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HODGES v. EPPS

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.
Sep 13, 2010
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

PER CURIAM. INTRODUCTION

{¶ 1} A jury convicted Carl M. Morris Jr. of two counts of raping his stepdaughter, S.K. According to S.K., Mr. Morris sexually molested her over the course of several years while he was living with her and her mother. The trial court sentenced Mr. Morris to life in prison on one count of rape of a child less than ten years old and five years in prison on one count of rape of a child less than thirteen years old. The trial court adjudicated Mr. Morris a Tier III sex offender/child victim offender. Mr. Morris timely appealed his convictions, raising six assignments of error. This Court reverses because the trial court prejudiced Mr. Morris by incorrectly admitting testimony of Mr. Morris's character in violation of Rule 404 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.

BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} When S.K. was in the first grade, her mother married Mr. Morris, and he moved into their house to live with S.K., her grandmother, and her older half-sister, Sarah. According to S.K., when she first met Mr. Morris, he would do magic tricks to entertain her. He would do card tricks, coin tricks, or make his leg "disappear" using a towel. Sarah and their mother testified that Mr. Morris walked around the house in a towel before and after showering and would sometimes stop and do magic tricks, like the one involving manipulating the towel to make it seem as though one of his legs had disappeared.

{¶ 3} S.K. testified that, when the two of them were alone, Mr. Morris used to show her a trick requiring her to feel his thumb through a towel across his lap. S.K. was amazed that he could make his "thumb" turn to Jell-o and then become very hard. She testified that Mr. Morris later showed her that it was his penis she had been touching behind the towel. According to S.K., at some point, Mr. Morris started lying on the couch beside her and masturbating while rubbing her thighs with his other hand.

{¶ 4} S.K. testified that Mr. Morris vaginally raped her at least 10 times between when she entered second grade and when her grandmother died. S.K. was 13 years old when her grandmother died. She testified that, after her grandmother died, she started walking away from Mr. Morris when he would try to touch her. According to S.K., Mr. Morris soon stopped trying.

{¶ 5} S.K. testified that, for the most part, she could not remember the dates of the events she described, but that, after talking to police, she found she was able to assign dates to two of the incidents. She testified that Mr. Morris raped her when they were home alone before taking her to the hospital to visit her mother after surgery. S.K.'s mother testified that she stayed overnight in a hospital on April 22, 2003, following a hysterectomy. S.K. was nine years old at that time. S.K. also testified that Mr. Morris raped her sometime between October 20 and November 1, 2005, when she was 12 years old. She testified that she remembered the date because Mr. Morris interrupted a Halloween cartoon on television.

{¶ 6} S.K. testified that Mr. Morris never grabbed her, used force, or threatened her. She said that he never told her not to tell anyone what he was doing. She testified that she did not tell anyone about Mr. Morris's behavior until at least four months after he had separated from her mother and moved out of their house. S.K.'s best friend testified that, about four or five months after Mr. Morris had moved out of the house, S.K. told her that he had raped her, but did not share any details. Six months after Mr. Morris had moved out of the house, S.K. told her parents that Mr. Morris had raped her. They insisted that she repeat the information to the police and to a therapist she had been seeing. S.K.'s therapist testified that, although he cannot be certain whether a client is telling the truth, there was no clinical reason to disbelieve S.K.'s account. He further testified that her description of the magic tricks fit the pattern of something a pedophile would do to prepare a child for sexual activity.

{¶ 7} At trial, Mr. Morris argued that both S.K. and her mother had reasons to fabricate the allegations against him. S.K.'s mother testified that, after Mr. Morris moved out, she suffered financial hardship and lost the house they had purchased together. Although she said that Mr. Morris had difficulty keeping jobs, she admitted that she could not afford the house without his help. Mr. Morris also elicited testimony from various witnesses that S.K. first told her parents that Mr. Morris had raped her in the middle of a dramatic confrontation between her and her parents regarding something they had seen on her MySpace page. The trial court excluded the details of the information contained on the page, but S.K. testified that the issue that provoked her parents' wrath had nothing to do with Mr. Morris. {¶ 8} Although there were no eyewitnesses in this case other than S.K., S.K.'s mother and half-sister, Sarah, both testified to situations that provoked some suspicion regarding Mr. Morris's conduct with S.K. Sarah testified that she once saw Mr. Morris and S.K. "underneath the blankets" on the couch. Although the two had always been close and it was not uncommon to see them physically close to each other, it made her uncomfortable on that occasion.

{¶ 9} S.K.'s mother testified that she came downstairs late one night in the spring of 2005 "and both [S.K. and Mr. Morris] jumped off the couch really quick and [S.K.] went and ran in to the bathroom." She testified that she confronted both of them, but each repeatedly denied that anything inappropriate had happened. S.K. testified that she remembered being on the couch with Mr. Morris while he was masturbating and touching her leg with his other hand when her mother suddenly came down the stairs. According to S.K., "[Mr. Morris] jumped a little" while she just "tightened up" for a moment before heading to the bathroom. She said that when her mother asked her what was going on, she told her that nothing had happened.

OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE

{¶ 10} Mr. Morris's first assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly allowed the State to introduce evidence of his "other . . . acts to show proof of [his] character in violation of [Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence]." Mr. Morris has pointed to three lines of questioning to which he objected at trial. First, he has argued that the trial court should have excluded S.K.'s mother's testimony regarding him sometimes ejaculating into towels or t-shirts during intercourse. Second, he has argued that the trial court should have excluded all references to an incident involving Sarah, S.K.'s adult half-sister. Finally, he has argued that the trial court should have excluded S.K.'s mother's testimony regarding his penchant for kicking the dog if the mother refused to have sex with him. {¶ 11} "A hallmark of the American criminal justice system is the principle that proof that the accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused's propensity or inclination to commit crime." State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 68 (1975). Many years ago, the General Assembly codified that principle, but specified several alternative purposes for which such evidence may be used. Under Section 2945.59, "any acts of the defendant which tend to show his motive or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan, or system in doing the act in question may be proved . . . notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant," provided that the permissible alternative purpose for the evidence "is material" in the case. Rule 404 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence broadened the principle beyond the realm of criminal behavior. "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. . . ." Evid. R. 404(A). "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith," but may be admissible for certain other purposes. Evid. R. 404(B). For example, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id. {¶ 12} "The rule is in accord with [the statute]." State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St. 3d 277, 281 (1988). "If the other act does in fact `tend to show' by substantial proof any of those things enumerated, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, then evidence of the other act may be admissible." Id. at 282 (quoting State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St. 2d 124, 126 (1972)); see also State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St. 3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, at ¶ 46 (quoting Broom, 40 Ohio St. 3d 277 at paragraph one of the syllabus). Evidence that tends to prove one of the things enumerated by the statute or the rule is admissible if the alternative purpose for which the evidence is being offered is a material issue in the case. State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 71 (1975); State v. DePina, 21 Ohio App. 3d 91, 92 (1984) (citing State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 158 (1974)). This Court has held that both the rule and the statute "are to be strictly construed against the state and conservatively applied by the trial courts." State v. Bronner, 9th Dist. No. 20753, 2002-Ohio-4248, at ¶ 93 (citing State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St. 3d 191, 194 (1987)). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "the standard for determining admissibility of such evidence is strict." Broom, 40 Ohio St. 3d at 282.

