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U.S. v. SNIPES
PER CURIAM:
On April 18, 2006, Michel Abi Nasr was killed in a construction accident when a 1,200 pound steel beam fell on his head. His estate subsequently filed suit against Industrial Steel Fabricators, Inc. ("ISF") and its subcontractor A K Erectors, Inc. ("A K") for negligence. Pursuant to ISF's general liability insurance policy, the Burlington Insurance Company ("Burlington") is indemnifying and defending ISF in that lawsuit to the extent of ISF's coverage under the policy.
The parties dispute the policy's coverage limit for Nasr's accident. Burlington believes that the limit was reduced from $1 million to $25,000 because ISF failed to require A K to obtain, maintain, and submit certified proof of its own insurance policy with coverage and limits of liability at least equal to those in ISF's policy with Burlington. To obtain a declaratory judgment regarding the coverage limit, Burlington initiated a separate suit against ISF, A K, and the estate. Each of the parties in that case, except for A K against whom a default judgment was entered, moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Burlington, a decision appealed only by Nasr's estate. After thorough review, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling.
I.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standards that governed the district court's analysis. Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2010). In doing so, we would normally examine the record to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, but here the parties stipulated that there are no triable issues of fact and waived their right to a jury trial. Therefore, we need only determine whether the district court properly entered judgment in favor of Burlington based on its interpretation of the ISF insurance policy. See Hercules Bumpers, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 839, 841 (11th Cir. 1989).
This declaratory judgment action was brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court implicitly determined that Florida law controls Burlington's legal obligations under its insurance policies, and the parties have not objected to that determination on appeal. Accordingly, we apply Florida law in analyzing the policy's terms. See LaTorre v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Florida adheres to the traditional rule that the legal effects of terms of the insurance policy and rights and obligations of persons insured thereunder are to be determined by the law of the state where the policy was issued.") (citing Wilson v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 415 So.2d 754, 755 (Fla.Dist.Ct App. 1982); see also Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701 F.2d 879, 882 (11th Cir. 1983)) ("Because the parties did not raise any conflict of laws issue in the district court and do not raise it on appeal, under applicable conflict of laws principles the law of the forum ([Florida]) would govern the substantive issues due to the absence of facts justifying the application of the law of some other jurisdiction.") (alteration in original) (quoting Montgomery Ward Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51, 58 n. 11 (3rd Cir. 1977)).
II.
Under Florida law, "insurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy." Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003). But if the relevant policy language is ambiguous then extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions may be introduced to explain the ambiguity. Reinman, Inc. v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 So.2d 788, 788 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1987). Ambiguity exists if the policy language is "susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation," such as "one providing coverage and the another limiting coverage." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). In making that determination, the policy as a whole must be examined and ordinary rules of contract construction apply. Swire, 845 So.2d at 166. An ambiguous provision, particularly a provision that excludes or limits coverage, is liberally construed in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer who prepared the policy in order to achieve the greatest possible coverage. Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 So.2d 740, 744 (Fla. 2002).
A "warranty endorsement" in the insurance policy underwritten by Burlington is the sole focus of the parties' dispute. That endorsement reduces ISF's coverage from $1 million to $25,000 per occurrence if ISF breaches two warranties regarding contractors:
WARRANTY — INSURANCE FOR LEGAL LIABILITY
(CONTRACTORS)
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
1. In consideration of our agreeing to to [sic] issue this policy, you agree, covenant and warrant that you require without exception that those who undertake a job for or in your behalf obtain and maintain insurance, during the duration of the job, for legal liability arising out of their operations with coverage and limits of liability equal to or greater than those provided by this policy.
2. You further warrant that you obtain [certified proof or the equivalent] of such insurance prior to commencement of any work performed for or in your behalf.
3. For any "occurrence" arising out of your failure to comply with the warranties in Paragraph 1 and 2 above the limits of insurance [are reduced as set forth in the schedule]. These limits are inclusive of and are not in addition to the limits being replaced.
The policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Not surprisingly, the parties agree that the "occurrence" in this case is Nasr's death. They also agree that A K, as ISF's subcontractor, did not have the requisite insurance policy and that ISF never obtained certified proof of insurance from A K.
