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IN RE LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York.
Nov 16, 2010
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RALPH KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judge

Confirmation of Debtors' Plan (Docket No. 2) is pending in this Chapter 13 case. The Chapter 13 Trustee Robert G. Drummond objects to confirmation on the grounds that the Plan is not proposed in good faith as required under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) because Debtors proposed to continue making payments on several secured claims while making "minuscule" payment to general unsecured creditors. The hearing on confirmation was held at Missoula on September 9, 2010. Debtors were represented by attorney Edward A. Murphy ("Murphy") of Missoula, and Sharon Welsh ("Sharon") testified. The Trustee appeared in opposition to confirmation. No exhibits were admitted. At the conclusion of the parties' cases-in-chief the Court granted the parties time to file additional briefs, which have been filed and reviewed by the Court along with the record and applicable law. This matter is ready for decision. For the reasons set forth below the Court overrules the Trustee's objection and orders Debtors' Chapter 13 Plan confirmed.

Paragraph 2 of the Trustee's objection (Dkt. 15), based on the disposable income requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), was withdrawn by the Trustee at Dkt. 30. In his post-hearing brief, however (Dkt. 31), at pages 5 to 8 the Trustee revives his disposable income objection.

This Court has jurisdiction in this Chapter 13 case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Confirmation of Debtors' Plan is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L). This Memorandum includes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as provided at F.R.B.P. 7052 (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 52).

FACTS

Sharon and David Welsh ("David") moved to Montana in 2006. Sharon is employed as a nurse at St. Patrick's Hospital in Missoula. She testified that David used to work at a golf course, but he suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and his prognosis is that he can remain stable or get worse, but will not get better and he cannot work. David is retired and collects social security. Sharon testified that they live in a house on top of a ridge at 3831 Petty Creek Road, Missoula, and their driveway is a mile long with hairpin turns.

Sharon testified that when they first moved to Montana they rented, and finished their house using credit cards. She testified that, after making payments for 18 months, they consolidated their credit card debt with Bank of America at a high interest rate of 15 percent (15%) per annum, which Bank of America refused to reduce the interest rate.

Because of financial difficulties Debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition on May 27, 2010, along with their Schedules, Statements, Form B22C, and Plan. Debtors' Summary of Schedules lists total assets in the sum of $466,230.20 and total liabilities of $590,828.81.

Schedule A lists Debtors' residence at 3831 Petty Creek Road in Missoula, which they list as having a current value of $400,000, encumbered by a secured claim in the sum of $330,593.66.

Schedule B lists personal property with a total value of $66,230.20. Paragraph 25 of Schedule B lists six motor vehicles, including: a 2005 Ford F-250 with a current market value of $10,000; a 2006 Subaru Outback with a current value of $9,500.00; a 2005 Toyota Matrix with a value of $2,200.00; a 2005 Airstream trailer with a value of $23,000; and two 2007 Honda ATVs valued at $2,700.00 each. Sharon testified that they use one or the other of the ATVs equipped with a snowplow to shovel their long driveway. All their vehicles are listed as jointly owned by the Debtors, and all six are encumbered by secured claims. Debtors claim one $204 motor vehicle exemption in the Toyota under MONT. CODE ANN. ("MCA") § 25-13-609(2) on Schedule C. Sharon testified that they purchased the Toyota for their daughter, who is a medical resident and cannot afford a car because she owes $150,000 in student loans.

Schedule C does not list a homestead exemption.

Schedule D lists creditors holding secured claims. Schedule D lists both Honda ATVs are overencumbered. AHFC has a claim secured by one ATV, listed in the amount of $3,065. GE Money Bank ("GE") has a claim secured by the other ATV, listed in the amount of $4,500. Bank of America has a claim secured by Debtors' residence listed in the amount of $330,593.66. The 2005 Airstream Trailer, valued at $23,000, is encumbered by a claim of "Citizen't [sic] Auto Finance" listed in the amount of $39,000. The Subaru is encumbered by a claim listed in the amount of $12,211.00 in the name of JP Morgan Chase Bank NA ("JP Morgan"). The Toyota is encumbered by a claim listed in the amount of $1,996.00 in the name of LGFCU, and LGFCU is listed as having a claim secured by the Ford F-250 in the amount of $18,959.00.

Several secured creditors filed Proofs of Claim. Citizens Auto Finance ("Citizens") filed Claim No. 2 on June 10, 2010, asserting a claim in the amount of $37,936.22 secured by the Airstream trailer. LGFCU filed Claim 10 on June 30, 2010, asserting a claim in the amount of $1,380.58 secured by the Toyota. Claim 10 includes as an attachment a copy of the Toyota's certificate of title stating David Conwell Welsh as the owner, and an attachment of the promissory note signed by David. LGFCU also filed Claim 11 on June 30, 2010, asserting a claim in the amount of $10,838.51 secured by the Ford F-250. American Honda Finance Corporation ("AHFC") filed Claim 16 on August 12, 2010, asserting a claim in the amount of $2,533.15 secured by a 2007 ATV, VIN 1HFTE336074201552. JP Morgan filed Claim 21 on October 13, 2010, asserting a claim in the amount of $10,680.86 secured by the Subaru. GE has not filed a Proof of Claim and the claims bar date has expired.

Citizens filed a second Claim No. 7, which was disallowed as a duplicate of Claim 2.

Schedule F lists unsecured claims totaling $180,504.15, the largest of which are Debtors' daughter's student loan debt in the amount of $60,000, based on Debtors' personal guaranty, and a $50,000 joint debt owed to Bank of America on a line of credit. The remainder of creditors listed on Schedule F are mostly for credit card debt, medical and dental bills.

Schedule H lists Debtors' daughter Lauren N. Welsh as codebtor to Sallie Mae.

Schedule I lists Debtors' monthly income. Sharon's monthly income as a nurse is stated as $6,975.40, and she lists a pension income in the sum of $1,100.00 at line 12. David's income is listed as $358.03 from wages, salary and commissions, even though he is retired and unemployed, plus $1,165.00 in social security retirement income ("SSI"). After deductions for taxes, social security and insurance Debtors' total combined average monthly on Schedule I is $7,692.68.

Schedule J lists Debtor's current monthly expenditures in the total amount of $7,298.00, including a $2,177 mortgage payment, $375 for utilities, $125.00 for telephone, $309 for other utilities including cell phone ($85), satellite TV ($106), internet ($90) and garbage disposal ($28). Debtors' tax expenditures for real estate taxes and vehicle taxes total $350. Debtors list food expenses at $600, transportation at $400.00, charitable contributions at $100.00. Automobile expense is stated as $664, and Debtors list a total of $1,215.00 in "other installment payments" for the Subaru ($375), Toyota Matrix ($150), $113 for one Honda ATV and $158 for the other, and $419 for the RV. Schedules I and J, taken together, show a monthly net income at line 20c in the sum of $394.68.

Debtors completed and filed on May 27, 2010, Form B22C ("Chapter 13 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income") (Dkt. 3). On Form B22C Debtors blacked in the boxes at the top of page 1 stating that the applicable commitment period for their Chapter 13 Plan is 5 years, and that their disposable income is determined under § 1325(b)(3), which refers to the "means test" at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). Debtors listed their income in Part I of Form B22C, which at line 11 and line 20 states the total "current monthly income" ("CMI") in the amount of $8,116.31. That CMI does not include David's monthly SSI income of $1,165 from Schedule I, because as discussed below SSI benefits are excluded from CMI by 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B).

Sharon's income is listed in Column A of Form B22C, and David's income in Column B. They list their income in the opposite order on Schedule I.

Part IV of Form B22C calculates deductions from Debtors' income for food, apparel, health care, housing and utilities, transportation, taxes, insurance, and other expenses allowed under the means test totaling $3,993.76 at line 38. Line 46 adds additional monthly expenses for health and disability insurance totaling $346.01.

At line 25B Debtors list their $2,177 monthly mortgage payment below the IRS standard for mortgage or rent, and because their actual payment exceeds the IRS standard they entered $0.

Subpart C lists deductions for debt payments, including at line 47 future payments on secured claims. Debtors list six such monthly payments: $67.50 to AHFC and $147.47 to GE for the two Honda ATVs; a $2,177 home mortgage payment to Bank of America; $425 to Citizens for the 2005 Airstream; $231.25 to JP Morgan for the Subaru; $80 to LGFCU for the Toyota; and $399 to LGFCU for the Ford F-250. Sharon testified that the Debtors are current on all their secured obligations provided for in Form B22C.

Under cross examination Sharon overestimated the Subaru payment in the amount of $375 per month, and the truck payment as $600 per month.

