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FOX v. GRAYSON

Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Aug 26, 2010
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OPINION

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.

Following investigations in 2005 and 2007 of drug trafficking by the Sunnyside Gang in Saginaw, Michigan, prosecutors obtained guilty pleas from and convictions against numerous gang members. Damarlon Thomas, who pled guilty to distribution of crack cocaine, now appeals, arguing that his 230-month below-the-Sentencing-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable given his minor role as a street-level dealer. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Thomas, and so affirm the sentence.

I.

Over the course of several years the Sunnyside Gang, which included over 100 members, sold crack cocaine on the South Side (or "Sunnyside" area) of Saginaw, Michigan. In 2005, the government arrested, indicted, and convicted several gang members on federal drug charges. In 2007 the government launched a second investigation targeting gang members. During the course of this investigation, a confidential informant on three occasions purchased crack from Thomas, who was a street-level dealer. In November of 2007, the government indicted Thomas, along with nine other gang members, on various drug charges. Thomas himself was charged with conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine.

On August 12, 2008, Thomas pled guilty to count 9 of the first superceding indictment: distribution on June 19, 2007, of more than 5 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). At that time, Thomas also admitted that he had in total sold the confidential informant approximately 14.88 grams of crack cocaine in three separate transactions. As part of the plea agreement, Thomas — while conceding that he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and that he qualified as a career offender within the meaning of the Guidelines because he had twice been convicted of felony drug trafficking in Michigan state court — specifically reserved the right to argue that the court should have imposed a below-Guidelines sentence because his criminal history category over-represented the seriousness of his criminal history.

According to the Presentencing Investigation Report (PSR), Thomas was born on August 30, 1985, and was raised in his grandmother's house. He graduated from Saginaw High School in June of 2003 and for a short time attended Minnesota West Community College on a football scholarship. After returning to Saginaw, Thomas began selling drugs for the Sunnyside Gang. In 2005 he was twice arrested for selling crack cocaine; in each case Thomas pled guilty to the felony charges and the state court judges sentenced Thomas to 36 months of probation. Following these guilty pleas, Thomas apparently continued to sell crack cocaine for the Sunnyside Gang until he was arrested in the summer of 2007. Given his career offender status, and taking into account his acceptance of responsibility, Thomas was sentenced at Offense Level 34 with a Criminal History Category of VI. This resulted in a sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 262-327 months.

At sentencing, the district court explicitly addressed Thomas's argument that his categorization as a career offender significantly overstated his actual criminal history:

[T]his gentleman arrives here without ever having been sentenced to a day in jail, and at this point arrives with a career offender designation and a sentence range of a minimum term of 262 months under the guidelines.
I appreciate the point, which is the fact that the gentleman's treatment at sentencing in state court on the prior sentences probably did an inadequate job of informing him of the gravity of the offense if his conduct continued. Notwithstanding that fact, he had any number of circumstances where, with the assistance of an attorney, he had proceeded through drug trafficking offenses and had the assistance of counsel in those instances in order to put into perspective the gravity of continued misbehavior.
I respectfully do not see that we can ascribe a level of fault for leniency in the imposition of this sentence because of the argument that the courts were inordinately lenient in the earlier circumstances in state court.
Second, I have reviewed a number of the sentences that we have imposed with respect to the codefendants largely because of the consideration that counsel has advanced, that imposing a guideline sentence in this instance would be disproportionate given Mr. Thomas' role in the conspiracy or his role in the controlled substance distribution group of folks that were involved here.
Clearly, I think a guideline sentence could be justified in this instance simply if one looks at a comparative prospective with respect to anyone of those other individuals. There are differences in criminal history, there are differences in their level of participation within the conspiracy that I think distinguish these sets of circumstances from those earlier cases. That is to say, I do not find any grounds for either a departure within the guidelines or a variance based on 3553(a) factors with respect to those two arguments.
I do believe there is, however, some justification for a modest variance from the guideline minimum based on legitimate [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) factors here. A review of the transactions at this point largely reflects a street dealer at a retail level. . . . While his behavior has been consistent, repeated violations of the law, nevertheless, his role and involvement in the offense is that of a retail distributor; he is not responsible from the information that the court can see for a greater level of responsibility within the organization.
Also, in looking at 3553(b), the gentleman arrives here without — perhaps by luck but, nevertheless, distinguishing — juvenile record. . . . And, equally important to the court, is the remarks he has made in court. They reflect a distinguishable level of remorse for his circumstance. They also reflect a level of depth that I think is also distinguishable. . . .
That said, the court . . . after having given consideration not only to the guideline factors that we have exhaustively addressed here as well as the 3553(a) factors, commits the defendant to the United States Bureau of prisons for a term of 230 months.

(11/20/08 Sentencing Tr. (R. 220) at 14-18.)

