MARSHEK v. STEPHENS

JAMES GRAHAM, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement while he was housed at the Emanuel County Jail in Swainsboro, Georgia. Defendants Stephens, Fann, and Craft ("Movants") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed a Response. Movants filed a Reply, and Plaintiff filed a Surreply. For the following reasons, Movants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Fann assaulted him with a belt, which caused him to have bruises and welts. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants Craft and Royal handcuffed him in an awkward, unnatural, and unnecessary position. Plaintiff contends that the handcuffs were so tight for so long that he lost all circulation and feeling in his arm and suffered nerve damage to his right thumb. Plaintiff also contends that as a result of being handcuffed, his back and neck hurt and he suffers from migraine headaches. Finally, Plaintiff states that the alleged violations of his constitutional rights can be traced back to Sheriff Stephens' hiring, training, and supervision policies and procedures.

Movants assert that Plaintiff flooded his cell in an attempt to get Defendant Craft's attention. Movants contend that Defendant Craft found Plaintiff in his cell with a broom in his hand. Movants also contend that Plaintiff was told to give the broom to the officers, but Plaintiff refused and began swinging the broom at the officers when they tried to take the broom away from Plaintiff. Movants allege that the officers had to use force to get Plaintiff to release the broom. Movants assert that Defendant Craft took Plaintiff to the "B" block of the detention center; later that afternoon, Movants allege, the sprinkler in Plaintiff's cell was activated when Plaintiff was in his cell alone. Movants also allege that Plaintiff sought treatment in the medical unit two days later and stated that he was bitten by a spider.

STANDARD OF DETERMINATION

Summary judgment should be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving part[ies are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2004). An issue of fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case, and an issue of fact is "genuine" when it could cause a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2004). The court must determine "`whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Id. at 1260 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

The moving parties bear the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the moving parties must identify the portions of the record which establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Hickson, 357 F.3d at 1260 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving parties may discharge their burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial. Id. In determining whether a summary judgment motion should be granted, a court must view the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Acevado v. First Nat'l Bank, 357 F. 3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

I. Plaintiff's Assertion That Defendants Fann and Craft Used Excessive Force Against Him.

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the use of cruel and unusual punishment governs the amount of force that a prison official is entitled to use. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). An excessive force claim has two requisite parts: an objective and a subjective component. Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994). In order to satisfy the objective component, the inmate must show that the prison official's conduct was "sufficiently serious." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). The subjective component requires a showing that the force used was "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" rather than a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986). In order to determine whether the force was used for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm or whether the force was applied in good faith, the following factors are relevant: the need for the exercise of force, the relationship between the need for force and the force applied, and the extent of injury that the inmate suffered. Id. at 321, 106 S. Ct. at 1085.

Movants allege that there is no evidence to support Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant Fann beat him with a belt or that Defendant Craft grabbed him by the throat and handcuffed him. Movants contend that there are no medical records to support Plaintiff's allegations that he sought treatment for bruises and abrasions and nerve damage to his right thumb. Movants allege that Plaintiff's medical records indicate that he sought medical treatment two (2) days after this event allegedly occurred for a spider bite to his right thumb and that Plaintiff did not mention any assault or other injuries. (Doc. No. 204, pp. 20-21.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Fann "whipp[ed]" him with a belt, an action which was not "rationally related to any pen[o]logical interest" because he was never uncooperative with her. (Doc. No. 266, p. 16.) Plaintiff also asserts that, after Defendant Fann assaulted him, Defendant Craft entered his cell and grabbed Plaintiff with a "choke hold" and slammed his head onto a bunk frame. (Doc. No. 266, p. 17.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant Craft handcuffed him in an unnatural and awkward position, which caused him to suffer from nerve damage and migraines.

The parties submitted documentation in support of their positions. Movants submitted Defendant Craft's responses to the interrogatories Plaintiff propounded. According to Craft's responses, on the date in question, Defendant Craft went to Plaintiff's cell to help Defendant Fann and Joann Royal (another Defendant) remove Plaintiff from his cell. When Defendant Craft reached Plaintiff's cell, he saw Plaintiff pushing Defendant Fann around, pulling away from her, and slinging her around. Defendant Craft asserted that he came up behind Plaintiff, put his arm behind his back, and brought him out of his cell; Defendant Craft stated that he took Plaintiff to the bottom of the stairs and stood with him while the sprinkler head in Plaintiff's cell was replaced. Defendant Craft also stated after Plaintiff's cell was cleaned, he took Plaintiff back to his cell without any further incident. (Movants' Ex. C, p. 4, ¶ 2.) Movants also submitted Plaintiff's medical records, which reveal that Plaintiff requested to visit the medical unit at the Emanuel County Jail two (2) days after this alleged incident because Plaintiff received a spider bite and had no feeling in his right thumb. (Movants' Ex. E, p. 11.)

