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ATWATER v. N. F. L. PLAYERS ASS'N

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Nov 23, 2010
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Factual and Procedural Background

Kenneth Wesley Murray (appellant) was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for killing his sister, C.W., during the early morning hours of March 31, 2008. The siblings lived in separate family-owned houses next to each other. A dispute arose when C.W. wanted to rent appellant's house, but appellant, recently returned from drug treatment, did not want to move out. On March 30, 2008, they argued multiple times, including accusations about stolen firewood. C.W. made two 911 calls reporting appellant's presence on her property, his intoxication, verbal abuse, and threats to hit and kill her. Deputy Bowen responded to the second call and witnessed an argument between the siblings. The next morning, appellant called 911, stating that C.W. had broken into his house and that he had killed her in response. Deputies found C.W.'s body and evidence consistent with appellant's account. At trial, the Commonwealth admitted an audiotape containing the three 911 calls. The appellant did not challenge the tape's admissibility but objected to the jury considering the truth of C.W.'s statements under the present sense impression hearsay exception. The trial court allowed the jury to consider the statements for their truth without a limiting instruction, and appellant was convicted of second-degree murder.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider the truth of the victim's statements in the second 911 call under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.
  2. Whether the trial court should have instructed the jury that the audiotape was admitted only to establish that the 911 call was made and that the statements therein were not to be considered for their truth.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider the victim C.W.'s statements from the second 911 call for their truth under the present sense impression exception.
  • The court should have instructed the jury that the audiotape was admitted only to prove the fact that the call was made and not for the truth of the statements made during the call.
  • Alternatively, relying on Hodges v. Commonwealth, appellant argued that a limiting instruction was required to inform the jury that the statements were admitted only to establish C.W.'s state of mind. This issue was not granted appeal and thus was not addressed.

Commonwealth's Arguments

  • The victim’s statements in the second 911 call were admissible for the truth of the matter asserted under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.
  • The appellant's request for a limiting instruction was untimely under Rule 5A:18 because it was made only after the audiotape was played.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 461, 624 S.E.2d 675 (2006) Standard of review for trial court's discretion on admissibility of evidence Used to affirm that admissibility decisions lie within trial court's sound discretion and are not disturbed absent abuse of discretion.
Breeden v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 169, 596 S.E.2d 563 (2004) Standard of review for evidentiary rulings Quoted to support standard that reasonable jurists must agree on error for reversal.
Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 635 S.E.2d 688 (2006) Definition of abuse of discretion Quoted to clarify when appellate reversal is appropriate.
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 549, 100 S.E.2d 701 (1957) Timeliness of limiting instructions Supported assumption that appellant's request for limiting instruction before jury verdict was not untimely.
Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 689 S.E.2d 748 (2010) Definition of hearsay and exceptions Confirmed that out-of-court statements offered for truth are hearsay and must fall under exceptions to be admissible.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 650 S.E.2d 859 (2007) Limiting instructions when evidence is admissible for one purpose but not another Referenced appellant’s argument for limiting instruction on hearsay statements.
Sargent v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 895 (1987) Harmless error doctrine Used to conclude that admission of cumulative statements was harmless error.
Clark v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1068, 421 S.E.2d 28 (1992) Present sense impression exception to hearsay rule Set out the requirements for present sense impression and supported admission of victim’s statements.
Wilder v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 579, 687 S.E.2d 542 (2010) Requirements for present sense impression exception Confirmed that statements must be contemporaneous, explain the act, and be spontaneous; applied to victim’s statements.
Foley v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 149, 379 S.E.2d 915 (1989) Spontaneity and contemporaneity in present sense impression Supported conclusion that victim’s statements were spontaneous and near contemporaneous.
Arnold v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 275, 356 S.E.2d 847 (1987) Distinguishing spontaneous statements from planned narratives Distinguished victim’s spontaneous statements from informant’s planned statement, justifying admissibility here.
McLean v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 322, 516 S.E.2d 717 (1999) Rule 5A:15 on appeal scope Appellate court declined to address appellant’s alternative argument not granted for appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging that the appellant did not challenge the admissibility of the audiotape itself, only the use of the victim's statements therein for their truth. The trial court found that the victim's statements made during the second 911 call were admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. This exception requires that the statements be contemporaneous with the act, explain the act, and be spontaneous.

The court analyzed the content of the second 911 call, noting that the victim described appellant's actions in the present tense while on the phone, including threats to hit and kill her. These statements were made close in time to the events described and were spontaneous, reflecting the victim's immediate perceptions rather than a narrative of past events.

The court distinguished this case from Arnold v. Commonwealth, where the informant's statements were not spontaneous but rather a planned narrative. Here, the victim had no time to reflect or fabricate her statements, which related directly to the ongoing situation.

Appellant's request for a limiting instruction that the statements were admitted only to prove the call was made was rejected. The court assumed, without deciding, that appellant preserved this argument for appeal and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling.

The court further noted that some statements by the victim were cumulative of other evidence and any error in admitting those statements was harmless. Finally, the court observed that while the victim's statements about threats to kill were relevant to premeditation, the jury convicted appellant of second-degree murder, which does not require premeditation, rendering any potential error harmless.

Holding and Implications

The Court AFFIRMED appellant's conviction for second-degree murder.

The trial court did not err in admitting the victim's statements under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule and in declining to give a limiting instruction. This decision directly upholds the conviction and does not establish new precedent beyond the application of established hearsay exceptions and evidentiary standards. The ruling clarifies that statements made contemporaneously during an ongoing event, even if threatening, may be considered for their truth without limiting instruction when admitted under the present sense impression exception.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES.