This appeal followed sentencing.

II.

Thomas argues that the district court's decision to sentence him to 230 months in prison — a sentence which was 32 months below the appropriate Guidelines range — was substantively unreasonable "when his status as a career offender substantially overrepresented the seriousness of [his] criminal history and represented a disparity from sentences imposed upon defendants with similar criminal histories and convicted of similar conduct." (Thomas Br. at 1.) The district court, Thomas argues, erred by incorrectly assessing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and so the sentence: (1) was greater than necessary, especially given that Thomas had never previously been sentenced to spend time in prison on his prior felony convictions; (2) demonstrated that the district court gave unreasonable weight to one 3553(a) factor (the suggested Guidelines range); and (3) reflected an unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly-situated defendants. We disagree.

Courts of appeals review all sentences "under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In determining whether a court abused its sentencing discretion, we look to whether the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. See United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). As the Supreme Court explained, we:

must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Assuming that the district court's sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. When conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (citation omitted). Here, Thomas concedes procedural reasonableness, but argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. "A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor." United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008)).

While Thomas appears to argue that the district court erred both by not departing downward and by not varying downward far enough, in either case, his arguments are ultimately unavailing.

"`Departure' is a term of art under the Guidelines and is distinct from `variance.' A Guidelines `departure' refers to the imposition of a sentence outside the advisory range or an assignment of a criminal history category different than the otherwise applicable category made to effect a sentence outside the range. Importantly, a departure results from the district court's application of a particular Guidelines provision, such as § 4A1.3 or § 5, Part K. A `variance' refers to the selection of a sentence outside of the advisory Guidelines range based upon the district court's weighing of one or more of the sentencing factors of § 3553(a). While the same facts and analyses can, at times, be used to justify both a Guidelines departure and a variance, the concepts are distinct." United States v. Grams, 566 F.3d 683, 686-87 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (per curiam).

A. Unreasonableness of Not Departing Downward Under the Guidelines

Although he focuses on the weight accorded the § 3553(a) factors, and so seems to be arguing primarily that the district court should have granted a greater downward variance, Thomas conflates the departure and variance arguments by citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1), which applies only to departures and which states that "[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be warranted." While Thomas is correct that § 4A1.3(b)(1) permits the district court to depart downward in such circumstances, however, we do "not review a decision not to impose a departure, `unless the record shows that the district court was unaware of, or did not understand, its discretion to make such a departure.'" United States v. Blue, 557 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Santillana, 540 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Or. 2008)). As the Santillana court said, "[w]e do not require that a district court explicitly state that it is aware of its discretion to make such a departure. Rather, we presume that the district court understood its discretion, absent clear evidence to the contrary." Santillana, 540 F.3d at 431 (citations omitted). Here, on the contrary, the district court clearly understood that it could depart downward, but it did "not find any grounds for either a departure within the guidelines or a variance based on 3553(a) factors with respect to" the argument that a Guidelines sentence was disproportionate. Accordingly, we do not review the district court's decision not to depart downward under § 4A1.3(b)(1).

Even if the district court had chosen to depart under § 4A 1.3(b)(1), the authorized Guidelines departure under this section was actually less downward than the 32-month variance the district court in fact granted. Given Thomas's career offender categorization, and taking into account Thomas's acceptance of responsibility, Thomas was sentenced at Offense Level 34 with a Criminal History Category of VI. This resulted in a sentencing range of 262-327 months. According to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(3)(A) — which explicitly limits any downward departure under § 4A 1.3 (b)(1) — "The extent of a downward departure under this subsection for a career offender . . . may not exceed one criminal history category." In other words, had the district court relied on § 4A1.3(b)(1) to justify a departure, then the appropriate Guidelines range would have been defined by Offense Level 34 and Criminal History Category V. This would have resulted in a sentencing range of 235-293 months — which, at the low end, is still five months more than the sentence the court imposed.

B. Unreasonableness of Not Varying Further Downward From the Guidelines

The heart of Thomas's argument is that the district court erred by not sufficiently varying downward on the basis of the 3553(a) factors after calculating the appropriate Guidelines range. According to 3553(a), a district court "shall `impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with" the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public from the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed training or treatment in the most effective manner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Among other factors, the sentencing court must also consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the Guidelines range; and "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3), (4), (6). Thomas argues that the court erred by not varying downward in that the sentence: (1) was greater than necessary; (2) demonstrated that the court gave unreasonable weight to the Guidelines; and (3) reflected an un-warranted sentencing disparity among similarly-situated defendants.

i. Imposing A Sentence Greater Than Necessary

Thomas first argues that the district court imposed a sentence greater than was necessary to meet the purposes of § 3553(a)(2). In support, he cites various decisions in which courts have considered whether the career offender Guidelines can produce a penalty greater than necessary. As we stated in 2007, however, "[o]ur review of sentences for reasonableness is not to be confused with the district court's task to impose a sentence that is `sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Bolds, 511 F.3d at 578. Regardless, given Thomas's criminal history, the court did not impose a sentence that was greater than necessary — even given the legitimate § 3553(a) factors.

