothers of illegitimate children from public schools. | Referenced to illustrate expanding protection against sex-based discrimination. |
| Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971) | Invalidated mandatory maternity leave policy as violating equal protection by treating pregnancy differently than other medical disabilities. | Strongly relied upon by the court to deny dismissal and to frame plaintiffs' claims as viable. |
| Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), reversed 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972) | Initially invalidated, but on appeal upheld compulsory maternity leave as rationally related to a permissible state purpose. | Court noted the reversal to highlight conflicting authority on maternity leave policies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first addressed the jurisdictional challenge by defendants, who argued that plaintiffs' claim was not cognizable under civil rights statutes because it involved an alleged deprivation of property rights dependent on personal liberty claims. The court rejected this argument, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., which rejected the distinction between personal liberties and property rights for jurisdictional purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Thus, the court found subject matter jurisdiction proper.
Regarding the merits, the court recognized that plaintiffs alleged the mandatory maternity leave policy was arbitrary and lacked medical foundation, violating Fourteenth Amendment protections of liberty, property, and equal protection. The court noted the growing judicial and legislative trend against sex-based discrimination, citing multiple precedents that applied heightened scrutiny to sex classifications.
The court acknowledged conflicting authority on maternity leave policies, referencing the Cohen decision which invalidated similar policies on equal protection grounds, and the Schattman decision which was reversed on appeal. The court found that plaintiffs' equal protection claim could not be dismissed at this stage.
However, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment due to disputed factual issues concerning the actual application of the maternity leave policy. Defendants asserted that individualized medical judgments were made in each case and that no arbitrary seven-month rule was strictly enforced. The court found these factual disputes precluded summary judgment.
Finally, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to certify the case as a class action, finding that the class was sufficiently numerous, that common questions of law and fact predominated, and that the named plaintiffs would adequately represent the class interests, consistent with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Holding and Implications
The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and granted plaintiffs' motion to certify the case as a class action.
The direct effect of this decision is that the lawsuit will proceed to further factual development and possibly trial as a class action challenging the mandatory maternity leave policies of New York City agencies. The court recognized the constitutional viability of the plaintiffs' claims under the Fourteenth Amendment but found factual disputes precluded summary judgment. The decision does not establish new precedent but aligns with the evolving judicial approach toward heightened scrutiny of sex-based employment discrimination and the protection of pregnant employees' rights.
MOTLEY, District Judge:
This is an action by female employees of the New York City Board of Education and the New York City Department of Social Services on behalf of themselves and other female employees in city agencies similarly situated. Plaintiffs challenge, on federal constitutional grounds, rules and regulations of the defendant city agencies which plaintiffs claim arbitrarily compel pregnant women employees to take unpaid leaves of absence when they desire to and are capable of continuing to work beyond the mandatory leave period.
The complaint alleges that in the case of pregnant female employees agency policy permits such employees to work through the seventh month of pregnancy with the approval of the agency physician. However, under city-wide leave regulations pregnant female employees are permitted to work only until the completion of the fifth month of pregnancy, unless they receive agency medical approval and approval of the head of the agency involved (Complaint, para. 22, 26.) The only exception to the aforesaid policy obtains when the eighth month of pregnancy occurs during the last month of the school term (Complaint, para. 28.) This, of course, applies only to women in the school system.
The primary constitutional claim is that the policy making unpaid leave mandatory at the end of the seventh month of pregnancy is arbitrary and without medical foundation and therefore violates plaintiffs' rights to liberty and property and equal protection guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Defendants have moved to dismiss this action on the ground that 1) the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter; or 2) the complaint fails to state a complaint on which relief can be granted. The motion is denied.
Jurisdiction in this court is predicated solely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), the civil rights statutes.