{¶ 13} Whether proffered other-act evidence has a tendency to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident and whether any of those things is of consequence to the determination of the action in a given case are questions of law. See State v. Lester, 2d Dist. No. 8679, 1984 WL 4043 at *3 (Oct. 2, 1984). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. See Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St. 3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, at ¶ 13.

He used towels during sexual intercourse.

{¶ 14} S.K. testified that, every time Mr. Morris ejaculated while molesting her, he would quickly cover his penis with a towel. Mr. Morris has argued that S.K.'s mother, who was married to him at the time of the alleged incidents, should not have been permitted to testify that "[w]hen [Mr. Morris] and I had sex, he would sometimes [ejaculate] in a towel or a T-shirt or whatever was around." She went on to say that she did not understand why he would do that because he knew she could not get pregnant. Mr. Morris has argued that the trial court should not have allowed the mother's testimony under Evidence Rule 404(B). {¶ 15} The State has argued that the testimony was admissible because it is evidence of "idiosyncratic behavior that shows a common plan" and "his modus operandi for disposal of semen . . . [that is,] [e]xcept when having sex with his wife, [Mr.] Morris always ejaculates into a towel." The State's argument is based on a misunderstanding of S.K.'s mother's testimony. What she said was that Mr. Morris "sometimes" ejaculated into a towel when they did have sex-not at times other than when they had sex.

{¶ 16} The State has cited this Court's opinion in State v. DePina, 21 Ohio App. 3d 91 (1984), for the proposition that evidence of "idiosyncratic behavior that shows [a] common plan and modus operandi" is admissible in a rape prosecution. In DePina, this Court determined that the trial court correctly admitted testimony from a woman who had been raped by the defendant in a manner similar to that described by the victim in the DePina case. The similarities included the defendant threatening her, taking her into the woods, ordering her to disrobe, laying his own shirt or jacket on the ground for her to lie on, vaginally raping her, ordering her to get dressed, and escorting her out of the woods.

{¶ 17} In order for evidence of other acts to be admissible under Rule 404(B), "[p]roof of one of the other [non-character] purposes outlined in Evid. R. 404(B) must go to an issue which is material to proof of the defendant's guilt for the crime with which he is charged." State v. DePina, 21 Ohio App. 3d 91, 92 (1984) (citing State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 158 (1974)); see also State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 71 (1975). In DePina, this Court approved the trial court's admission of the evidence regarding the many similarities in the two rapes because proving identity is one of the approved purposes for use of such evidence and "[the] defendant's identity as the rapist was both controverted and material" in that case. Id. The evidence of the prior rape in DePina was admissible as proof of modus operandi because "it provide[d] a behavioral fingerprint which, when compared to the behavioral fingerprints associated with the crime in question, [could] be used to identify the defendant as the perpetrator." State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St. 3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, at ¶ 104 (quoting State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St. 3d 527, 531 (1994)).

{¶ 18} In describing such evidence, the Ohio Supreme Court has written that "[o]ther acts forming a unique, identifiable plan of criminal activity are admissible to establish identity under Evid. R. 404(B)." State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St. 3d 527, 531 (1994) (quoting State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St. 3d 182, syllabus (1990)). "To be admissible to prove identity through a certain modus operandi, other-acts evidence must be related to and share common features with the crime in question." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 19} A modus operandi describes a pattern of behavior, not one isolated detail that is not necessarily a unique identifier. A single act, that does not involve criminal activity or even moral turpitude, does not demonstrate "a unique, identifiable plan of criminal activity." State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St. 3d 527, 531 (1994) (quoting State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St. 3d 182, syllabus (1990)). S.K.'s mother's testimony about Mr. Morris ejaculating into "a towel or a T-shirt or whatever was around" was just such testimony about a single act that does not involve criminal activity or even moral turpitude. Furthermore, identity was not an issue in this case. There was no dispute that, if S.K. was telling the truth when she said she was raped, Mr. Morris was the perpetrator. His denial of any sexual contact or conduct between him and S.K. created a factual dispute regarding Mr. Morris's treatment of S.K. — not a dispute about his identity. See State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 61 (1992); State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 73 (1975); State v. Wilkins, 135 Ohio App. 3d 26, 31 (1999). Therefore, "identity was not a material issue properly subject to proof by other-acts evidence in the trial court. . . ." Wilkins, 135 Ohio App. 3d at 31-32; see also Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d at 71.

{¶ 20} The State's second argument was that the testimony was admissible to prove Mr. Morris's motive to rape S.K., that is, a frustrated reaction to her mother refusing to have sex with him. One's proclivity for ejaculating into a towel during consensual sex with one's adult wife has no tendency to show a motive to rape a child. Mr. Morris has correctly argued that S.K.'s mother's testimony about him ejaculating into towels is not within the exceptions listed in Evidence Rule 404(B).

{¶ 21} The mother's testimony is not excluded by Evidence Rule 404, however, because it is not "evidence of a person's character or a trait of character." Evid. R. 404(A); see also State v. Shedrick, 61 Ohio St. 3d 331, 337 (1991) (explaining that Evidence Rule 404 excludes evidence that "tends to show [the defendant's] bad character."). S.K.'s mother's testimony about Mr. Morris unexpectedly ejaculating into towels during sex implied nothing about his character. The testimony was relevant because S.K. had previously said that Mr. Morris had always ejaculated into a towel when molesting her. Evid. R. 401. It could hurt Mr. Morris's case because, if believed, it provided some corroboration of S.K.'s allegation that she had been involved in a sexually intimate situation with Mr. Morris. As relevant evidence, it was admissible unless otherwise objectionable. Evid. R. 402. It was not objectionable character evidence under Rule 404.

{¶ 22} Mr. Morris has also argued that this testimony was "inflammatory, confusing, [and] unreliable" and that any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Evid. R. 403(A). The testimony was clear, and it was not inherently unreliable. The jury was capable of determining what weight, if any, it deserved in light of the other evidence in the case. Admission of the testimony, harmful as it may have been to Mr. Morris's case, was not unfairly prejudicial and was not a violation of Evidence Rule 403(A).

{¶ 23} This Court has not considered the application of Ohio's rape shield law to this testimony because Mr. Morris neither raised an objection in the trial court nor an argument on appeal based on it. See R.C. 2907.02(D). To the extent that it addressed the mother's testimony regarding Mr. Morris ejaculating into towels, the first assignment of error is overruled because the trial court correctly overruled Mr. Morris's objection to the testimony, albeit on an incorrect basis. See State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St. 3d 320, 329 (2000).

He would kick the dog if his wife refused to have sex with him.

{¶ 24} S.K.'s mother, who was once Mr. Morris's wife, testified that he wanted to have sex every day and would become verbally abusive and kick the family dog if she refused. Mr. Morris has argued that his former wife's testimony on this topic should have been excluded under Evidence Rule 404. The State has argued that the testimony was admissible because it showed "a motive and common plan" for rape. According to the State, Mr. Morris's "insatiable sexual appetite . . . is clearly the motive for [Mr.] Morris's sexual abuse of S.K."