We addressed a very similar argument in United States v. Alexander, 543 F.3d 819, 826 (6th Cir. 2008), in which a low-level drug dealer pled guilty and was sentenced as a career offender to 360 months of imprisonment. As we concluded in Alexander in responding to the argument that the sentence was greater than necessary:

Alexander argues that his criminal history is of a "petty nature" that justifies a sentence much lower than 360 months of imprisonment, a sentence that would be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). But Alexander is still a career offender — regardless of whether he characterizes his prior felony convictions as "petty." Indeed, despite being a career offender, and despite having already abused the district court's leniency when committing other drug-related offenses while out on bond, Alexander was sentenced at the low end of the recommended Guidelines range. This suggests that the court was mindful of both the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant."
Id. (citations omitted).

Just like the defendant in Alexander, Thomas here argues that his criminal history is minor — but also like Alexander, Thomas (as he concedes) was previously convicted of multiple felonies, and has thus appropriately been designated a career offender. Moreover, the sentence of 230 months for Thomas (a 32-month, 12% downward variance), along with the district court's explicit comments, demonstrates that the district court in sentencing was clearly mindful (as required by § 3553(a)(1)) of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant.

ii. Giving an Unreasonable Amount of Weight to the Guidelines as a Sentencing Factor

Thomas's second argument is that the district court gave too much weight to Thomas's status as a career offender under the Guidelines. While a sentence "may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court . . . gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor," Presley, 547 F.3d at 630-31, the case law offers little guidance as to what an "unreasonable amount of weight" would be. If a district court entirely discounted all but one 3553(a) factor, then that court would presumably be giving an unreasonable amount of weight to that factor. Where, in contrast, a district court explicitly or implicitly considers and weighs all pertinent factors, a defendant clearly bears a much greater burden in arguing that the court has given an "unreasonable amount of weight" to any particular one. Among the sentencing factors the district court must consider, moreover, the Guidelines hold a special place: as the Supreme Court emphasized in Gall, "a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. . . . [t]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark." Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586. While sentencing courts must then, with the Guidelines range in mind, consider all other § 3553(a) factors, "district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process." Id. at 50 n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 586.

We have in the past rejected a defendant's argument that the district court failed to accord proper weight to certain sentencing factors where the "arguments and evidence with respect to [the defendant's] plea for a lesser sentence were fully before the district judge, and were expressly noted and considered" before being rejected. Conatser, 514 F.3d at 527. Here, similarly, after correctly calculating the appropriate Guidelines range and rejecting either a departure or a variance on the basis of two of Thomas's arguments, the district court concluded that there was "some justification for a modest variance from the guideline minimum based on legitimate 3553(a) factors here," explicitly considered those factors, and then varied downward substantially.

iii. Imposing a Sentence That Reflects an Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity

Thomas's third argument is that his sentence reflects an unwarranted disparity between similarly-situated defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) instructs sentencing courts to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." Thomas compares his sentence first to those received by his co-defendants and defendants in a related case, and then to those received by five defendants sentenced as career offenders elsewhere in the country.

Thomas's comparison of his sentence to those given his co-defendants is both incorrect and unwarranted. While Thomas's sentence of 230 months may exceed the sentences of other Sunnyside Gang members, in fact these other members were not career offenders within the meaning of the Guidelines, and so were not similarly-situated within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6). Regardless, the question under § 3553(a)(6) is not necessarily whether a particular defendant received a sentence that was different from the sentences of his co-defendants. As we have stated repeatedly, "this factor concerns national disparities between defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of similar criminal conduct — not disparities between codefendants." Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007)). "Because § 3353(a)(6) is not concerned `with disparities between one individual's sentence and another individual's sentence, despite the fact that the two are co-defendants,' `the district court is not required to consider that type of disparity under § 3553(a)(6).'" Presley, 547 F.3d at 631 (emphasis in original) (quoting Simmons, 501 F.3d at 623-24).

Notably, Kevin Stephens, whose appeal has been consolidated with Thomas's and who was roughly similarly positioned in the hierarchy of the Sunnyside Gang, was sentenced as a career offender and was given a sentence 32 months longer than was Thomas's.