A jury convicted Kenneth Wesley Murray (appellant) of second-degree murder. At appellant's trial, the trial court admitted an audiotape of a 911 telephone call made by the victim, C.W. Appellant on appeal does not challenge the admissibility of the audiotape, which was played for the jury. However, he argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the jury to consider, under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, the truth of C.W.'s statements in the audiotape. Appellant contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the audiotape was admitted only to establish that C.W. made a 911 call and that the statements made during that call were not to be considered by the jury for their truth. Disagreeing with appellant's argument, we affirm the conviction for second-degree murder for the following reasons.

Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, but the jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.

We use initials for the victim in this opinion rather than her actual name in an attempt to better protect the privacy of the decedent and her family.

Alternatively, appellant argues under Hodges v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 418, 634 S.E.2d 680 (2006), that the trial court should have given a limiting instruction informing the jury that C.W.'s statements were admitted only to establish her state of mind. An appeal was not granted on this issue, and, therefore, we do not address it. See Rule 5A:15; McLean v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 322, 329, 516 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1999).

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant acknowledges killing C.W., his sister, during the early morning hours of March 31, 2008. At the time, appellant and C.W. lived next to each another in separate houses belonging to their family. C.W. maintained both houses, and she wanted to rent appellant's house to a paying tenant. Appellant had recently returned from a six-month stay at a drug treatment facility, and he did not want to move out of his house.

According to a neighbor who saw or heard the siblings several times on March 30, 2008, appellant and C.W. argued that day about C.W.'s plans for appellant's house, as well as on other matters. At one point, while the neighbor was at appellant's home, appellant asked what could be done to stop C.W. from throwing him out of the house. While the neighbor was still at appellant's house, C.W. came over and accused appellant of stealing her firewood. The neighbor walked C.W. back to her house next door at about 8:00 p.m.

Shortly after 10:00 p.m., C.W. called the 911 emergency operator to report that appellant was inside her house, that he had been drinking and taking drugs, and that he was verbally abusing her. However, C.W. indicated at the end of this 911 call that no police response was necessary because appellant was going back to his house.

Approximately twenty minutes later, C.W. called the 911 operator again, saying that appellant had returned. C.W. told the 911 operator, "[H]e's stealing my firewood." She also said, "[H]e's verbally abusing me" and "[H]e's threatening . . . to hit me." C.W. told the operator that appellant was outside her house and taking her firewood as they were talking, adding, "I don't know what he might do." C.W. told the 911 operator that she had called because appellant was trespassing on her property, which was posted with a "No Trespassing" sign, and because appellant was threatening her. "Oh yeah, he's threatening me," C.W. told the 911 operator. "He's said he'll kill me."

C.W. also told the 911 operator about appellant's stay at a drug treatment facility, about his need for further drug treatment, and about the dispute over the house where appellant was living.

Responding to C.W.'s second 911 call, Deputy Bowen arrived at C.W.'s home at about 11:00 p.m. He met with appellant and C.W. under a carport between the two houses. Appellant told Bowen that he was upset because C.W. was "kicking" him out of his house. Appellant and C.W. then argued in front of Bowen. After Bowen told C.W. to go back to her house, Bowen and appellant discussed appellant's drug problem. Appellant acknowledged that he might have to leave the area to seek further rehabilitation.

At about 7:30 a.m. on the morning of March 31, 2008, appellant made a call to the 911 operator. He told the operator that C.W. had broken into his house with a flashlight and knife and that he had killed her in response. Deputy Spencer, who responded a short time later, found a flashlight and a knife on the floor of appellant's house. He saw C.W.'s body on the floor. Deputy Spencer believed C.W. had been dead for some time before he arrived at the house.

Appellant later told Detective Tribble that C.W. broke into his house at around midnight and attacked him with a large flashlight and a knife. He claimed that he "avoided her blows" and "managed to disarm her" after two minutes. Appellant told the detective that he then attempted to "steer" C.W. to the door, but she resisted. In the struggle that ensued, appellant struck C.W. with the flashlight, pulled her to the floor, "clamped" his hands around her mouth and nose, and "cut off her air" for three or four minutes until she "seemed subdued." Appellant also acknowledged taking a $50 check that C.W. had made out to Wal-Mart, stating that he had intended to "take and use a couple of her checks."

At appellant's trial on the murder charge, the Commonwealth offered an audiotape containing all three 911 calls — C.W.'s two calls from the night of March 30 and appellant's call from the morning of March 31. The audiotape was admitted into evidence and played for the jury without objection. After the audiotape was played, appellant's trial counsel, referring to C.W.'s second 911 call, said:

I'd like the Court to admonish the jury that that's not for the truth of what [C.W.] said [on the tape]. It's just for the fact that she made the phone call. She makes a lot of allegations in the phone call.

The prosecutor argued that C.W.'s statements in her second 911 call were admissible for the truth of the matter asserted under the present sense impression doctrine. The trial court overruled appellant's objection without further argument by appellant's trial counsel.

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it did not admonish the jury that the audiotape containing C.W.'s second 911 call was offered only for the purpose of establishing that the call was made — and not for the truth of the matters asserted by C.W. during that 911 call. "Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence `lie within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.'" Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 461, 465, 624 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2006) (quotingBreeden v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 169, 184, 596 S.E.2d 563, 570 (2004)). An abuse of discretion occurs only when `"reasonable jurists could not differ'" that the trial court erred. Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 21, 635 S.E.2d 688, 689 (2006) (quotingThomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005)).