The total future payments on secured claims at line 47 is $3,527.22. The Trustee's fee of $31.20 is added at line 50 and the total deductions for debt payment is stated at line 51 in the amount of $3,558.42. Lines 52, 56 and 58 lists the total deductions from income in the amount of $7,898.19. Deducting that sum from the CMI of $8,116.31 leaves monthly disposable income under § 1325(b)(2) at line 59 of Form B22C calculated in the sum of $218.12.

Debtors' Plan (Dkt. 2) provides for plan payments in the amount of $125.00 per month for 30 months and then increases to $500 per month for 30 months, or $18,750 in total plan payments. Sharon testified that the monthly payments on the Subaru, Ford F-250, and Toyota all will cease during the 5 year plan term, and that their Plan payments will increase to $500 as the vehicles are paid off. However, she testified that, after the Subaru is paid off, she will have to buy another vehicle because the Subaru has high mileage and she drives it 75 miles each day, so not all of the surplus funds will be available for increased plan payments. Paragraph 2(c) lists unimpaired secured claims of Bank of America, AHFC, Citizens, GE, JP Morgan, and LGFCU along with a description of their respective collateral. Paragraph 2(g) provides that unsecured claims will receive a distribution of at least $14,700. Sharon testified that the Debtors will be able to make their plan payments during the 5-year term.

By contrast, 60 monthly payments of $218.12 monthly disposable income calculated at line 59 of Form B22C would result in $13,087.20, a difference of $5,662.80 less than the total payments under Debtors' proposed Plan.

The Trustee filed objections to confirmation on July 26, 2010, on the grounds that Debtors' have not proposed their Plan in good faith under § 1325(a)(3) because of "minuscule" payments to unsecured claims while living in a $400,000 home and making payments on several secured claims, and that Debtors are failing to commit 100% of their disposable income as required under § 1325(b) and instead are deducting payments for unnecessary secured claims under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).

The Trustee withdrew the disposable income objection on September 23, 2010. Dkt. 30. In reviewing Trustee's Objection filed on July 26, 2010, dkt. 15, he cites to § 707(b)(2)(B)(iii). The Court concludes that this citation and statutory reference must be a typographical error and believes the Trustee really meant § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), which will be considered in this memorandum of decision.

Sharon testified that they have cut back on almost all outside entertainment and changed their lifestyle to reduce expenses. She testified that they have cut back on their cell phone and internet usage, do not have cable TV, cut back on food and clothing and do not go to movies. She testified that they have used their Airstream trailer to travel to dog shows and to visit family, and still use it as lodging when they have visitors staying with them. They considered stopping payments on the Airstream, but decided to continue making the payments. The Trustee asked Sharon on cross examination about the Toyota which their daughter is using. She responded that they approached their daughter about paying for the Toyota but she is not able to make the payments because she works as a resident and pays approximately $1,000 to her student loans.

Sharon testified that they considered stopping payments on the ATVs, but they need at least one of them to plow their driveway and access their home, and during the winter her Subaru will not make it up their driveway unless they plow it using an ATV. They also use the ATVs to drive on nearby land owned by the Nature Conservancy.

DISCUSSION

It is well established law in this Circuit that for a bankruptcy court to confirm a plan, "each of the requirements of section 1325 must be present and the debtor has the burden of proving that each element has been met." In re Barnes, 32 F.3d 405, 407 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Andrews, 49 F.3d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995); In re McSparran, 410 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2009); In re Tuss, 360 B.R. 684, 690 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2007); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 241 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2006). Section 1325(a)(1) requires confirmation of a plan if "the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other applicable provisions of this title." Therefore, the Debtors have the burden of proof on all elements of confirmation. Meyer v. Hill (In re Hill), 268 B.R. 548, 552 (9th Cir. BAP 2001).

I. Disposable Income.

Although he withdrew his disposable income objection at Dkt. 30, the Trustee continues to object to confirmation contending Debtors' Plan fails to satisfy the disposable income requirement of § 1325(b)(1)(B) because they omit social security income when calculating their projected disposable income.

Section 1325(b)(1) provides:

(b)(1) If the trustee . . . objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan —
* * *
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
Hamilton v. Lanning, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 2469, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010).

The Trustee cites Lanning for the proposition that pre-BAPCPA practice included SSI income as a component of projected disposable income and, absent a clear indication that Congress intended a departure from pre-BAPCPA practice, the Supreme Court will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode that past bankruptcy practice. 130 S.Ct. at 2473-74. The corollary to this must be that when there is a clear indication that Congress intended a departure from pre-BAPCPA practice, courts may read the Code to erode that past practice.

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. 119 Stat. 23.

Because Congress did not amend the term "projected disposable income" in BAPCPA, the Trustee argues based on Lanning, pre-BAPCPA practice requires inclusion of SSI in the calculation of projected disposable income. Debtors contend that Congress made such a change when it enacted BAPCPA and so pre-BAPCPA practice no longer applies to include SSI in projected disposable income.

The Supreme Court in Lanning was referring to Congress' failure to amend the term "projected disposable income" in 2005 when it enacted BAPCPA, and what that failure meant with respect to whether courts may take into account virtually certain changes in debtors' income and expenses when projecting disposable income. 130 S.Ct. at 2473-74. However, the facts in Lanning do not include any mention of SSI as income, and the decision in Lanning does not construe applicable statutes governing treatment of SSI in bankruptcy. Stephanie Lanning had received a onetime buyout from her former employer which resulted in monthly disposable income calculated from her Form 22C in an amount much greater than the monthly income calculated from Schedules I and J. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2470. Because Congress had not expressed an intent to depart from pre-BAPCPA practice, the Court held that the forward-looking approach and pre-BAPCPA practice allowed the Court to consider the debtor's reduced future income to confirm her plan. Id. at 2476.

A split of authority exists on the applicability of the Lanning decision to SSI benefits. The Trustee cites Utah bankruptcy cases, In re Timothy, 2009 WL 1349741 (Bankr.D.Utah) and In re Cranmer; 433 B.R. 391 (Bankr.D.Utah 2010) as authority requiring that SSI should be included for purposes of calculating projected disposable income for Debtors to be eligible for Chapter 13 relief and for their Plan to be feasible.

This Court observes that Cranmer recognized that "[t]here is no dispute that SSI is statutorily excluded from both the calculation of CMI under § 101(10A) and the calculation of DI under § 1325(b)(2) as both calculations are determined by using Form 22C." 433 B.R. at 395. Notwithstanding that lack of dispute, the court in Cranmer denied confirmation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan, relying on pre-BAPCPA case law, citing Lanning. The Trustee argues that "this court should hold that the most harmonious readings of all the statutes requires a finding that social security income should be included in the disposable income determination." Such a finding would conflict not only with the above-quoted language from Cranmer, but also with the plain language of two distinct and broad, yet specific statutes, governing SSI.

The first is 42 U.S.C. § 407 of the Social Security Act which states:

(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this title shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
(b) No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit withholding taxes from any benefit under this title, if such withholding is done pursuant to a request made in accordance with section 3402(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by the person entitled to such benefit or such person's representative payee.
See Cranmer, 433 B.R. at 393-94.

The court in Cranmer noted the debtor's response relying on 42 U.S.C. § 407 at 433 B.R. at 393-94, but thereafter never returned to address § 407 in its decision. Under Ninth Circuit precedent this Court cannot ignore § 407. The Ninth Circuit in Lopez v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 302 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2002), noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) extends the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) to SSI benefits. It also recognized that case law has broadly construed the phrase "other legal process" within § 407(a). Id.; Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995).

This Court included the reference to subsections 407(b) and (c) above to demonstrate that Congress knew how to limit the application of 407(a) to limit or modify its provisions, by requiring express reference to § 407. Neither § 1325(b) nor the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3) includes such an express reference to § 407 which is required to limit or modify its limitation to "other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law." (Emphasis added).

This Court construed § 407 in Anderson v. International Revenue Service, 18 Mont. B.R. 369, 373-74, 250 B.R. 707 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2000). The Court noted that § 407(b) states that no other provision of law may be construed to limit or modify § 407(a) unless the provision makes specific reference to § 407. Id., 18 Mont. B.R. at 373-74, 250 B.R. 707 (Section 6334(c) of the Internal Revenue Code governing IRS levies included the specific reference to § 407's predecessor, section 207 of the Social Security Act). Other courts have found that § 407(b) serves to insulate social security benefits from the operation of bankruptcy laws. See, e.g., In re Radford, 265 B.R. 827, 830 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 2000) (citation omitted).

In the instant case the Trustee has not identified any express reference to 42 U.S.C. § 407 which would limit or modify its provisions, either in the disposable income requirement of § 1325(b)(2), or the means test, or the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3). On the contrary by enacting § 101(10A)(B) Congress demonstrated an intent to reinforce or buttress the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) against inclusion of SSI in CMI.

Courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030-31, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); In re Jore Corp., 298 B.R. 703, 731 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2003). Given the breadth of § 407(a)'s protections against "legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law[,]" and the absence of any express reference to § 407 in the Bankruptcy Code cited by the Trustee, the language of § 407(a) cannot be ignored. Anderson, 18 Mont. B.R. at 373-74. Cranmer did not address 42 U.S.C. § 407 other than quoting it, and since it cannot be ignored and applies to "any" bankruptcy law this Court declines to follow Cranmer, Timothy, and the other cases which require inclusion of SSI in provisions of § 1325(a) which lack the express reference required by 42 U.S.C. § 407(b).

The second statute is 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) which provides that "current monthly income"

(A) means the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is taxable income, derived during the 6-month period ending on —
(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the case is the debtor files the schedule of current monthly required by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); or
(ii) the date on which current income is determined by the court for purposes of this title if the debtor does not file the schedule of the current income required by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); and
(B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse), on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and in a joint case the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act. . . .

(Emphasis added).

Section 101(10A) was inserted in 2005 in BAPCPA. Courts recognized that the definition of disposable income calculated by reference to § 101(10A) was significantly revised by Congress in 2005 by substitution of the newly defined term CMI in § 1325(b)(2) in place of "income which is received by the Debtor." In re Bartelini, 434 B.R. 285, 294 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849, 865 (Bankr. E.D.La. 2007) (The calculation of disposable income or projected disposable income now begins with CMI). The court in Cranmer admitted: "There is no dispute that SSI is statutorily excluded from both the calculation of CMI under 101(10A) and the calculation of DI under 1325(b)(2) as both calculations are determined by using Form 22C." 433 B.R. at 396. Notwithstanding, the court then noted that the Supreme Court in Lanning upheld the Tenth Circuit's "determination that CMI and DI calculations are different that [sic] the calculation of PDI found in 1325(b)(1)(B)." Id., 433 B.R. at 395.

The Trustee's statutory interpretation based on Lanning and Cranmer conflicts with basic canons of statutory construction. One such canon is that when the language of a statute is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms unless the disposition required by the text is absurd. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (in turn quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917))). SSI is excluded from CMI under the plain language of § 101(10A)(B), and thus from disposable income under the means test.

Next the Trustee argues that Lanning's forward-looking approach, which requires courts to measure projected disposable income as of the effective date of the plan, means that this Court should include Debtors' "actual" SSI to determine disposable income because it is certain to exist in the future, notwithstanding the plain language of § 101(10A)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). The Supreme Court stated:

As the Tenth Circuit recognized in this case, a court taking the forward-looking approach should begin by calculating disposable income, and in most cases, nothing more is required. It is only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into account other known or virtually certain information at the time of confirmation.
Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2475.

The Supreme Court noted: "BAPCPA left the term `projected disposable income' undefined but specified in some detail how `disposable income' is to be calculated." 130 S.Ct. at 2470. Lanning makes clear in the above-quoted language at 130 S.Ct. at 2475 that calculation of projected disposable income is not so much "different" from the calculations of CMI and disposable income, as the court in Cranmer states at 344 B.R. at 395 citing the Tenth Circuit, but rather the calculation of projected disposable income begins with CMI. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2475 ("[A] court taking the forward-looking approach should begin by calculating disposable income, and in most cases, nothing more is required."); Bartelini, 434 B.R. at 294.

With SSI income excluded from CMI by § 101(10A)(B), which was enacted by Congress in BAPCPA, pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice cannot apply to have the effect of adding SSI back into projected disposable income without violating two federal statutes, § 101(10A)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous. Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).

The Supreme Court held "that when a bankruptcy court calculates a debtor's projected disposable income, the court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation." 130 S.Ct. at 2464. "We hold that the `forward-looking approach' is correct." Id. at 2469. Lanning is mandatory authority, and as such this Court is bound by it and obligated to change its mechanical approach to the forward-looking approach.

The Trustee argues that Debtors ask to apply the mechanical approach which was specifically rejected in Lanning. The above-quoted passage in Lanning, however, states plainly that in most cases nothing more is required than simply calculating disposable income, which is what the mechanical test does, and "only in unusual cases" go further. Id.

The Trustee does not explain how the instant case is an unusual case, and does not explain what changes in the Debtors' income or expenses are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation. David's SSI income has not been shown to increase or decrease during the term of the Plan. The Debtors already have accounted for changes in their Plan and increased plan payments as their vehicles are paid off and the payments freed up.

The Trustee contends that Lanning rejected the mechanical approach to calculating projected disposable income, and so this Court should reject the mechanical approach and take into account Debtors' social security income because it is known or virtually certain, and avoid the "senseless results" which would occur by not including Debtors' social security income in their projected disposable income. "The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning." Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158, 112 S.Ct. 527, 116 L.Ed.2d 514 (1991). It is not the courts' role to avoid "senseless results" or rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide what the court might think is the preferred result. Tranmer, 355 B.R. at 243, quoting In re Rotunda, 349 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 2006), citing In re Alexander 344 B.R. 742, 748 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (quoting Lamie, 540 U.S. at 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023).

The effect of Lanning is to increase this Court's discretion under § 1325: "We decline to infer from § 1325's incorporation of § 707 that Congress intended to eliminate, sub silentio, the discretion that courts previously exercised when projecting disposable income to account for known or virtually certain changes. Accord, In re Liverman, 383 B.R. 604, 613, and n. 15 (Bkrtcy.N.J. 2008)." Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2475.

Heeding Lanning, this Court begins by calculating disposable income from Debtors' Form B22C, and in most cases nothing more is required. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2475. Debtors' Form B22C results in disposable income of $218.12 at line 59, which over the 5-year plan term totals $13,087.20 in plan payments, or $5,662.80 less than the $18,750 which Debtors propose in their Plan. Debtors' Plan's proposed distribution to unsecured claims, $14,700, by itself exceeds the total disposable income required under the means test over the term of the Plan.

The Trustee has not shown that this case is unusual, and has not shown any changes in Debtors' income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation, which are not already reflected in Debtors' Plan. See Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2475, 2478. The Trustee asks that SSI be added back in when calculating projected disposable income, based on Lanning. But since no showing has been made that the case is unusual or that there are any changes in Debtors' income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation, coupled with the plain language of § 101(10A)(B) excluding SSI from CMI and the broad proscription of 42 U.S.C. § 407, and there being no express reference thereto in § 1325(b), this Court concludes that David's SSI is not subject to the disposable income requirement. The Court finds that Debtors have satisfied their burden of proof under the disposable income requirement of § 1325(b).

II. Good Faith.

The Trustee objects that Debtors' Plan has not been proposed in good faith as required by § 1325(a)(3). Hill, 268 B.R. at 552. The Court reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a plan has been proposed in good faith. In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1999); Eisen v. Curry (In re Eisen), 14 F.3d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Gress, 257 B.R. 563, 567, 18 Mont. B.R. 30, 34 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2000). In Leavitt the Ninth Circuit held that in determining whether a Chapter 13 plan is proposed in good faith, a bankruptcy court should consider (1) whether debtors misrepresented facts in their plan or unfairly manipulated the Code, (2) the debtors' history of filings and dismissals, (3) whether the debtors intended to defeat state court litigation, and (4) whether egregious behavior is present. Leavitt, 171 F.3d at 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1999); Drummond v. Cavanagh (In re Cavanagh), 250 B.R. 107, 114 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).

No evidence exists in the record, and the Trustee does not argue, that Debtors misrepresented facts in their plan or unfairly manipulated the Code. No history of filings and dismissals by these Debtors is shown by the evidence, and no evidence exists that the Debtors' intended to defeat state court action. Three of the four Leavitt factors weigh in favor of a finding that Debtors' proposed their Plan in good faith under § 1325(a)(3).

Notwithstanding, the Trustee argues that the totality of circumstances weighs against confirmation because Debtors' Plan will pay only approximately 8.5% of unsecured claims, while Debtors continue to make payments on claims secured by the Airstream, two ATVs and three automobiles. The Trustee characterizes these payments as for luxury items not necessary for the maintenance of their home, which appears to parallel his disposable income objection. The Trustee contends that the payments for luxury items and support for their adult daughter constitutes egregious conduct, or behavior that is "remarkably bad" or flagrant, citing In re Covino, 245 B.R. 162 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2000). Debtors deny that they engaged in egregious conduct, and argue that they found themselves in a financial predicament because of cost overruns on their house and inability to refinance with Coutrywide, a company that itself collapsed, and exhausted their savings.

