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MURILLO v. PACIFIC GAS ELECTRIC COMPANY

United States District Court, E.D. California.
Jul 20, 2010

CAROL R. EDMEAD, J.

This is an action to set aside the election of trustees and officers of a synagogue located in the lower east side of Manhattan. Specifically, petitioners, alleged members of the synagogue, seek the following relief: (1) a declaration that, pursuant to section 618 of the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (N-PCL), the election of trustees and officers of Community Synagogue Center (CSC) held on February 7, 2010, be deemed irregular and of no effect; (2) setting aside the election of the persons elected as trustees and officers at said election; (3) fixing a new election at a time and place to be set by the court under the supervision of inspectors of election to be appointed by the court; and (4) declaring that the individuals listed on the schedule annexed as Exhibit A are the only members of CSC duly qualified to vote in said election.

The parties declined the Court's suggestion that this matter be taken to a religious forum for resolution.

The schedule so annexed includes the names of 134 individuals.

On April 20, 2010, this court granted petitioners' order to show cause for an interim stay in order to maintain the status quo as of February 6, 2010, pending a further hearing on the matter. This interim stay was subsequently vacated by the Appellate Division on May 11, 2010.

PETITIONERS' CONTENTIONS The Petition.

According to the Petition, on December 28, 2009, a Demand for Meeting to Elect Trustees of CSC, signed by 10 members of CSC, was served on the individuals then purporting to serve as the Board of Trustees. Allegedly, the persons indicated on the above-referenced schedule were, as of December 28, 2009, members in good standing of CSC.

On Wednesday, January 21, 2010, Jeffrey Levine, a CSC member, caused a Notice of Special Meeting of CSC to be sent to all CSC members, said Notice indicating that elections for the trustees of CSC would be held on March 1, 2010.

On January 22, 2010, the Board met and voted to hold the annual meeting and election of trustees on February 7, 2010. Allegedly, CSC's by-laws provide that "The names of those nominated for office and as trustees shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the Temple at least 20 days before election." Petitioners aver that the Board failed to post the names of those nominated for office and as trustees at least 20 days prior to the election.

On February 7, 2010, a meeting of CSC members and an election of trustees was held at the CSC offices, at which time two separate slates of proposed trustees were presented, referred to as "Slate A" and "Slate B." The election was presided over by CSC's part-time rabbi, respondent Greg Wall (Rabbi Wall). Petitioners maintain that, according to CSC by-laws, elections are to be presided over by the CSC president, and, at the time of the contested election, Rabbi Wall was not the CSC president.

Allegedly, at the election, Rabbi Wall announced that only CSC members who attended CSC services at least once a month and contributed monies to CSC on a regular basis were qualified to vote. According to the Petition, Rabbi Wall used an arbitrary and capricious standard to determine qualified voters. Petitioners contend that the votes cast by them and other persons alleged to be CSC members in good standing were not counted. Petitioners further maintain that persons who were not members in good standing of CSC were permitted to cast votes, and that those individuals' votes were counted. The Petition alleges that Rabbi Wall and other individuals acting at the direction of the Board improperly and unlawfully disqualified petitioners' votes and the votes of other individuals similarly situated.

The ballots were collected by three attorneys hired by the Board for that purpose. At the conclusion of the election, it was announced that Slate A was elected, and that respondents David Landis (Landis), Herb Latner (Latner), Jack Lebewohl and Max Isaacs (Isaacs) were elected as officers of CSC.

Petitioners claim that the election was illegal and invalid because members in good standing of CSC were not permitted to vote and that their votes were not counted, whereas persons who were not members in good standing of CSC were allowed to vote and that those persons' votes were counted. Further, petitioners argue that the election was illegal and invalid because the names of the persons nominated as trustees were not posted at least 20 days prior to the election, and because the election was presided over by an individual who was not CSC's president, and who did not personally receive the ballots of votes, in violation of CSC's by-laws.

Petitioners are individuals who were candidates for the positions of trustees and were allegedly defeated because of the above-stated alleged improprieties, and, therefore, claim to be injured and aggrieved thereby.

Michael Rosen Affirmation in Support of Motion.

In support of the instant motion, a duly notarized affirmation has been provided by petitioner Michael Rosen (Rosen). Rosen states that, in 2008, in order to increase membership in CSC, CSC entered into an agreement with the Meaningful Life Center (MLC), an organization designed to restore Jewish identity to both practicing and unaffiliated Jews. Rosen Aff., Ex. B. According to Rosen, it is his belief that, in April of 2009, CSC's Board of Trustees held a meeting at which it was determined that elections for new officers and trustees would be held in February, 2010. At this same meeting, the Board also approved a membership drive to be spearheaded by CSC's finance committee, of which Rosen was then a member. Id., Ex. C (Minutes of April 2009 Board Meeting).

As a result of the membership drive, Rosen states that, by September, 2009, 56 individuals had joined the synagogue, some of whom were acknowledged as new members in CSC's Fall newsletter ( id., Ex. D) and in the minutes of a Board meeting held on September 16, 2009. Id., Ex. E. According to Rosen, prospective members were advised that they would have an opportunity to participate in the growth and future direction of CSC.

At the September 16, 2009, Board meeting, some concern was voiced about the synagogue being taken over by the new members, many of whom appeared to belong to MLC. A membership committee was formed to investigate the issue of membership, and it was proposed that new members not be permitted to vote for at least one year after joining, and not be permitted to become Board members for their first two years of membership. Id.

At the next meeting of the Board, held on October 21, 2009, the membership committee recommended the above-stated limitations for new members, but stated that those limitations would not apply to the next annual meeting. Concern was expressed because such limitations were not currently in CSC's by-laws. Id., Ex. H.

On November 18, 2009, two new CSC members met with Landis and Matthew Pace (Pace), then CSC Board members, for the purpose of proposing a slate of Board members for the February 2010 election. Allegedly, Landis told these new members that new members would not be nominated to the Board.

