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PACE SUBURBAN BUS v. ILL. LABOR REL. BD
PRESIDING JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, Wendy T., appeals from the trial court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for up to 90 days pursuant to section 2-107.1(a-5)(5) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) ( 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (West 2008)). Respondent contends that (1) the trial court erred in finding that she did not have the capacity to waive counsel; (2) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision whether to take the medication; and (3) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she had deteriorated in her ability to function. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Respondent was admitted to the forensic treatment program at Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC) in July 2009 after being found unfit to stand trial on criminal charges. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Mirella Susnjar petitioned the court for authority to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to respondent for 90 days pursuant to section 2-107.1(a-5)(5) of the Code.
Prior to the hearing on the petition, respondent requested that she be allowed to represent herself in the proceedings. In response to the trial court's questions, respondent stated that she was 42 years old and had a bachelor's degree in journalism and communications. When asked what the purpose of having legal counsel was, respondent stated, "The purpose to have legal counsel is so that a person can communicate to the [j]udge, the [de]fendant's case, and right now, this person is not able to effectively assess what I'm providing." She also stated that she understood she would be subject to involuntary medication if she were to be unsuccessful in defending against the petition. She then requested time to retain private counsel, which the trial court allowed.
At the next hearing, over a month later, respondent informed the trial court that she was unable to retain private counsel. The trial court again inquired into respondent's competency to waive counsel. Respondent acknowledged that she had been found unfit to stand trial in Cook County. She again indicated that she understood that she would be subject to involuntary medication if she were unsuccessful in representing herself. She also stated that the purpose of legal counsel is that counsel "really understands the law in detail." The trial court denied respondent's request to represent herself, finding that she lacked the capacity to waive counsel.
At the hearing on the petition, Dr. Susnjar testified as follows. After examining respondent, she diagnosed respondent as suffering from bipolar disorder, manic with psychotic features. As a result of this illness, respondent had disorganized thinking, which caused her to be unable to execute plans, carry on everyday conversations, accept and process what other people say, or make decisions. She also suffered from paranoia and a distorted view of reality, causing her to be unable to accept the facts that she had been found unfit to stand trial and that she had been ordered to EMHC. Respondent also denied that she suffered from a mental illness. Dr. Susnjar opined that as a result of her illness, respondent showed a deterioration in her ability to function. Dr. Susnjar based this opinion on the facts that at one point, respondent held a job and was functioning well, but that she now had a lot of legal problems, was unable to work, was found unfit to stand trial, and could not retain her own lawyer. Dr. Susnjar also opined that because of her illness, respondent was suffering. According to Dr. Susnjar, respondent would become angry because she was unable to effectively convey information she wanted to give people, and she was unable to execute simple tasks that the average person could easily perform.
Dr. Susnjar requested authorization to administer numerous medications, including risperidone, Risperidal Consta, olanzapine, and quetiapine. In the alternative, Dr. Susnjar requested authorization to administer haloperidol, fluphenazine, chlorpromazine, benztropine, diphenhydramine, and lorazepam. Dr. Susnjar testified to the benefits and possible side effects of all of the requested medications. Dr. Susnjar gave respondent written information on the risks and benefits of the proposed medications on two separate occasions. Dr. Susnjar opined that due to her mental illness, psychosis, paranoia, and disorganized thinking, respondent did not have the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the benefits and side effects of her treatment. According to Dr. Susnjar, respondent was unable to process the information regarding the medications, because she felt that she did not have a mental illness. During one incident at EMHC when respondent's rights were restricted, Dr. Susnjar administered Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl to respondent, and respondent responded well to the medications. Alternative services were ineffective and, according to Dr. Susnjar, would continue to be ineffective until respondent's psychosis was a bit more controlled.
Respondent testified that she refused to take the recommended medication because she had never been on medication or diagnosed with bipolar disorder. She also did not want to take the medication because she suffered from a number of medical conditions including ADHD, a mass on her brain, a blood disorder, and severely painful ovulation. In addition, she had undergone four maxillofacial surgeries, and her mother suffered from breast cancer. She believed that the staff at EMHC tended to overmedicate the patients.