In construing paragraph three of the warranty endorsement, Nasr's estate urges us to strictly adhere to the policy's explicit language in such a way that strains logic. It argues that the "arising out of language requires Nasr's death to be causally connected to ISF's breach of the two warranties. Under this interpretation, the coverage limitation would not apply because ISF's failure to require A K to obtain, maintain, and submit certified proof of the required insurance policy did not cause Nasr's death. The estate acknowledges that the endorsement makes little sense given this interpretation but urges that Burlington should have brought a reformation action if it wanted to avoid the effect of the provision's "plain, easily understandable English."
We agree with the district court and Burlington that the estate's interpretation is not reasonable. The limitation provision follows the two warranties and thus must be read in conjunction with them. No reasonable interpretation of all three provisions in context would require a causal connection between the occurrence and the breach of warranties. To hold otherwise would have us accept the illogical proposition that fatal accidents could result from ISF's failure to ensure that its contractors had the requisite insurance. Rather, the only reasonable interpretation of the endorsement is that the uninsured (or under-insured) subcontractor employed by ISF, here A K, must somehow be implicated in the accident or occurrence.
Because we find the contractual language in paragraph three susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, that paragraph is not ambiguous and we need not consider any extrinsic evidence. See Acceleration Nat'l Serv. Corp. v. Brickell Fin. Servs. Motor Club, Inc., 541 So.2d 738, 739 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989) ("Before extrinsic matters may be considered by a court in interpreting a contract, the words used on the face of the contract must be ambiguous or unclear."). But even if we were inclined to do so, our conclusion would remain unchanged. Not surprisingly, the estate has not set forth a single piece of evidence suggesting that ISF and Burlington intended the reduction in coverage to apply only if the accident was somehow causally connected to a breach of the warranties. Notably, while ISF's general manager perhaps did not appreciate the effect of the warranty endorsement when he signed an identical version in the previous year's policy, he has admitted that the language has "become clear as rain" in that there is "[n]o ambiguity at all." Without any evidence refuting the inescapable conclusion that even ISF's general manager ultimately drew, a reasonable trier of fact surely could not conclude otherwise.
The estate also argues, in the alternative, that there should not be any reduction in coverage because ISF did not breach the warranties in paragraphs one and two. To support its argument, the estate urges that the warranties should not be construed as creating prospective obligations but rather' as only representations of present facts given that they are written in the present, not future, tense. Under this interpretation, a breach of the warranties could only occur if ISF, at the time the policy was "applied for and issued," did not have a standard operating procedure requiring its contractors to obtain and submit proof of the requisite insurance coverage. Because ISF had such a procedure at that time, the estate says that ISF's inadvertent failure to follow that procedure with respect to A K following the under-writing of ISF's insurance contract is irrelevant and could not have resulted in a breach of the warranties.
The estate's argument implores us to ignore all context and limit our attention to only the words it selects to make its case, namely the ones written in present tense. Courts, however, "may not isolate a single sentence or group of words in an insurance policy and read the isolated part alone and apart from other provisions; the goal is to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the entire policy to accomplish its stated meaning and purpose." Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 649 So.2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App. 1995).
When reading the warranties in context, they clearly create prospective obligations rather than represent existing facts. Burlington's obligation to provide $1 million in coverage without any reduction was conditional on ISF requiring its subcontractors to have the requisite insurance and obtaining proof of that coverage "prior to commencement of any work." If the existence of a standard operating procedure to this effect when the policy was issued was sufficient, there would be no need for the policy to spell out different coverage limits depending on whether ISF complied with the warranties in the context of a particular accident. In other words, the warranties had to be prospective obligations or else the language in paragraph three regarding "occurrences" would be superfluous. Under the estate's interpretation, the reduction in coverage would apply if the warranties were untrue when the policy was issued regardless of what particular occurrence later gave rise to coverage. That interpretation is unreasonable in light of the endorsement as a whole. We therefore reject the estate's argument that the provision is ambiguous so as to require liberal construction of the provision in favor of the insured.