On December 9, 2009, the Board met again, and Landis expressed his concern over the large number of MLC new members, and respondent Seymour Karp (Karp) moved to review the applications of the new members a second time, and that motion passed by a vote of 10 to 2, with one abstention. Another motion was made to terminate CSC's agreement with MLC, which also passed. In addition, the Board voted to postpone the February 2010 elections until the membership issue could be resolved, and that motion also passed. Id., Ex. I.

Rosen then reiterates the facts appearing in the petition, but adds that the eventual vote for each slate was 255 to 100. Rosen states that, as of November, 2009, there were approximately 121 voting members of CSC, thereby making the election count suspect.

RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION Affirmations and Affidavits in Opposition. Affidavit of David Landis.

Landis affirms that he has been the president of CSC since 2007, and a trustee since about 2000. Landis states that CSC has a very small congregation, and that it operates informally, never following any by-laws or holding regular annual meetings.

Landis claims that the agreement with MLC was intended to have MLC as a part-time licensee of the synagogue, for which it would pay a percentage of its revenue to CSC, in the hope that the agreement would provide both revenue and new CSC members. Landis claims that, contrary to CSC's intent, it is his belief that MLC had its members sign up to be members of CSC in the hopes of taking over the building that houses the synagogue, and that the presumed new members of CSC have no genuine interest in the temple or its community.

Landis says that, after the election was noticed, MLC attempted to "stack the vote" by having people who had never appeared at any CSC services turn up for the election, with membership checks paid in bulk by both MLC and James Garfinkel (Garfinkel), an MLC member. Exs. A-E. Landis states that these checks were subsequently returned; however, the persons for whom the checks were sent appeared at the election.

Landis maintains that he was present throughout the entire election, that every vote was publicly counted, that the election was overseen by Rabbi Wall, and that MLC did not put up a slate for officers, only a slate for trustees. Landis contends that, after all of the votes were tallied, even including the votes of MLC members whom he asserts had no right to vote, the CSC slate still won by a vote of 155 to 100. By a second count, deleting the persons whom respondents claim were not entitled to vote, the CSC slate still prevailed by a vote of 83 to 2.

Landis further argues that, at oral argument, petitioners claimed that under the by-laws, which Landis maintains are "defunct," only the vote of a husband is to be counted if both spouses are CSC members. This proffered argument does not appear in the moving papers. However, Landis says that even after discounting the wives' votes, the CSC slate still would have won.

Landis concludes by stating that the ballots have been available for inspection since the election, but not a single person has asked to see them prior to the filing of the instant petition.

Affidavit of Herb Latner.

Herb Latner (Latner) is the secretary of CSC, a position that he has held for over 20 years. Latner testifies that he has searched all of CSC's records and has found no evidence of any by-laws that were properly adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members after proper notice and two meetings, as required by New York Religious Corporations Law (RCL) § 5. Further, Landis states that, even if there were properly adopted by-laws, they have not been followed for several decades. Lastly, Landis contends that the list of members appearing in the petition is not genuine, based on his personal knowledge as CSC secretary.

Affirmation of Israel Vider, Esq.

Israel Vider (Vider) is legal counsel to CSC, and attended the election that is the subject of this controversy. Vider states that, prior to the election, he met with Spencer Schneider, Esq. (Schneider), who represented members of MLC, in order to discuss voting procedures. Vider asserts that he agreed to all of Schneider's requests regarding the balloting and voting, except for the request that Schneider or Rabbi Jacobson, the MLC rabbi, speak to the members.

Schneider attended the election for approximately 2.5 hours, at which time he had to leave, and petitioner Bruce Montague (Montague) took his place to assist all MLC-affiliated members. Montague was permitted to speak on behalf of the MLC slate.

The day after the election, Schneider sent an e-mail in which he identified himself as representing the disenfranchised members of CSC. Ex. A.

Affidavit of Jacob Lebewohl.

Lebewohl is the treasurer of CSC, and states that MLC never paid its share of revenue to CSC, pursuant to the agreement between the organizations. Lebewohl asserts that the motivation behind the instant lawsuit is MLC's wish to take over CSC's facility, and points to a letter allegedly published in the newspaper Jewish Week. A typed version of this letter, authored by Alan Dorfman, appears as Ex. B to this affidavit, and states:

"In the article Hurling Curses Amid the Whitefish' (Feb. 12), Sharon Udasin wrote about the rift at the Sixth Street Community Synagogue. I happily became a new member last year in order to be a part of something special. Rabbi Simon Jacobson's goal is to revitalize the shul for everyone, old and new members alike. He has sparked the recruitment of over 100 new members, raised much-needed funds for the synagogue, and created an incredible array of classes and holiday programming where all Jewish people are welcome. Very simply, Rabbi Jacobson's desire is to help the synagogue survive and thrive. This selfless desire was shot down last Sunday at the shul elections. The old board decided that you had to attend synagogue one time per month' to be considered a member. What was not mentioned in the article is that many new members do attend the synagogue at least once a month — for classes, programs and events throughout the week. The truth is that the one time per month' criterion is only applicable on specific days when the old board members are present. Right now we have an opportunity to put egos and selfish desires aside. Each member of the shul, old and new, should be given an equal vote in deciding the direction of the shul's future. If we work together, we can make this small East Side shul into a hub of religious renaissance for everyone."

Lebewohl further states that he believes that this lawsuit was instituted when MLC was notified of its alleged default in making payments to CSC.

Affirmation of Ilann M. Maazel.

Ilann M. Maazel (Maazel) is an attorney whose firm was retained by CSC to advise and oversee the election that is the subject of this lawsuit. Maazel states that MLC did not put up a slate of officers, and so the officers were elected unopposed. Maazel further says that everyone who attended the election was allowed to participate, and every single vote was tallied, although those votes deemed not valid were not counted. However, even if every single vote would have been counted, the MLC slate of trustees still would have lost by an overwhelming margin.

