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RUSH v. MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Factual and Procedural Background
This case arises from an action by Mary Rush and Nathaniel Rush against Aiken Manufacturing Co. and William Birmingham. The plaintiffs alleged that Mary Rush was lawfully in possession of a tenement house owned by the defendant company, where she stored household goods. While temporarily absent, the defendant's agent forcibly broke into the house, unlawfully seized and removed the plaintiff's household goods, and left them exposed in public in a damaged and humiliating manner. The plaintiff claimed damages for property loss and emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding $500 in damages. The defendants appealed, raising multiple exceptions to the trial judge's instructions to the jury.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a landlord may use force to re-enter leased premises after termination of tenancy without being liable as a trespasser.
- Whether the landlord must wait a reasonable time and make due inquiry before forcibly entering the premises after tenancy termination.
- Whether the landlord is liable for damages for forcibly removing tenant's personal property without seizure for rent or other charges.
- Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the landlord’s duty to use process of law to eject tenants asserting rights after tenancy termination.
- The applicability of bailor-bailee relationship between landlord and tenant regarding personal property left on premises after tenancy ends.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The law of South Carolina allows a landlord to enter leased premises by force after tenancy termination without being liable as a trespasser.
- The trial court improperly charged the jury that the landlord must wait a reasonable time and cannot use force immediately after tenancy ends.
- The landlord is not liable for damages when entering premises or removing goods after tenancy termination, even if force is used, so long as no breach of peace occurs.
- The court erred in instructing the jury that process of law must be used to eject tenants asserting rights after tenancy termination.
- The landlord does not assume bailor-bailee liability for tenant’s personal property found on premises after tenancy ends.
Respondent's Arguments
- The landlord must not use force to enter premises after tenancy ends without reasonable notice or inquiry to ascertain tenant's claim to possession.
- Entry by force without notice can make the landlord liable in damages for trespass.
- The landlord has a duty to ascertain if the tenant asserts a right to possession before entering.
- If the landlord forcibly and unlawfully removes tenant’s goods without notice, the landlord is liable for damages.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Willoughby v. R.R. Co., 32 S.C. 410 | Landlord may enter after tenancy termination without being trespasser ab initio; force may subject to criminal or civil liability only if unnecessary or abusive. | The Court relied on this case to hold that a landlord is not liable as a trespasser simply for entering after tenancy ends, even if force is used, but must avoid unnecessary force or illegal acts. |
| Johnson v. Hannahan, 1 Strob. 313 | Earlier case with differing views on landlord entry and liability. | The Court noted that some expressions in this case conflict with the prevailing rule but were not followed. |
| Sharp v. Kinsman, 18 S.C. 108 | Earlier case with differing views on landlord entry and liability. | The Court recognized conflicting expressions but rejected them in favor of the rule in Willoughby. |
| Smith v. Building Ass'n, 39 L.R.A. (Mich.), 410 | Supporting authority for the landlord's right to enter after tenancy ends without trespass liability. | Used to bolster the Court's conclusion aligning with Willoughby. |
| 32 S.C. 431 | Landlord may enter by force after expiration of lease without committing trespass. | Cited by appellant in support of their position. |
| 37 S.C. 368; 29 S.C. 4, 34; 37 S.C. 335; 40 S.C. 383; 41 S.C. 440; 47 S.C. 517; 55 S.C. 569 | Construction of charges and landlord's duties regarding entry. | Cited by respondent to argue landlord's duty to ascertain tenant's claim before entry. |
| 18 S.C. 114; Rev. Stat., 2423; 41 Ill., 27; 106 N.C. 494; 3 Rich. L., 349 | Landlord's duty to inquire and liability for forcible entry without notice. | Used by respondent to support claim of landlord’s liability for damages if entering without notice. |
| 119 U.S. 608 | Landlord liable in damages if forcible entry without notice. | Respondent cited to support liability for forcible entry without notice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed whether the landlord’s use of force to enter the premises after tenancy termination constituted trespass. It relied heavily on Willoughby v. R.R. Co., which clarified that a landlord is not a trespasser ab initio merely because force is used to regain possession after tenancy ends. The Court distinguished between liability for trespass to real estate and liability for trespass to the person or personal property of the tenant. While a landlord may be liable criminally or civilly for unnecessary force or illegal acts during entry, the use of force alone does not render the landlord liable as a trespasser on the real estate. The Court rejected earlier conflicting cases and emphasized the weight of authority supporting this rule.
Regarding the landlord’s liability for personal property, the Court found the bailor-bailee relationship inapplicable since the defendant did not retain possession of the goods unlawfully. The Court considered the other exceptions speculative given its ruling on the core liability issues.
Holding and Implications
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
The Court held that a landlord who forcibly re-enters leased premises after the termination of tenancy is not liable as a trespasser on the real estate solely because of the use of force, provided no unnecessary or unlawful acts are committed. However, the landlord may be liable for trespass to the tenant’s person or personal property if improper force or illegal acts occur. The Court’s decision directly affects the parties by overturning the prior verdict and requiring a new trial. No new legal precedent was established beyond reaffirming the rule in Willoughby v. R.R. Co.