The estate urges us to consider that ISF's policy is a renewal from the previous year and in that year ISF's policy contained not only the same warranty endorsement but also a conflicting endorsement called the "Contractors Special Conditions." That endorsement contained virtually the same provisions as the warranty endorsement but used the future tense and did not reduce coverage in the event of a breach of the provisions. The only way to resolve this conflict, the estate says, is to interpret the warranty endorsement as only requiring ISF to have a standard operating procedure when the policy is applied for and issued. The estate urges us to give the warranty endorsement in the policy here the same meaning.
Even if we were inclined to consider this extrinsic evidence, the estate's resolution of the conflict does not work a reasonable reconciliation. As discussed above, it is unreasonable to construe the warranty endorsement as creating no prospective obligations even though it fails to use the future tense. In any event, the Contractors Special Conditions endorsement is irrelevant given that it has been removed from the policy at issue. See Hercules Bumpers, Inc., 863 F.2d at 842 ("It is a basic tenet of insurance law that each time an insurance contract is renewed, a separate and distinct policy comes into existence.").
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order granting Burlington's motion for summary judgment.
On February 1, 2008, the jury convicted co-defendants Kahn and Rosile on Counts One and Two (the conspiracy and false claim charges), but acquitted Snipes on the same charges. The jury convicted Snipes, however, on Counts Three, Four, and Five, for the willful failure to file individual federal income tax returns for calendar years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The jury acquitted Snipes on Counts Six, Seven, and Eight, the failure-to-file charges for 2002, 2003, and 2004.
The probation office's presentence investigation report ("PSI") recommended that Snipes be assigned a base offense level of 28 under U.S.S.G. §§ 2T1.1(a) and 2T4.1. The PSI measured Snipes's intended tax loss at $41,038,051, and assigned a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2), determining that Snipes had used sophisticated means to hide assets from taxation by using foreign accounts. The PSI also recommended a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, because Snipes had obstructed justice by directing Carmen Baker to conceal evidence from a federal grand jury investigation. Finally, the PSI recommended a guidelines sentence of thirty-six months' imprisonment. Snipes objected to the PSI's sentencing recommendations and challenged the PSI's reliance on any extra-verdict facts for enhancing his sentence. Snipes also objected that the obstruction of justice adjustment was unsupported, because Baker's testimony was unreliable.
The district court sentenced Snipes on April 24, 2008. Before the sentence was pronounced, Snipes challenged the tax sentencing regime, arguing that the Sentencing Commission had contravened 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) by not providing probation for non-serious offenses. The district court rejected this claim, observing that, although Snipes's crimes were not felonies, Congress had deemed them to be serious. The court also overruled Snipes's objection to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. The court did, however, sustain Snipes's objection to a sophisticated-means enhancement. Snipes called several character witnesses who testified on his behalf. The district court calculated the guidelines range, specifically observed that the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory, and discussed each of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court sentenced Snipes to a total term of thirty-six months' imprisonment, comprised of three one-year terms for the failure-to-file convictions, to be served consecutively, followed by one year of supervised release and a $75 special assessment fee.
Snipes timely appealed and the government cross-appealed.
II. A.
We examine first whether the district court erred by denying Snipes's June 4, 2007, statutory elective transfer under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) as being untimely. Snipes claims that when the magistrate judge extended the pretrial motions deadline, the new deadline necessarily extended the period of time in which he was allowed to elect to transfer his trial. This theory rests on the notion that Rule 12(c)'s provision that a district court may set deadlines for pretrial motions somehow supersedes § 3237(b)'s command that an election to be tried in the district in which the defendant resided must be filed within twenty days after arraignment. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(c). Snipes also claims that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Snipes permission to make a late statutory elective transfer on the basis of his former counsel's "excusable neglect," under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b)(1)(B).
Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(c) provides that "[t]he court may, at the arraignment or as soon afterward as practicable, set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial motions and may also schedule a motion hearing."