The facts in Covino which gave rise to a finding of bad faith included filing a Chapter 13 case in an attempt to circumvent a penalty imposed on the debtors for inappropriate conduct in a prior bankruptcy case, including concealment of assets. 245 B.R. at 166-67, 169. The Chapter 13 plan proposed by Covinos called for $75 monthly payments for 36 months, and total payments of $1,800 to unsecured creditors. 245 B.R. at 167. No corresponding egregious or flagrant conduct by Debtors is shown in the instant record. There is no evidence of concealment of assets, prior bankruptcy cases, and Debtors are paying into their Plan and to unsecured creditors much more than the disposable income calculated on Form B22C.

No definition of "egregious" exists in § 1325(a)(3). If a statute uses a term which it does not define, the court gives that term its ordinary meaning. DeGeorge v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 219 F.3d 930, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2000). "Egregious" is defined in Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961) variously as "extraordinary," "extreme," and "flagrant." Egregious behavior supporting a finding of bad faith In re Opper, 20 Mont. B.R. 123, 132 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2002), consisted of debtors proposing $0 to unsecured creditors while making payments to secured creditors to retain luxury items such as a boat and snowmobile, repaying a loan to a 401(k) plan, and failure to list assets. Opper, 20 Mont. B.R. at 132.

Under BAPCPA and § 1322(f) repayment of a 401(k) loan is now authorized. Egebjerg, 574 F.3d at 1050.

The facts shown by the record in the instant case are not comparable to Opper. Debtors' Plan proposes $14,700 in payments to unsecured creditors. Their ATV's are not a luxury, since at least one is required for Sharon to plow her driveway in the winter in order to reach her home. David is the owner of the Toyota, on which they make payments but let their daughter use, and the secured creditor filed a claim in this case which has been allowed without objection showing David is the borrower. Their retention of the Airstream, by itself, is not enough to find egregious conduct.

The Trustee's good faith objection based on their payments to secured claims ignores the fact that payments to secured claims are authorized in the means test at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) and (iii). In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2009) ("In calculating the debtor's current monthly income, § 707(b)(2) permits the debtor to deduct `the average monthly payments on account of secured debts.'") (Emphasis in original). The Supreme Court in Lanning noted that, for above-median income debtors, the expenses included in § 707(b)(2) are included in the means test. 130 S.Ct. at 2470. Thus, Lanning recognizes that secured claims provided at § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) are included. Id. This Court has adopted the analysis from In re Austin, 372 B.R. 668, 680-83 (Bankr.D.Vt. 2007), that where a debtor is current on a secured obligation that is provided for in Form 22C, the Court refrains from determining whether the expense is reasonable. McSparran, 410 B.R. at 671. Sharon testified that the Debtors are current on all their secured obligations provided for in Form B22C, so the Court refrains from determining whether their payments to secured claims are reasonable.

The Trustee contends that the Court should extend the reasoning of student loan dischargeability cases to the instant case because Debtors have not sought to minimize their expenses, citing In re Hamilton, 361 B.R. 532, 557 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2007). The instant case does not involve dischargeability of student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), so Hamilton does not apply.

The Trustee next argues that Debtors' failure to utilize David's SSI income to increase their plan payments to creditors is an indicia of egregious behavior sufficient to find bad faith. The Trustee contends that Debtors can apply their SSI to their basic needs and offset other income currently being used, and free up money for plan payments, citing in re Hall, 2010 WL 3447575 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2010). Hall cites the Hagel v. Drummond, 184 B.R. 793, 798 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) as support for applying social security benefits to basic needs. As the court in Devilliers notes, the provision of BAPCPA is an unambiguous directive that social security benefits are not considered in calculating disposable income. 358 B.R. at 866 and n. 26 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)). Given the enactment of § 101(10A)(B) in 2005, the decision in Hagel that debtors must use social security benefits for their basic needs and include them in the disposable income calculation is no longer valid, and Hall's citation to Hagel lends that decision no weight.

Based upon specific exceptions to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) not at issue here, the court noted that payroll taxes and medical bills payable from SSI are subject to a trustee's objection that they are not reasonable and necessary deductions from CMI. Devilliers, 358 B.R. at 866.

The Trustee cites In re Rodgers, 430 B.R. 910 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 2010) as an example where the court considered exempt social security benefits in calculating good faith and disposable income. Rodgers cites several pre-BAPCPA cases, including Hagel, which as discussed above no longer apply because of the enactment of § 101(10A)(B) excluding SSI from CMI and expressing an intent to depart from pre-BAPCPA practice. 430 B.R. at 913-14. In addition the court in Rodgers found that the debtors' excess actual income, even resulting from excluded social security income, "must be counted toward a Debtors' current monthly income and, thus, towards their projected monthly income." 430 B.R. at 914. In this Court's view that clearly violates § 101(10A)(B) which by its plain language excludes SSI from CMI.

On the issue of good faith the court in Rodgers applied a list of non-exclusive factors from the Eleventh Circuit in determining whether the plan was proposed in good faith, including the amount of the debtor's income from all sources and the living expenses of the debtor and his dependents. This Court follows the Ninth Circuit analysis from Leavitt and, while the Court considers David's SSI benefits as one of the totality of the circumstances, the Court does not consider the SSI benefits probative of a lack of good faith in proposing the Plan under § 1325(a)(3).

Courts generally avoid construing one provision in a statute so as to suspend or supersede another provision. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471-72, 113 S.Ct. 2187, 2192, 124 L.Ed.2d 424 (1993). Courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render statutory language superfluous, and so long as there is no positive repugnancy between two laws, a court must give effect to both. Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. at 252-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146. Statutory construction canons require that "[w]here both a specific and a general statute address the same subject matter, the specific one takes precedence regardless of the sequence of the enactment, and must be applied first." In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 624 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1994) (citing Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)).

Section 101(10A)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 407 are two separate federal statutes, each more specific than § 1325(a)(3) with respect to SSI benefits. Section 1325(a)(3) does not include the express reference to § 407 which § 407(b) requires in order to limit or otherwise modify § 407(a)'s prohibition against "the operation of any bankruptcy . . . law" against SSI. The Trustee's good faith objection on the basis of SSI cannot be sustained without running afoul of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) and the above-listed canons of statutory construction, while overruling the good faith objection gives them effect without weakening § 1325(a)(3).

Debtors cite the Eighth Circuit case In re Thompson, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 3583400, *3 (8th Cir. BAP) which, citing Lanning, held that because of § 101(10A)(B)'s exclusion of SSI from CMI, considering the same issue under the good faith test would be duplicative and render § 1325(b)'s ability to pay test meaningless. This Court agrees. In re Chavez, Case No. 07-60567-13, 2007 WL 3023145 (October 11, 2007) and In re O'Connor, Case No. 08-60641-13, 2008 WL 4516374 (September 30, 2008), this Court overruled good faith objections because the adequacy of plan payments is determined by Form 22C. Based on those cases, Form B22C filed in the instant case, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and there being no express reference thereto in § 1325(a)(3) modifying or limiting § 407(a), and there being no evidence of the first three Leavitt factors for bad faith, the Court finds that the Debtors have satisfied their burden of proof to show that they proposed their Plan in good faith. The Trustee's good faith objection based on § 1325(a)(3) is overruled.

Memorandum of Decision, Docket No. 50. At pages 9 and 10 this Court quoted extensively Austin, 372 B.R. at 682-83, and ruled that where debtors properly computed the plan payment under the means test the Court would not deny confirmation based on the good faith requirement. See also In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224, 232 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2006). The Chapter 13 Trustee Drummond did not appeal the Court's decision in Chavez.

Memorandum of Decision, Docket No. 31. As in Chavez the Court at pages 28-31 quoted Austin, 372 B.R. at 680-83 for the proposition that if a secured claim expense is properly included on Form 22C then issues of reasonably necessary expense and bad faith would not arise. The debtors in O'Connor failed to disclose a boat payment, but this Court determined that the failure to include the boat expense on Form 22C did not by itself establish lack of good faith. Drummond did not appeal the decision in O'Connor.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This Court has jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).

2. Confirmation of Debtor's Plan is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(1).

3. Debtors satisfied their burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3) to show that their Plan provides that all of the Debtors' projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the Plan.

4. Current monthly income defined under BAPCPA, § 101(10A)(B), excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act; Section 101(10A)(B) is a clear indication that Congress intended a departure from pre-BAPCPA practice and exclude SSI income from the disposable income calculation. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2474-75.

5. The Trustee failed to show, and there is no evidence in the record, that this was an unusual case which would allow the Court to go further and take into account changes or other known or virtually certain information about the Debtors' future income or expenses. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2475, 2478.

6. Debtors satisfied their burden of proof under § 1325(a)(3) that their Plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law; and they satisfied their burden under all other requirements for confirmation in § 1325(a).

IT IS ORDERED that separate Orders shall be entered in conformity with the above (1) overruling the Trustee's objections; and (2) confirming Debtors' Chapter 13 Plan (Dkt. 2).

94) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, the court must consider "each word . . . along with not only all the other words that surround it, but also the history and education of the parties, the nature of the contract, the purposes of the parties, and all other relevant circumstances." The Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In re Delta Airlines, Inc.), 608 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (vacating district court decision that affirmed a bankruptcy court's interpretation of a contract in way that defeated the intentions of the parties).

The plain language of the security agreement reveals that the parties mutually intended to create a special account for a distinct limited purpose that should not be eligible for setoff under New York law. For one thing, the security agreement's prefatory language expressly states that the parties entered into the agreement governing the creation of the Deposit Account for the sole, limited purpose of protecting BOA in the event of an intra-day overdraft. See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) at 1 ("Whereas" Clause I) ("WHEREAS . . . the Bank and/or its subsidiaries and/or affiliates . . . may, but are not obligated to, permit the Pledgor, its subsidiaries and affiliates to incur overdrafts in accounts maintained with the Bank . . .") (emphasis added); id. at 1 (Whereas Clause II) (WHEREAS . . . the Bank, its subsidiaries and affiliates . . . require that any such overdrafts be fully covered by cash collateral ") (emphasis added). Although such "whereas" clauses have no operative effect, they do offer guidance as to the intentions of the parties when entering into the security agreement. Moreover, the Court finds it significant that it was BOA, and not LBHI, that added the clauses to the security agreement.

The operative provisions of the security agreement are consistent with and confirm the mutual intent of the parties memorialized in the "whereas" clauses. Notably, the security agreement defines "Indebtedness" in a very limited fashion relating "solely in respect of overdrafts." The significance of this tightly focused definition becomes apparent when read in conjunction with section 11 of the security agreement, which governs BOA's remedies following an event of default by LBHI. This section permits BOA to seize the collateral only for the purpose of satisfying the amount of "Indebtedness" existing under the security agreement. See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 11(c) ("If an Event of Default occurs, the Bank may do any one or more of the following: . . . (c) Apply, without notice, any funds in any Deposit Account against the Indebtedness"). Viewed together, then, sections 2 and 11(c) confirm the only expressly stated purpose of the security agreement — i.e., to collateralize "Indebtedness" directly related to intra-day overdrafts, and to authorize BOA to use the collateral to satisfy any such intra-day overdraft.

Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 2 ("`Indebtedness' means (a) any and all existing and future indebtedness and liabilities of every kind, nature and character, direct or indirect, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, voluntary or involuntary, solely in respect of overdrafts of the Pledgor . . . including, without limitation, daylight and overnight overdrafts and all costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys fees . . .") (emphasis added).

Although BOA recognizes that the language of section 11(c) grants it a contractual right to apply the collateral to any overdrafts following an event of default, it does not concede that its rights are tied exclusively to overdrafts. According to BOA, section 11(c) of the security agreement is not the sole remedy available upon the occurrence of an event of default because the limiting language only appears in the definition of the term "Indebtedness." BOA argues, "it is entirely reasonable that the Security Agreement thus limited the security interest to the negotiated definition of Indebtedness, but there is no reason to import that limitation in the definition to other portions of the Agreement . . ." BOA Opp'n to Mot. at 25-26. BOA cites two boilerplate reservations of rights provisions — sections 11(d) and 14 — as support for the proposition that the parties intended that the collateral would be available for additional purposes beyond simply securing overdraft protection.

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Lehman Brothers' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Further Support of Bank of America's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Nov. 3, 2009, ECF Doc. # 58 ("BOA Opp'n to Mot") at 23.

Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 11(d) ("If an event of default occurs, the Bank may . . . exercise any . . . remedy provided under this Agreement or by any applicable law").

Id. § 14 ("The rights, powers, and remedies given to the Bank by this Agreement shall be in addition to all rights, powers, and remedies given to the Bank by virtue of any statute or rule of law.").

BOA further relies on sections 11(d) and 14 to argue that the security agreement does not waive BOA's pre-existing state law setoff rights. See, e.g., BOA Opp'n to Mot. at 23 ("The unambiguous language of the agreement contains no waiver of the Bank's right of setoff"). While it is true that BOA did nothing to waive its setoff rights, it is more significant that it never raised the issue at all in negotiations and never gave any notice to LBHI that the pledged collateral might one day be applied unexpectedly to unrelated indebtedness. The argument that the right, not having been waived, should enable BOA by stealth to reduce swap indebtedness and improve its position relative to other creditors is a convenient use of form language to contradict the actual agreement reached by the parties. In the context of these negotiations, the Court concludes that the parties never stated any intention to expose this collateral to a general right of setoff and that BOA's non-waiver argument based on boilerplate language must fail because it conflicts with the expressed intent of the parties to dedicate the collateral to a designated purpose.

The Court disagrees with BOA's self-interested reading of these general provisions and declines to interpret the plain language of the security agreement in the manner urged by BOA. BOA attributes exceptional and unwarranted significance to the boilerplate language of section 14. As a general matter, courts typically accord full force and effect to boilerplate language within a contract. See, e.g., In re Victory Mkts., Inc., 221 B.R. 298, 304 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1998) ("[E]ven if the operative provisions [in the contract] were to be considered boilerplate, we cannot accept the contention that language of that character is to be disregarded . . . At no time should the source of language affect its efficacy"). Nonetheless, the Court must simultaneously construe the boilerplate language in a way that does not undermine the overarching purpose of the security agreement. See, e.g., Montblanc-Simplo GmbH v. Aurora Due. S.r.l., 363 F.Supp.2d 467, 475 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Where the strict reading of one provision will render another provision meaningless, or without effect, such reading should be rejected") (citation omitted); Williams Press, Inc. v. State, 335 N.E. 2d 299, 302 (N.Y. 1975) ("We read the writing as a whole. We seek to give each clause its intended purpose in promotion of the primary and dominant purpose of the contract") (citations omitted).

BOA disputes the characterization of section 14 as "boilerplate," instead characterizing this provision as a "negotiated term of fact." 12/10/09 Tr. at 72:24-5; 75:20-21 ("it wasn't even boilerplate because it was negotiated"). While the inclusion of section 14 as a whole may have resulted from negotiation between the parties, the specific language contained therein was not negotiated. Rather, this provision appears to have been copied verbatim from BOA's standard forms and, accordingly, was not drafted with this particular transaction in mind. See also 12/10/09 Tr. at 77:17-78:14 ("COURT: Nobody drafted this with particular reference to this transaction? It's a form that was used for the transaction, correct? [COUNSEL FOR BOA]: This provision was used in this transaction, as it has been in many others. You're right . . . I don't think there's evidence to that effect in the record . . . It's part of what I think is the bank's — this bank's and probably many other banks' standard forms. As long as we are speculating on that . . .".)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that sections 11(d) and 14 simply cannot be fairly interpreted to negate or override specific provisions in the agreement that are consistent with the clearly expressed intentions of the parties to collateralize an identified overdraft risk. Accepting BOA's proposed construction of boilerplate sections 11(d) and 14 would effectively leave BOA with an unlimited right of setoff with respect to all manner of indebtedness notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was entered into for the stated purpose of securing any "Indebtedness" that might arise "solely in respect of overdrafts." This reading of the language would lead to unintended consequences by giving greater significance to the meaning of general provisions than the more specific provisions within the security agreement. This is contrary to the way that agreements are to be construed. The specific is supposed to trump the general, not vice versa. See Aramony v. United Way of America, 254 F.3d 403, 413 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that it is a fundamental rule of contract construction that "specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language") (citations and internal quotations omitted).

The best way to harmonize the specific and general provisions of the security agreement is to find that these provisions are consistent with the special purpose to secure indebtedness relating to intra-day overdrafts. The boilerplate cannot be properly construed as granting rights to BOA in the collateral for all purposes. BOA engaged in a negotiation to achieve a particular objective and to obtain security to cover a specified risk. The deposit of collateral was not intended to serve as a fund to secure any or all of BOA's many other exposures to the credit risk of Lehman. Such an expansive improvement in position was never contemplated by the parties and would both ignore BOA's limited purpose for having created the security agreement and would disregard the narrowly focused meaning of the term "Indebtedness" as used in the security agreement.

B. Extrinsic Evidence Demonstrates that the Parties Intended to Create a Special Purpose Account Exempt from Setoff

In light of the unambiguous language of the security agreement, the Court does not need to examine extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Int'l Multifoods Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 309 F.3d 76, 83 (2d. Cir. 2002) (noting that "[i]f the court finds that the contract is not ambiguous it should assign the plain and ordinary meaning to each term and interpret the contract without the aid of extrinsic evidence") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, given the divergent views of the parties as to the proper interpretation of the same language, it is useful to review the negotiations surrounding the creation and execution of the security agreement, as well as the characteristics of the resulting Deposit Account. This examination confirms that the parties intended to create a special purpose account exempt from setoff under New York law.