Appellant essentially sought a limiting instruction from the trial court. See Hanson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 173, 183, 416 S.E.2d 14, 20 (1992) (stating that a limiting instruction should be given to the jury when evidence is "admissible for one purpose, but inadmissible for another"). The Commonwealth contends that appellant's request for a limiting instruction was untimely under Rule 5A:18 because appellant's trial counsel sought the limiting instruction only after the audiotape containing C.W.'s second 911 call had been played for the jury. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Simpson v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 549, 100 S.E.2d 701 (1957), suggests that appellant's request for a limiting instruction, which occurred before the jury retired for its verdict, was not untimely.See id. at 554-55, 100 S.E.2d at 705 ("It appears that none of the cited cases lays down the principle that such an instruction must be given at the time the evidence is offered, but they do postulate that the jury should be so instructed before retiring to consider their verdict."). Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal, we assume without deciding that appellant preserved his argument for appeal.

The audiotape of C.W.'s second 911 call contained out-of-court statements from C.W. that were hearsay, given that the Commonwealth agrees that her statements were admitted for their truth.See Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 497, 689 S.E.2d 748, 751 (2010) (defining hearsay as "an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted"). "Hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id.

During the second 911 call, C.W. claimed, "he's threatening to hit me" and "he's said he'll kill me." Appellant argued that these two out-of-court statements were admissible only for the purpose of proving that the call had in fact been made — a "`limited, non-hearsay'" purpose for admitting the statements that required an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury. Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 451, 650 S.E.2d 859, 866 (2007) (quotingHanson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 173, 187, 416 S.E.2d 14, 22 (1992)). Rejecting this argument, the trial court found that C.W.'s statements in the second 911 call, including these specific allegations, were admissible for the truth of the matter asserted under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, the trial court ruled that no limiting instruction was needed.

C.W. made other statements during the second 911 call that were included in appellant's request for a limiting instruction to the jury — such as C.W.'s claim that appellant was stealing her firewood, that appellant needed further drug rehabilitation, and that the siblings were arguing over the house where appellant lived. These statements were cumulative of other, properly admitted trial evidence. Thus, any conceivable error in permitting the jury to consider the truth of these statements was harmless. See Sargent v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 143, 154, 360 S.E.2d 895, 903 (1987).

"It is generally accepted that a statement accompanying and characterizing an act is admissible as a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Virginia recognizes this type of statement as the `present sense impression' exception to the hearsay rule."Clark v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1068, 1070, 421 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1992). "In order for the present sense impression exception to apply, three requirements must be satisfied: `(1) the declaration must have been contemporaneous with the act; (2) it must explain the act; and (3) it must be spontaneous.'" Wilder v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 579, 587, 687 S.E.2d 542, 546 (2010) (quotingClark, 14 Va. App. at 1070, 421 S.E.2d at 30).

Here, twenty minutes after calling the 911 operator to complain that appellant was intoxicated and verbally abusing her, C.W. called the 911 operator again, claiming appellant was again on her property without permission and was again threatening her. While she was on the telephone with the 911 operator, C.W. said that she was watching appellant, and she described his actions in the present tense. C.W. claimed, "he's stealing my firewood," "he's verbally abusing me," and "he's threatening . . . to hit me." (Emphasis added.) C.W. told the operator that she felt threatened by appellant, commenting, "I don't know what he might do." As C.W. described the situation that was going on at her house, she continued to feel threatened.

Near the conclusion of this second 911 call, C.W. said, "he's threatening me — he's said he'll kill me." Although phrased somewhat differently from her claim about appellant's threat to hit her, this statement, when viewed in the context of the entire second 911 call, described a threat to kill her that was made very close to the time of the call — and her statement clearly did not describe a threat from well in the past. Thus, C.W.'s description of appellant's threat to kill her satisfied the timing requirement of the present sense impression exception because it described a contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous act. See Foley v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 149, 161-62, 379 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1989) (noting that the present sense impression exception's "`requirement of contemporaneousness, or near contemporaneousness, reduces the chance of premeditated prevarication or loss of memory'" (quotingBooth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 980 (Md. 1986))); see also Wilder, 55 Va. App. at 588, 687 S.E.2d at 546 ("Contrary to Wilder's contention, from the facts in the record, the trial court could have properly concluded that the statements contained in the tape recording were made contemporaneously or near contemporaneously with the acts they describe.").

Although appellant's threat to kill C.W. was relevant in determining whether appellant committed a premeditated murder, we note that the jury did not convict appellant of first-degree murder — but instead convicted him of second-degree murder. Premeditation is not an element of second-degree murder, and the jury did not find that appellant's killing of C.W. was premeditated. Thus, admission of these statements in order to prove premeditation was clearly harmless because, even after considering this evidence from the 911 call for the truth of the matters stated in the call, the jury concluded that appellant did not premeditate the murder.

These statements by C.W. were also spontaneous, as they reflected C.W.'s "personal perceptions at that time" and were not "a narrative reflection of a past event." Foley, 8 Va. App. at 164, 379 S.E.2d at 923. Thus, C.W.'s statements were unlike the informant's statements in Arnold v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 275, 356 S.E.2d 847 (1987), where an informant's recorded description of a drug transaction lacked spontaneity under the present sense impression because the tape recording was made after the drug transaction had taken place.Id. at 277, 282, 356 S.E.2d at 848, 851. The informant's summary in Arnold lacked the requisite spontaneity because it described "a designed plan" to conduct a controlled drug transaction. Id. at 282, 356 S.E.2d at 851. In contrast, C.W. did not plan or anticipate her second 911 call. She made the call because appellant was trespassing on her property and threatening her. Thus, her statements about appellant's threats were spontaneous because they were "`made without time to reflect or fabricate'" and "`related to the circumstances of the perceived occurrence.'" Wilder, 55 Va. App. at 589, 687 S.E.2d at 546 (quotingBlack's Law Dictionary 1438 (8th ed. 2004)).