We review a district court's denial of a motion on the grounds of untimeliness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990). However, we review de novo Snipes's argument that Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure supersedes the twenty-day deadline contained in § 3237(b). United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
The proper venue for the crime of willfully failing to file an individual federal income tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, is either the federal judicial district in which the defendant resided at the time of the offense or the judicial district of the designated service center. United States v. Calhoun, 566 F.2d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1978). Title 18 U.S.C., § 3237(b) provides that a defendant facing a failure to file charge
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) ( en banc), we adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered before the close of business on September 30, 1981.
may upon motion filed in the district in which the prosecution is begun, elect to be tried in the district in which he was residing at the time the alleged offense was committed: Provided, That the motion is filed within twenty days after arraignment of the defendant upon indictment or information.
Congress placed particular emphasis on the deadline, underlining the limiting word "provided" in the text of the statute. The deadline was specified "[i]n order to prevent dilatory transfers by defendants." S. Rep. 85-1952, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3261, 3263.
In the first place, "[c]ourts in applying criminal laws generally must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985). Section 3237(b)'s twenty-day statutory deadline for an elective transfer is unambiguous and unqualified. See Abrams v. McGohey, 260 F.2d 892, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1958) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has strictly construed clear statutory deadlines limiting periods for filing motions in criminal cases, holding that there is "simply no room in the text" of more general criminal rules to supersede Congress's clear directions in criminal statutes. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996). Unlike deadlines derived only from Court rules, statutory deadlines that "achieve a broader system-related goal" are "more absolute." See John R. Sand Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008). The unmistakeable statutory deadline in § 3237(b) cannot be waived by a general extension of the motions deadline under Rule 12(c). The language employed by Congress is fatal to this claim.
We add that "[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). Plainly, Congress showed no "intention," clear or otherwise, that Rule 12(c) would control the tax statute; the rule of procedure never even mentions the crime of failure to file a federal income tax return. It merely affords the district court the discretion to set pretrial deadlines. Section 3237(b), in sharp contrast, is specific to the offense at hand and is a controlling exception to Rule 12(c)'s discretion. See ConArt, Inc. v. Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc., 504 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2007).
Indeed, construing Rule 12(c) to supersede the command of Congress embodied in § 3237(b)'s unambiguous deadline would repeal, by judicial fiat, an unambiguous provision found in a congressional enactment. Because the general extension of the motions deadline could not have waived § 3237(b)'s clear twenty-day deadline, the district court's denial of the five-month late elective transfer motion was not an abuse of discretion.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a waiver of the statutory deadline on the theory of "excusable neglect" under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because Snipes's original attorney misunderstood the import of the statutory elective transfer deadline. "[C]ounsel's misunderstanding of the law cannot constitute excusable neglect." Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Finally, it would not have been reasonable anyway to read Snipes's general request for an extension of time to file motions as a request to suspend the § 3237(b) transfer deadline. Snipes's putative motion for elective transfer would already have been two weeks late when his attorneys first requested an extension of time to file motions. The twenty-day deadline for the § 3237(b) election expired on December 28, 2006; Snipes's motion for extension of time to file pretrial motions was not filed until January 12, 2007. Indeed, Snipes's motion for extension of the pretrial motions deadline did not discuss the § 3237(b) venue election at all. In short, there is no indication that even Snipes considered a § 3237(b) transfer election to be governed by the pretrial motions deadline at the time that he moved for the extension.
B.
Snipes also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting a pretrial evidentiary hearing — essentially, a bench trial — on venue. He says that a pretrial evidentiary hearing was essential because, if the choice of venue were improper, a jury sitting in the Middle District of Florida would be the wrong decision-maker to decide the question. This claim purportedly has a constitutional dimension: Snipes submits that by denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the district court forced him to choose between presenting the best evidence — his own testimony — on this disputed fact and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court's denial of a pretrial motion for an evidentiary hearing to challenge venue. United States v. Diaz, 811 F.2d 1412, 1414 (11th Cir. 1987). However, we review Snipes's argument that the denial of a pretrial evidentiary hearing violated his Fifth Amendment rights de novo. United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
It is by now well-settled that venue is an essential element of the government's proof at trial. "[Q]uestions of venue . . . are not to be taken lightly or treated as mere technicalities. . . ." United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1980). "The Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, and Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee defendants the right to be tried in the district in which the crime was committed." United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004).