Maazel further argues that petitioners' attorneys and representatives watched all of the votes being counted, and that petitioners' tallies agreed with his. After the election, the ballot box was delivered to his office, where it has remained, and, at no time prior to filing the instant petition, have petitioners sought to review the ballot box. Maazel notes that petitioners instituted this action over two months after the election, and, therefore, does not see how they can claim irreparable harm.

Maazel has attached what he calls the purported by-laws of CSC (Ex. B), which state, in pertinent part:

"ARTICLE III MEMBERSHIP
SECTION I
All men and women of the Jewish faith over the age of 21 years, and of good moral character shall be eligible to membership in this organization.
SECTION II
Each prospective applicant for membership shall submit a signed application in the form to be provided and furnish the information to be requested, upon receipt of which, such application shall be referred to a Membership Committee for appropriate action as hereinafter set forth.
SECTION III
The Membership Committee shall pass upon the said application after an investigation of the applicant, and thereafter submit the name to the trustees at one of their regular meetings for their appropriate action.
SECTION IV
An applicant shall be deemed elected to membership upon the favorable recommendation of the majority of the Membership Committee and the favorable vote of the Majority of the Body at their regular meeting.
***
ARTICLE VI DUTIES
SECTION I
The President shall preside at all meetings.
***
ARTICLE X ANNUAL MEETING
SECTION I
The annual meeting of this organization shall take place on the first meeting in February of each year.
***
ARTICLE XII ELECTION
SECTION I
Election of officers and Trustees shall take place at the annual meeting in February.
***
ARTICLE XIV NOMINATION
SECTION I
At the first meeting in December, a nominating committee of 5 members shall be appointed, 3 by the President and 2 by the Vice-President. The nominating committee shall consist of two members of the Board of Trustees and 3 non- trustees. No officer or director whose term of office expires at the end of the current year shall be appointed to the membership of said nominating committee. This committee shall organize and proceed with the nomination of the officers of this organization as well as the Trustees to be elected at the next annual meeting. The names of those nominated for the office and as Trustees shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the Temple at least 20 days before election. Fifteen members in good standing shall have the right to nominate a member for an office provided the nomination is posted in the temple 2 weeks prior to the date of election and the signatures of said 15 members shall be affixed to said nomination petition.
SECTION II VOTING
All voting at election [ sic] shall be on a written ballot. All ballots shall be secret and deposited in a ballot box and in charge of and under the supervision of 3 Tellers, two of whom are to be appointed by the President and one by the Vice-President. Each candidate for a contested office shall have the right to appoint a watcher to supervise the count of the votes in his own contest.
SECTION III
Proxies shall not be permitted.
SECTION IV
Only members who have fully paid their dues and all obligations on the books of the organization shall be entitled to vote at an election.
SECTION V
One vote shall be allowed to each family, based upon the dues paid as hereinabove provided. It is the intention that husband and wife and children, where annual dues are paid for the family, shall be entitled to cast but one vote for the entire family. In the event of a dispute in the family with respect to such vote, the male member shall have the right to cast the vote.
***
ARTICLE XVI COMMITTEES
***
SECTION VIII MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE
This committee shall be charged with the duty of investigating all prospective applicants for membership, and report the results of said investigation to the Trustees as hereinabove provided for.
It is noted that these by-laws are unsigned and undated.

Respondents' Argument in Opposition to the Motion.

Respondents maintain that petitioners have failed to present any evidence to challenge a single vote that was submitted in the election, and that their sole motivation is to take over CSC's valuable building, which is a landmark building constructed in 1847. The site has been the home of CSC since 1940.

Respondents argue that, when MLC failed to fulfil its financial obligation pursuant to its agreement with CSC, it decided that, rather than vacate the building, it would take over CSC and then install its own board and rabbi. To achieve this goal, according to respondents, MLC members signed up as new members of CSC, and MLC sent checks for membership fees directly from its own account on behalf of these new members, and one MLC member in particular, sent bulk membership fee checks to CSC.

Respondents allege that, in order to take over CSC, petitioner James Garfinkel (Garfinkel), along with several other MLC members, sent a letter to the board demanding a special meeting to be called to elect trustees. According to respondents, CSC had not held an election in over 10 years. Further, its purported by-laws had never been properly adopted, and had never been followed.

In response to the demand letter, the board announced that an annual meeting and election would be held on February 7, 2010, and notices to that effect were posted on the outside door and bulletin board of CSC for over two weeks prior to the election, and notice of the election was also provided in three separate Saturday services.

Fifteen members of CSC nominated a slate of candidates as officers and trustees, and posted this slate in the synagogue 15 days prior to the election. Respondents note that the MLC slate was not nominated or posted two weeks before the election, as required by the by-laws petitioners assert control the election procedures.

Respondents aver that, in order to oust the CSC board, MLC submitted several checks to CSC, representing membership fees for multiple individuals, within the two weeks prior to the election, even though CSC membership is only open to individuals and, allegedly, cannot be purchased in bulk, which is what respondents assert MLC was attempting to do.

According to the opposition papers, every person who attended the meeting was permitted to vote, and, regardless of whether the votes of individuals who CSC maintains are not members are or are not counted, the MLC slate lost the election. Additionally, respondents state that no less than 40 of the 100 people who voted for the MLC slate do not appear on the membership list provided by petitioners with respect to the instant motion, which, respondents contend, render them improper, even by petitioners' arguments. Furthermore, respondents argue that there were no improprieties or procedural irregularities involved in the election, and petitioners and MLC members and representatives were allowed to and did participate in the election.

Lastly, in response to petitioners' contention that only the president is authorized to preside over the election, respondents point to RCL § 195, which states that the minister of the church, in this instance, Rabbi Wall, shall preside over such meetings.