{¶ 25} The State presented no evidence that an unfulfilling sexual life with one's spouse has a tendency to show motive for the rape of a child. Further, it presented no evidence that men with voracious sexual appetites are sexually attracted to young children. What is more, even if evidence of Mr. Morris's voracious sexual appetite were admissible, the added fact that he took out his sexual frustration by kicking the dog goes far beyond tending to prove that voracious appetite. The kick-the-dog evidence tended to show that Mr. Morris was prone to act out if his wife refused to have sex with him every day. The only possible reason for introducing that evidence was to demonstrate his character, that is, that he was both sexually frustrated and mean and aggressive. The obvious reason to present that evidence was to encourage the jury to conclude that Mr. Morris acted in conformity with that character by committing the rapes with which he had been charged. The testimony had no relevance to any fact at issue in the case and did not tend to prove any of the permissible topics enumerated in Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. The evidence that Mr. Morris kicked the dog out of sexual frustration was received by the trial court in violation of Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.

He propositioned S.K.'s half-sister.

{¶ 26} Mr. Morris has also argued that the trial court incorrectly permitted S.K.'s older half-sister, Sarah, to testify about an incident with Mr. Morris. Sarah is seven years older than her half-sister, S.K. In spring 2005, Sarah was an adult and had been married the previous Christmas, but was living in the same house with her grandmother, younger half-sister, mother, and Mr. Morris. Sarah testified that she walked into her mother's bedroom one evening and found Mr. Morris sitting on the corner of the bed. She said that he "grabbed [her] waist and pulled [her] toward him and said, `You don't know what I would do to you but your mother would get mad.'" Sarah testified that she perceived the comment to be sexual in nature,was mostly cumulative, and without it there was ample testimony to support a conviction." Hodges II, 949 So.2d at 718. Also on post-conviction review, the court considered whether counsel performed ineffectively in failing to confront Cora Johnson with letters she wrote to Petitioner while he was incarcerated to establish that she vacillated in her feelings for Petitioner. See id. at 718. It also considered whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to offer the testimony of Petitioner's niece, Lakasha Hodges, who would have testified that Cora called Petitioner repeatedly on the night Isaac was shot. See id. at 718. The court found that "this information might have been helpful, and defense counsel should have been aware of it, [but] its persuasive effect is questionable" as Petitioner broke into her home and murdered her brother. See id. at 718.

In his reply brief, Petitioner argues that Betts was sentenced to the RID program upon his plea of guilty, and that counsel could have undermined the State's theory that Petitioner had received a "break" as a result of Ms. Tatum's intervention by presenting the evidence. (Pet. Reply 11; see also Pet. Memo Ex. 53, "Sentencing Order for Anthony Betts," dated February 23, 2000).

It is a well-established principle that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Miller filed an affidavit with the State court admitting that he "was too busy with paperwork to attempt to gather impeachment evidence," despite his suspicion that some of the State's witnesses might have criminal records. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 15 ¶ 7). The Court assumes counsel performed deficiently in failing to learn of Betts' criminal history, as it does not appear as though counsel's failure to do so is linked to any trial strategy. However, it is not enough that counsel should have investigated Betts and Cora and failed to do so. Petitioner must show how the investigation would have made a difference at trial.

Anthony Betts, a friend who had known Petitioner for two or three years at the time of trial, testified for the State at the guilt phase. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 17, 658-663). Betts testified to the events during the evening hours of July 20, 1999, when Petitioner was attempting to arrange a visit with Cora. ( See id. at 660-63). The only potentially damaging information elicited from Betts was his statement that the weekend before Isaac was killed, Petitioner said that he was going to buy a gun and kill someone with it. ( See id. at 660). Betts' testimony established that he did not know what happened the night that Isaac was killed, and he also testified that he last saw Petitioner around 11:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. ( See id. at 665-66).

Also at trial, defense counsel confronted Cora with a series of letters she wrote to Petitioner while he was incarcerated on the prior burglary charge of the Johnson home. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 17, 601-639). The jury heard some of the content of those letters, including Cora's professed love for Petitioner, her taunts to Petitioner about her relationships with other men, and her uncertainty about whether Petitioner was the father of her child. ( See id.). While Lakasha's testimony might have added support to the proposition that Cora was initiating and leading Petitioner on, there was also testimony from Corporal Mark Miley with the Lowndes County Sheriff's Department that the Caller Identification box at the Johnson home showed calls to Cora's home from the Hodges' home on July 20, 1999 and July 21, 1999. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 18, 779-80).

There was a call from Reginald Martin's home to the Johnson residence at 9:27 p.m. on July 20, 1999. ( See id. at 780). The last call from the Hodges home to the Johnson home occurred at approximately 12:14 a.m. on July 21, 1999. ( See id. at 779).

The Court does not find it unreasonable to conclude that Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to introduce the omitted evidence. Petitioner confessed that he got off of the telephone with Cora on the night of July 20, 1999, and that he went home and retrieved his mother's pistol and her car. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 18, 808-07). He said he drove to the Johnson home, parked two houses away, and entered the back door of the house. ( See id.). Cora testified that when Petitioner entered her room, he was wearing black shoes, pants, gloves, a black shirt, and a beige mask. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 563). She testified that he struck her in the head with a gun and forced her to leave with him. ( See id. at 564). Cora stated that while she was being held against her will with Petitioner, he told her that he had gone to her house with the intention of killing her and her mother, had she been there. ( See id. at 568). Petitioner has not shown that it was unreasonable to conclude that the omitted evidence would have altered the jury's verdict of guilt, and this claim shall be dismissed.

Plea Bargain

Prior to the start of Petitioner's trial, the State offered him a plea bargain whereby he would plead guilty to capital murder in exchange for a life sentence without the possibility of parole. ( See SCP Vol. 13, 103-04). Petitioner maintains that based on counsel's erroneous advice that he would be eligible for a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, he rejected the State's offer. (Pet. Memo Ex. 24, 61). Petitioner argues that this Court should vacate his conviction and sentence, as he did not have the opportunity to make an informed decision about the plea offer. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's claim on direct appeal, finding that as he could not prove that but for his attorney's error he would have accepted the plea offer. See Hodges I, 912 So.2d at 763. The court found Petitioner expressed no desire to plead guilty prior to his conviction, and that his after-the-fact affidavit was insufficient to prove prejudice. See id.

On the first day of trial, defense counsel Rogers informed the trial court that he had spoken to the District Attorney about the possibility of a plea, which was then discussed with Petitioner. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 13, 103). Rogers informed the court that the recommendation made by the State was life without parole. ( See id.). The court questioned counsel about whether he had advised Petitioner of the sentencing options, which the court stated as "not guilty, death penalty, life without parole, or life." ( See id.). Rogers stated he had discussed with Petitioner the three potential sentences Petitioner would face if convicted. ( See id.). Rogers informed the court that Petitioner had chosen not to accept the plea offer, and Petitioner confirmed that fact to the trial court. ( See id. at 104). The affidavit submitted by Petitioner in his State court proceedings states that he decided to reject the offer and "take [his] chances" at trial in hopes he might receive a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 24).