Thomas's comparison of his sentence to those given five random defendants scattered throughout the United States is only marginally relevant; he cannot demonstrate the existence of a national sentencing disparity for street-level dealers sentenced as career offenders by citing five individual district court cases. In Simmons, we approvingly cited a First Circuit case criticizing exactly this sort of argument. "[A] single example is about the weakest sort of proof of national practice that can be imagined," we observed, warning against a system in which "great weight [is] given to such singular examples." Simmons, 501 F.3d at 626 (quoting United States v. Saez, 444 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2006)). As the First Circuit had noted, "such a comparison [between different singular sentences given by different judges] opens the door to endless rummaging by lawyers through sentences in other cases, each side finding random examples to support a higher or lower sentence, as their clients' interests dictate." Saez, 444 F.3d at 19. A more relevant consideration would be whether some significant percentage of district courts vary downward significantly (or by more that 32 months or 12% of the Guidelines sentence) where street-level dealers are characterized as career offenders under the Guidelines; Thomas, however, has not provided any evidence to that effect. That in five cases district courts exercised their discretion to grant downward variances simply cannot prove that the district court in this case imposed a disparate sentence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) by also varying downward (though perhaps not as much) from the recommended Guidelines range.

III.

As the district court imposed a below-the-Guidelines 230-month sentence on Thomas after appropriately calculating the Guidelines range, explicitly considering the pertinent factors, and determining that the § 3553(a) factors justified a 32-month downward variance, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing and so AFFIRM the sentence.

provide for executive appointment of state officers "subject to Senate and/or House approval." And we relied in Kraus upon the fact that this Court or its predecessor had issued many decisions "acknowledging] that the Senate has the power to consent to the appointment of inferior state officers." So this Court rejected Kraus's arguments and affirmed the lower courts because we had reached a "conclusion that the Senate has the inherent power to advise and consent on executive branch appointments of inferior state officers."

Id.

Id.

Id. at 438.

But during the length of the 1992 General Assembly's regular session, the separation of powers questions raised by Kraus awaited a final answer in the appellate courts. And it requires no blind leap of faith to infer that securing the Senate's role in the confirmation process was the context from which some relevant part of SB 226 arose. This logical inference did not escape the Governor's notice in the case at hand: he mentions it in his brief. So we agree with the Governor's conclusion that the relevant amendment to § 93 "was offered to prospectively settle . . . [Kraus's] separation-of-powers question" and to "remove[] all doubt that the `manner' of appointing inferior officers to be `prescribed by law' `may include a requirement of consent by the Senate.'"

The Governor correctly notes that "[i]n 1992, during the litigation of the Kraus case discussed above, the General Assembly drafted, passed, and proposed an amendment to Section 93 of the Kentucky Constitution.

The wisdom of adding failsafe language to § 93 to preserve the Senate's right to confirm nominees is proven by the fact that this Court's decision upholding the Senate's inherent right to confirm nominees such as Kraus was not a unanimous decision. See 872 S.W.2d at 440-41 (dissenting opinion of Justice Lambert, joined by Justice Combs).

Acceptance of this premise, however, actually undermines the Governor's position in the case. If we accept the premise that the framers of the revisions to § 93 were motivated to amend the constitution to thwart Kraus's constitutional challenges, then the framers should only have logically been concerned with the Senate's power to confirm nominees because Kraus's lawsuit did not present any issue involving the House in the confirmation process because Kraus was not subject to confirmation in the House. In other words, the deliberate words chosen by the General Assembly in SB 226, which became the proposed amendments to § 93, reflected concern about senatorial confirmation rights because that was all that was at issue in Kraus. So the Governor's argument is unpersuasive to the extent that it relies upon the then-unresolved Kraus appeal to prove that the General Assembly intended the amendments to § 93 to permit the House constitutionally a role in confirming executive appointments.

Kraus is important to the case at hand for reasons beyond supplying the historical context for SB 226 and the 1992 amendments to § 93. First, as previously discussed, our decision in Kraus provides compelling precedent for us to reject the Governor's argument that the constitutional convention's decision to delete proposed language requiring mandatory confirmation by the Senate for all appointees means that the House is constitutionally authorized to have a role in the confirmation process. Second, analysis of our decision in Kraus affords us the opportunity to correct some unfortunately imprecise language in that opinion. Specifically, we stated in a clause the Governor relies upon that "for more than the last one hundred years, the independent branches of government have recognized that the General Assembly has authority to confirm nominations from other branches of government." To be accurate, what we should have said was that history shows that the Senate's right to confirm nominees has long been recognized.

Id. at 437 (emphasis added).

Toward the beginning of our opinion, we noted that "the House is not involved in the confirmation process" for Kraus. It is clear that the issue in Kraus involved only whether the Senate had the inherent authority to confirm (or reject) certain executive appointments. The question of whether the House was constitutionally permitted to play any role in confirming nominees such as Kraus was not at issue. Even the first sentence of our opinion in Kraus says that "David L. Kraus challenges the authority of the Kentucky State Senate to grant to itself the power to consent to the employment . . . of an Administrative Law Judge. . . . "

Id. at 435.