BOA demanded that the Deposit Account be established for the limited purpose of mitigating its exposure to intra-day overdrafts and wanted collateral to secure credit customarily extended to Lehman in the course of its daily banking relationship. In the months preceding LBHI's filing, BOA became alarmed at its potentially large exposure to Lehman's daylight overdrafts. This alarm was heightened on July 25, 2008, when LBHI overdrew approximately $650 million from a segregated client account at BOA. In response, BOA requested "deposits that would be pledged by [Lehman] . . . and used as collateral against future overdrafts." 1/29/10 Tr. 209:22-23 (Dever). The message delivered to LBHI by Dever, a senior banker and relationship manager at BOA, dealt with this one concern and nothing else — how to address "the overdraft issue." 1/29/10 Tr. 212:7-12 (Dever).

1/29/10 Tr. 54-57 (Hawk).

(Wang Dec. Appx. I, Exs. 151, 152, 153).

The initial discussions between the parties as to the form of the Deposit Account confirm that they intended to structure an account for the specific purpose of securing overdraft exposure. Initially, LBHI proposed a "plain vanilla" account to address BOA's anxiety with respect to overdraft exposure. Such a "plain vanilla" account, had it been created, would have permitted LBHI broader and unrestricted access to its funds, but BOA rejected that proposal as too loose because the absence of a security interest would have given LBHI the freedom to withdraw these funds at will and, in effect, restore BOA's exposure. The Deposit Account, on the other hand, restricted LBHI's ability to withdraw the collateral and achieved the objective of securing BOA's exposure to LBHI overdrafts.

See 1/29/10 Tr. 79:14-20 (Hawk); 221:21-23 (Gowin).

See 1/29/10 Tr. 104:15-19 (Sparks).

See 1/29/10 Tr. 64:18-65:6, 74:7-16 (Hawk) (explaining a pledge was required to mitigate the Lehman overdraft risk).

The parties did not even mention the issue of setoff at any time during their negotiations. BOA's negotiators, for example, testified that their discussions with LBHI concerning the security agreement related exclusively to the need to obtain collateral to secure overdrafts. Similarly, the Lehman personnel involved in the negotiations — Tonucci, the treasurer of Lehman, and Stirling Fielding, the European head of treasury operations, — understood that the requested deposit "was intended to cover intra-day overdrafts" and nothing more. Thus, the parties were talking about a limited subject matter that did not include a general right of setoff.

See Memorandum of Law in Reply to Bank of America's Opposition to Lehman's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Nov. 9, 2009, ECF Doc. # 65, at 17 ("In short, neither side discussed the issue of setoff with respect to the collateral . . ."); 12/10/09 Tr. 122:9-11 (statements by Lehman counsel) ("[BOA was] not negotiating a broad right of setoff, which was never discussed"); 1/29/10 Tr. 14:20-25 (statements by BOA counsel) ("there is no evidence of . . . any discussion of the waiver of the right of setoff . . ."); Debtors' Post-Hearing Memorandum, dated Mar. 12, 2010, ECF Doc. # 85, at 2 ("Setoff rights were the furthest thing from the parties' minds").

1/29/10 Tr. 98:5-10 (Hawk) (no discussion of BOA accessing the collateral for any reason other than securing Lehman overdraft); 212:14-22 (Dever) (same); 174:22-175:2 (Sparks) (same).

2/1/10 Tr. 205:2-8 (Tonucci); 25:15-21 (Fielding) (BOA never mentioned that the pledge account was for anything other than security for the pledge accounts); 79:15-18 (Yeung) (same).

This clear focus on pledging the deposited funds for a single purpose reflects the intention of the parties to treat these funds as "collateral" ineligible for setoff. Under New York law, a bank is unable to set off a debt against pledged "collateral." See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D'Urso, 278 F.3d 138, 149 (2d. Cir. 2002) ( quoting Pink v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 28 N.E. 2d 842, 844 (N.Y. 1940)) ("a person holding monies pursuant to a contract obligation is `a trustee . . . as to monies in its hands belonging to the [beneficiary] or to be applied to a specific purpose,' in which case setoff may not be applied") (additional citation omitted). The transaction, as documented by the parties, is consistent with a pledge of collateral intended to be exempt from setoff, and not the creation of a simple debt. The security agreement defines LBHI as a "Pledgor" and its deposit of $500 million as "Collateral." See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 4. The extrinsic evidence in relation to the security agreement also supports the conclusion that the funds were being pledged for the specific purpose of securing intra-day overdraft credit.

1/29/10 Tr. 209:22-23 (Dever); 1/29/10 Tr. 98:5-10 (Hawk) (no discussion of BOA accessing the collateral for any reason other than securing Lehman overdraft); 174:22-175:2 (Sparks) (same)). See also 2/1/10 Tr. 205:2-8 (Tonucci); 25:15-21 (Fielding).

The negotiations between BOA and LBHI with respect to the definition of "Indebtedness" confirm the intent of the parties. Initially, BOA wanted to define the term "Indebtedness" with broad language that would have permitted a more expansive right of setoff, but LBHI rejected that definition. That rejection of a broad definition of "Indebtedness" was followed by the ultimate selection of a tightly worded definition that is confined to the intra-day overdraft issue that precipitated the discussions. See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 2 (defining "Indebtedness" as "solely in respect of overdrafts"). This process of revision reflected the negotiations and effectuated the agreement of the parties. 1/29/10 Tr. 170:17-22 (Sparks). It is undisputed that the language chosen by the parties for the security agreement reflects the mutual intent to secure the risk associated with intra-day overdrafts.

Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts, dated Dec. 7, 2009, ECF Doc. # 74 at ¶ 22 (indicating "Indebtedness should only be defined to cover overdraft exposure"); ¶ 24 (BOA's acceptance of new definition of Indebtedness).

1/29/2010 Tr. 222:22-223:6, 225:22-226:14 (Gowin) (confirming that the "understanding" which Lehman communicated to BOA was that "the pledge account is for overdraft exposure and not broader indebtedness"); 2/1/10 Tr. 205:3-8; 161:17-24 (Tonucci).

The negotiations with respect to a customer agreement proposed by BOA also confirm this intent of the parties. Initially, BOA proposed that LBHI sign a pre-printed standard form of customer agreement which contained an express right of setoff as broad as BOA's original definition of "Indebtedness." Andrew Yeung, an attorney for LBHI, rejected this provision of the customer agreement. BOA thereafter dropped the customer agreement from the negotiations, and the form was never executed.

2/1/10 Tr. 111:7-9 (Yeung) (recognizing that he did not use the word "rejection" in his comments to the proposed customer agreement, but that "if you read the section and read the comment, its clear that its not an acceptance").

The negotiations between BOA and LBHI also fail to support BOA's legal interpretation of sections 2, 11(c), 11(d), and 14 of the security agreement. BOA argues that the narrowly drafted definition of "Indebtedness" in section 2 should not be read to limit BOA's rights, including rights of setoff, arising from the operative provisions of the security agreement. BOA contends that the security agreement reflects what amounts to a "two part deal" — "a cash deposit in a regular deposit account and a limited security interest in the cash running in favor of the bank." 1/29/10 Tr. 13:18-24 (BOA counsel). The negotiating history as reflected in the record does not support the existence of such a "two part deal."

An examination of the characteristics of the Deposit Account corroborates the express mutual intent of the parties to create a special purpose account. For example, the special purpose of the Deposit Account is confirmed by the restrictions that BOA placed on LBHI's ability to withdraw the deposited funds. Any withdrawal request by LBHI was subject to a three-day notice period. See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 4 ("The Pledgor may, from time to time in its sole discretion . . . remove Collateral on deposit in the Deposit Account so long as the Pledgor shall have given written notice to the Bank of such . . . removal of Collateral at least three (3) business days prior to the date . . .").

The parties understood that LBHI had severely restricted its ability to gain access to the funds deposited in this account. In addition to the restrictions imposed by the three-day notice period, BOA also placed the deposited funds on an "indefinite" hold. BOA explains this indefinite freeze on LBHI's withdrawal rights alternately as an "extra administrative precaution," and as an "operational means [to ensure] LBHI compliance with the three-day notice requirement." BOA Opp'n to Mot. at 52 n75. Regardless of how this internal practice may be characterized, BOA had erected barriers to protect the deposited funds and, as a condition to maintaining demand deposit accounts at BOA with overdraft privileges, would not allow these funds to be touched by LBHI.

See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 71 (BOA employees were warned that if "anyone sees entries passing through the account . . . they must NOT touch them. This is the collateral for the Lehman accounts and must not be released. The account is on indefinite hold, but please be sure no one touches it").