In his supporting affidavit, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Fann assaulted him with a belt and that Defendant Craft attempted to choke Plaintiff and slammed his head into the bunk. (Doc. No. 268, Ex. 1, p. 4, ¶¶ 14 and 17.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Craft took him down the stairs and shackled him "upside down in a pretzel like fashion," and, as a result, he lost feeling in his right thumb. (Doc. No. 268, Ex. 1, p. 5, ¶¶ 19 and 22.) Plaintiff further contends that he went to see the doctor the next day due to the numbness in his right thumb and that he also saw the doctor about an unrelated spider bite. (Doc. No. 268, Ex. 1, pp. 5-6, ¶¶ 25-26.)

The parties' contentions, along with the corresponding documentation in support thereof, reveal that Plaintiff has shown that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants Fann and Craft used excessive force against Plaintiff, whether Plaintiff suffered any injuries, de minimis or otherwise, as a result of a use of force incident, and whether Defendants Fann and Craft were justified in using an excessive amount of force against Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants Fann and Craft are not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

II. Plaintiff's Allegation That Defendant Stephens Failed to Properly Train, Hire, and Supervise his Employees, That Defendant Stephens is not Entitled to Summary Judgment Based on Respondeat Superior Principles, and That Defendant Stephens Failed to Protect Plaintiff From a Known Risk of Harm.

"It is only when the `execution of [a sheriff's] policy or custom infl[i]cts the injury' that the [sheriff] may be held liable" for the failure to properly train, hire, and supervise his employees. See McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989)). A sheriff does not incur § 1983 liability for injuries caused solely by his employees. Nor does the fact that a plaintiff may have suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of an employee infer culpability and causation on the sheriff. Id. Instead, to impose § 1983 liability on a sheriff for his alleged failure to properly train, hire, and supervise his employees, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the sheriff had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation. Id.

Additionally, in section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations. Id. at 802. A "causal connection" may be established when the supervisor is well aware of a "history of widespread abuse" and fails to correct the alleged violations.Id. Constitutional "deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervis[or] must be obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences." Id. Having actual notice of the alleged unconstitutional practices combined with a refusal to investigate or respond comprises such a causal connection.

Moreover, the Eighth Amendment imposes duties on jail officials such as the duty to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). This right to safety is violated when a jail official shows deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S. Ct. at 1974). In order to survive summary judgment on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) there was a substantial risk of serious harm to him; (2) defendant showed a deliberate indifference to this risk; and (3) there is a causal connection between the defendant's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.

Movants assert that there is no evidence that Defendant Stephens failed to adequately train, hire, or supervise his employees. Movants aver that Plaintiff admitted during his deposition that Defendant Stephens was not present at the time of the alleged incident, and, therefore, Plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a history of rampant, flagrant, obvious, and continuous constitutional violations. Movants allege that one alleged incident does not amount to a history of constitutional violations which would have put Defendant Stephens on notice.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Stephens was deliberately indifferent to his safety after being informed of Plaintiff's complaints of staff misconduct. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that he spoke with several officers regarding his concern for his safety and that he was told that Defendant Stephens, the Emanuel County Sheriff, would be informed of his concerns.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant Stephens is responsible for the alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The affidavit Stephens provided reveals that he had no contact with Plaintiff while he was housed at the Emanuel County Jail or that Defendant Stephens received any complaints from Plaintiff regarding misconduct of the Emanuel County Jail staff. In addition, Stephens' affidavit reveals that no one ever notified him that Plaintiff had concerns or complaints about the staff or other inmates at the Jail. (Movants' Ex. A, ¶¶ 3-5.) At best, Plaintiff has shown that prison officials were supposed to inform Defendant Stephens that Plaintiff was concerned about his safety due to an incident occurring several days before Defendants Fann and Craft purportedly used excessive force against Plaintiff; this is not enough to establish that, even if Defendant Stephens had been made aware of Plaintiff's concerns, Defendant Stephens failed to adequately train, hire, or supervise his employees. It appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Stephens liable based solely on his supervisory role as the Sheriff. Plaintiff does not come forward with any evidence to refute Defendant Stephens' contention that he was never made aware of Plaintiff's alleged concerns for his safety. Defendant Stephens is entitled to summary judgment as on all of Plaintiff's claims against him.

It is unnecessary to address the remainder of Movants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Movants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant cause of action. This contention has been denied by Order dated August 17, 2005, and need not be addressed again, as Movants raise no additional contentions with their instant Motion. (Doc. No. 144.) Additionally, it is unnecessary to address Movants' assertion that Defendant Craft should be dismissed because he died intestate and has no legal representative. Defendant Craft was terminated as a named Defendant in this case by Order dated October 27, 2005. (Doc. No. 225.) However, by this same Order, "John/Jane Doe" was added to the caption of this case as the administrator of Craft's estate. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Craft should survive his death and remain pending in the name of the administrator of his estate. A person who died intestate (i.e., without having a valid will) is not the same as someone having no estate and no legal representative of that estate. See O.C.G.A. § 53-6-20.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Fann, Craft, and Stephens (Doc. No. 202) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Stephens should be DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Fann and Craft should remain pending.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.