Respondent also testified that the reason she was not working prior to her arrest was that she had recently inherited her aunt's estate and had been busy preparing her aunt's house and condominium for sale.
The trial court found that the State had sustained its burden by clear and convincing evidence, and it authorized the petitioned-for medication. Respondent appealed.
ANALYSIS
Before addressing the merits of defendant's contentions on appeal, we must first address the issue of mootness. This appeal is moot because the 90-day period covered by the trial court's order has already expired. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004). "An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party." In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-50 (2006). Generally, courts of review do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine, such as (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the involuntary treatment order could return to plague the respondent in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects of the respondent's life. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-62 (2009); J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350; In re Wathan, 104 Ill. App. 3d 64, 66 (1982).
• 1 The collateral-consequences exception applies here. The record does not indicate that respondent has ever before been subject to an order for the involuntary administration of medication. Thus, there are collateral consequences that might plague respondent in the future. Compare In re Meek, 131 Ill. App. 3d 742, 745 (1985) (as the case appeared to be the respondent's first involuntary commitment, court found that the collateral-consequences exception applied), with Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 363 (because the respondent had multiple prior involuntary commitments and was a felon, there were no collateral consequences that would stem solely from the present adjudication; every collateral consequence that could be identified already existed as a result of the respondent's previous adjudications and felony conviction). Also, the evidence shows that respondent suffers from a mental illness that cannot be successfully controlled by nonmedicinal methods. Thus, it appears that respondent will very likely be subject to future proceedings and that her past involuntary treatment could adversely affect her at that time. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 362 (collateral-consequences exception applies where reversal could provide a basis for a motion in limine that would prohibit any mention of the hospitalization during the course of another proceeding).
• 2 Turning to the merits, respondent first contends that the trial court erred in finding that she lacked the capacity to waive counsel and represent herself. Section 3-805 of the Code provides:
"Every respondent alleged to be subject to involuntary admission shall be represented by counsel. If the respondent is indigent or an appearance has not been entered on his behalf at the time the matter is set for hearing, the court shall appoint counsel for him. A hearing shall not proceed when a respondent is not represented by counsel unless, after conferring with counsel, the respondent requests to represent himself and the court is satisfied that the respondent has the capacity to make an informed waiver of his right to counsel." 405 ILCS 5/3-805 (West 2008).
Although referring to involuntary admissions, the statute applies with equal force to the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. Barbara if., 183 Ill. 2d at 493. Before allowing a respondent to waive counsel, the trial court must, at a minimum, inquire into the respondent's mental ability or intelligence and the respondent's understanding of the basic purpose of counsel. In re Lawrence S., 319 Ill. App. 3d 476, 481 (2001). We review the trial court's determination that respondent lacked the capacity to waive her right to counsel for an abuse of discretion. Lawrence S., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 481.
Respondent concedes that the trial court adequately inquired into her mental ability and understanding of the role of counsel. She contends, however, that her answers demonstrated that she had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
In the involuntary admission or medication context, the existing case law does not address the standard by which the trial court is to determine whether the respondent lacks the capacity to waive counsel. However, in the criminal context, the competence to waive counsel is measured by the same standard as the competence to stand trial. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 524 (1995). A person is unfit to stand trial when, due to a physical or mental condition, he or she is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist in a defense. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d at 524. We can think of no logical reason why a different standard should apply in the context of involuntary admission or medication. If one is incompetent (or competent) to waive counsel in a criminal proceeding, it seems to follow that he or she must be equally incompetent (or competent) to waive counsel in a proceeding for involuntary admission or medication. In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1110-11 (2003).
In this case, respondent was found unfit to stand trial on criminal charges slightly more than a month before the trial court denied her leave to represent herself. She remained under that finding of unfitness when the trial court denied her leave to represent herself, and no evidence was presented at the hearing on respondent's request to represent herself that indicated that she was no longer unfit. Thus, we believe that she necessarily lacked the capacity to waive counsel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to do so.
Respondent next contends that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she lacked the capacity to decide whether to take psychotropic medication. We disagree.