Therefore, we hold that C.W.'s statements in her second 911 call — that appellant threatened to hit her and threatened to kill her — fall under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected appellant's request to give a limiting instruction to the jury that C.W.'s statements in the second 911 call were admissible only for the limited purpose of establishing that this call had in fact been made.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court was not required to give appellant's limiting instruction concerning C.W.'s second 911 call. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction for second-degree murder.

Affirmed.

o Foy v. Giant Food Inc., 298 F.3d 284, 287, 289 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding question of whether § 301 preempted a state-law tort claim asserted against a co-worker turned, not on whether he was a signatory to the CBA, but on whether resolution of the claim required interpretation of the CBA); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Covenant Coal Corp., 911 F.2d 895, 895-96, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding § 301 preempted state-law claim against non-signatory employer for tortious interference with a CBA); Stringer v. Nat'l Football League, 474 F.Supp.2d 894, 898-99, 901-02 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (holding nonsignatories to CBA — the NFL, NFL Properties, LLC (which licensed and promoted NFL football equipment), an NFL official and two football equipment manufacturers — could raise § 301 preemption as a defense to plaintiffs' state-law claims); Mullins v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 77, 214 F.Supp.2d 655, 668 (E.D.Va. 2002) (noting, in addressing an employee's tort claims against employer, its president and several co-workers, that § 301 "preempts state law claims against non-signatories where interpretation of the [CBA] is required for resolution"), aff'd, 60 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished); see also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 878 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (E.D.Mich. 1995).

In any event, the record before us indicates that, although not a formal signatory, the NFL is bound by the CBA's terms. The CBA was entered into between the NFLPA, "which is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future employee players in the NFL," and the National Football League Management Council, "which is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future employer member Clubs of the National Football League." (Doc. 180, ex. 1 (2002 CBA Preamble), at 5.) The CBA explicitly specifies that "all players, Clubs, the NFLPA, the NFL, and the Management Council" are all bound by the CBA. ( Id. at 8 (Art. II § 1) (emphasis added).) And there are numerous provisions in the CBA that specifically reference the NFL or "the League" and set forth explicit rights and obligations of the NFL or the League. Stringer v. Nat'l Football League, 474 F.Supp.2d 894, 906 n. 8 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (listing obligations of NFL under CBA). Further, the NFL, in this litigation, has never contended that the CBA's provisions do not bind it. To the contrary, in its district court pleadings, the NFL identified the NFLMC as "its collective bargaining representative." (Doc. 185-2 at ¶ 3.)

( See Doc. 180, ex. 1 (2002 CBA) Art. IV, Art. V §§ 4, 7, 8, Art. VI §§ 2, 3, Art. IX § 13, Art. XIII §§ 1(a), 3(b), Art. XIV § 5(a), (b), Art. XVI §§ 5, 12, Art. XVII § 3, Art. XIX § 6, Art. XX §§ 6, 7, Art. XXII § 5, Art. L §§ 3, 9, Art. LV §§ 2, 4, 6, 13, Art. LVII § 2, Art. XXIV § 1, Art. XXVI §§ 5, 6, Art. XXVII §§ 5, 6, Art. XXVIII §§ I, 3, 4, 14, 16, Art. XXX §§ 1-6, Art. XXXVII § 6, Art. XXXVIII §§ 12, 15, Art. XXXVIII-B, § 1, Art. XLIV §§ 5, 6.)

Given Plaintiffs' failure to develop or timely to argue that § 301 preemption should not apply to their claims against the NFL because the NFL is not a formal signatory to the CBA, the foregoing analysis is sufficient for us to accept for purposes of this appeal that the NFLMC, in negotiating the CBA, was acting in an agency capacity for the NFL, and in any event, § 301 preemption may properly be applied to the claims against the NFL. We therefore proceed to the preemption arguments before us.

C. Section 301 preempts Plaintiffs' claims

We review de novo whether § 301 preempts a state-law claim. See Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc., 60 F.3d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1995). It is Defendants' burden to establish § 301 preemption. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2010 WL 1940794 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2010). In determining whether § 301 preempts Plaintiffs' state-law claims, we consider the elements of each of those claims in turn. See Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 132 F.3d 1405, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998).

1. Plaintiffs' negligence claims

Plaintiffs' first state-law claim alleged that both Defendants negligently investigated Wright, Bond and IMA.

To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, the following elements are essential: (1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiffs legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.
Dixie Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc., 303 Ga.App. 459, 693 S.E.2d 888, 895 (2010) (quoting Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1982)). We focus here solely on the first element, the existence of a legal duty.

a. NFLPA

As part of the NFLPA's Financial Advisors Program, the NFLPA created a list of registered financial advisors. To be included on this list, an advisor had `to apply with the NFLPA, pay a fee and meet the NFLPA's eligibility requirements. The NFLPA would deny an application if the financial advisor failed to meet all of the eligibility requirements or if a background check indicated that specific judicial or regulatory actions had been taken against the advisor or revealed "[a]ny misrepresentation, material omission, or other evidence of misfeasance or malfeasance," which "may also cause the NFLPA, in its sole discretion, to deem an Applicant unqualified to be a Registered Player Financial Advisor." (Doc. 180, ex. 2 at 14-15.)

In support of their negligence claim, Plaintiffs specifically alleged that the NFLPA owed them a "duty to exercise reasonable care while performing due diligence background checks on Wright, Bond [and] IMA," a

duty to exercise reasonable care in the evaluation and approval of Wright's and Bond's applications as Registered Financial Advisors under the Program requirements and [a] duty to exercise reasonable care in the monitoring of Wright's and Bond's compliance with the Program requirements while they continued to be registered in the Program.