As with resolving other important elements contained in a charge, a jury must decide whether the venue was proper. See Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1962) ("We hold that the trial court erred in failing to submit the question of venue to the jury."). See also United States v. Stickle, 454 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). In this case, the grand jury returned a facially sufficient indictment, with a clear statement of venue. Counts Three through Eight identified both Snipes's residence (Windermere, Florida) and the location of the crime (the Middle District of Florida). "An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (footnote omitted).
Indeed, it would not have been proper for the district court to find the appropriate venue in a pretrial evidentiary hearing. "Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) an indictment may be dismissed where there is an infirmity of law in the prosecution; a court may not dismiss an indictment, however, on a determination of facts that should have been developed at trial." United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 1987). To permit preliminary trials on essential facts, post-indictment, would "run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, . . . [and] would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial." Costello, 350 U.S. at 363-64, 76 S.Ct. 406.
Snipes argues, nevertheless, that under Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), a pretrial hearing was necessary because a defendant cannot be forced to cede his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in order to enforce his right to testify about venue at trial. In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's testimony in a Fourth Amendment pretrial suppression hearing cannot be admitted in trial without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; it was "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Id. at 394, 88 S.Ct. 967.
However, Simmons has never been extended beyond its context. See In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 975 F.2d 1488, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1992). Only three years after the Simmons decision, in McGautha v. California, the Supreme Court itself questioned Simmons's rationale of the "intolerable tension" between constitutional rights, explaining that the application of this reasoning was "open to question." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 212-13, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 765 (1972). The Supreme Court observed that in many criminal contexts, such as choosing between forgoing testimony at trial or having one's prior criminal acts disclosed, a defendant must make a choice between competing rights. Id. at 214-15, 91 S.Ct. 1454. The Supreme Court explained that even though "a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved." Id. at 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454.
Snipes's Sixth Amendment rights were not impaired in this case. Unlike the Fourth Amendment right, protected by the exclusionary rule, the Sixth Amendment right to have venue proven as an element of the offense is safeguarded by integrating it into the trial. Snipes had a constitutional right to have venue decided by the jury. It did just that. Both parties presented evidence on venue at trial in great detail. Moreover, the district court fully instructed the jury that venue is an element of the offense and that Snipes must be acquitted if the government failed to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. There was no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a novel pretrial, post-grand jury hearing to challenge the claimed venue found in a facially sufficient indictment.
In a final challenge to venue, Snipes claims that the district court should have entered a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for insufficient evidence on venue. But because Snipes's Rule 29 motion only raised evidentiary issues concerning the false claim charge and whether the statute of limitations had expired, we review this issue only for plain error and may reverse only if the error is plain, affects Snipes's substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1312 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2010). There is no plain error here. In establishing venue by a preponderance, United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 1982), the government provided ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Snipes was a Florida resident. Among other evidence, the government showed that Snipes was born in Florida, had maintained a Florida driver's license since 1978, and had averred in several formal documents that his residency was Florida. This is enough to meet a preponderance of the evidence.
C.Snipes also claims that the district court abused its considerable discretion in declining to give an instruction on Snipes's purported good faith reliance on his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. At trial, defense counsel argued that after Agent Lalli had read Snipes his non-custodial rights in May 2002, Snipes believed the "right to remain silent" allowed him to refuse to file his individual federal income tax returns.
A district court has "broad discretion in formulating jury instructions." United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
In reviewing the denial of a requested jury instruction, we consider whether that instruction: (1) was a correct statement of the law; (2) was not adequately covered in the instructions given to the jury; (3) concerned an issue so substantive that its omission impaired the accused's ability to present a defense; and (4) dealt with an issue properly before the jury.United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir. 1995). The government concedes that Snipes's proposed jury instruction was substantially correct. Nevertheless, Snipes's assignment of error fails.
It is uncontested that willfulness is an important element of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 193-94, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991), and that "a good faith claim of privilege against self-incrimination, although erroneous, is a defense to the element of willfulness." United States v. Goetz, 746 F.2d 705, 710 (11th Cir. 1984). "[T]he word `willfully' in these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973). See also United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is the `voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.'") (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. 604) (footnote omitted).