To the extent Petitioner argues that the sentencing options given to the jury constitute objective evidence of his attorney's ineffectiveness, he fails to persuade the Court that his claim warrants relief. The fact that trial counsel should have known of the correct sentencing options does not constitute prejudice in this matter, as Petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors he would have accepted the agreement. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (determining that the issue of prejudice is "whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process"). Petitioner's affidavit, standing alone, is insufficient to establish prejudice. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that a petitioner's conclusory, self-serving allegation will not form the basis for habeas relief. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 270 (5th Cir. 2001) (conclusory allegations will not support federal habeas relief); Fahle v. Cornyn, 231 F.3d 193, 196-97 (5th Cir. 2000) (self-serving allegations do not merit relief); McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1058-60 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding court did not abuse discretion in finding petitioner's claim lacked arguable basis in fact where court "observed the absence of supporting evidence other than the petitioner's own self-serving allegations" that his attorney did not explain his right to appeal); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sanderson, 595 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1979) (affidavit of reliable third party corroborating habeas petitioner's affidavit may entitle him to evidentiary hearing, self-serving statements do not).

The Court notes, for example, that a December 2000 report from the Mississippi State Hospital documents that Petitioner stated he would reject a plea offer if offered one. ( See Evid. Hr'g Ex. 35EE).

The Court also rejects the notion that the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court held Petitioner to a higher burden than is required under Strickland. The court cited the standard for demonstrating prejudice prior to engaging in a discussion of the individual claims. See Hodges I, 912 So.2d at 758-59. The Mississippi Supreme Court held Petitioner had failed to submit sufficient evidence that he would have accepted the plea offer but for his attorney's failure to properly advise him of the correct law. See id. at 763. The Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Mississippi Supreme Court reached a decision contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of clearly established law in requiring Petitioner to submit other evidence in support of his allegation he would have accepted the plea, and the Court finds the decision did not impose a higher burden of proof than required by Strickland.

Motion to Suppress

Petitioner argues counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate the facts, properly prepare a sufficient motion, and present evidence in support of the motion to suppress his confession. He additionally asserts that counsel failed to impeach the testimony of Kevin Pitre of the Lowndes County Sheriff's Department. Officer Pitre, along with Detective Joe Young, was the first officer to question Petitioner and secure a confession from him. Petitioner maintains that Officer Pitre's testimony given at the suppression hearing was inconsistent with the testimony offered at the preliminary hearing, and that counsel's failure to cross-examine Officer Pitre about the inconsistencies was constitutionally deficient performance.

On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Officer Pitre did not give inconsistent testimony, thus counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to question him about the alleged disparity. See Hodges I, 912 So.2d at 760-62. The court also rejected Petitioner's claim that counsel performed deficiently in failing to introduce evidence that Officer Pitre allegedly informed him that he would be charged with manslaughter if he gave a statement. See id. at 761-62. The court also determined that it would not "second guess" the attorney's decision not to put Petitioner on the stand during the suppression hearing to testify to the allegation. See id. The court noted that Petitioner turned himself in to law enforcement, he stated he wanted to make a statement, and that no evidence of coercion existed with regard to the confession. See id.

On July 21, 1999, Petitioner turned himself into the Lowndes County Sheriff's Department and Officer Pitre secured a waiver of rights form from him. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 516-520). Thereafter, Petitioner was taken to an interview room and questioned by Detective Joe Young, with Officer Pitre acting as a witness. ( See id. at 521). At the preliminary hearing held in this case on October 19, 1999, Officer Pitre testified. ( See Pet. Memo, Ex. 56). On cross-examination by Carrie Jourdan, Pitre testified that Petitioner did not request an attorney when giving his statement. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 56, 12). Officer Pitre said that Petitioner did ask what his sentence would be if he was convicted of capital murder for Isaac's death. ( See id.). At the suppression hearing held on September 11, 2001, the prosecutor asked whether Petitioner had any question prior to signing the waiver of rights form, to which Officer Pitre testified that Petitioner "indicated he didn't have a question or didn't have a problem with the rights." ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 527). It is clear from the record that Officer Pitre testified at the suppression hearing that Petitioner did not have any questions about his rights prior to executing the waiver of rights form, and the Mississippi Supreme Court did not make an unreasonable determination of facts in concluding this testimony was not inconsistent with the testimony given at the preliminary hearing. As there was no inconsistency with which to impeach Officer Pitre's testimony, counsel was not deficient in failing to do so. See, e.g, Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that "failure to assert a meritless objection cannot be grounds for a finding of deficient performance"). As Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief based upon the Mississippi Supreme Court's adjudication of the first prong of Strickland, he is not entitled to relief and the Court has no need to address the prejudice prong. See Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 285 (5th Cir. 1985) ("If proof of one element is lacking, the court need not examine the other.").

Petitioner does not here argue that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to put him on the witness stand to testify at the suppression hearing. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under the AEDPA based on any implied claim that trial counsel failed to present evidence that Petitioner was informed he would receive a maximum sentence of manslaughter if he gave a statement to police. Officer Pitre and Detective Young each testified that no promises were made to Petitioner to induce him into giving a statement. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 527, 541-42). There was testimony that Petitioner voluntarily surrendered himself to law enforcement officials, that he was advised of his right against self-incrimination and right to an attorney, that the statement was not the product of coercion, threat, or promises, and that Petitioner had a sufficient understanding of the rights he was waiving prior to signing the waiver form. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 515-544). Therefore, the Court determines Petitioner has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to present additional evidence at the suppression hearing, even if counsel could be found deficient in their preparation.

Conclusion Regarding Guilt Phase Claims

The record establishes that Petitioner's counsel were not adequately prepared for trial. However, Petitioner confessed that he took his mother's pistol and car, and that he drove to the Johnson home wearing black clothing, gloves, and a ski mask. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 563; Trial Tr. Vol. 18, 807-08). The jury heard evidence that Petitioner hit Cora in the head with the pistol and forced her to leave with him, and that he subsequently told her he had gone to her house with the intention of killing her and her mother. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 564, 568). The jury was presented with evidence that Petitioner voluntarily surrendered himself to law enforcement officials and gave a voluntary statement admitting that he shot Isaac Johnson. The overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt and his intent precludes the Court from determining that the Mississippi Supreme Court was unreasonable in determining Petitioner was not prejudiced by any deficiencies of counsel during the guilt portion of his trial. See, e.g., Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2008) (overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt precluded his demonstrating prejudice as required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel); Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543 (5th Cir. 2005); Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029 (5th Cir. 1998).

Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief on any ineffective assistance claim asserted concerning the guilt phase of his trial, and therefore, he is not entitled to relief based upon an allegation of cumulative error by counsel. See Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1454 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding habeas relief may be granted on the cumulative effect of errors where the individual errors are of constitutional dimension, they are not procedurally defaulted, and they so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process). As Petitioner has not demonstrated that trial counsel's performance undermines confidence in the verdict of guilt, all of the claims relating to the assistance trial counsel rendered during the guilt phase of Petitioner's trial are dismissed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

B. Sentencing Phase

As the Court has already determined that Petitioner is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, it finds it unnecessary to address every ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised with respect to the sentencing phase of Petitioner's capital murder trial.