In moving to dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds defendants relied upon the decision of the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969) and its progeny. Tichon v. Harder, 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971); Canty v. Board of Education, 448 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971). Defendants' claim is that the gravamen of the complaint — that plaintiffs have been deprived of the income they would have earned had they not been required to take maternity leave — is nothing more than a claim of injury to personal liberty which is dependent for its existence upon the infringement of a property right and, therefore, not a claim cognizable under the civil rights jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
In Eisen v. Eastman, the Second Circuit had held that jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Acts, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), could not be predicated on a claim of infringement of property rights. However, the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1115, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) ruled that it "has never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietory rights as a guide to the contours of § 1343(3) jurisdiction" and expressly rejected the distinction. The complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs' equal protection claim is that the requirement that a woman employee take a leave of absence at an arbitrary period during her pregnancy discriminates against women generally, and pregnant women in particular, in violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, by placing an unconstitutional limitation on their employment.
It is true, as plaintiffs claim, that equal rights for women is an idea whose time has come. `As a result, the courts have begun to re-examine all sex based restrictions and to apply with increasing sensitivity the guarantee of equal protection of the laws to prohibit arbitrary sex discrimination. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (discrimination against unwed fathers with respect to custody of their children); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) (discrimination against women in appointment to administration of estates); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (jury discrimination against women); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (unequal sentences for men and women); Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (exclusion of women from state institution of higher education); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971) (exclusion of women from employment as bartenders); Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School District, 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D.Miss. 1969) (exclusion of mothers of illegitimate children from public schools).
Discrimination against women in employment generally is now prohibited by national law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Discrimination against pregnant women employees and in the application of disability benefits to pregnancies has recently been prohibited by the Rules and Regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 37 Fed.Reg. 6837. An equal rights amendment to the Federal Constitution is making its way through the ratification process of the states. Sex legislation is thus automatically suspect. Reed v. Reed, supra.
Very recently two federal district courts relied upon the guarantee of equal protection to invalidate state maternity leave policies similar to those in the instant case. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971); Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 330 F. Supp. 328, 331 (W.D. Texas 1971). The favorable decision in the Schattman case, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972) (Judge John Minor Wisdom, dissenting). The majority held that the compulsory maternity leave after the seventh month involved there was shown to be reasonably and rationally related to a permissible state purpose.
In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, supra, women were required to take a leave of absence after the fifth month of pregnancy. There the court ruled: "The maternity policy of the School Board denies pregnant women such as Mrs. Cohen equal protection of the laws because it treats pregnancy differently than other medical disabilities. Because pregnancy, though unique to women, is like other medical conditions, the failure to treat it as such amounts to discrimination which is without rational basis, and therefore is violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ( 326 F. Supp. at 1161.)
The instant complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment cannot be granted. The central issue of fact is disputed. Plaintiffs claim that women are compelled in every case to leave in the seventh month of pregnancy, except when the eighth month of pregnancy occurs during the last month of the school term. On page 16 of defendants' brief on their motion they assert: "A teacher may continue working, however, until such time as her pregnancy condition interferes with the effective performance of her duties. There is no arbitrary seven month rule." Defendants state in a letter dated March 28, 1972, addressed to the court, that their policy is that an "individualized medical judgment is made in each case accommodating the teacher's desires with its medical examiner's professional judgment as to her ability to deliver satisfactory performance with reasonable safety to herself."
In the Cohen case the court ruled that "since no two pregnancies are alike, decisions of when a pregnant teacher should discontinue working are matters best left up to the woman and her doctor." ( 326 F. Supp. at 1160.) Whether the defendants would accept the medical judgment of the pregnant teacher's doctor and a waiver of any claim of liability against defendants, such as was offered by one of the plaintiffs, is not at all clear. Whether defendants require other medically disabled persons to submit to the medical judgment of defendants' doctors as opposed to their own is also not clear.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment must be denied.
Plaintiffs have also moved for an order designating the present action a class action. The motion is granted. Plaintiffs represent a class which is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There are numerous women employees in the City of New York's many agencies. There are questions of law and fact common to the class. The claims of the instant plaintiffs are typical of the claims of other members of the class. This court finds that plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The action is further maintainable as a class action since the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effective adjudication of the controversy. The court also finds all other criteria for determining whether a class action should be allowed met in this case. Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.
So ordered.
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