• 3 Given the potential serious side effects of psychotropic medication, courts must be cautious in the entry of orders allowing hospital staff to involuntarily administer these drugs to persons suffering from mental illness. In re David S., 386 Ill. App. 3d 878, 883-84 (2008). Section 2-107.1 of the Code delineates the nonemergency circumstances under which psychotropic medication may be administered against the wishes of the recipient. Under this section, psychotropic medication may be administered to one who is receiving mental health services, provided that the standards and procedures set out in the section are satisfied. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 204 (1994). These guidelines are in place in order to provide the respondent with due process. David S., 386 Ill. App. 3d at 881. Section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) directs that the forced administration of psychotropic medication is authorized only if the court finds evidence of each of the following elements, by clear and convincing proof:
"(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.
(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient currently exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, as compared to the recipient's ability to function prior to the current onset of symptoms of the mental illness or disability for which treatment is presently sought, (ii) (Suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior. (C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.
(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.
(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.
(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate.
(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the treatment." 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-6X4) (West 2008).
In determining whether respondent meets these criteria, we may consider respondent's history of serious violence, repeated past pattern of specific behavior, actions related to her illness, and past outcomes of various treatment options. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4) (West 2008).
Clear and convincing evidence is defined as the quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the veracity of the proposition in question. In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d 24, 35 (1996). As a reviewing court, we give great deference to the trial court's factual findings ( In re Kness, 277 Ill. App. 3d 711, 718 (1996)), but we will reverse an order allowing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication when the trial court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 781 (2003).
• 4 "An individual has the capacity to make treatment decisions for himself when, based upon conveyed information concerning the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment and reasonable alternatives to treatment, he makes a rational choice to either accept or refuse the treatment." In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d 24, 36 (1996). When determining whether an individual has the capacity to make a reasoned decision whether to take psychotropic medications, the trial court should consider the following factors:
"(1) The person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) The person's ability to understand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages;
(3) Whether the commitment is voluntary or involuntary; (4) Whether the person has previously received the type of medication or treatment at issue;
(5) If the person has received similar treatment in the past, whether he can describe what happened as a result and how the effects were beneficial or harmful; and
(6) The absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions or beliefs or interfering emotional states which might prevent an understanding of legitimate risks and benefits." Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 37.
None of these factors is dispositive, and other factors that are relevant should also be considered. Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 37.
• 5 Review of the record and application of the above factors demonstrates that the trial court's determination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although no one explicitly testified that respondent was aware that she had a choice to make, her testimony regarding her reasons for refusing the medication indicates that she was aware that she had such a choice. Respondent was given information regarding the recommended medications, but Dr. Susnjar testified that respondent was unable to process that information due to her paranoia, psychosis, disorganized thinking, and denial of her professionally diagnosed mental illness. Respondent testified that she was concerned about her medical history, but Dr. Susnjar testified that respondent refused to allow Dr. Susnjar to explain the implications* if any, the medications might have on respondent's medical problems. While respondent's presence at EMHC was not the result of formal involuntary admission procedures, it was not voluntary, being the result of a finding of unfitness to stand trial. Respondent denied having ever taken any of the recommended medications; however, Dr. Susnjar testified that respondent had been administered Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl and that respondent had reacted well to the medications. Due to respondent's denial of having ever taken these medications, she was unable to explain what happened as a result and how the effects were beneficial or harmful. Finally, respondent's belief that she did not suffer from a mental illness and her inability to accept and process the information provided to her would certainly interfere with her ability to understand the legitimate risks and benefits of the recommended medications. Based on all of this, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision whether to take psychotropic medication. See In re Lisa P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1093-94 (2008) (where the respondent was aware she had a choice to make but denied that she suffered from a mental illness, was involuntarily committed as a re Biilt of a finding of unfitness to stand trial, and suffered rage and paranoia that interfered with her decision making, the trial court's finding that the respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision whether to take psychotropic medication was not against the manifest weight of the evidence).