The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance based upon counsel's failure to investigate and present all available mitigating evidence. See Hodges I, 912 So.2d at 764-67; Hodges II, 949 So.2d at 718-720. The Court here reviews many of the rejected claims while mindful that judicial scrutiny of the performance of counsel must avoid "second-guessing" counsel's decisions and concluding with the benefit of hindsight that an unsuccessful strategy was unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

The Court has already recounted several facts pertaining to the assistance rendered by Petitioner's trial attorneys. The Court here additionally notes that even though there was no theory or plan of mitigation, trial counsel did present the testimony of five of Petitioner's family members and the testimony of Petitioner himself at the sentencing phase of trial. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 10; Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. I, 114-15; Evid. Hr'g Ex. 8, 111). The jury learned that Petitioner's parents were never married, and that while Petitioner frequently visited with his father, they were never particularly close. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 19, 945, 965, 969, 972). Testimony was offered that Petitioner was a sickly child who was soft-spoken, non-violent, and extremely close to his mother. ( See id. at 945, 946, 952, 954, 957-58, 965, 969, 979). Family members testified that Petitioner began experiencing problems when the family moved near the Caledonia community and Petitioner's relationship with Cora began. ( See id. at 956, 959-960, 973-74, 976). The jury learned that Petitioner was expelled from one school in the ninth grade, and that he eventually dropped out altogether. ( Id. at 974-75; 1003-04). Evidence was presented that Petitioner was attempting to obtain his GED at one time, but that he had so many problems with authorities as a result of his relationship with Cora that he stopped attending the classes. ( See id. at 975). There was also testimony presented that Cora aggressively pursued a relationship with Petitioner, and that they sneaked around to see one another at the home of Cora's cousin after Petitioner's release from the RID program. ( See id. at 978, 996-97).

Many of the affidavits submitted in support of this claim on post-conviction review mimic the testimony given at trial while adding a few potentially helpful details about Petitioner's life and background. ( See, e.g., Pet. Memo Ex. 33, Aff. of Joseph Griffin, June 23, 2006; Ex. 34, Aff. of Linda Hodges, June 23, 2006; Ex. 35, Aff. of Kanesha Hodges, June 23, 2006; Ex. 41, Aff. of Joann Latz, October 1, 200; Ex. 42, Aff. of Lisa Pearl Hodges, June 23, 2006; Ex. 43, Aff. of Martha Hodges, June 23, 2006). A full investigation would have revealed that Ms. Hodges smoked cigarettes and drank alcohol throughout her pregnancy with Petitioner, and that her alcohol consumption was sometimes so excessive that she required hospitalization. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 40, 41, 42). The affidavits allege that Cora manipulated Petitioner's feelings for her, and he believed her claim that he was the father of her child. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 31, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43).

Petitioner was sent to the Mississippi State Hospital for a forensic evaluation prior to trial upon Jourdan's motion for a mental examination. Dr. Philip Merideth and Dr. R. McMichael were ordered to conduct an evaluation in connection with Petitioner's pending capital murder and kidnapping charges to assist the court in determining Petitioner's competency to proceed with trial; his mental state at the time of the offense alleged; any mitigating circumstances, particularly whether the charged offense was committed while Petitioner was under extreme mental or emotional distress; and whether he was competent to waive or assert his constitutional rights. ( See Evid. Hr'g Ex. 16). Their December 14, 2000 report contained the opinion that Petitioner was competent, that he was not acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the crime, and that while he displayed average intellectual functioning and no symptoms of mental illness, Petitioner's limited education and drug abuse were possible mitigating factors. ( See id.). The report also included that Petitioner reported feeling "angry and depressed" at the time of the offenses and "reportedly had a conflictual relationship with the alleged kidnapping victim." ( See id.). Miller did not request subpoenas for anyone at the Mississippi State Hospital to testify at Petitioner's trial, but he contacted Dr. Merideth on September 11, 2001. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 15). Miller sent Dr. Merideth some of the letters Cora wrote to Petitioner to determine whether the doctor could provide help in mitigation. ( See id.). September 11, 2001, was the second day of trial. Dr. Merideth informed Miller that he could not appear on such short notice and that his opinion had not changed. (Trial Tr. Vol. 19, 933). Miller did not think his testimony would be helpful, and the trial court noted that counsel had made a strategic decision not to call Dr. Merideth as a witness. ( See id. at 934). Neither of the December 14, 2000, reports from the Mississippi State Hospital were presented at Petitioner's trial. ( See, e.g., Pet. Memo Ex. 47, 48; Evid. Hr'g Ex. 16 and 17). The potentially mitigating factors contained in the report were not explored by an expert prior to or at trial.

One evaluation related to Petitioner's November 20, 1999, jail escape charge.

On post conviction review, Petitioner supplemented his claim that trial counsel should have secured and presented expert assistance with the reports of Dr. Karen Wiviott and Dr. Marc Zimmerman. Dr. Wiviott conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Petitioner on June 19, 2006, and she concludes that the disruption in his parental relationships during his formative years left him particularly sensitive to rejection and vulnerable to abandonment. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 49). Dr. Wiviott concludes that Cora's "inconsistency in the preceding months and weeks and her betrayal on the night of July 20, 1999 had a profound effect on [Petitioner] that contributed significantly to his actions on that night." ( See id.). At the federal evidentiary hearing held on March 31, 2010, this Court heard testimony from Dr. Antionette Kavanaugh, a clinical psychologist with a specialty in adolescent psychological development, concerning the mitigating evidence that was available and should have been presented at Petitioner's capital murder trial. Dr. Kavanaugh reviewed Petitioner's medical, social services, and psychiatric/psychological history as part of her evaluation in this case, and much of that history has been attached as exhibits to her report.

On June 23, 2006, Dr. Marc Zimmerman conducted an evaluation of Petitioner and determined that Petitioner is suffering symptoms commonly associated with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. ( See Pet. Ex. 50).

Dr. Kavanaugh testified that the chronic level of poverty in Petitioner's home when he was growing up resulted in a focus on meeting physical needs, and that Petitioner's emotional needs went unfulfilled as a result. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. II, 6-7). For instance, records from the time Petitioner was three years old show that a total income of less than $500 per month supported the five family members living in the Hodges' household. ( See id. at 9; Ex. 35J). Petitioner, who was on Medicaid, often had to seek emergency room treatment for his asthma, and his symptoms often went unaddressed for days before treatment was sought. ( See id. at 11-13). Other records repeatedly reference the fact that Ms. Hodges appeared to be tired of raising children, and Dr. Kavanaugh notes that such records show that it is unlikely that Ms. Hodges could have met her children's needs if she was unable to meet her own. ( See id. at 17-18; 22, Ex. 35S). For example, numerous hospital records document Ms. Hodges' admissions with alcohol intoxication and/or dependence when Petitioner was between two and twelve years of age. ( See Evid. Hr'g Ex. 35L, 35M, 35N). Ms. Hodges also took Valium to treat anxiety and insomnia problems. ( See Evid. Hr'g Ex. 35P). During at least part of Petitioner's childhood, Ms. Hodges had the additional stress of attempting to care for her mother, who had Alzheimer's. ( See Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. II, 30; Ex. 35P).