The district court's instructions were adequate first because the issue of whether Snipes asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege was not before the jury on the counts for which he was convicted. When Special Agent Lalli read Snipes his non-custodial rights in May 2002, Snipes was already legally obligated to have filed his individual federal income tax returns for the calendar years 1999, 2000, and 2001. Snipes was only convicted of willful failure to file individual federal income tax returns for these three years, contained in Counts Three, Four, and Five. The Fifth Amendment good faith defense — grounded in the subsequent May 2002 advice of rights — could not have been relevant to any of the charges of conviction.
Moreover, the good faith and willfulness instructions that the district court delivered were altogether sufficient to cover the good faith reliance on the Fifth Amendment argument anyway. The court instructed the jury that good faith is a complete defense to the charges in the indictment. The court reinforced that Snipes was under no burden of proving good faith: it was the government's duty to prove that he acted willfully. Further, the court gave the jury Snipes's proposed language on intent, instructing that "one who expresses an honestly held opinion or an honestly formed belief is not chargeable with fraudulent intent, even though the opinion is erroneous or the belief is mistaken." Even though the district court did not specifically identify good faith reliance on the Fifth Amendment in the instruction, the good faith instruction was thorough and substantially covered Snipes's proposed instruction. Contrast Morris, 20 F.3d at 1117 (holding that it was error for the district court to refuse to give a general good faith jury instruction at all).
When the instructions omitted are "substantially covered by other instructions which were delivered by the district court," there can be no reversible error. United States v. Stone, 702 F.2d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, for example, in United States v. Pomponio, the Supreme Court affirmed convictions for willfully filing false income tax returns despite the judge's refusal to give a good faith instruction: "The trial judge in the instant case adequately instructed the jury on willfulness. An additional instruction on good faith was unnecessary." 429 U.S. 10, 13, 97 S.Ct. 22, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976) (per curiam). See also United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) ("The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give [the defendant's good faith instructions] because their concepts were substantially included in the instruction that the criminal act must be done `knowingly' or `willfully.'"); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978) (no reversible error in a district court's refusal to give an instruction on the defendant's good faith reliance on his constitutional rights because the jury was instructed both on willfulness and good faith); United States v. McCarty, 665 F.2d 596, 597 597 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming tax conviction where judge gave general good faith and willfulness instructions, but did not instruct on a good faith reliance on Constitutional rights). Pomponio, Jordan, and Johnson are controlling here: the instructions concerning general good faith, good faith reliance on counsel, and willfulness sufficiently addressed Snipes's argument that he relied in good faith on the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, the omission of the instruction in no way "impaired the accused's ability to present a defense." Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1200. The district court allowed Snipes's attorneys to thoroughly cross-examine witnesses on the subject of Snipes's good faith reliance on the Fifth Amendment. And defense counsel squarely presented the argument to the jury in closing. Contrast Goetz, 746 F.2d at 712 (holding that the court's refusal to allow the defendant to present evidence of good faith was error in a 26 U.S.C. § 7203 prosecution). Indeed, the defense was arguably successful: the jury acquitted Snipes of the willful failure-to-file charges for 2002, 2003, and 2004, the years that followed Special Agent Lalli's May 2002 advice of rights.
D.
As for sentencing errors, Snipes first claims that the district court erred in sentencing him pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1. According to Snipes, Section 2T1.1 is invalid because it (1) violates Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(j)'s prescription that a misdemeanor be treated as a less serious offense; (2) creates unwarranted disparity in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); and (3) is not the product of careful empirical evidence.
We review this legal claim de novo. United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006). Section 994(j) provides, "[t]he Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense." 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (emphasis added). Snipes argues that a 26 U.S.C. § 7203 misdemeanor offense is a less serious offense for which no first-time offender should be awarded jail time.