Respondent's final contention is that the State failed to demonrate that her ability to function had deteriorated. According to respondent, her unemployment, legal problems, and inability to retain private counsel do not demonstrate she was unable to function. While individually these facts might not demonstrate a deterioration in respondent's ability to function, taken together and with other evidence they support the trial court's finding that respondent's ability to function had deteriorated due to her mental illness. In addition to the facts that she was no longer working, had multiple legal issues, was unable to retain private counsel despite contacting 19 different attorneys, and had been found unfit to stand trial, respondent seemed unable to control herself during court proceedings. During both hearings at which respondent's request to represent herself was addressed, the trial court had to warn respondent numerous times to stop interrupting the court and to answer the questions put to her. At one point, the trial court even had to remove respondent from the courtroom after she refused to stop interrupting. While respondent was testifying during the hearing on the petition, she became so excited that the trial court had to tell her to calm down and sit back in the chair. Further, Dr. Susnjar testified that as a result of her illness, respondent was unable to execute plans, carry on everyday conversations, accept and process what other people say, make decisions, or execute simple tasks. Certainly, respondent's inability to behave appropriately in court, interact with others, process information, make decisions, and execute simple tasks supports a finding that her ability to function had deteriorated due to her mental illness.
Moreover, Dr. Susnjar opined that respondent was suffering in that she would become angry because she was unable to effectively convey information and to execute simple tasks that the average person could easily perform. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a)(4)(B) (West 2008) (requiring that the State demonstrate that the respondent, as a result of her mental illness, (1) had deteriorated in her ability to function, (2) was suffering, or (3) exhibited threatening behavior). Respondent does not contend that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she was suffering. Instead, she argues that the trial court did not make a specific finding of whether respondent was suffering and that we should defer to the trial court's decision not to make such a finding. Respondent overlooks, however, the fact that we may affirm on any basis found in the record. Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 97 (1995) ("As a reviewing court, we can sustain the decision of a lower court on any grounds which are called for by the record, regardless of whether the lower court relied on those grounds and regardless of whether the lower court's reasoning was correct").
CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order authorizing the administration of psychotropic medication.
The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BURKE and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.
B. Antiunion Animus
On appeal, Pace first argues that the Board's order is erroneous because Panikowski failed to establish that her discharge was motivated by antiunion animus, which Pace asserts is required to establish a violation of section 10(a)(1) of the Act. Although the interpretation of statute is a question of law which we review de novo (Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005)), we will not substitute our construction of a statutory provision when, as in this case, the agency charged with the administration of the statute has adopted a reasonable interpretation. Church v. State of Illinois, 164 Ill. 2d 153, 162 (1995). Pace relies on City of Burbank v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335 (1989), to support its argument. In City of Burbank, the city "restructured" its public works department by eliminating two foreman positions and creating one position to replace them. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 342. The Board found that the City had engaged in unfair labor practices under sections 10(a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the Act because the "restructuring" was a pretext for discharging one of the foremen, Robert Randle, who was active in getting the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the department's employees. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 342-43. As a result, the Board ordered the city to remove the foreman it appointed and to reinstate Randle. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 344.
In affirming the Board's order, our supreme court held that, "Where an employer is charged with an unfair labor practice because of the discharge of an employee engaged in protected activity, the charging party must first show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the adverse employment action was `based in whole or in part on antiunion animus — or *** that the employee's protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse action. `" City of Bur-bank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345, quoting National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401, 76 L. Ed. 2d 667, 675, 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2474 (1983). Pace asserts that because the Board acknowledged that Panikowski failed to demonstrate that her termination was motivated, in whole or in part, by antiunion animus, the Board should have found that she failed to establish a prima facie case of an unfair labor practice. Instead, Pace contends, the Board inserted a prohibited motive into the analysis, namely that adverse action was taken against Panikowski for her involvement in "protected activity," and in so doing, created a "moving target" standard for establishing a section 10(a)(1) violation. As a result, Pace argues, the Board's findings are erroneous as a matter of law.