As a commercial matter, LBHI's ability to withdraw the deposited funds was further constrained by LBHI's dependency on its long-standing banking relationship with BOA at the time of negotiating the security agreement. For at least sixteen years before LBHI filed for bankruptcy, BOA provided essential clearing services to LBHI. The intra-day overdraft credit that BOA provided to LBHI was the critical "life-blood" of liquidity without which LBHI would have been forced to cease ongoing daily operations.

Dever Dep. Tr. at 14:2-15.

Wang Dec. Appx. II Ex. 6, Harney Dep. Tr., at 26-28 ("the slowing of payments . . . [could] create a perception . . . of a crisis of liquidity"); Wang Dec. Appx. II Tab 8, Mazzella Dep. Tr. at 39-42 ("the system would grind to a halt").

Moreover, LBHI effectively lacked the ability to simply "walk away" from BOA and transfer its accounts to a competing commercial bank offering comparable services because such a process would have taken months to complete. It would not have been an easy transition to accomplish because LBHI at this point also suffered from negative perceptions in the marketplace, thereby making it that much more difficult to jump seamlessly to another clearing bank. As a result, this was an asymmetrical negotiation between sophisticated parties conducted at a time of growing apprehension as to LBHI's financial strength. BOA had the distinct advantage in this negotiation of situational leverage over LBHI. Once the funds were segregated at BOA, LBHI faced the practical dilemma of being unable to withdraw the deposited funds and thereafter continue functioning in the ordinary course of its business without overdraft protection. LBHI was stuck and had no choice but to maintain the deposited funds with BOA.

2/1/10 Tr. 15:5-12 (Fielding) ("We did consider [transferring accounts to obtain overdraft protection from a competing bank] . . . However, these things take two to three months . . .").

BOA officials recognized as much. Dever Dep. Tr. at 129-30.

Careful analysis of the interest feature of the Deposit Account does not indicate, as argued by BOA, that the parties intended to create a general account. While the payment of interest may be one indication that a depositor intended an account to be a general account, it is not dispositive. Here, the security agreement provided that BOA would pay interest to LBHI on the deposited funds, but that provision standing alone does not conclusively transform the Deposit Account into a general account. The fact that this was an interest bearing account was an incidental aspect of the overall arrangement designed to soften the adverse impact of removing the funds from LBHI's direct control. The rate earned on the deposited funds was calculated at or below the market rate. More importantly, the inclusion of an interest component in the security agreement appears to have been introduced by BOA, not LBHI, in an effort to assuage LBHI concerns.

Compare Merrill Lynch, 293 F.Supp. 2d at 108-09 (citations omitted) (applying New York law, court held that parties expressly agreed in governing contract to create special purpose account, and, accordingly, payment of interest was "not material") with Bennett, 212 B.R. at 215 (identifying the fact that the debtor was paid interest on all of the amounts on deposit as a "critical term" indicating that the account was general).

See Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 4 (security agreement) § 6 ("Interest Payments. Notwithstanding the Bank's security interest in the proceeds of the Deposit Account, the Bank will continue to pay to the Pledgor any interest accruing thereunder until the occurrence of an Event of Default under this Agreement") (emphasis in original).

See Wang Dec. Appx. II, Tab 10, Tonucci Dep. Tr. at 103-4 ("the return that we were getting on the account was . . . at or below . . . the level that we would normally expect to get on our deposits . . . our intention was to earn some interest, but it wasn't for the purposes of earning interest").

Hawk Dep. Tr. at 28 (the intent was to make the deposit as "palatable" as possible).

Similarly, the question of whether the parties agreed to segregate the collateral is a factor to be evaluated in determining whether the Deposit Account should be characterized as a special purpose account. See, e.g., Peoples Westchester Savings Bank v. F.D.I.C., 961 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1992) (presumption not rebutted given the absence of "clear evidence of intent to create a special deposit, or an explicit agreement between an attorney and a bank to segregate funds"). The parties have chosen to highlight different points in relation to this question. Lehman has emphasized that BOA assigned a unique "Global Customer Information" number to the Deposit Account as a means to differentiate the account and to keep it separate, and, in any event, recognized the unique purpose behind the pledged collateral. BOA has argued that the security agreement did not require the segregation of the collateral, and that such segregation was never requested by LBHI and never occurred. The Court concludes that regardless of the labels used to describe the account and irrespective of whether the collateral was segregated in a formal manner, the account was intended to function and in practice did function as a segregated account established for the special limited purpose of securing any indebtedness that might arise on account of intra-day overdrafts. That was the only reason for setting up this particular account.

See Wang Dec. Appx. II, Ex. 1, Alpert Dep. Tr. at 48 (BOA assigned a Global Customer Information number in order to "set up [the Deposit Account] as a stand-alone client totally separate from the existing Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. relationship."); Wang Dec. Appx. I, Ex. 42 (Sparks' Email) ("This is a regular DDA that will be dedicated solely to this collateral pledge. Lehman will deposit funds earmarked as collateral into this account").

BOA Opp'n to Mot. at 50 ("it is undisputed here that the Security Agreement did not require the Bank to keep LBHI's deposit separate from the Bank's other funds held on deposit . . .").

Bank of America's Post-Hearing Memorandum in Further Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Lehman's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Mar. 12, 2010, ECF Doc. # 84, at 18 ("First, the witnesses confirmed that Lehman did not ask the Bank to keep the deposited funds segregated from its other funds (a key indicator), even though Mr. Tonucci was familiar with lockbox accounts and Ms. Birney testified that such segregation was often negotiated in connection with security agreements").

BOA points out certain other account characteristics in an effort to demonstrate that the Deposit Account should be classified as a general account. One such characteristic is that no third party has an interest in the account. Although the interest of a third party in an account may be indicative of a special limited purpose, the absence of any interest by a third party does not transform the account into a general account when the parties have expressly agreed in a governing contract to the contrary. Another characteristic identified by BOA involves the fact that the Deposit Account itself was a conventional "Eurodollar DDA Account." BOA introduced evidence demonstrating that such accounts were familiar to LBHI employees and were viewed as general deposit accounts, but BOA's reliance on the familiar form of the Deposit Account seeks to treat as ordinary what the evidence demonstrates to be an extraordinary transaction.

Compare Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81 B.R. 194, 200 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (applying New York law and identifying that third-party interest in the account is a common feature of special accounts) with In re Ben Franklin Retail Store, Inc., 202 B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding a special purpose account, despite absence of third-party interest) and In re Airwest Int'l, 70 B.R. 914 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987) (same).

See e.g. BOA Opp'n to Mot. at 49 n. 65 (characterizing Eurodollar time deposit accounts as a general account); 2/2/10 Tr. 43:21-23 (Rahavy) (explaining how Lehman employees viewed Eurodollar deposits as "bank deposits").

This account was created in response to urgent demands made by BOA, not at the request of BOA's customer and not to provide BOA with collateral to secure all of its Lehman-related exposure. The purpose is unmistakably clear — to provide incremental security to BOA for a specific, well-defined overdraft risk, not a general cash collateral account. In the end, the Court's decision to characterize this account as a special purpose account is based on the totality of the circumstances of the negotiations that produced this account. The formulaic approach urged by BOA disregards the clearly expressed mutual intent of the parties to provide collateral for only one kind of indebtedness and elevates form above substance. The plain language of the security agreement, and related extrinsic evidence, support the conclusion that the account created to cover overdraft exposure was designed exclusively for that special purpose.

Merrill Lynch, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 109 ("The form of the account (checking, interest-bearing, etc.) does not matter. The critical point is whether a bank and a depositor have agreed that an account is to be a special deposit or not") (citations omitted).

II. BOA's Seizure of Collateral Violated the Automatic Stay

The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, is "one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envt'l Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) (citations omitted). The stay "is crucial for the benefit and protection of creditors and the central bankruptcy objective of equal treatment of creditors." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Bibb (In re Delta Air Lines), 359 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). "When a bankruptcy petition is filed, § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an automatic stay of, among other things, actions taken to realize the value of collateral given by the debtor." United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. V. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 369 (1988). The Code expressly prohibits exercising a setoff of any debt that arose before commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). In seeking relief from the automatic stay to exercise setoff, a creditor must establish cause and satisfy the initial burden of proof. Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. TRI Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.,), 907 F.2d 1280, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990).

Due to the importance of the automatic stay, the Supreme Court has held that the proper procedure for a creditor-bank that wishes to exercise a right of setoff against a debtor is to place a temporary administrative hold on the debtor's account while promptly seeking relief from the stay. See Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 19-20. When a creditor fails to obtain leave of the court and then seeks retroactive approval of a setoff that had been taken while the automatic stay was in effect, the creditor "must (1) prove the validity of the setoff it seeks and (2) justify its failure to . . . move for relief from the automatic stay to exercise setoff rights." Shugrue v. Chem Bank, Inc. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 177 B.R. 198, 206 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). Retroactive relief from the automatic stay is an "extraordinary measure" and a creditor must demonstrate "unusual and unusually compelling" facts to justify that relief. See Haughton v. Alipio (In re Alipio), 380 B.R. 645, 649 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007) (citations omitted).