While struggling with her own depression and addictions in the midst of this poverty, Ms. Hodges and Petitioner's father, Wren Blair, had a contentious relationship that involved years of legal proceedings to address child support and custody issues. ( See Evid. Hr'g Ex. 35Y). Dr. Kavanaugh reports that Ms. Hodges often belittled Petitioner, particularly when he would return from visits with his father. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. II, 32). Records establish that community counseling workers encouraged Ms. Hodges to praise Petitioner, but that praise was lacking in the home. ( See id. at 38). Dr. Kavanaugh believes that Petitioner's own alcohol and cannabis dependence led Petitioner to be extremely impulsive, and when he dropped out of high school, he had more free time to associate with negative influence peers. ( See Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. II, 37-40 and Ex. 35R). Dr. Kavanaugh finds it significant that Petitioner's impulsivity, immaturity, and lack of disciplined parenting all occurred in an environment where Petitioner did not feel loved. ( See id.). Petitioner's tolerance in his relationship with Cora, Dr. Kavanagh opines, shows Petitioner's emotional immaturity and longing for an emotional connection with another person, as she was often belittling and inconsistent in how she treated him. ( See id. at 42-46).

The letters Cora wrote to Petitioner between August 1998 and June 1999 while Petitioner was in prison for the burglary of the Johnson home are illustrative of the relationship between the two. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 54). In some of these letters, Cora expresses a desire to reconcile with Petitioner if he turns his life around by getting a job, a car, and a home. In others, she discusses her relationship with other men and tells Petitioner he will not be allowed to see her or the baby when he is released. Cora expresses her love and sexual desire for Petitioner in some letters, and in others, she informs Petitioner that he is inadequate. She writes about her new boyfriend, Harold Jackson, and about the frequency of their sexual encounters and his desire to marry her. In later letters, she expresses doubt about whether she wants to be with Harold, and reinforces the idea that she and Petitioner can be together if he will become a responsible provider. In a letter dated June 14, 1999, approximately two weeks before Petitioner was released from the RID program, Cora states that she wants to see Petitioner every day once he is released. ( See id.).

Dr. Kavanaugh notes that Petitioner maintained contact with Cora despite being arrested because of something that involved her, and she notes that Cora was the only non-family member Petitioner listed on his inmate visit list. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. II, 44-45, Ex. BB). Dr. Kavanaugh notes that the letters written by Cora to Petitioner the month he is released indicate Cora's demands if Petitioner wished to be with her: get a job, a car, and a house. ( See id. at 45-46). Dr. Kavanaugh observes that Petitioner got a job working twelve hour shifts when he was released from RID, but he experienced difficulty adjusting to his new freedom. ( See id. at 46-47, Ex. 35EE). Dr. Kavanaugh opines that the emotional deprivation that Petitioner experienced earlier in his life left him vulnerable to Cora, and that Cora and the child "became the focus of his idealized goal of having a family." (Evid. Hr'g Ex. 35, 13). Dr. Kavanaugh opines that the relationship, which Petitioner believed would fulfill his goal, was threatened on July 20, 1999, when he learned that Cora was with another man and refused to see him. ( See id.). Dr. Kavanaugh concludes that the culmination of all the mitigating factors was that Petitioner felt unloved, had low self-esteem, and sought a relationship with Cora Johnson that he thought would provide that worth and value. ( See Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. II, 50-51).

The Court also heard from four of Petitioner's family members at the federal evidentiary hearing. Despite the fact that Ms. Hodges was an excessive drinker who was hospitalized several times for acute alcohol intoxication, one of her daughters testified that she would not classify Ms. Hodges as having a drinking problem. ( See Evid. Hr'g Tr. Vol. I, 84, 88). Although the record establishes that Ms. Hodges called the police on Petitioner's father on at least one occasion, initiated child support suits against him for years, and refused to comply with visitation orders, Wren Blair testified vaguely to "problems" with visitation and child support at times when Petitioner was young. ( See id. at 98-102). Additionally, although he knew of Ms. Hodges excessive consumption of alcohol, selling liquor out of her home, Petitioner's chronic asthma, and the contentious custody/visitation arrangement, he stated at the hearing that he did not have information that he thought should have been shared with Petitioner's attorneys. ( See id. at 110). Petitioner's niece, who lived with Petitioner and Ms. Hodges for a period of time, testified that although Ms. Hodges would get depressed sometimes, and she never heard Ms. Hodges tell Petitioner that she loved him or discuss things with him, that she was "good" with him. ( See id. at 122-23).

The Fifth Circuit has held that " Strickland requires that we defer to counsel's decision not to present mitigating evidence or not to present a certain line of mitigating evidence when that decision is both fully informed and strategic, in the sense that it is expected, on the basis of sound legal reasoning, to yield some benefit or avoid some harm to the defense." Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 615 (5th Cir. 1999). Where the decisions "do not serve any conceivable strategic purpose," no deference is required to the decision. See id. In Moore v. Johnson, the court stated that courts are "not required to condone unreasonable decisions parading under the umbrella of strategy, or to fabricate tactical decisions on behalf of counsel when it appears on the face of the record that counsel made no strategic decision at all." Moore, 194 F.3d at 604.

In this case, trial counsel admittedly made no investigation concerning the sentencing phase of trial, and therefore, the Court finds that the omission or presentation of mitigating evidence was not based upon reasonable strategic decisions. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-24 (2003) (The "principal concern in deciding whether [trial counsel] exercised `reasonable professional judgment' is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [Petitioner's] background was itself reasonable.") (internal citations omitted). The lack of a meaningful investigation in this case, as well as a plan for the sentencing phase of trial, was based on a sheer failure to prepare. See Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 158 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting difference between strategic judgment and plain omissions); United States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2000) (no deference where demonstrated counsel "blundered through trial, attempted to put on an unsupported defense, abandoned a trial tactic, failed to pursue a reasonable alternative course, or surrendered his client). That lack of a plan is apparent in the opening statement given by co-counsel, Guy N. Rogers, Jr., at the sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial:

BY MR. ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank you for your time and attention that you've given to this case.
BY THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, it is improper for a lawyer to thank the jury. I will thank the jury for you. The State thanks you. The defendant thanks you, and the Court thanks you. You may proceed.
BY MR. ROGERS: (Continuing)
I want to say that it was your verdict and we respect that verdict. You've done that and I know that you've considered everything and were sincere and that is where we are now. This is kind of a new process that we're going through now.
BY THE COURT: Mr. Rogers.
BY MR. ROGERS: Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT: Just tell the jury what your witnesses are going to say.
BY MR. ROGERS: All right sir. I will do that.
BY MR. ROGERS: (Continuing)
Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to put on what we call mitigation proof, mitigating circumstances. We have witnesses that are going to testify and they are members of the defendant's family and that's usually what you have. These people are going to testify as to the defendant's background, about his life when he was a kid coming up. As you know, the law, of course, doesn't require you to return that penalty of death. You consider the mitigating and the aggravating factors, and as we told you earlier, even if the mitigators outweigh the aggravators —
BY THE COURT: — You're arguing, Counsel.
BY MR. ROGERS: Yes, sir.
BY MR. ROGERS: (Continuing)
Anyway, after this phase of the trial where we put on our mitigating and the District Attorney puts on his aggravating proof, then you will go back and consider what verdict that you're going to return. I would just ask that you listen closely to the mitigation proof and that you consider it very sincerely and I know that you will because you took an oath to do that. I would just ask when you go back there that you not put this defendant to death.
BY THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, this is supposed to be an opening statement where they're going to tell you what they're going to offer. After the evidence is completed, then the Court will again give you jury instructions and then I will let the attorneys argue to you and try to convince you that their side is the correct side.