Respondents contend, however, that to prove a retaliatory discharge claim under section 10(a)(1) of the Act, an employee must demonstrate retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Act, regardless of whether it is considered union activity or the discharge was otherwise motivated by antiunion animus. Although section 10(a)(1) generally does not require proof of the employer's illegal motive ( Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 14 PERI H2029, at X — 177 (ISLRB 1998)), when an employee asserts that she was discharged for engaging in protected activity, she necessarily contends that the employer's motives for her discharge were improper. In those cases, the Board has followed the framework applied in section 10(a)(2) claims to determine whether a public employer terminated the employee for an illegal motive. Mulligan, 11 PERI 113008, at XI — 40 (ILLRB 1995). Because section 10(a)(1) broadly protects public employees in exercising their rights under the Act, in contrast to section 10(a)(2), which more narrowly protects union membership and activities, an employer violates section 10(a)(1) if it discharges an employee in retaliation for exercising her rights under the Act, regardless of whether the employee establishes antiunion animus. Therefore, respondents contend, an employee can establish a prima facie case of a section 10(a)(1) violation by demonstrating that (1) she was engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of the nature of her conduct; and (3) the employer took adverse action against her for discriminatory reasons, i.e., animus toward her participation in such activities. We agree.
First, Pace's reliance on City of Burbank is misplaced because there our supreme court held that an employer violates the Act where the discharge is based in whole or in part on antiunion animus or that the employee's protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345. That language indicates that a showing of either motivation on the part of the employer is sufficient to establish an unfair labor practice under the Act. Further, we note that the Fifth District of this court adopted this standard in Sheriff of Jackson County v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415 (1999), holding that an employee can establish a prima facie case under section 10 of the Act by proving the same three factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Sheriff of Jackson County, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 415, citing City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345-46. Similarly, in Speed District 802 v. Warning, 392 Ill. App. 3d 628 (2009), the First District of the court held that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under section 14(a)(3) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act ( 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(3) (West 2006)), which is analogous to the Act at issue in this case, a complainant must prove that (1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of the activity; and (3) the employer took adverse action against the complainant for engaging in that activity. Speed District 802, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 636. The court further held that the third element of the prima facie case is satisfied when the employee establishes the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's adverse action against the employee. Speed District 802, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 636.
Federal courts interpreting section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relation Act of 1935 ( 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006)), which is analogous to section 10(a)(1) of the Illinois Act, further support the argument that an employee only needs to prove an employer discharged her in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, such as filing a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, regardless of antiunion animus. Because there is a close parallel between the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), it is appropriate to examine federal interpretations of the NLRA where those decisions are consistent with the purposes of the Illinois Act. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345. Although the cases cited by respondents do not directly address whether antiunion animus is required to establish a violation of section 8(a)(1), they do support a holding that an employer commits an unfair labor practice under the Act by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activities under the NLRA, such as filing a grievance. See National Labor Relations Board v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836, 79 L. Ed. 2d 839, 852, 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1513 (1984) ("No one doubts that the processing of a grievance *** is concerted activity within the meaning of § 7"); Roadmaster Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 874 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1987) ("It is well settled that the filing of grievances pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is protected concerted activity under § 7"); National Labor Relations Board v. Ryder/PI.E. Nationwide, Inc. 810 F.2d 502, 507 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Since the filing of grievances is a right rooted in the collective bargaining agreement, invocation of that right is a protected, concerted activity for purposes of the Act").
• 1 Further, as previously discussed, section 10(a)(1), unlike section 10(a)(2), broadly protects public employees in exercising their rights under the Act. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, an employee can establish a prima facie violation of section 10(a)(1) by showing that she was discharged for exercising those rights, including the right to file a grievance against her employer. Requiring the employee to also prove that her employer's actions were motivated by animus toward the union would unduly burden an employee seeking redress against an employer interfering with those rights.
We next turn to Pace's contention that the Board erred in finding that the evidence presented by Panikowski established a prima facie violation of section 10(a)(1). Pace does not contest that Panikowski was engaged in protected concerted activity under section 10(a)(1) of the Act when she filed her 1999 grievance. Indeed, federal precedent has held that filing and pursuing a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement are protected concerted activities under sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA ( City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. at 836, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 852, 104 S. Ct. at 1513 ("No one doubts that the processing of a grievance in such a manner is concerted activity within the meaning of § 7")), and the Board has similarly recognized filing a grievance as a protected concerted activity under section 10(a)(1) ( Bryant, 20 PERI ¶ 73, at 393 (ILRB State Panel 2004)). Nor does Pace contend that it was not aware of Panikowski's 1999 grievance or the 2001 arbitrator's award reinstating her employment. Pace does contend, however, that Panikowski failed to establish that there was a causal connection between the employee's protected activity, in this case, filing a grievance, and the employer's adverse action, which Pace asserts is the sin qua non of a violation of the Act.