Id. at 434 (emphasis added).

It is obvious, therefore, that we painted with too broad a brush in Kraus when we referred to a purported historical recognition of the General Assembly's authority to confirm nominees. To the contrary, Fox has ably and conclusively shown in this case that Kentucky's history provided for confirmation by the Senate alone. So, in Kraus, we did not need to discuss what role the House could, or could not, play in confirming nominees.

We have already quoted our former state constitutions that unequivocally authorized the Senate alone to confirm nominees, and we will not belabor this opinion with all the additional citations provided by Fox for this proposition. But suffice it to say that we generally agree with her assertion that Kentucky has a largely "unbroken practice . . . of almost 200 years . . . of authorizing only the Senate to exercise a power of confirmation."

Close scrutiny of our opinion in Kraus reveals that we did not intend to confer confirmation rights upon the House, our unfortunately broad language notwithstanding. Instead, when our opinion is examined carefully, it appears evident that we mentioned the House in Kraus in passing only to point out, without comment, that some statutes then-existing provided "for executive appointments subject to Senate and/or House approval." We used imprecise language when we stated that other branches of Government have historically recognized the General Assembly's right to confirm nominees. To our knowledge, Fox's action is the first challenge to the recently enacted statutes purporting to give the House a role concomitant with the Senate's role in the confirmation process. The question of what role, if any, the House may permissibly take in the confirmation process was not before us in Kraus; and nothing in that opinion should be interpreted to stand for a ruling by us that the House is constitutionally entitled to play a role in the confirmation process.

Id. at 437.

I. Contemporary Construction, Statutes Permitting the House to Perform a Role in the Confirmation Process, and the Ballot Question Prepared by the Secretary of State. As noted in our discussion of Kraus, there are several recent statutes that clearly afford the House a role equal to the Senate in the confirmation process. The Governor relies heavily upon those statutes to buttress his argument that § 93 was intended to — and actually does — afford the House a role in the confirmation process.

KRS 11.160, which provides the general framework for the confirmation of gubernatorial appointments, was first enacted in 1990. As originally enacted, it did not mention confirmation by the House. In 1992, however, the General Assembly amended KRS 11.160 to specify the manner of confirmation of appointees who were statutorily required to be confirmed by both the House and the Senate. The addition in 1992 of language pertaining to the House having a defined role in the confirmation of appointees was done in the same legislative session in which the General Assembly passed, and thereby presented to the electorate, SB 226 and the amendments to § 93 at hand.

1990 Ky. Acts, Ch. 505 (S.B. 176).

1990 Ky. Acts, Ch. 415 (S.B. 107), § 1(2).

The Governor argues that this contemporaneous recognition of bicameral confirmation requirements in KRS 11.160 is entitled to great weight in interpreting the 1992 amendments to § 93. We agree, of course, that contemporaneous legislative explanation or clarification of a constitutional provision should ordinarily be given deference by a reviewing court. But we disagree with the Governor's ultimate assertion that the enactment of statutes purporting to specify the manner of bicameral confirmation of appointees nullifies clear constitutional language to the contrary. Obviously, because "the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it[,]" no statute can validly direct or authorize the performance of an unconstitutional act.

See, e.g., Coleman v. Mulligan, 234 Ky. 691, 28 S.W.2d 980, 981 (1930).

Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Ky. 2003) ("As a general proposition, constitutional rights prevail over conflicting statutes and rules.").

It appears that there were at least two statutes requiring bicameral confirmation of gubernatorial nominees existing before the 1992 amendments to § 93. In 1990, for example, the General Assembly created the State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education. The act creating that Board, currently codified at KRS 156.029, requires the eleven Board members to be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by both the Senate and the House. Also, in 1990, as part of the same act that created this State Board for Elementary and Educational Education, the General Assembly also created the Council for Education Technology. The nine members of that Board were also required to be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by both the Senate and the House. But in 1992, the General Assembly repealed the section of the KRS covering the Council for Education Technology. In its place, the General Assembly created a new Council for Education Technology. But that new Technology Council consisted of several ex officio members and eight members appointed by the Governor. Notably, however, that bill did not require those eight appointed members to be confirmed by either the House or the Senate.

Ky. Acts 1990, Ch. 476, Pt. II, § 35.

Id. KRS 156.029(1) still requires bicameral confirmation of Board members.

Ky. Acts 1990, Ch. 476, Pt. I, § 21.

Id.

Ky. Acts 1992, Ch. 195, § 15.

Id. at § 8.

Id.

It is important to note that when those statutes providing for bicameral confirmation were enacted in 1990, the Constitution had not been amended to preclude the House from having a role in the confirmation process. Nor had the amendment to § 93 specifically giving the Senate alone the right to confirm nominees been ratified by the people when, in 1992, the General Assembly amended KRS 11.160(2) to specify the bicameral confirmation procedures.