( See Trial Tr. Vol. 19, 938-39). At no point in defense counsel's opening statement did he point to a single specific piece of mitigating evidence that would be presented for the jury's consideration. He could not, because there was admittedly no theory of mitigation. (Evid. Hr'g Ex. 8, 96-97).

The fact that counsel did produce some witnesses in mitigation does not necessarily fulfill counsel's constitutional duty to investigate and present a case in mitigation. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[t]actical decisions must be made in the context of a reasonable amount of investigation, not in a vacuum." Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1987). The Court determines that the presumption of effective assistance with regard to trial counsel's performance at the sentencing phase of trial is objectively unreasonable in light of the admissions by trial counsel, and it also finds that counsel performed deficiently at the sentencing phase of trial. See Moore, 194 F.3d at 617 ("Given that counsel's conduct in failing to develop or present mitigating evidence was not informed by any investigation and not supported by reasonably professional limits upon investigation, we find that there is no decision entitled to a presumption of reasonableness under Strickland.").

Given the fact that Dr. Merideth stated that the letters written from Cora to Petitioner would not have changed the opinions in his report, and that much of the testimony he might offer would have the potential to be adverse to Petitioner, the finding that counsel's failure to secure his testimony at trial was not deficient would not be problematic if it had been supported by any real investigation. However, trial counsel stated into the record that he was unable to secure Dr. Merideth's presence at the sentencing hearing. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 20, 932-33). Counsel did not attempt to contact Dr. Merideth until two days into trial, and his communication with Dr. Merideth about his availability to testify and the effect of the letters written from Cora to Petitioner consisted of a voicemail message. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 20, 932-34). At the start of the sentencing phase, Miller put in the record that he had in his possession the December 14, 2000, report from the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield that he was not seeking to introduce because he had no one to sponsor it. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 20, 932). There is no indication in the record that counsel actually discussed the mitigating factors with Dr. Merideth prior to or during trial. Defense counsel's contact with Dr. Merideth did not absolve counsel of the duty to develop a mitigation case through reasonable investigation and preparation. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (holding that a strategic choice on an incomplete investigation is reasonable only to the extent that the limitation of investigation was itself reasonable).

Trial counsel made no investigation to determine how Petitioner's feelings of depression and anger and conflicted relationship with Cora might have had possible mitigating effect. He only knew that the letters from Cora to Petitioner did not change Dr. Merideth's reported opinion. Moreover, defense counsel did not attempt to seek an independent expert opinion, and testimony such as that offered through the reports of Dr. Wivott, Dr. Kavanaugh, and Dr. Zimmerman regarding Petitioner's emotional distress might have provided him with an entitlement to a statutory mitigating circumstance. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (statutory mitigating circumstance that "[t]he offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance"). Even had the trial court not found that Petitioner was entitled to the statutory mitigating circumstance, however, such professional testimony would have described Petitioner's emotional state with regard to Cora Johnson and provided an explanation for Petitioner's crime. From the beginning of trial, the defense asserted that Petitioner killed Isaac Johnson, but that he had no intent to do so and was at the Johnson home to see his girlfriend. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 547-550). The State's theory was that Petitioner was guilty of capital murder because he burglarized the Johnson home with the intent to commit an assault against Cora. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 16, 573-74; Trial Tr. Vol. 19, 917). The District Attorney also made it clear that Petitioner's "obsession and his intent" with regard to Cora was the "crux of the State's theory." ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 15, 572). He characterized Petitioner's "obsession with this particular victim" as the heart of the case. ( See id. at 574). The fact that lead counsel entered this case twenty-one days before trial notwithstanding, Petitioner did not present evidence to support a logical theory of mitigation.

Also unexplored at trial were the feelings of Bessie Tatum, the mother of the victim. Six days before trial, Miller informed the trial court that he had not read the entire court file. (Trial Tr. vol. 14, 42). Contained in that file was the November 16, 1999, victim impact statement signed by Ms. Tatum concerning Isaac's murder. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 45). In the statement, Ms. Tatum indicated that the court could impose a sentence of death if it wished, but that she did not "believe in killing" and would rather see Petitioner imprisoned for life. ( See id.). Rogers stated in the deposition he gave during the course of federal habeas proceedings that he did not even know of the victim impact statement's existence. ( See Evid. Hr'g Ex. 10, 32-33). Defense counsel did not attempt to contact Ms. Tatum before or during Petitioner's trial. ( See, e.g., Evid. Hr'g Ex. 31, 8).

The testimony that was elicited from mitigation witnesses was primarily generic, and trial counsel's failure to prepare witnesses to testify in mitigation opened the door to the admission of damaging testimony elicited from Lisa Hodges and Chris Hodges. On cross-examination of these two mitigation witnesses, the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding Petitioner's two prior jail escapes, two burglary charges, and an attempted sexual battery charge. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 19, 949; 960-61). The prosecution also asked defense witnesses Sharon Green, Johnnie Hodges, and Petitioner about the prior charges. ( See id. at 966-67; 984-85; 1010-1012). During the testimony of Chris Hodges, Petitioner's twenty-two year old nephew, the prosecution questioned Chris about Petitioner's school burglary and burglary/attempted sexual battery charges, thereby developing the idea that the Petitioner's trouble with law enforcement had nothing to do with Cora Johnson. ( See id. at 957-61).

The Court recognizes that Mississippi allows evidence regarding unadjudicated crimes or prior bad acts as rebuttal evidence to the mitigation evidence put on by a defendant during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. See Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 148 (Miss. 1991); Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss. 1987). However, counsel's re-cross of the witnesses after damaging information was elicited failed to include important facts to rebut the negative impact of that testimony. For instance, in response to the prosecutor's references to Petitioner's attempts to escape punishment, trial counsel did not elicit from Petitioner on re-direct that he turned himself in to law enforcement authorities the morning after Isaac's murder. Following testimony implicating Petitioner in another burglary and the sexual assault of Tasha Martin, trial counsel did not elicit from the witnesses or present testimony that those charges had been dropped by the alleged victim. ( See Pet. Memo Ex. 4; Evid. Hr'g Ex. 33). Moreover, when Petitioner denied knowledge of additional indictments pending against him at the time of his 1998 guilty plea, the prosecutor was allowed to improperly introduce into evidence the two-count indictment for burglary and the attempted sexual battery of Tasha Martin. ( See id. at 1011-14).

Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."