PETITIONERS' REPLY

In response to respondents' arguments, petitioners contend that respondents' slate would have been defeated because a significant number of individuals who voted for the CSC slate had not paid membership dues, and therefore were not qualified to vote. Petitioners assert that it was respondents who, on the eve of the election, recruited those individuals in order to "stack the vote" against the MLC slate. Petitioners say that 86 paid members of CSC voted for the MLC slate, whereas only 37 paid members voted for respondents' slate. Moreover, petitioners assert that, after they inspected the election ballots in May and June of 2010, which the court notes is several months after the present Petition was filed, they discovered that numerous ballots were submitted by proxy, which is not permitted by the by-laws.

Petitioners also maintain that the CSC by-laws referenced above control the election procedures, and may not be abrogated by Rabbi Wall immediately before the election. In support of this argument, petitioners cite to the board minutes in which Landis makes frequent references to the by-laws. However, petitioners also refer to the minutes of an April, 2009, board meeting, in which it is indicated that "the By-Laws committee is pretty close to a final product" (Motion, Ex. C), which indicates to the court that, at least at that point in time, there were no actual by-laws in operative effect.

Petitioners also challenge respondents' allegation that they posted the nomination petition in a timely manner, asserting that they were first posted on January 27, 2010, less than two weeks before the election.

Lastly, petitioners aver that a preliminary injunction is necessary to protect their interests, since respondents are attempting to cancel the MLC agreement with CSC, and that, in balancing the equities, the fairness of the vote weighs in their favor, an argument rendered moot by the Appellate Division's vacatur of this court's temporary restraining order.

RESPONDENTS' SUR-REPLY

By permission of the court, respondents have been afforded to submit a sur-reply to the arguments presented for the first time in petitioners' reply concerning petitioners' count of the actual ballots, which took place after the instant motion papers were submitted.

Landis Aff., Ex. A.

Respondents state that the results of the ballot count demonstrates that petitioners' candidates still lost, regardless of how membership is determined.

The court only allowed respondents to submit a sur-reply on the issue of the qualifications of the voters, and, although respondents re-argued other issues, the court only considered their arguments with respect to voter qualifications. The court notes that petitioners sent the court a letter on this point; however, since petitioners were not permitted to respond to the sur-reply, the court could not consider their specific arguments.

DISCUSSION

This action is brought pursuant to N-PCL § 618, which provides:

"[u]pon the petition of any member aggrieved by an election and upon notice to the persons declared elected threat, the corporation and such other persons as the court may direct, the supreme court at a special term held within the judicial district where the office of the corporation is located shall forthwith hear the proofs and allegations of the parties, and confirm the election, order a new election, or take such other action as justice may require."

Consequently, the first issue to be resolved by this court is whether petitioners are members of CSC so as to be deemed members "aggrieved by [the] election, "and it is well-settled that, in reviewing an election pursuant to N-PCL § 618, the court sits as a court of equity and should not interfere with the election unless a clear showing is made to warrant such action. Nyitray v New York Athletic Club of City of New York, Inc., 195 AD2d 291 (1st Dept 1993).

"The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs. Civil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution. The neutral principles of law' approach requires the court to apply objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues [internal citations omitted]."
Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v Kahana, 9 NY3d 282, 286 (2007).

"A decision as to whether or not a member is in good standing is binding on the courts when examining the standards of membership requires intrusion into constitutionally protected ecclesiastical matters. [However,] courts generally have jurisdiction to determine whether a congregation has adhered to its own bylaws in making determinations as to the membership status of individual congregants . . . [internal citations omitted]."
Id. at 287-288; Matter of Kissel v Russian Orthodox Greek catholic Holy Trinity Church of Yonkers, 103 AD2d 830 (2d Dept 1984).

For example, a court may determine whether a particular individual who voted at an election paid his or her dues, but may not intrude in such matters as determining whether that individual is a member in good standing according to the religious organization's internal rules ( Esforms v Brinn, 52 AD3d 459 [2d Dept 2008]), or according to religious criteria, such as "following the ways of the Torah." Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v Kahana , 9 NY3d 282 (2007).

In examining questions of membership in a religious organization, in order to avoid constitutionally impermissible scrutiny into ecclesiastical matters, the courts are constrained to determine only whether the religious organization has followed its own internal rules, or, if no rules are existent, that it has followed the dictates of the New York Religious Corporations Law (RCL). Matter of Venigalla v Alagappan, 307 AD2d 1041 (2d Dept 2003); Islamic Center of Harrison, Inc. v Islamic Science Foundation, Inc., 262 AD2d 362 (2d Dept 1999).

According to the purported CSC by-laws submitted, any person over the age of 21 who is a member of the Jewish faith and of good moral character is entitled to CSC membership, upon submitting an application to the membership committee for approval.

Section 195 of New York's Religious Corporations Law (RCL) provides:

"the following persons, and no others, shall be qualified voters, to wit: All persons who are then members in good and regular standingof such church by admission into full communion or membership therewith in accordance with the rules and regulations thereof . . . or who have been stated attendants on divine worship in such church and have regularly contributed to the financial support thereof during the year next preceding such meeting. . . ."

Petitioners argue that they are members in good standing according to CSC by-laws, and that their votes were impermissibly invalidated at the disputed election. Respondents contend that the purported by-laws upon which petitioners rest their argument have never been either formally adopted by the congregation nor have they ever been followed. The only response to this assertion put forth by petitioners is the allusion to by-laws appearing in the minutes of some of the meetings of the board. However, as previously noted, those minutes also refer to a committee working on a final by-law project, and also refer to a vote to establish a membership committee, which, according to the purported by-laws, must pass on membership applications. These references appearing in the minutes of the board meetings indicate that the purported by-laws were not in effect at the time of such meetings.