• 2 Our supreme court has held that motive is a question of fact and that the Board may infer discriminatory motive from either direct or circumstantial evidence. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345. Because motive involves a factual determination, the Board's finding must be accepted if supported by substantial evidence. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345. In City of Burbank, the court delineated factors a court may look to in order to infer antiunion motivation including: (1) an employer's expressed hostility toward unionization, together with knowledge of the employee's union activities; (2) the timing of the adverse action in relation to the occurrence of the union activity; (3) a pattern of an employer's conduct directed at those engaging in union activity; (4) shifting explanations for the employer's actions; and (5) inconsistency in the reasons given for its action against the employee as compared to other actions by the employer. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 346. Pace contends that Panikowski failed to establish any of the five factors, and therefore, the Board erred in finding that it had an improper motive for discharging Panikowski. Alternatively, Pace asserts that the Board's only stated reason for finding an improper motive, shifting explanations, is, alone, insufficient to establish an improper motive.
It is clear from the record, as Pace asserts, that the ALJ found that neither the first factor, an employer's expressed hostility toward unionization, nor the third factor, a pattern of conduct directed at those engaging in union activity was present, as his recommended decision states that Pace expressed no hostility toward the union and "there is no evidence that any disparity of treatment as to complaints reflects a pattern on protected union or concerted activity." As for the second factor, the timing of the adverse action in relation to union activity the ALJ acknowledged that the time period between the protected activity in 1999 and the discharge in 2005 was too remote to infer a causal relationship. The ALJ made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the fifth factor, inconsistencies between the proffered reason for discharge and other actions of the employer.
Therefore, Pace asserts, the ALJ must have rested his finding of a prohibited motive solely on the final factor, the employer's shifting explanations. Further, Pace asserts, the ALJ's finding that shifting explanations existed was based on Superintendent Foster's testimony during which he first cited Panikowski's entire employment history as a reason for her termination and then stated that there were three incidents, escalating in severity, which led to his recommendation of termination. Pace asserts, however, that Panikowski's termination letter states that she was removed from service pending investigation of the February 1, 2005, incident involving George Wang and that a subsequent investigation determined that she violated several rules in Pace's General Rule Book. The letter then stated that "[b]iased on the above, and your entire work record, your employment at Pace Northwest Division is terminated, effective immediately." Pace asserts that no reasonable person could find, based on this letter, that Panikowski was discharged for her entire work history. Pace also contends that the ALJ placed too much weight on Foster's testimony stating that he considered the 1996 last-chance agreement in making the termination decision, because Foster only said that he reviewed it and found it strange that Panikowski had not been terminated, and that this is not evidence of shifting rationales for her discharge.
Alternatively, Pace contends that shifting explanations alone are not sufficient to establish that an employer had an improper motive for discharging an employee. For support, Pace cites American Federation of State, County Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 175 Ill. App. 3d 191 (1988) (hereafter, AFSCME, Council 31). In that case, this court held that the fact that two employees who were active union members were terminated several days after the certification of the union was not sufficient to establish the employer's union animus. AFSCME, Council 31, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 200. "It is but one factor to be weighed with the others. Standing alone, or even together with the hazy disparate treatment evidence presented, it is insufficient to establish union animus," the court stated. AFSCME, Council 31, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 200. Similarly, Pace contends in this case a finding of shifting explanations alone is not sufficient to establish an improper motive.