Ky. Acts 1992, Ch. 415, § 1(2).

It is apparent that the General Assembly, the body that originally drafted the amendments to § 93 at issue, had already shown its ability and willingness to put specific language in legislation requiring appointees to be confirmed by both the Senate and the House. Tellingly, however, the General Assembly chose not to put specific language in the relevant amendments to § 93 that would have required, or at least authorized, the House to confirm appointees.

We are unwilling to assume that the General Assembly omitted reference to the House in § 93 by oversight. Instead, we agree with Fox that the absence of language mentioning the House in § 93 should rationally be interpreted as a conscious decision by the General Assembly not to include the House in confirming nominees.

Although not memorialized in a statute, there are, in fact, some indicators that the contemporaneous construction of the 1992 amendments to § 93 envisioned only senatorial confirmation. First, the May 4, 1992, Legislative Record, a newspaper-style summary of Kentucky legislative activities edited and published by the Legislative Research Commission (LRC) (an entity charged with assisting the General Assembly), contains the steps that SB 226 took along the path to being enacted by both legislative chambers. That Legislative Record also contains a summary of SB 226. That summary states that one aspect of SB 226 was to "authorize appointment of members of boards and commissions with the consent of the Senate. . . ." The bill log for the House Committee on Elections and Constitutional Amendments likewise summarizes SB 226, in pertinent part, as a proposal "to amend Section 93 to . . . authorize appointment of members of boards and commissions with consent of the Senate. . . ." These are, therefore, at least two contemporaneous indications that the General Assembly contemplated only the Senate having the ability to confirm (or reject) appointments such as Fox's.

Legislative Record, May 4, 1992 (Vol. 20, No. 102, Regular Session), p. 37.

Neither the Legislative Record nor the bill log was provided to us by the parties. We may, however, properly sua sponte consider documents available to the general public. See, e.g., Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Ky.App. 2004) ("A court may properly take judicial notice of public records and government documents, including public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the internet."). These documents are available to the general public from the LRC upon request.

The LRC's website still summarizes the relevant portions of S.B. 226 as containing a proposal "to amend Section 93 to . . . authorize appointment of members of boards and commissions with consent of the Senate. . . ." See http://www.lrc.ky.gov/recarch/92rs/bills/sb226.htm.

Of course, the General Assembly has the ability to propose amendments to our Constitution; but those amendments must be ratified by the electorate. As our predecessor-Court memorably held, "[i]n the ultimate sense, the legislature does nothing unless and until the people ratify and choose to give the revised constitution life by their own direct action." Indeed, § 256 of our Kentucky Constitution provides that after appropriate passage of a proposed amendment by the General Assembly, "such proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the voters of the State for their ratification or rejection. . . ." Obviously, therefore, the will of the people regarding constitutional amendments is paramount. Because the electorate has an inviolable right to be informed of all proposed constitutional amendments upon which it will pass judgment, § 257 of our Kentucky Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[b]efore an amendment shall be submitted to a vote, the Secretary of State shall cause such proposed amendment, and the time that the same is to be voted upon, to be published at least ninety days before the vote is to be taken thereon. . . ."

Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Ky. 1966).

Of great assistance to our determination of this matter is the actual question the Secretary of State directed the county clerks to place on the ballot in 1992. Since proposals to our Kentucky Constitution are "nothing" until a majority of the electorate gives the amendment "force and effect[,]" what could be more critical to our decision than reading the actual question presented to the voters of Kentucky? So we granted Fox's request to supplement the record with a copy of the Secretary of State's official certification of the ballot question at hand.

Gatewood, 403 S.W.2d at 721.

In pertinent part, the ballot question presented to the voters asked them whether they were in favor of "permitting the General Assembly to require the Senate's consent to the selection of inferior state officers and members of boards and commissions. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Unlike previous proposed amendments that have spawned lawsuits challenging the form of the ballot question, we have been cited to no actions, nor are we independently aware of any, that were filed to contest the sufficiency or accuracy of the ballot question in this case.

Current law permits the General Assembly or the Attorney General to prepare a document stating the substance of the proposed constitutional amendment "in the form of a question in a manner calculated to inform the electorate of the substance of the amendment." KRS 118.415(1) (2). The General Assembly did not grant to itself the power to create this ballot question for proposed constitutional amendments until 1994, however. Ky. Acts 1994, Ch. 461, § 1 (S.B. 185). We must presume, therefore, that the Attorney General prepared the 1992 ballot question at issue.