As the New York Court of Appeals recently stated, "nonusage of a by-law, continuing for a considerable length of time, and acquiesced therein, will work its abrogation [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]." Matter of Venigalla v Nori , 11 NY3d 55, 62 (2008). In the Venigalla case, the religious organization whose election was under scrutiny actually had by-laws that were formally adopted by the organization in 1970, but the evidence presented indicated that by 1975 the persons running the organization's affairs "had apparently forgotten (if they ever knew) that the 1970 bylaws existed." Id. at 62. None of the members of the organization protested the manner in which the organization was operated until 2001. The Court stated that "[t]o allow petitioners to resuscitate the 1970 bylaws when they finally rediscovered them would be unwise and unfair [citation omitted]." Id.

In the case at bar, there is no evidence that the purported by-laws were ever formally adopted by CSC, and there is no evidence that they were ever followed for more than 40 years. Under these circumstances, based on the evidence presented, the court finds that CSC did not have operative by-laws whose provisions regarding membership and elections were not followed. As a consequence, the court must look to RCL § 195 to determine whether petitioners qualify as members of CSC entitled to vote.

Lacking internal rules regarding membership, the RCL mandates two requirements be met for persons to be considered members in good standing of a religious organization: (1) the persons claiming membership must attend divine worship at the religious organization; and (2) the persons claiming membership must regularly contribute to the religious body for the year preceding an election.

Respondents assert that the MLC-affiliated members did not meet either of these statutory requirements because they did not attend religious services at the synagogue, nor have they been members for the year preceding the election so as to allow them to contribute financial support to the congregation. As indicated above, the membership drive did not start until April of 2009, 10 months prior to the election that is the subject of this proceeding. Further, according petitioners' reply papers, petitioners do not challenge the contention that the MLC-affiliated members did not attend services at the synagogue, but assert that they did attend other functions at the premises so as to meet the spirit of the RCL.

Petitioners' argument that the allegedly aggrieved members' attendance at other functions at the synagogue constitutes appropriate attendance goes against the very wording of the statute. The statute is quite precise in stating that persons claiming to be members in the religious organization must attend divine worship, not lectures or other functions at the synagogue. Therefore, petitioners do not, by their own admission, meet the first statutory requirement to be considered members in good standing of CSC, attendance at CSC's divine worship services.

Nor do petitioners meet the second statutory requirement for being deemed members in good standing of CSC. Since petitioners were not members in any form whatsoever for one year prior to the election, it would be impossible for them to have contributed financially to CSC for the requisite statutory period. Moreover, there is no evidence that any of the MLC-affiliated members contributed any financial support to CSC at all, other than the requisite membership fee.

As a consequence of the foregoing, the court concludes that petitioners are not members of CSC within the meaning of RCL § 195, and, therefore, lack standing to bring this suit pursuant to N-PCL § 618.

However, even if the court were to determine that petitioners do have standing to bring the instant action, they still would not be able to prevail.

First, petitioners' argument that notice of the election did not conform to the purported CSC by-laws is found to be unpersuasive. Even though the notice of the election did fall short, by a few days, of the purported by-laws' requirements, "there is no evidence that a member was prevented from voting due to lack of notice." Sillah v Tanvir , 18 AD3d 223 , 224 (1st Dept 2005).

Second, the court also finds unpersuasive the fact that the rabbi, rather than the president, presided over the election. Since the president was one of the candidates up for re-election, the court believes that it would have been unwise for him to preside over his own election. Moreover, even though he did not preside at the meeting, he was in full attendance, and, pursuant to RCL § 195, it is the rabbi who is the first person authorized by statute to preside over meetings held for the purpose of elections.

Third, voting by written proxy is permitted under section 208 of the RCL.

Fourth, and finally, although both sides argue the numbers as to what each considers to be "valid votes" to determine the eventual election outcome, petitioners have not provided sufficient and conclusive evidence, such as certified copies of the actual ballots, that they would have prevailed at the election had their votes been counted. Nyitray v New York Athletic Club of City of New York, Inc., 195 AD2d 291, supra. Furthermore, this argument misses the primary issue as to whether petitioners are members of CSC with the legal right to challenge a CSC election, regardless of any alleged improprieties and irregularities.

Notwithstanding the preceding, even if the court were to determine that the subject election was invalid, the court only has the legal authority to pass on the validity of an election that has been held, and to confirm or invalidate it, but it lacks the authority, absent a stipulation between the parties, to act in advance of an election to determine qualifications of voters. See Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Bartholomew's Church in City of New York v Committee to Preserve St. Bartholomew's Church, Inc., 85 AD2d 425 (1st Dept), affd 56 NY2d 71 (1982). Therefore, the court, under any circumstances, could not grant petitioners' fourth requested relief.

As a consequence, based on the foregoing, the court finds that petitioners do not meet the statutory requirements of N-PCL § 618, so as to maintain the present proceeding.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that counsel for respondents shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry within twenty (20) days of entry on counsel for petitioners.

intiff or any Class Member had, now has, or may have in the future against Released Parties or any of them for any acts occurring on or before December 32, 2009 that were asserted in this Action or that are based upon, arise out of, or relate to the facts of this Action." ( Id. ¶ 30(a).)