Section 2T1.1 (the Sentencing Guideline for willful failure to file returns) directs the district court to calculate the offense level for the advisory guideline range with the use of the Tax Table (§ 2T4.1) that measures the tax loss and an assessment of specific offense characteristics. Section 2T1.1 embodies a change from pre-guidelines sentencing practice. Although under "[u]nder pre-guidelines practice, roughly half of all tax evaders were sentenced to probation without imprisonment, . . . [§ 2T1.1] is intended to reduce disparity in sentencing for tax offenses and to somewhat increase average sentence length." U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 comment. (backg'd).
As for seriousness, Snipes's argument that § 2T1.1 conflicts with § 994(j) misapprehends the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 2T1.1 works in concert with other sections of the Guidelines to allow an award of probation to first-time offenders who committed less serious offenses. Principally, § 2T4.1 allows a district court to measure the tax loss and pin the offense level to that loss. The table found in § 2T4.1 assigns a modest offense level of 6 to tax losses of $2,000 or less and, not surprisingly, increases the offense level as the tax loss increases. Thus, a defendant who caused a tax loss of more than $400,000,000 or more would receive an offense level of 36. If the tax loss were not serious, a first time offender might well be assigned an offense level for which probation would be appropriate. Similarly, § 4A1.1 allows the district court to assess the defendant's criminal history; less serious criminal histories mitigate § 2T1.1's reach.
This graduated penalty structure reflects the Sentencing Commission's assessment that a "greater tax loss is obviously more harmful to the treasury and more serious than a smaller one with otherwise similar characteristics." U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, comment. (backg'd). Thus, the Commission complied fully with § 994(j) by ensuring that the tax offense "guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment" for first time offenders who have committed less serious crimes. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). If the defendant's crime were not "serious" because the tax loss was minor and if his criminal history so warranted, the guidelines would advise a sentence of probation. In contrast, if the tax loss were high and thus more "serious" and "harmful to the treasury," as it was in this case, the guidelines would advise a longer sentence. Snipes merely disputes Congress's and the Commission's assessment of major tax losses as serious. We are unpersuaded.
Snipes's challenge to Section 2T1.1 on disparity grounds is also unsuccessful. Snipes claims that "[b]y treating misdemeanors the same as felonies, the tax guidelines violate" 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). Yet Congress was concerned about the disparity of sentences "among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct," not between misdemeanants and felons. Id. The district court noted that misdemeanants who, like Snipes, had willfully failed to file their personal income tax returns had engaged in similar behavior to the felons who had received similar sentences. The guideline does not create disparity of the kind that would violate 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
Finally, Snipes's claim that § 2T1.1 is not the product of careful empirical evidence is also incorrect. To begin with, the absence of empirical evidence is not an independent ground that compels the invalidation of a guideline. In Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), the Supreme Court disapproved of the crack cocaine guideline in part because it was not based on empirical evidence, but the Court did not invalidate the guideline. Id. at 96, 109-10, 128 S.Ct. 558. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the lack of empirical evidence was one factor that a district court could consider in exercising its post- Booker right to depart from the guidelines. Id. at 109-10, 128 S.Ct. 558. The lack of empirical evidence would not require the wholesale invalidation of sentencing guidelines.
Further, although Snipes correctly notes that the revised Guidelines reflect a change from pre-Guideline sentencing procedures, U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 comment. (backg'd), that does not mean that the Commission performed no empirical analysis when it increased sentences for tax offenses. According to the Sentencing Commission, Section 2T1.1 was created after empirical analysis of sentences for white-collar crimes. The Commission compared sentences for tax crimes and other white-collar crimes, such as embezzlement, with similar crimes, such as larceny, and discovered that the white-collar crimes were given "considerably lower" sentences. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Supplementary Report On the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements 18 (1987). The change to increase sentences for offenders who had caused major tax losses was adopted "[i]n light of the legislative history supporting higher sentences for white-collar crime." Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 177 (1983)). Thus, Snipes's suggestion that Section 2T1.1 was not based on empirical evidence is unavailing.
The district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 to Snipes's crimes.