(Doc. 10 at 27.)

These duties arose directly from the CBA's mandate that "[t]he parties will use best efforts to establish an in-depth, comprehensive Career Planning Program," which would include "provid[ing] information to players on handling their personal finances." (Doc. 180, ex. 1 at 80 (2002 CBA Art. LV § 12).) Undisputed evidence connected the NFLPA's Financial Advisors Program to the NFLPA's efforts to meet its obligations under the CBA to provide such a program. For example, Richard Berthelsen, the NFLPA's general counsel and senior manager, stated that "[t]he Financial Advisors Program is part of the Career Planning Program mandated by the CBA and part of the NFLPA's effort to comply with the CBA's requirement that the NFLPA `provide information to players on handling their personal finances.'" (Doc. 180, ex. 4 ¶ 14.) NFLPA Director of Player Development Stacy Robinson also indicated that the Financial Advisors Program was part of the Career Planning Program.

On appeal, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempt to dispute this evidence linking the NFLPA's Financial Advisors Program to the CBA-mandated Career Planning Program in three ways. First, Plaintiffs point to an assertion that the NFLPA made to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") when the NFLPA was seeking an opinion from the SEC that its Financial Advisors Program would not be subject to SEC regulations pertaining to financial advisors. In distinguishing its Financial Advisors Program, in which participation by both players and advisors is voluntary, from the CBA's mandate that all player agents must be certified by the NFLPA, the NFLPA noted that "financial advisors are not covered by this framework" that applies to contract agents. (Doc. 180, ex. 4, attach. K at 10.) Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, this statement to the SEC does not address whether the Financial Advisors Program itself arises from the CBA.

Second, Plaintiffs point out that when the NFLPA's Board of Representatives approved the Financial Advisors Program, there was never any mention that it was part of the CBA-mandated Career Planning Program. But that also does not contradict the NFLPA's undisputed evidence linking the Financial Advisors Program to its compliance with the CBA's provision mandating a Career Planning Program.

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that there is no evidence that there is any Career Planning Program at all. But undisputed evidence in the record established that there is. Stacy Robinson stated that "[t]he NFLPA and the NFL have collaborated and jointly developed a host of Career Planning programs and activities," including the coaches intern program for NFL Europe; a "Broadcast Bootcamp" for current and retired players interested in a second career in broadcasting; officiating clinics for current and former players interested in officiating as a second career; a networking program; a pilot program for NFL players transitioning to second careers; an exit symposium for players who have applied for severance benefits, which includes information for players on how to manage their lives after their football careers have ended; and a business and management entrepreneurial program at the business schools of Harvard, Stanford, Penn and Northwestern Universities. (Doc. 180, ex. 7 ¶¶ 7-14.)

In an effort to dispute Robinson's declaration, Plaintiffs presented only the affidavits of Plaintiffs Crockett and Smith stating that they had never heard of the "Career Planning Program." That is not enough to create a factual dispute sufficient to preclude summary judgment. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding non-movant's "conclusory assertions" made "in the absence of supporting evidence" are insufficient to withstand summary judgment in face of movant's undisputed relevant evidence).

The district court, therefore, properly held that § 301 preempted Plaintiffs' negligence claim against the NFLPA because the duties underlying that claim arose directly from the CBA. See United Steel-workers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 369-71, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990) (recognizing "that a state-law tort action . . . may be preempted by § 301 if the duty" underlying the tort claim "is created by a [CBA]"); see also Clarke v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 916 F.2d 1539, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1990); cf. Brown v. Nat'l Football League, 219 F.Supp.2d 372, 379-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding NFL's duty to train its employees properly did not arise from CBA but instead was a duty owed to any member of the public and, therefore, § 301 did not preempt state-law tort claim based upon that duty).

Even if the NFLPA's duty to conduct an adequate background investigation before including an applicant on its list of vetted financial advisors did not arise directly from the CBA's Career Planning Program provision, which it clearly did, a court would still have to consider the CBA's Career Planning Program provision in determining the scope of any duty the NFLPA owed Plaintiffs. Specifically, a court would have to consider the effect of that provision's language, "that players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances," (Doc. 180, ex. 1 at 80), in determining the legal relationship that existed between the parties and their expectations stemming from that relationship. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 880-S1; see also Stringer, 474 F.Supp.2d at 908-11; Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939 F.Supp. 517, 527-28 (N.D.Tex. 1996).

The district court treated this language as pertaining to Defendants' defense to Plaintiffs' state-law claims. Circuits are split as to whether a defense, as opposed to a claim, that is substantially dependent on the terms of a CBA compels § 301 preemption. Compare Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 88 F.3d 831, 838 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[I]f a CBA must be interpreted to resolve the claim, even if the CBA interpretation is initiated by the defense, the federal or state court must hold the claim preempted by § 301."), Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that, in deciding whether the district court properly entered summary judgment for defendant on § 301 preemption grounds, court can inquire whether plaintiffs' state-law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA and in doing so is "free to resolve this question by looking beyond the plaintiffs' complaint to the defenses [the defendant] asserts"), and Hanks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 70 (8th Cir. 1988) (in denying motion to dismiss and remanding for further record development, noting that "[s]hould affirmative defenses attempt to implicate the [CBA], the district court should carefully analyze whether in actuality construction or interpretation of the [CBA] is required in considering such defenses"), with Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 872-73, 879 n. 1 (8th Cir. 2009) (in addressing summary judgment decisions on merits of § 301 preemption, holding a defendant's defenses are not relevant to determining whether § 301 preempts a state-law cause of action), cert. denied, 2010 WL 1940794 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2010); Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994, 996-98 (9th Cir. 2007) (in reversing summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' state-law tort claims, holding "[a] defense based on the CBA is alone insufficient to require preemption"). See generally Williams, 582 F.3d at 879 n. 13 (noting that, in the Eighth Circuit, "[w]hen faced with conflicting precedents. . . . [a panel of the Eighth Circuit is] free to choose which line of cases to follow"). We need not address this question here, however, because the language of the Career Planning Program provision of the CBA implicates the necessary elements of Plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 881 (holding § 301 preempted state-law claims alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty where CBA's language was relevant to the duty underlying those claims).