2. Rule 23(e) Factors

a. Strength of the Plaintiff's Case

Ascertaining the strength of plaintiff's case is difficult due to the limited record of evidence available to the court. Prior to settlement in October 2009, the only motion filed in this action was a motion to strike portions of defendant's answer to the First Amended Complaint. Discovery also remained open at the time of settlement. As a result, the court does not have the benefit of a long record of adversarial testing of plaintiff's case prior to plaintiff's unopposed motion to certify the settlement class. However, it is evident that a number of legal issues relating to plaintiff's case were disputed by defendant at mediation, including whether the Hiring Hall Premium could be excluded from overtime calculations as a health benefit and whether defendant was entitled to substantial offsets for any inadequate overtime pay. Nonetheless, the paucity of the record ultimately precludes the court from assessing whether plaintiff's case is either strong or weak. Accordingly, the court will not consider this factor for settlement purposes.

b. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely

Duration of Further Litigation

Although the court cannot assess the strength of plaintiff's case from the record, the presence of substantially disputed legal issues at the heart of plaintiff's case does serve to heighten the risk and uncertainty that both parties would face if this action went to trial. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. First, the parties disagreed over whether the FLSA even required Hiring Hall Premium payments to be included in overtime pay calculations. The parties specifically disputed whether the premium could be excluded from overtime calculations as a health care benefit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(4). (See Settlement Agreement ¶ 46.)

Second, the parties disagreed over the extent to which defendant was entitled to offsets for any underpayment of overtime because of substantial amount of extra compensation, including weekend and holiday pay, that defendant provided to its employees. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) Defendant contended that it was entitled to reduce overtime obligations by any extra compensation each employee received over the entire period of the lawsuit, rather than during each individual pay period; a view which is shared by the majority of courts. See, e.g., Farris v. County of Riverside, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1164-65 (C.D. Cal. 2009). If defendant were to prevail on its interpretation of the offset period, class members would likely have been able to recover little, if any, damages from defendant. Third, the parties disagreed over whether plaintiff was entitled to liquidated damages under the FLSA. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 50.) These disputed and novel legal issues injected a great deal of risk and uncertainty for both sides into further litigation of this action.

Assuming the case progressed even further, the complexity and duration of the litigation would also have been considerable. With a class of over 1,000 members, completing discovery in this case and going through a series of dispositive motions would have been extremely costly. Accordingly, the court finds that the uncertainty and likely expense and duration of further litigation favors settlement in this case.

c. Risk of Maintaining Class-Action Status Throughout Trial

The court is unaware of any specific difficulty in maintaining class-action status were this case to continue to trial. Accordingly, the court will not consider this factor for settlement purposes. See In re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03-0283, 2005 WL 3096079, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005) (favoring neither approval nor disapproval of settlement where the court was "unaware of any risk involved in maintaining class action status"), aff'd in relevant part, 496 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2007).

d. Amount Offered in Settlement

The value of the settlement in this case is $200,020.80, which will be paid out to class members based upon the number of overtime hours they worked while employed for defendant. (See Loper Decl. Ex. B.) Defendant has also agreed to make separate payments of $132,602.00 in attorney's fees, $7,398.00 in costs, and a $10,000.00 incentive payment to the named plaintiff. (Mot. Attorney's Fees at 1.) As of the time of the fairness hearing 358 class members opted in and are eligible to receive claims from the settlement administrator. (Loper Decl. ¶ 7.)

According to an analysis submitted by the settlement administrator, class members will almost uniformly recover more than they would have been due if they had prevailed on their claims and plaintiff's interpretation of the offset period was adopted, taking the three year statute of limitations into account. (See id. Ex. B.) Class members' actual recovery, therefore, at least appears comparable to their injuries and is fair and reasonable in light of the risks and costs of further litigation in this case. Accordingly, the court finds that the amount offered favors approving the settlement.

e. Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings

The parties arrived at settlement at an advanced stage of the proceedings. At the time of the mediation session in October 2009 that led to settlement, discovery had been ongoing in this matter for almost a year and the parties were two months away from the close of discovery. (See Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order (Docket No. 13.) at 2-3.) A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the proceedings "suggests that the parties . . . carefully investigated the claims before reaching a resolution."Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., No. Civ. 07-1895 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 4891201, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008) (internal citations omitted). The parties' use of third-party mediation also suggests that they had sufficient information about the claims to present their arguments to an experienced mediator and considered a neutral opinion in evaluating the strength of their arguments in this matter. Accordingly, the court finds that amount of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings at the time of settlement weigh in favor of settlement in this case.

f. Experience and Views of Counsel

The Law Offices of Michael Tracy, class counsel in this action, specializes in employment law and has served as class counsel in numerous federal and state class action lawsuits. (See Hutchins Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The lead counsel for the class has also personally litigated over 200 wage and hour cases. (Id.) Therefore, class counsel is familiar with the attendant risks of litigating class action lawsuits similar to this case.

Class counsel, moreover, indicates that it endorses the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Id. at ¶ 8.) When approving class action settlements, the court must give considerable weight to class counsel's opinions due to counsel's familiarity with the litigation and its previous experience with class action lawsuits. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D.Ariz. 1989) (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City County of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)). Thus, this factor supports approval of the Settlement Agreement.

g. Presence of a Government Participant

No government party participated in this matter; this factor, therefore, is irrelevant to the court's analysis.

h. Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement

Using a mailing list generated by defendant's employment records, the settlement administrator mailed packets comprised of the court-approved class notice, opt-in, and opt-out forms to 1,116 potential class members. (Loper Decl. ¶ 3.) When 113 of the packets were returned as undeliverable, the settlement administrator used the National Change of Address service and "skip tracing" via the credit reporting agency Experian to find updated addresses for these individuals. (Id. ¶ 5.) The settlement administrator then mailed the packets to these 113 individuals, none of which were returned as undeliverable. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) In total, 358 individuals opted-in to the settlement, and only 25 opted out. (Id. ¶ 7.)

The notice complied with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) and 23(e). It provided the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and it informed potential class members of the settlement amount, the basis of the lawsuit, the definition of the class, the procedure for and consequences of opting-in to the settlement, the procedure for and consequences of objecting to or obtaining exclusion from the settlement, and the date of the final fairness hearing.

As of this date, no member of the class has filed an objection to the settlement. (Id. ¶ 9.) "It is established that the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class members." In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 528-29 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). Therefore, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of settlement.