E.Snipes says next that the district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. The enhancement was based on Snipes's instruction to Amen RA employee Carmen Baker not to respond to a grand jury subpoena. Snipes warned her that she would have to "pay the consequences" if she cooperated with the federal tax investigation. Snipes argues that because the subpoena was never entered into evidence, the government did not prove that the subpoena actually related to the charges in the indictment. Snipes also benignly characterizes the phrase "pay the consequences" as a reference to potential legal action that Baker might face for breach of a confidentiality agreement.
We review a district court's factual finding of obstruction of justice for clear error. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2006). The application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to those factual findings is reviewed de novo. Id.
The district court did not clearly err in finding the evidence was sufficient to establish that the subpoena was related to the charged tax offenses. Although the grand jury subpoena was never placed into evidence, it is undisputed that the subpoena was delivered by the investigating IRS agent to a former employee of Snipes's film company, Amen RA, in an attempt to obtain records about Amen RA. And Baker testified that Snipes "told [her] not to respond, not to talk to anybody or to disclose any information on the company." The context of the subpoena's delivery, Baker's response, and Snipes's comments were sufficient to allow the trial court to determine that the subpoena was related to the tax investigation.
The district court also did not err in finding that Snipes's instruction to Baker to refuse to comply with the subpoena and his threat that "if you do contact them, you will have to pay the consequences" constituted obstruction of justice. We have long held that encouraging another person to avoid complying with a grand jury subpoena may be considered to be obstruction. United States v. Rudisill, 187 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding obstruction enhancement where the defendant encouraged a witness to flee instead of complying with a grand jury subpoena); United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding obstruction enhancement where the defendant brought a witness into a walk-in freezer and asked him not to speak with the FBI). The commentary to the Guidelines describes this kind of conduct as amounting to obstruction: "(a) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a . . . witness, . . . directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so"; and (d) "directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 comment. (n. 4(a) and (d)). The application of this Guideline was not legal error.
Snipes also argues that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the district court erred in sentencing because the jury made no findings about either the extent of the tax loss or obstruction of justice. Apprendi held that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, "the use of extra-verdict enhancements in a non-mandatory guidelines system is not unconstitutional." United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). Since the district court correctly observed that the guidelines were purely advisory, Apprendi does not apply to this case.
F.Finally, we address whether Snipes's thirty-six month prison sentence was unreasonable because the district court allegedly placed undue reliance on general deterrence as a sentencing factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Snipes insists that the only reasonable sentence for his failure to file convictions would have been a period of probation.
In reviewing reasonableness, we begin by examining the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, ensuring "that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence." United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Under Gall, the sentencing judge must "consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party." Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586. "[A] district court's unjustified reliance on any one Section 3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence," Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191, although attaching great weight to any one factor does "not necessarily make a sentence unreasonable." Id. at 1192.
Here, the district court carefully complied with the sentencing procedures. The judge conducted an extensive sentencing hearing and listened to Snipes's allocution, several character witnesses, and argument about sentencing. The court correctly calculated the guideline range and, again, noted that the guidelines were advisory. The sentencing transcript reveals that the judge weighed each factor embodied in the Section 3553(a) calculus before pronouncing the sentence, which was within the recommended guideline range. The sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.
Next, we "consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586). "[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the judge accorded to a given factor . . . [under § 3553(a)], as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented." Id. at 1191 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The party challenging a sentence has the burden of establishing that it was unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
The district court gave ample consideration to each of the relevant considerations found in 3553(a). Although the discussion about general deterrence was somewhat longer than the discussion of the other factors, its length corresponds with the emphasis the Sentencing Guidelines placed on deterrence in the criminal tax context. The introductory commentary to the Tax section of the Sentencing Guidelines explains that
[b]ecause of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines. Recognition that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be violators.
U.S.S.G. Ch. 2 Pt. T, intro. Comment (emphasis added).
Moreover, "[w]hen the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one." Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). Although Snipes argues that there were mitigating factors that the judge did not specifically mention at sentencing, these facts — his college education, his family, and his charitable activities — do not compel the conclusion that the sentence crafted in accordance with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was substantively unreasonable. The district court acted well within its considerable discretion in sentencing Snipes to thirty-six months in prison.
AFFIRMED.
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