See, e.g., Ferguson v. Redding, 304 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1957) (action challenging ballot question regarding proposed amendments to, among others, § 93); Smith v. Hatcher, 311 Ky. 386, 223 S.W.2d 182 (1949) (action challenging ballot question for proposed amendments to § 246); Funk v. Fielder, 243 S.W.2d 474 (1951) (action challenging ballot question for proposed amendment to § 256).

The question proposed to the voters plainly asked them whether they favored giving the Senate the express authority to consent to appointments. No reasonable voter could have construed that ballot question to mean that the House had any right whatsoever to confirm nominees. And, of course, since any constitutional provision "does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any . . . abstruse meaning in the words employed. . . ." Instead, we must accept that the people, who, after all, were responsible for giving life to the constitutional provision, "accepted . . . [its terms] in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that was the sense designed to be conveyed. Accordingly, in construing a constitution, it is presumed that the language has been employed with sufficient precision to convey the intention. . . ."

16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 59 (2009).

Id.

Yet the Governor's construction of § 93 would logically authorize the House to have a role, either alone or in conjunction with the Senate, to confirm appointments such as Fox's even though there is no mention of any role for the House in either § 93 itself or in the ballot question prepared by the Secretary of State. No voter reading the ballot question for the 1992 amendments to § 93 reasonably could have foreseen such a result.

We are aware that mainly since the 1992 amendments to § 93 were ratified, the General Assembly has enacted new statutes, or has amended existing statutes, to require certain nominees to be confirmed by both the House and the Senate. But, as stated before, the intent of the people who ratified the constitutional provision must be considered the paramount consideration in constitutional interpretation. And it has been conclusively shown that no reasonable voter would have believed that voter was authorizing bicameral confirmation (or confirmation by the House alone) by voting to approve the 1992 amendments to § 93. So the General Assembly's later attempts to require bicameral confirmation of certain appointees contravenes the will of the people, as unmistakably expressed by their approval of the amendments to § 93.

See, e.g., KRS 248.707(2)(b) (Agricultural Development Board); KRS 351.1041(2) (Mine Safety Review Commission); KRS 161.028(2)(b) (Education Professional Standards Board); KRS 164.005(1) (Governor's Postsecondary Education Nominating Committee); KRS 7B.030(1)(b)(2) (Kentucky Long-Term Policy Research Center).

16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 59 (2009).

J. Remand for Further Proceedings is Necessary.

For the reasons we have discussed at some length in this opinion, we agree with Fox that § 93 permits only the Senate to confirm nominees. So the bicameral confirmation requirement set forth in KRS 164.011(1) is invalid, even taking into account the presumption of constitutionality generally afforded to statutes. This conclusion does not necessarily mean, however, that Fox is entitled to return to her seat on the CPE.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Ky. 2000) ("It is uncontroverted that a statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it clearly offends the limitations and prohibitions of the Constitution.").

As stated before, this case was early in the pleading stage when the trial court granted the Governor's motion to dismiss for failure to state a legally cognizable claim. Our conclusion that bicameral confirmation requirements in statutes such as KRS 164.011(1) are constitutionally infirm, however, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the trial court erred by dismissing Fox's complaint based upon its contrary interpretation of § 93. The ultimate merits of Fox's complaint, however, are an entirely separate matter, which the parties have not yet had a full opportunity to either prove or defend.

The only proper question before us is whether the trial court erred by dismissing Fox's complaint for failure to state a claim because of the purported bicameral confirmation requirement for members of the CPE. We have determined that the attempted bicameral confirmation requirement is contrary to § 93 of the Constitution of Kentucky. The merits of Fox's demand that she be restored to a place on the CPE were not fully presented to the trial court and, consequently, are not properly before this Court on appeal. Remand is necessary so that the parties may present their proof to advance or defend the ultimate merits of Fox's demand.

IV. CONCLUSION.

We reverse the circuit court's order dismissing Virginia Fox's complaint for the reasons discussed in this opinion, and we remand the matter to the trial court for all necessary further proceedings.

All sitting. NOBLE, SCOTT, and VENTERS, JJ., concur.

ABRAMSON, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion.

CUNNINGHAM, J., dissents by separate opinion in which SCHRODER, J., joins.

SCHRODER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which CUNNINGHAM, J., joins.

ABRAMSON, J., concurring in result only.

I concur in result only and write separately to state a point of fundamental disagreement with the well-reasoned majority opinion. Specifically, I disagree with the following observation by the majority regarding how it came to pass that the confirmation provision in § 93, as amended in 1992, was confined to the Senate:

We are unwilling to assume that the General Assembly omitted reference to the House in § 93 by oversight. Instead, we agree with Fox that the absence of language referencing the House in § 93 should rationally be interpreted as a conscious decision by the General Assembly not to include the House in confirming nominees.