Respondents assert, however, that Pace's reliance on AFSCME, Council 31 is misplaced because in the instant case, the Board did not rely on temporal proximity alone in finding that Pace had an improper motive for firing Panikowski. Instead, respondents contend, the Board found that Pace manufactured reasons for discharging Panikowski and treated her differently than other bus operators, and that these are grounds for inferring an improper motive by an employer. See York Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 881 F2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[b]oth implausible explanations and false or shifting reasons support a finding of illegal motivation"); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 E2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that in a Title VII case alleging racial discrimination, "[i]f the employer is trying to hide its real reason, that effort — coupled with the evidence making up the employee's prima facie case — may convince the trier of fact that the real reason needed to be hidden and therefore probably was discriminatory"). For support, respondent cites Temp-Masters, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 460 F3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006), which stated that "[i]n determining whether discriminatory motivation exists, *** the Board may rely on a subset of the relevant factors and, often, not all factors will be present in a specific case." Temp-Masters, Inc., 460 F.3d at 693, citing W.F. Bolin Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 70 E3d 863, 871 (6th Cir. 1995). The subset of factors identified in W.F. Bolin, as permitting a reasonable inference of discriminatory motivation, include the company's expressed hostility toward unionization combined with knowledge of the employees' union activities; inconsistencies between the proffered reason for discharge and other actions of the employer; disparate treatment of certain employees compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses; a company's deviation from past practices in implementing the discharge; and proximity in time between the employees' union activities and their discharge. W.F. Bolin, 70 F.3d at 871.
• 3 Here, the Board found that the ALJ correctly inferred a discriminatory motivation based on his finding that the reasons offered by Pace managers for discharging Panikowsi were shifting and not believable, that Pace treated Panikowski differently from other employees by undertaking unprecedented efforts to investigate customer complaints against her, and by imposing disparate discipline on her. All of these factors, the Board found, demonstrate that Pace sought to disguise its true motive for discharging her. We agree. First, the Board inferred an improper motive from its finding that Pace's investigation into the July 2004 Golf Mill accident and the subsequent complaint from Office Carver was fabricated by Pace supervisors in order to discipline Panikowski. This finding was based on the Board's conclusion that there was no basis for finding Panikowski at fault for the accident. Despite the fact that the accident review board, which included two bus operators, confirmed Pace's finding that the accident was preventable, the Board found that the credibility of this finding was undercut by the fact that two Pace supervisors, who were also Panikowski's supervisors when she was discharged in 1999, were on that accident review board. Further, the Board found that Officer Carver's written complaint was not credible and that her testimony stating that Pace asked her to write the complaint letter was further evidence that Pace manufactured reasons for discharging Panikowski. With regard to the incident involving bus passenger George Wang, the Board found that Pace's "highly unusual" investigation, which included sending Pace supervisors to the Cumberland Circle station to find witnesses. Given that other bus operators who had similar complaints filed against them were not similarly investigated by Pace, the Board found that this disparate treatment of Panikowski was further evidence of its improper motive. Lastly, the Board found that Pace's offer of a last-chance agreement to Panikowski was not evidence that it was not behaving in a vindictive manner toward Panikowski because Pace did not present evidence showing that the agreement was comparable to agreements offered to other discharged employees.
Motive is a question of fact, and the Board's finding must be upheld if it is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 345; Speed District 802, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 634. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. Here, the Board's finding that Pace had an improper motive for discharging Panikowksi in violation of section 10(a)(1) of the Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
C. Business Justification Defense
Next, Pace contends that the Board erred in failing to apply the dual motive analysis to Pace's business justification defense. Once a charging party establishes a prima facie case of an unfair labor practice, the burden shifts to the respondent, who may demonstrate that even absent that prohibited motivation, it would have taken the same action against the charging party for legitimate business reasons. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 346. Merely proffering a legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action does not end the inquiry, for it must be determined whether the reasons advanced are bona fide or pretextual. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 346. If the suggested reasons are a mere litigation figment or were not relied upon, then the determination of pretext concludes the inquiry. City of Bur-bank, 128 Ill. 2d at 346. However, if the employer advances a legitimate reason and is found to have relied upon that reason, then the case is characterized as dual motive and the employer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee would have been terminated notwithstanding his union involvement. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 347
Pace asserts that in his recommended order, the ALJ found that Pace honestly discharged Panikowski for at least some of its proffered justifications, namely, her December 2004 altercation with a motorist. Therefore, Pace contends that the ALJ should have determined under the dual motive analysis set forth in City of Burbank whether Pace had a business justification for discharging Panikowski but, instead, it summarily rejected the defense and did not permit Pace to prove that it would have discharged her for a legitimate business reason. Further, Pace argues that under the "honest belief" rule, since the ALJ concluded that Foster "assumed" that the complaints about Panikowski were true and based his recommendation that she be terminated upon this belief, there was no discriminatory intent on Foster's part and, therefore, there was a legitimate business justification for her discharge. We disagree.