b. NFL

It is undisputed that the NFL will, at a player's or former player's request, conduct a background check on a potential financial advisor or any other individual or entity with whom a player might do business. In light of that, Plaintiffs alleged that the NFL owed them a "duty to exercise reasonable care while performing due diligence background checks on Wright, Bond [and] IMA." (Doc. 10 at 27.)

The NFL acknowledged in its pleadings before the district court that it performed these background checks as part of the CBA-mandated Career Planning Program. Thus, any duty the NFL owed Plaintiffs to conduct these investigations with reasonable care arose directly from the CBA. Even if it did not, in determining the scope of any duty the NFL owed Plaintiffs (which is part of Plaintiffs' affirmative case), we would, again, still have to consult the CBA to determine the scope of the legal relationship between Plaintiffs and the NFL and their expectations based upon that relationship, especially in light of the Career Planning Program's language indicating that players were "solely responsible for their personal finances." (Doc. 180, ex. 1 at 80.)

( See Doc. 185-2 at ¶ 5 ("The broad scope of the protection for which the NFLMC bargained included, but was not limited to, activities conducted, supported by, or promoted through the Career Planning Program, such as background checks by NFL security representatives." (citing to the Declaration of Dennis Curran, NFL Sr. vice president and NFLMC general counsel)); Doc. 185-3 ¶ 6 ("The NFLMC intended for activities supported by or promoted through the Career Planning Program, such as background checks by NFL Security Representatives, to be within the scope of the protection for which it had bargained in Article LV, Section 12" of the CBA (citing Curran's Declaration)); Doc. 185-5 ¶ 9 ("The business inquiries conducted by NFL security representatives are promoted and supported by the Career Planning Program." (Curran Declaration.)).)

2. Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claims

Plaintiffs' second claim against both the NFL and the NFLPA was one for negligent misrepresentation; these claims may be considered together. Under Georgia law, "[t]he essential elements of a claim of negligent misrepresentation are . . . `(1) the defendant's negligent supply of false information to foreseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such persons' reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.'" Futch v. Lowndes Cnty., 297 Ga.App. 308, 676 S.E.2d 892, 896 (2009) (quoting Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade Douglas, Inc., 267 Ga. 424, 479 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1997)).

a. Negligent supply of false information

The element requiring proof that Defendants negligently supplied Plaintiffs with false information encompasses a claim of negligence which, again, requires proof, among other things, that Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty. See Newitt v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 270 Ga.App. 538, 607 S.E.2d 188, 196 (2004). In support of their negligent misrepresentation claim, Plaintiffs alleged that both Defendants "owed the duty to Plaintiffs to act reasonably and competently in the provision of information to Plaintiffs concerning the background of Wright, Bond, [and] IMA." (Doc. 10 ¶ 93.) In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that the "NFLPA further owed the duty to Plaintiffs to act reasonably and competently in the listing of Wright, Bond[,] and IMA as Registered Financial Advisors in the Program because such information reflected that Wright, Bond[,] and IMA met all program requirements, including that they had adequate insurance coverage." ( Id. ¶ 94.)

For the same reasons set forth above, each of these duties arose directly from the CBA's mandate that both the NFL and the NFLPA use "best efforts to establish [the] Career Planning program." (Doc. 180, ex. 1 at 80.) And once again, even if that was not the case, the determination of any duty Defendants owed Plaintiffs to provide information about Wright, Bond and IMA was substantially dependent on, and the scope of the duty will be sculptured by, the language of the Career Planning Program provision of the CBA, and its indication that players were "solely responsible for their personal finances." (Id.)

b. Plaintiffs' reasonable reliance

Even if Plaintiffs established that Defendants owed them a duty independent of the CBA, which they have not, to recover under a negligent misrepresentation claim, Plaintiffs also had to "show they actually and justifiably relied on the representations" Defendants made regarding Wright, Bond and IMA. Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall Cnty., 281 Ga.App. 825, 637 S.E.2d 763, 773 (2006) (quotation, emphasis, alteration omitted). But here again the determination of whether Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendants' alleged misrepresentations is substantially dependent on the CBA's language indicating that the Career Planning Program "will . . . provide information to players on handling their personal finances, it being understood that players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances." (Doc. 180, ex. 1 at 80 (emphasis added).) That is because, under Georgia law, "the mere presence of [a] disclaimer," regardless of whether or not the plaintiff saw it, can "render [the plaintiffs'] alleged reliance unreasonable." Mitchell v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga.App. 174, 635 S.E.2d 798, 804 (2006) (addressing representations made on website that also contained disclaimers); see also Marquis Towers, Inc. v. Highland Grp., 265 Ga.App. 343, 593 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2004) (noting the question of justifiable reliance "depends upon the circumstances under which the report was made"). Therefore, because the court would have to address the disclaimer language in the CBA in order to resolve the reasonable-reliance element of Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claims, § 301 preempts these claims for that reason as well. Cf. Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 331-32 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding § 301 preempted Minnesota claims for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation because court would have to refer to language of CBA to determine whether Plaintiff was justified in relying on Defendant's alleged misleading statements that may have contradicted CBA's language).

3. Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims

Plaintiffs' third state-law claim alleged that both Defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs. Under Georgia law, "[establishing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach." Paschal v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. Emp. Ret. Plan, 305 Ga.App. 6, 699 S.E.2d 357, 362 (2010) (citation and quotation omitted). Again we focus on the first element, the existence of a fiduciary duty. Georgia law provides that

[a] fiduciary or confidential relationship arises where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc. The party asserting the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship bears the burden of establishing its existence. When a fiduciary or confidential relationship is not created by law or contract, we must examine the facts of a particular case to determine if such a relationship exists.
Savu v. SunTrust Bank, 293 Ga.App. 683, 668 S.E.2d 276, 282 (2008) (quotation omitted).

In support of this claim, Plaintiffs alleged only that "Defendants have maintained a close and special relationship with each of the Plaintiffs such that Defendants were in a position to, and did, exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and/or interest of Plaintiffs." (Doc. 10 ¶ 101.) Plaintiffs also alleged that "Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiffs placed confidence and trust in them to exercise the highest standard of care and competence while performing due diligence background checks on Wright, Bond [and] IMA . . . in order to ensure their integrity and fitness as financial advisors to the Plaintiffs." ( Id. ¶ 102.) Specifically as to the NFLPA's operation of its Financial Advisors Program, Plaintiffs further alleged that the

NFLPA also knew or should have known that Plaintiffs placed confidence and trust in them to exercise the highest standard of care and competence in approving the applications of Wright, Bond and IMA for registration as financial advisors under the NFLPA's Program and in monitoring Wright's, Bond's and IMA's continuing compliance with Program requirements for purposes of renewing and/or maintaining Wright's, Bond's and IMA's registration in the Program.

( Id. ¶ 103.)

The fiduciary-duty claims supported by these allegations directly arise from the CBA's mandate that Defendants "use best efforts to establish [the] Career Planning Program," which includes the provision of "information to players on handling their personal finances," (Doc. 180, ex. 1 at 80). Further, resolution of these claims is substantially dependent on the interpretation of the CBA's language providing that "players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances." ( Id.) Cf. Schuver v. MidAm. Energy Co., 154 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding § 301 preempted claim for breach of fiduciary duty because court had to determine whether alleged oral contracts underlying that claim were superseded or contradicted by terms of CBA).

4. The status of some of Plaintiffs as retirees does not change this analysis

Lastly, some of the Player-Plaintiffs argue that, because they were retired at the time they made their ill-fated investments with IMA and thus were not at that time members of the NFLPA's bargaining unit, § 301 cannot preempt their claims, nor the claims of the other investment-entity Plaintiffs which are derived from duties Defendants owed the Player-Plaintiffs. Although these Player-Plaintiffs remained members of the NFLPA after their retirement, the NFLPA's bargaining unit does not include retired NFL players. (It appears, furthermore, that Player-Plaintiffs were members of the bargaining unit when the 1993 CBA first containing the Career Planning Program was agreed to or was extended.)

Because Plaintiff Carlos Emmons was an active NFL player at the time he invested with IMA, Plaintiffs do not make this argument as to him.

The, NFLPA bargaining unit is limited to players currently employed by an NFL club, those who have previously been employed by an NFL club and "who are seeking employment with an NFL Club," all rookie players after they are selected in the draft, and all undrafted rookies once they begin negotiating with an NFL club for employment. (Doc. 180, ex. 1 (2002 CBA Preamble) at 5.)

Membership in the bargaining unit, however, is not dispositive of whether § 301 preempts Plaintiffs' state-law claims. Even when retirees are not part of the recognized bargaining unit and thus the union has no continuing obligation to bargain on their behalf, the union and employer can still choose to negotiate benefits for retirees. See Allied Chem. Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171 n. 11, 181 n. 20, 92 S.Ct. 383, 30 L.Ed.2d 341 (1971). And where they do so, retirees can enforce under § 301 a provision in the collective bargaining agreement to provide them with retirement benefits. See id. at 181 n. 20, 92 S.Ct. 383; see also Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am., Corp., 980 F.2d 698, 699-700, 702 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing § 301 governed retired employees' claim that CBA precluded employer from modifying their health insurance benefits). In this case, the NFLPA negotiated with the NFL for the CBA's clause providing for the Career Planning Program. And no one disputes that the benefits from that program are available to retired as well as current players. Thus, it appears that Plaintiffs could seek to enforce their rights in the Career Planning Program under § 301.

No one disputes that the Career Planning Program's services in general, and the Financial Advisors Program and the NFL's background checks in particular, were available to retired NFL players such as these Plaintiffs. These services were among a number of benefits that the CBA provides for former players, including "post-career" medical and dental insurance, an annuity plan, and a retirement plan.

The relevant question, for § 30J preemption is, again, whether the court will be required to interpret or apply the CBA to resolve the retirees' claims. And, as explained above, Plaintiffs' state-law claims arise from the CBA, or are substantially dependent upon the court's interpretation of the CBA. Therefore, § 301 preempts those claims. 5. Conclusion as to preemption

The cases on which Plaintiffs rely to argue to the contrary are inapposite. Most of them involve claims that do not arise out of, and are not dependent upon, a collective bargaining agreement. As we have pointed out previously, Plaintiffs' claims here are dependent upon language in the CBA.