Before, during and after the 1992 legislative session, the Kentucky General Assembly has passed legislation, which provides for bicameral confirmation of appointments to at least eight different boards and commissions. In my view, these laws reflect a clear, good faith belief on the part of the majority of both houses of the General Assembly that bicameral confirmation is constitutionally permissible. Unfortunately, given the plain wording of § 93, it is not. I firmly believe that the wording of § 93 was chosen to address the separation of powers issue raised, and eventually addressed by this Court, in Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1994). In a classic case of focusing on the tree and forgetting to see the forest, SB 226 produced a constitutional amendment which specifically recognized the Senate confirmation provision at issue in Kraus but inadvertently undermined the bicameral confirmation provisions which had been deliberately included in prior legislation and which would continue to be included in laws relating to various boards and commissions in the years that followed.

The majority is correct that this Court must construe what it has before it and in § 93 we have language that does not admit a construction that is most likely what the General Assembly actually intended if their prior, contemporaneous and subsequent acts are considered. As for the idea that their intent has been rendered of secondary import, or even irrelevant, by the vote of the people, I cannot fully subscribe to that view. Notably, we have entrusted to the legislature the significant responsibility of initiating the constitutional amendment process. Ky. Const. § 256. As representatives of the people, their intent in proposing a constitutional amendment is vital and, therefore, it is equally vital that that intent be fully and painstakingly stated in any ballot question. If the overarching concept of the confirmation process, which in some instances is confined to the Senate but which in other instances has been shared by both houses of the Kentucky General Assembly, had been carefully considered in drafting the proposed amendment, I truly believe that we would not have been left with the "tree" that is now before us. We have been, however, and the language used in § 93 is so unambiguous that I can find no defensible basis for looking beyond that clear language. Consequently, I must reluctantly concur in result.

CUNNINGHAM, J., dissenting.

With due respect, I dissent.

We are bound by law to adhere to a strong presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. Analysis begins with the presumption that legislative acts are constitutional. Cain v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Ky. 2009) (footnote omitted). In my opinion, this presumption has been ignored in our holding that the "bicameral confirmation requirement" of KRS 164.011(1) is "constitutionally infirm."

Just last year, we addressed substantial deference given to upholding the constitutionality of statutes.

It is an axiomatic rule of statutory interpretation that when this Court considers the constitutionality of a statute, we must draw all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the validity of the statute. In Kentucky, a statute carries with it the presumption of constitutionality; therefore, when we consider it, "we are `obligated to give it, if possible, an interpretation which upholds its constitutional validity.'" To the extent that there is reasonable doubt as to a statute's constitutionality, all presumptions will be in favor of upholding the statute, deferring to the "voice of the people as expressed through the legislative department of government." A constitutional infringement must be "clear, complete and unmistakable" in order to render the statute unconstitutional.
Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 806 (Ky. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

I take major issue with the statement of the majority that "there is nothing in the plain language of § 93 that permits the House to have any role in the confirmation vote." That provision clearly authorizes both houses of the General Assembly to "prescribe by law" the method of Appellant's appointment to the Council on Post-secondary Education.

This section of the Kentucky Constitution plainly states that the office in question is to be appointed by the Governor "in such manner as may be prescribed by law." There is no ambiguity in those words. The provision simply broadens the representative involvement of the law-making body into the appointment process. There is ambiguity in the words "which may include a requirement of consent by the Senate." In fact, the majority spends page after page explaining what it means. In short, the majority gives minimal thrift to the precise and direct language of the constitutional provision and reverses this case on the ambiguous wording.

Our Court today gives hefty consideration to the fact that the voters of Kentucky approved this constitutional amendment and, therefore, must have endorsed Senate only confirmation. Says the Court, "No reasonable voter could have construed that ballot question to mean the House had any right whatsoever to confirm nominees." This requires a complete whiteout on the ballots throughout this state of the words "in such manner as may be prescribed by law." Of course, that was not the case.

In truth, when § 93 was on the ballot, it was all about the heart of the issue — authorizing the re-election of constitutional officers for one additional term. It is pure fantasy to think that the voters fully understood the last sentence we deal with here today when it has taken over a year of much consideration and discussion, and our Kentucky State Supreme Court almost forty pages, to tell us what it means.

In keeping with strong presumption of the constitutionality of statutes passed by our legislature, representing the citizenship of this state, I would affirm the decision below. Therefore, with deep appreciation for the five minds that differ, I respectfully dissent.

SCHRODER, J., joins.

SCHRODER, J., dissenting.

The bicameral confirmation requirement for members of the CPE contained in KRS 164.011(1) does not violate Section 93 of the Kentucky Constitution. The phrase in Section 93 regarding confirmation by the Senate is merely illustrative of how appointees could be confirmed. The phrase does not preclude a statute that requires confirmation by both chambers of the General Assembly. The language is clear; it says what it says.

CUNNINGHAM, J., joins.