Retroactive relief from the automatic stay is not warranted here. As discussed above, BOA is not entitled to setoff under applicable non-bankruptcy law because the funds seized by BOA were held in a special purpose account and constituted pledged collateral. BOA possessed the collateral and had instituted an administrative hold on those funds. The funds unquestionably were secure, and there was no risk of withdrawal or any decline in value of the funds held by BOA. Despite the fact that no urgency existed, BOA decided without obtaining relief from the stay simply to take the money and then seek to justify its actions after the fact.

Notwithstanding the conclusions reached in this decision that no right to setoff existed, the Court recognizes that BOA must have determined based on its own review of the facts and the law and after conferring with counsel that it had the ability to exercise a setoff right without first seeking relief from the stay. In essence, in taking the action that it did without prior judicial approval, BOA needed to be correct as to each of two highly debatable propositions. First, that it had the right under the circumstances to offset the collateral pledged by LBHI, and second, that it could exercise that right without having to file a motion for relief from the automatic stay.

BOA's stated justification for its strategy of seizing first and seeking comfort later is the exception to the automatic stay set forth in section 362(b)(17) of the Bankruptcy Code, one of the so-called "safe harbor" provisions. This provision deals expressly with "the exercise by a swap participant or financial participant of any contractual right (as defined in section 560) under any security agreement . . . forming a part of or related to any swap agreement. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17).

Despite the fact that the quoted language plainly is tied to contractual netting rights under swap agreements (including any master agreement for such agreements), BOA has chosen to rely upon this exception to the automatic stay as authority for its self-help taking of collateral having no connection to any swap transaction. BOA argues that section 362(b)(17) cannot be intended to limit setoff only when the debt and the claim arise under derivatives contracts, because "contractual rights" as defined in section 560 includes "common law" setoff rights that exist independent of any derivative contracts. See BOA Opp'n to Mot. at 69-70.

11 U.S.C. § 560 ("The exercise of any contractual right of any swap participant or financial participant to . . . offset or net out any termination values or payments amounts arising under or in connection with the termination, liquidation, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements shall not be stayed . . . by operation of any provision of this title . . . As used in this section, the term `contractual right' includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a derivatives clearing organization, . . . a multilateral clearing organization . . ., a national securities exchange, a national securities association . . .").

No such authority for reaching unrelated pledged collateral can be found within the plain language of subsection (b)(17). Section 362(b)(17) must be read together with section 560, including section 560's definition of a "contractual right." That definition states, in substance, that a "contractual right" may be set forth in a rule or bylaw of derivatives clearing organizations and exchanges or may arise under common law or by reason of normal business practice. The definition is a very flexible one, but it does offer guidance regarding the commercial objective of the exception to allow markets to function without interference due to the bankruptcy of a swap counter-party. Simply put, the automatic stay should not impact the exercise of a contractual right of setoff that is otherwise consistent with recognized customs and practices of market participants who engage in swap transactions.

Given this deference to the market, the initial question to be considered is whether a contractual right to offset exists in the first place. Assuming that there is such a right, the inquiry turns to whether that right may be exercised "under any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement forming a part of or related to any swap agreement" (emphasis added). The language, thus, specifies that in order to qualify for the exception the security agreement must be part of or must relate to a swap agreement. Ultimately, application of the exception will depend upon a determination as to whether a right is being exercised under a security agreement that has a sufficient connection to a swap agreement. Whether the exception will apply to a particular security agreement calls for a review of the facts and circumstances of each transaction or series of transactions and, of necessity, must be decided on a case by case basis by market participants or, in the event of a dispute, by the Court.

BOA effected its unauthorized taking of LBHI's funds without the benefit of any controlling precedent, relying instead upon its own untested interpretation of the language of section 362(b)(17). Nonetheless, BOA apparently takes comfort in the fact that the language of this section became less restrictive under the 2006 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. In 2005, section 362(b)(17) exempted from the automatic stay:

[t]he setoff by a swap participant or financial participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more swap agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant or financial participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities or other property held by, pledged to, or under control of, or due from such swap participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement.

Former 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17) (2005). As reformulated in 2006, section 362(b)(17) exempts from the automatic stay:

[t]he exercise by a swap participant or financial participant of any contractual right (as defined in section 560) under any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement forming a part of or related to any swap agreement, or of any contractual right (as defined in section 560) to offset or net out any termination value, payment amount, or other transfer obligation arising under or in connection with 1 or more such agreements, including any master agreement for such agreements.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17).

While it is true that the language of this subsection, as amended, has become broader, the current language is not so loose in its wording and reasonable application that unrelated security agreements or unrelated collateral such as that before the Court may be taken, without judicial oversight or restraint, to satisfy claims of a swap participant. Such a result-oriented reading of the language is not supported by the text and would conflict with the contemporaneous legislative history surrounding the enactment by Congress of the Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-648, available at 2006 WL 6165926 (indicating that amended language was intended to merely make "technical changes to the netting and financial contract provisions" of the Bankruptcy Code in order to "update the language to reflect current market and regulatory practices"). Moreover, the interpretation urged by BOA would run afoul of the longstanding maxim that exceptions to the automatic stay are to be construed narrowly. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 314 B.R. 524, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (exceptions to the automatic stay are to be narrowly construed).

Accordingly, BOA's conduct does not qualify for the exception set forth in section 362(b)(17) based on the very same record considered by the Court in finding that BOA is unable under these facts to establish its right to setoff under New York law. The collateral quite obviously never had any direct or indirect relationship to claims of BOA arising under a swap agreement and was pledged by LBHI exclusively to secure overdraft risks. The undisputed facts make clear that this particular exception to the automatic stay, even when interpreted in the broad manner urged by BOA, does not authorize a taking of a specially-designated fund of collateral to offset unrelated swap exposure.

This conclusion focuses attention on a troublesome aspect of the current procedural posture. It is inconceivable given the negotiating history that BOA believed that LBHI would readily concur with its determination with respect to its purported setoff rights and its interpretation of section 362(b)(17). Given the circumstances, the timing, the legal uncertainty and the material sums involved, some disagreement and conflict between the parties was clearly foreseeable if not inevitable. This background makes it even more astonishing that BOA would make the premeditated tactical decision to deliberately seize the collateral without first moving the Court for stay relief. Given the importance of the automatic stay and the adverse consequences for knowingly violating it, that is a decision not lightly made.

Nonetheless, BOA brazenly elected to violate the stay with apparent disregard for the consequences of its actions, seeking comfort after the fact by commencing an adversary proceeding. In a smaller chapter 11 case, such unchecked economically self-interested behavior could very well destroy a debtor's ability to reorganize. Here the numbers involved are much larger, and BOA certainly has the resources to restore the funds plus any damages that may be awarded, but the violation here is a serious one involving a significant fund of cash. It is difficult to understand how BOA could have thought that taking the money was the right thing to do without first seeking permission from the Court. While being free to advance novel theories, lenders and other counterparties must be obedient to the bankruptcy law as it is written and should exercise great care in determining the applicability of any claimed exception to the automatic stay before presuming to have the right to take debtor property without court approval.

BOA acted with the advice of experienced and sophisticated counsel. The Court assumes that BOA was fully informed regarding the untested, uncertain and extremely aggressive legal position that it was advancing and the risks it was thereby assuming that the exception to the automatic stay on which it relied might be found inapplicable to the seizure of LBHI's collateral. BOA, in the Court's view, had a responsibility to approach the setoff issue with far more restraint than was shown here, and the Court believes that the actions taken were surprising and, quite frankly, disappointing for a leading financial institution that should care a great deal about its reputation. BOA's setoff of property of Lehman is not supported by any reasonable application of the exception to the stay to the undisputed facts, and further proceedings will be needed to determine an appropriate remedy for this calculated violation of Section 362(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, LBHI's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the motion for summary judgment of BOA is denied. BOA's seizure of the deposited funds was an unauthorized and impermissible setoff in violation of the automatic stay in LBHI's bankruptcy case. LBHI is directed to submit a proposed form of order granting its motion for summary judgment in accordance with this decision, directing a return of the $500 million fund plus interest and denying the motion of BOA for summary judgment while reserving decision on the issue of any costs, damages or sanctions to be awarded. The parties are instructed to contact chambers to arrange a status conference within two weeks from the date of this decision for purposes of scheduling any further proceedings that may be appropriate to determine the amount of any further monetary award.

Dated: New York, New York

November 16, 2010