D. Attorneys' Fees

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, "In an action certified as a class action, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement of the parties. . . ." The parties agreed as part of the Settlement Agreement that defendant would pay attorneys' fees, costs, and an enhancement award to plaintiff of up to $150,000.00 in addition to the funds paid to class members. To determine attorneys' fees, courts "typically apply either the percentage-of-recovery method or the lodestar method." In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). While the percentage-of-recovery methods is favored in common fund cases, here, where attorneys' fees do not detract from a common settlement fund, the lodestar method is more appropriate. See id.

Under the percentage-of-recovery method, the court calculates the fee award by designating a percentage of the total common fund. Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).

"In an action where a district court is exercising its subject matter jurisdiction over a state law claim, so long as `state law does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court, and usually it will not, state law denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of the state, should be followed.'" MRO Commc'ns, Inc. v. AT T Corp., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n. 31 (1975)). Thus, when a federal court has federal question jurisdiction and exercises supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, the court may award attorney's fees under the applicable statute. See MRO Commc'ns, 197 F.3d at 1281-83.

In this case, class members are entitled to a statutory award of attorneys' fees pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA and California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."); Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc., No. SA CV 02-507-GLT (MLGx), 2005 WL 6007833, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005) (holding a hybrid FLSA-California state law action was entitled to attorney's fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5) rev'd on other grounds by 240 Fed. Appx. 172 (9th Cir. 2007).

"[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the `lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate." PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). "The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work." Id. (citingMargolin v. Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004 (1982)). The lodestar may then by adjusted upward or downward "by the court based on factors including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award." Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001). The purpose of adjusting the lodestar is to fix the fee for the action in question at fair market value. Id.

A similar approach is applied under federal law. The court first calculates the lodestar by taking the number of hours reasonably expended by the litigation and multiplying it by a reasonable hourly rate. Fisher v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The court may then adjust the lodestar based on an evaluation of the factors articulated in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 536 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975) that are not subsumed under the lodestar calculation. Id.

The factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70.

Federal law, unlike California law, does not allow for contingency multipliers. Compare City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992) with Serano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49 (1977). Here, class counsel requests $89,041.00 in attorneys' fees with a multiplier of 1.5, bringing the total fees to $132,602.00. Accordingly, the court will first evaluate the attorneys' fee award under California law.

Plaintiff's proposed lodestar amount principally accounts for the hours expended by attorneys Michael L. Tracy and Megan Ross Hutchins and paralegal Virginia Tomlinson. Tracy and Hutchins ask for an hourly rate of $300 per hour, and Tomlinson asks for an hourly rate of $95 per hour. A reasonable rate is typically based upon the prevailing market rate in the community for "similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11 (1984) ("[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community."); Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th at 1095. The relevant community is generally the forum in which the court sits. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997).

In support of their requested fee rates, Tracy, Hutchins, and Tomlinson each submit a declaration. Tracy's declaration states that his firm normally charges an hourly rate of $300 per hour for work by attorneys and $95 per hour for paralegal work for non-contingency fee cases, including cases in this District, and that the firm billed approximately $50,000 worth of hourly work at this rate. (Tracy Decl. ¶ 9.) Several California Federal District Courts have also awarded Tracy's firm an hourly rate of $300 per hour in similar wage and hour class actions. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Hutchins's declaration states that she has similarly been awarded attorney's fees at a $300 per hour rate by other courts and typically charges a rate of $300 per hour for wage and hour cases. (Hutchins Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Tomlinson's declaration indicates that she typically charges a rate of $95 per hour for her paralegal work and that she has assisted attorneys in lawsuits in both federal and state courts in California since 2005. (Tomlinson Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.)

Class counsel have sufficiently shown that their rates were reasonable. As previously indicated, class counsel has extensive experience with wage and hour class action litigation. Counsel also charges a $300 per hour attorney rate and $95 per hour paralegal rate for non-contingency fee cases, and many clients have agreed to pay these rates. That clients were willing to pay Tracy, Hutchins, and Tomlinson's hourly rates is a strong indication that their rates are reasonable for wage and hour cases in this market. See Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire Auto, Inc., 253 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2001). In light of the findings of other courts, the briefs, and the declarations submitted, the court finds that an hourly rate of $300 per hour is appropriate for similar work performed by similar attorneys of Tracy and Hutchins's caliber and paralegals of Tomlinson's caliber in the Sacramento area.

Plaintiff's counsel also submitted itemized billing statements for the court's review. (See Tracy Decl. Ex. 1; Hutchins Decl. Ex. 1; Tomlinson Decl. Ex. 1.) Class counsel expended over 280 attorney-hours in developing this case, which included conducting discovery, attending depositions and mediation, and interviewing class members. After reviewing the billing statements provided by Tracy, Hutchins, and Tomlinson, the court finds that the hours expended on this case were reasonable. Accordingly, the initial lodestar for class counsel's attorneys' fees is $89,041.00.

After calculating the lodestar, the court must decide whether to enhance or reduce the award in the light of particular factors, including the novelty and difficulty of the case, the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. However, "[t]here is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation." Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 834 (2001).

Class counsel requests a multiplier of approximately 1.5 to be added to the lodestar so that total attorney's fees come to $132,602.00. (Mot. Attorneys' Fees at 3.) This case contained multiple novel legal issues, including whether a payment of cash in lieu of health benefits needs to be included in the calculation of overtime under the FLSA. To the court's knowledge, this issue, which is at the heart of plaintiff's case, remains an open legal question. Class counsel also displayed skill in litigating this case, receiving a settlement amount that paid class members in a manner commensurate to their injuries. Finally, the contingent nature of this case also weights in favor of enhancement of the lodestar. Fee enhancements in contingency cases exists to compensate for the risk of loss inherent in such cases and create financial incentives for attorneys to take cases to protect important rights and goals, such as fair labor standards, in addition to fee-for-services cases. See Ketchum 24 Cal. 4th at 1132-33; Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1419 (1991). Because all of these factors weigh in favor of enhancing the lodestar, the court will grant counsel's request for a fee enhancement and award a total of $132,602.00 in attorneys' fees.