For these reasons, we uphold the district court's determination that § 301 preempts Plaintiffs' state-law claims. We, therefore, affirm the district court's decision granting the NFL and NFLPA summary judgment on those claims. In light of that determination, we need not consider Plaintiffs' challenge on appeal to the alternate basis on which the district court granted the NFLPA summary judgment — that the disclaimer contained in the NFLPA's Financial Advisors Program regulations precluded Plaintiffs' claims against it.

IV. Summary judgment for Plaintiffs on the NFLPA's counterclaims

The district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on the NFLPA's four counterclaims. On appeal, the NFLPA challenges the denial of relief on its second, third and fourth counterclaims.

A. NFLPA's second and fourth counter-claims

In its second counterclaim, the NFLPA sought indemnification from Plaintiffs Stephen Atwater and Blaine. Bishop for the NFLPA's costs in defending this action. This claim was based on allegations both that Atwater and Bishop, during their employment with IMA, became aware of the wrongdoing at IMA but never disclosed that wrongdoing to the other Plaintiffs, and that Atwater and Bishop implicitly agreed to indemnify the NFLPA because they "were contractually bound not to sue or impose any liability on the NFLPA for its operation of the Player Financial Advisors Program," in light of the NFLPA's disclaimers of liability for any acts of the financial advisors listed in its Financial Advisors Program. (Doc. 47 at 47-48.) In its fourth counterclaim, the NFLPA sought contribution from Atwater and Bishop "[t]o the extent that the NFLPA is held liable to any of the" Plaintiffs. ( Id. at 49.)

After granting Defendants summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims, the district court held that Plaintiffs Atwater and Bishop were entitled to summary judgment on these counterclaims:

Under Georgia law, liability must be imposed before a right to indemnity or contribution will arise. Because the Court has granted summary judgment in favor of the NFLPA on all of Plaintiffs' claims against it, no liability has been established, and no rights to contribution, indemnity, or attorneys' fees have arisen.

(Doc. 265 at 33 (citations omitted).)

On appeal, the NFLPA only argues, without any supporting authority, that the district court should have dismissed these indemnity and contribution claims as moot rather than granting Plaintiffs summary judgment. The district court, however, did not err in granting Atwater and Bishop summary judgment under these circumstances. See Perling v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 250 Ga. 674, 678, 300 S.E.2d 649 (1983) (affirming grant of summary judgment on indemnification claim because underlying claim failed); Emergency Prof'ls of Atlanta, P.C. v. Watson, 288 Ga.App. 473, 654 S.E.2d 434, 435 (2007) (granting summary judgment to defendants named in contribution and indemnification claims after holding that no contribution or indemnity claim "exist[ed]" because the party seeking to recover was not legally obligated to make the payment for which he sought indemnification and/or contribution); cf. Greenhorne O'Mara, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 298 Ga.App. 261, 679 S.E.2d 818, 819, 820 (2009) (holding that, where purported joint tortfeasor's liability had been rejected in a previous action, contribution claim failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). But see Ga. Power Co. v. Franco Remodeling Co., 240 Ga.App. 771, 525 S.E.2d 152, 153 (1999) (holding that, because plaintiffs claims against power company were barred, power company's counterclaim for indemnification was moot).

B. Third counterclaim

"Each member" of the NFLPA "agrees to be bound by the provisions of [the NFLPA] Constitution and by any by-laws, rules or other regulations duly adopted by the NFLPA pursuant to [its] Constitution or as otherwise authorized by law." (Doc. 180, ex. 3 at 7.) In its third counterclaim, the NFLPA alleged that Player-Plaintiffs breached Art. 8, § 8.04 of the NFLPA Constitution, which provides: "No member of the NFLPA shall resort to any court or agency outside the NFLPA unless and until he has exhausted all forms of relief provided in this Constitution." ( Id. at 21). Citing to Articles 5.02 and 2.11, the NFLPA contends that the Player-Plaintiffs should have submitted, but failed to submit, their claims for consideration to the NFLPA Board of Player Representatives ("the Board"), which legislates for the union.

Article 5.02 provides generally that the Board of Representatives shall exercise legislative functions:

Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Board of Representatives shall transact the business of the NFLPA. The Board shall have the authority to interpret and apply this Constitution and the legislation of the NFLPA. Such powers, duties and authority not otherwise delegated by this Constitution shall be exercised, acted upon and determined by the Board. Said powers of the Board shall include but not be limited to: enactment of policies governing the affairs of the NFLPA. . . .

(Doc. 180, ex. 3 at 15.) Article 2.11 further provides that "[a]ny person who has been an active player in the NFL by virtue of his signing an NFL contract may join the NFLPA as a retired player member after retiring from football. . . . A representative of the retired-player membership shall be invited to attend regular meetings of the Board of Player Representatives." ( Id. at 7-9.)

This court must follow the "plain language" of the NFLPA Constitution and is "bound to accept the interpretation placed on the Constitution by the [union] if it is fair and reasonable." Local 317, Nat'l Post Office Mail Handlers v. Nat'l Post Office Mail Handlers, 696 F.2d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, the district court did not err in determining that these provisions addressing the Board's general legislative authority did not create "a form of relief that the Player-Plaintiffs were obligated to exhaust. The NFLPA has failed to establish that the Board, exercising its general legislative authority, could have granted the Player-Plaintiffs the relief they sought on their specific claims alleged in this litigation. And if it could, the NFLPA has further failed to establish that the general language of the provisions of the NFLPA's Constitution on which the union relies informs the Player-Plaintiffs that such a mechanism for relief was available to them and had to be exhausted. The district court, therefore, did not err in granting Plaintiffs summary judgment on this counterclaim.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's decision in all respects.