The ALJ, and in turn the Board, found that Pace's proffered business reason for discharging Panikowski was a pretext for retaliating against her for her 1999 grievance. Based on City of Burbank, because the Board and the ALJ found that Pace's business justifications for discharging Panikowski were not bona fide but merely a pretext for retaliation, no further analysis was required. Further, Pace's suggestion that the ALJ found that it had honestly fired Panikowski for at least some of its proffered justifications is incorrect, as he found that Pace engaged in sham investigations of Panikowski and treated customer complaints about Panikowski differently from complaints about other bus operators. Therefore, we find that the Board did not err in deciding not to apply the dual motive analysis to Pace's business justification defense.
D. Statute of Limitations
Lastly, Pace argues that the Board erred in relying on evidence of conduct that occurred outside of the six-month statute of limitations provided for in section 11(a) of the Act. Section 11(a) of the Act states, in part, "no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of a charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom the charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby did not reasonably have knowledge of the alleged unfair labor practice or was prevented from filing such a charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the date of his discharge." 5 ILCS 315/11(a) (West 2006).
Like the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Act includes a six-month statute of limitations, which the Supreme Court interpreted in Local Lodge No. 1424 v. National Labor Relations Board, 362 U.S. 411, 4 L. Ed. 2d 832, 80 S. Ct. 822 (1960). In that case, the Court held that evidence of occurrences prior to the six-month limitations period are allowed for the limited purpose of "shed[ding] light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period." Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 416, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 838, 80 S. Ct. at 826. The Court also stated that "where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice," "it serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful. And where a complaint based upon that earlier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice." Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 416-17, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 838, 80 S. Ct. at 827. See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 122, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2072 (2002) (holding that in Title VII cases, the statute of limitations does not bar an employee from using prior acts as "background evidence in support of a timely claim").
This court subsequently addressed the issue in Moore v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 206 Ill. App. 3d 327 (1990), where it held, based on Lodge No. 1424, that allegations outside the six-month period could be used as evidence shedding light on the allegations alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by a failure to process Moore's grievance and by misrepresenting the status of his grievance to him but not as the source of an independent unfair labor practice.
Here, Pace asserts that Panikowsi filed her charge on June 21, 2005, and therefore, the Board had jurisdiction to issue an order based on actions that occurred in the prior six months. Pace contends that the ALJ's finding that it had "shifting explanations" for its discharge of Panikowski was based on events that occurred outside that six-month limitation, including the accident that occurred on July 6, 2004, resulting in the broken mirror on the bus. According to Pace, the ALJ improperly relied on this accident to establish a prima facie case. Pace asserts that the Board's finding that the ALJ relied on events predating the six-month statute of limitations was proper to "shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period" is contradicted by his recommended decision and order in which the ALJ stated that the statute of limitations does not apply with the "usual vigor" and by the extent to which the ALJ analyzed prelimitations events, including incidents that occurred nearly a decade before Panikowski's 2005 discharge. Pace asserts that, as a result, the ALJ's recommended decision and order served to "cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful." We disagree.
First, the ALJ considered evidence of prelimitations period conduct because Panikowski alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for her successful grievance challenging her 1999 discharge. As a result, she relied on her interceding employment history to establish Pace's illegal motive for her 2005 discharge, which "shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period." Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 416, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 838, 80 S. Ct. at 826. Therefore, consistent with Moore and Local Lodge No. 1424, the ALJ appropriately considered Pace's prelimitation period conduct to determine the true character of Pace's motive for its challenged discharge of Panikowski.
Further, it should be noted that Pace's discharge letter to Panikowski stated that she was being discharged for the February 1, 2005, incident and for her "entire work record" and Pace relies on several prelimitations events, such as the July 2004 Golf Mill Shopping Center incident, to establish that it had a business reason for terminating her. Based on its introduction of this evidence as grounds for discharging Panikowski, it should not then be permitted to object to the ALJ's reliance on that evidence in finding that Pace manufactured evidence as a pretext for discharging her.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board's finding that Pace violated section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it discharged respondent Urszula Panikowski.
Affirmed.
MURPHY and STEELE, JJ., concur.
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