E. Costs

As previously noted, class counsel is entitled to cover for their reasonable costs under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Class counsel has submitted an itemized list of costs relating to mediation fees, travel expenses, transcript requests, filing fees, and courier services. (Tracy Decl. Ex. 2.) These expenses total $7,397.54. (Id.) The court finds that these are reasonable litigation expenses, and it will therefore grant class counsel's request for compensation for costs.

F. Enhancement Payment to Named Plaintiff

The settlement proposes a $10,000.00 "enhancement payment" to the named plaintiff. The court recognizes that "a class representative is entitled to some compensation for the expense he or she incurred on behalf of the class lest individuals find insufficient inducement to lend their names and services to the class action." In re Oracle Secs. Litig., No. 90-0931, 1994 WL 502054, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1994) (citing In re Continental Ill. Secs. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992)). "Such payments, however, must be reasonable in light of applicable circumstances, and not `unfair' to other class members." Smith v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 338, 368 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (citation omitted); see also In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 1994 WL 502054 at *1 (reducing requested payment of $2,500 to $500 for spending "between two and five hours undergoing depositions and . . . respond[ing] to a few narrow document discovery requests").

The proposed payment is not particularly unfair to other class members, given that it will not reduce the amount of settlement funds available to the rest of the class because the award will be made as a separate payment by defendant. In addition, none of the class members have objected to the amount of additional compensation sought by the named plaintiff. Class counsel also contends that the named plaintiff attended an allday deposition, worked extensively with class counsel to review documents in the case upwards of fifteen hours, and attended over nine hours of mediation. (Mot. Final Class Certification at 6.) Accordingly, the court finds the 10,000.00 enhancement payment to the named plaintiff is reasonable.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court grants final certification of the settlement class and approves the settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court finds an award of $150,000.00 to be an appropriate amount for attorneys' fees, costs, and plaintiff's enhancement payment. Consummation of the settlement in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement is therefore approved, and the definitions provided in the Settlement Agreement shall apply to the terms used herein. The Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon all members of the class action who did not timely elect to be excluded and all members of the collective action who chose to opt-in.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for final approval of the class and collective action settlement be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(1) solely for the purpose of this settlement, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and FLSA § 216(b), the court hereby certifies the following class: All Hiring Hall Meter Readers employed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company from August 18, 2006 through December 31, 2009, inclusive. Specially, the court finds that:

(a) the settlement class members are so numerous that joinder of all settlement class members would be impracticable;

(b) there are questions of law and fact common to the settlement class which predominate over any individual questions;

(c) claims of the named plaintiff are typical of the claims of the settlement class;

(d) the named plaintiff and class counsel have fairly and adequately represented and protected the interests of the settlement class; and

(e) a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy;

(2) the court appoints the named plaintiff, Manuel Murillo, as representative of the class and finds that he meets the requirements of Rule 23 and § 216(b);

(3) the court appoints the following lawyers as counsel to the settlment class, and finds that counsel meets the requirements of Rule 23 and § 216(b):

Michael Tracy
Meghan Ross Hutchins
Law Offices of Michael Tracy
2030 Main Street, Suite 1300
Irvine, CA 92614
Telephone: (949) 260-9171
Facsimilie: (866) 365-3051

(4) the settlement agreement's plan for class notice is the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfies the requirements of due process, Rule 23, and § 216(b). The plan is approved and adopted. The Notice of Class and Collective Action Settlement complies with Rule 23(c)(2), Rule 23(e), and § 216(b) and is approved and adopted;

(5) the parties have executed the notice plan in the court's Preliminary Approval Order, in response to which 358 collective action class members submitted an Opt-In/Consent to Join form, and 25 putative class members submitted an Opt-out form. Having found that the parties and their counsel took extensive efforts to locate and inform all putative class members of the settlement, and given that no class members (or opt-outs) have filed any objections to the settlement, and having found that the number of individuals who opted in and opted out, respectively, to be reasonable, the court finds and orders that no additional notice to the class is necessary;

(6) as of the date of the entry of this Order, plaintiff and all class members hereby do and shall be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged any and all of the Released Parties (as defined by paragraph 29 of the Settlement Agreement) of and from any and all Settled Claims (as that term is defined in paragraph 74 of the Settlement Agreement). The claims released by plaintiff and class members include, but are not limited to, claims for damages, penalties, attorneys' fees or costs arising from or dependent on the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Civil Code, the California Labor Code, the wage orders of the California Industrial Welfare Commission, California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., California Labor Code section 2698 et seq., and the California common law of tort and contract;

(7) the distribution of settlement payments shall occur not later than thirty (30) days after the Effective Date (as that term is defined in paragraph 74 of the Settlement Agreement). Defendant shall effect the distribution of settlement payments by placing in the mail via check or via direct deposit into class members' bank accounts, the settlement payments for all collective action class members pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. No person shall have any claim against defendant, class counsel, defendant's counsel or any other agent designated by plaintiff or defendant based upon the distribution of settlement payments made substantially in accordance with the Settlement Agreement or further Orders of the court;

(8) class counsel is entitled to fees and costs in the amount of $140,000.00;

(9) the named plaintiff is entitled to an enhancement award in the amount of $10,000.00;

(10) the distribution of class counsel's fees and costs and the enhancement award shall occur no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the Effective Date (as that term is defined in paragraph 74 of the Settlement Agreement);

(11) Upon the distribution of settlement payments, attorneys' fees and costs, and the enhancement payment, defendant, the Released Parties, and defendant's counsel shall have no further liability or responsibility to class counsel, plaintiff, or any other class member; and

(12) the action is dismissed with prejudice; however, without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement with respect to all parties to this action, and their counsel of record.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.