Before the testimony of the mitigation witnesses, the allegations of Petitioner's violent or otherwise bad acts were confined to his relationship with Cora Johnson. After cross-examination of these witnesses, however, the jury could have reasonably believed that Petitioner was a serial rapist and burglar who would escape prison and be a threat to the community at large if he were not sentenced to death. In assessing the issue of prejudice, the Court is mindful that the mitigating evidence in the affidavits and testimony from Petitioner's friends and family members is not so compelling as to be considered crucial to the jury's deliberations at sentencing. See, e.g., Miller v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2005) (counsel performed deficiently in failing to contact treating physicians where client suffering from PTSD, organic brain disease, amnesia, where counsel aware of the conditions as basis for minimizing culpability). However, the statements of Petitioner's family members at the federal evidentiary hearing demonstrate the necessity of securing expert testimony in this case. Petitioner's family members had the opportunity to discuss their intended testimony with federal habeas counsel, yet their testimonies were still largely unhelpful to Petitioner. More importantly, the testimony offered was blind to the level of dysfunction that was present in the Hodges' home. The family's lack of awareness that a history of chronic poverty, parental conflict, excessive alcohol consumption, hospitalizations, lack of attention and support, etc., were relevant in mitigation undoubtedly had a profound impact on what testimony they offered, and it painted an unrealistic picture of what life was like in the home. An expert's testimony was necessary to give voice to the mitigating effect of conditions that were so commonplace to Petitioner's family as to seem insignificant.

Evidence existed, in the form of witness testimony, expert opinions, and the letters Cora wrote to Petitioner, to convincingly suggest to the jury that Petitioner was in a state of desperation on the night Isaac was murdered. Providing a background to the relationship with Cora and an explanation of Petitioner's history as relevant to the offense was critical to an accurate sentencing determination in this case, as the State itself noted several times at trial that Petitioner's relationship with Cora was the "crux" of their theory. Rather than take the evidence of the crime that was almost impossible to discount and attempt to explain the crime, defense counsel stumbled through a cursory examination of unprepared defense witnesses and opened the door to more damaging information. With little to rebut the aggravating factors, and trial counsel's failure to fully develop or explain the relationship between Cora and Petitioner through unbiased testimony, there exists a distinct possibility that the jury, once it heard evidence that Petitioner broke into other people's homes and attempted to sexually assault them, and that he had twice escaped from custody, could have returned a verdict of death based upon considerations wholly inappropriate to a determination of whether Petitioner deserved a sentence of death for murder.

The Court notes that counsel's lack of a prepared, coherent mitigation case continued into closing argument. Rogers attempted to argue to the jury that sentencing Petitioner to life imprisonment could meet the jury's concerns of protecting society and serving justice while simultaneously punishing him to a "horrible life" in a confined cell. ( See Trial Tr. Vol. 20, 1067-71). Immediately following Rogers' closing, Miller argued. He submitted to the jury that Petitioner was going to die in prison or by the State's hands, and that the jury could "have it on y'alls shoulders or not." ( See id. at 1072-73). He argued that prison was a fate worse than a sentence of death, and that if Petitioner was sentenced to death, it would "rest" on the jury. He stated:

I wouldn't want to go upstairs. I believe in God. Ya'll don't have to. It's a free country. You can believe anything you want to. I wouldn't put down anybody's views, but I wouldn't want to go up to my Maker knowing that part of my decision in the name of the State caused the death of a man.

( See id. at 1073). The Court acknowledges that judicial review of a defense attorney's summation is "doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas." See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003). However, the argument presented to the jury was not merely a legitimate plea for mercy or residual doubt, but an offensive suggestion that following the law as provided by the court could possibly result in eternal damnation.

The Court finds that the numerous errors committed by trial counsel in this case deprived Petitioner of a fair trial with a reliable result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Petitioner's lead counsel, hired less than a month before trial, had never tried a case in circuit court and has conceded that he was suffering from a mental breakdown at the time of trial. Both lead and co-counsel failed to explore any mitigating evidence prior to trial. While attempting to elicit testimony from witnesses who testified only because they happened to be present, the jury heard otherwise inadmissible evidence about Petitioner's prior indictments for burglary and sexual assault. The jury was presented false testimony about the "break" given to Petitioner by Ms. Tatum, and the jury never heard testimony that would explain Petitioner's emotional state at the time of the crime. Petitioner, by the actions and omissions of his own counsel, was portrayed as a dangerous, sexually deviant monster, and the prosecution made certain the jury knew that Petitioner had already been given leniency that he refused to acknowledge. All of this was compounded by the form of the verdict that misstated the realities of sentencing and told the jurors that if they did not sentence him to death, Petitioner could be released back into the community once again.

The Court notes that both Miller and Rogers had a duty to Petitioner that was not met. Therefore, the Court does not consider Miller a "sacrificial lamb" as suggested by Respondents.

For all of the reasons recounted above, the Court specifically finds that it is objectively unreasonable to conclude that trial counsel made strategic judgments concerning Petitioner's case in mitigation of punishment. The Court also determines that a finding that Petitioner was not prejudiced as a result of trial counsel's performance involves an unreasonable application of the law governing the right to effective counsel. Therefore, the Court also specifically finds that counsel's deficient performance in the sentencing phase of trial prejudiced Petitioner, and that a reasonable probability exists that the jurors would have found that "the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death" had Petitioner been assisted by competent counsel. Id. at 695. The Court reaches its conclusion based upon specific errors it has explicitly found in the body of this opinion, as well as the cumulative effect of all of the errors committed by counsel at the sentencing phase of trial. See, e.g., Moore, 194 F.3d at 619 (finding prejudice considering cumulative errors of counsel); Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1454 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (cumulative effect of errors warrant relief where individual errors are of constitutional dimension, not procedurally defaulted, and they so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process). Petitioner was denied the assistance of effective counsel at the sentencing stage of his capital murder trial and is entitled to have his sentence of death vacated.

Conclusion

The Court is convinced that Petitioner was denied the opportunity to have his jury make an accurate sentencing determination, and it is further convinced that the adversarial process critical to a fair trial was so lacking in this case as to render unreasonable the Mississippi Supreme Court's decisions regarding the assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of trial. Specifically, the Court finds that the decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court concerning the form of the verdict, the presentation of false evidence, and the effectiveness of counsel at sentencing constitute unreasonable applications of the clearly established federal law in these areas. Therefore, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

1. Relief on Petitioner's claims of (1) inaccurate parole instructions; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of trial; and (3) the presentation of false/misleading evidence at the sentencing phase of trial is GRANTED, and this Court will issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus unless, within sixty days of the date the Judgment in this case becomes final, the State of Mississippi vacates Petitioner's death sentence and either initiates a new sentencing proceeding or imposes a sentence less than death.

2. Petitioner is DENIED an evidentiary hearing on his remaining claims.

3. All other federal habeas corpus relief requested by Petitioner is DENIED, and the remaining claims in the petition shall be DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. All pending motions are DISMISSED as moot.

5. Petitioner is DENIED a Certificate of Appealability on all claims raised in the petition not related to the sentencing phase of his trial.

6. A separate Judgment in conformity with this Opinion and Order shall issue today.

SO ORDERED, this the 13th day of September, 2010.