July 7, 1900.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MR. JUSTICE GARY.
The first paragraph of the complaint herein alleges the corporate existence of the defendant, its ownership, control and operation of a large cotton factory in the town of Bath; also its ownership of other real estate in said town, consisting of a large number of tenement houses, which are rented to the operatives who work in said cotton mill. The second paragraph alleges that Mary Rush was the owner of the personal property hereinafter mentioned, and that she and her husband were in lawful possession of one of the tenement houses, occupying the same as a dwelling. The other allegations of the complaint necessary to understand the questions raised by the exceptions are as follows: "III. That on the 30th day of November, A.D. 1898, while the said plaintiff was in lawful possession of the said house as aforesaid, and occupied the same as a dwelling, and where the said household goods and furniture were kept, and while plaintiff was temporarily absent from home, the said defendant, the Aiken Manufacturing Company, wilfully, wrongfully, unlawfully, maliciously, and in a high-handed manner, caused plaintiff's said dwelling house to be broken by its codefendant and agent, William Birmingham, and unlawfully and recklessly seized the said household goods of the plaintiff, Mary Rush, and then and there, without authority or any notice whatever to either of the plaintiffs, wantonly, recklessly, wrongfully, maliciously and in a highhanded manner, caused the said household goods and furniture to be put out and into the public street of the said town of Bath, and in the face of the gaze, ridicule and gibes of the public, placed them down in a wet and muddy place, and there left them unprotected. IV. That by reason of the facts above set forth, the plaintiff was left without a home, was greatly delayed in the effort to get her said household goods removed to a safe place, that the goods were by the acts of the defendants badly injured by being saturated with kerosene oil, broken and thrown in the mud. V. That the acts of the defendants were high-handed, unlawful and malicious, and greatly outraged plaintiff's feelings and laudable pride, and exposed her to the gibes, taunts and ridicule of the public, for all of which acts and grievances aforesaid, plaintiff, Mary Rush, has been damaged in her property, injured in her person and feelings to her damages in the sum of $3,000."
His Honor, the presiding Judge, in his charge to the jury, used the following language: "You will understand this complaint contains two causes of action — one for breaking her house and the other for damaging her property — and really there is another for damage to her feelings, those two are not separated." The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $500. The defendants appealed upon exceptions which will be set out in the report of the case.
The practical question raised by the first, fourth, sixth and seventh exceptions is whether there was error on the part of the Circuit Judge in charging the jury that even if the tenancy had terminated, the defendant did not have the right to use violence in making a re-entry until a reasonable time had expired, or due diligence had been used to ascertain if the plaintiff asserted a right to the premises after the expiration of the tenancy, and if they asserted such a right, that the defendant could only eject them by process of law. In the case of Willoughby v. R.R. Co., 32 S.C. 410, Mr. Chief Justice McIver uses this language: "The question now presented is analogous to the question which has frequently arisen both in this country and in England, and this analogy has been recognized in many of the cases, and that is, how far a landlord who gains by force the possession of the demised premises after the possessory right of the tenant therein has determined, can be held subject therefor to any other liabilities than those which the statutes of forcible entry and detainer have expressly annexed to this act. This question has been very fully considered in 4 Amer. Law Review, 429, and the authorities down to that time (April, 1870,) elaborately reviewed. It is there shown that the idea that one who has authority to enter, and abuses that authority either by unnecessary force in making the entry, or by some illegal act done after the entry has been effected, thereby becomes a trespasser ab initio, so as to make even his entry a trespass, is based largely upon two English cases — Hillary v. Gray, 6 Car. P., 284, and Newton v. Harland, I. Man. G., 644 — the former of which was a nisi prius decision, and the latter has been distinctly repudiated; and the rule in England now is that, though the landlord may be liable to an indictment for using force in making the entry, or to a civil action for damages for committing any trespass upon the person of the tenant, either in making the entry or after he has entered, provided a proper case to that end is made, yet he cannot be made liable as a trespasser ab initio on the real estate, because of the use of force in making the entry, or because of the trespass upon the person of the tenant." He reviews the cases in this State, and shows that his conclusion is not only sustained by them, but by the overwhelming weight of authorities elsewhere. The article in 4 Amer. Law Review, to which the Court referred, throws much light upon the question under consideration. There are expressions in the cases of Johnson v. Hannahan, 1 Strob., 313, and Sharp v. Kinsman, 18 S.C. 108, which are not in accord with the views herein announced, but we are satisfied that the true doctrine is stated in Willoughby v. R.R. Co. See, also, Smith v. Building Ass'n, 39 L.R.A. (Mich.), 410.
We will next consider the fifth exception. As every act of the defendant in connection with the personal property was alleged to be unlawful, and it did not retain the possession thereof, we fail to see how the question of bailor and bailee has any application to this case. The conclusion which we have reached in considering the foregoing exceptions renders speculative the other questions in the case.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
MR. JUSTICE JONES concurs in result.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE McIVER concurring in result:
As I understand it, the rule in this State is, that where the tenancy has terminated, the landlord may enter upon and retake possession of the premises, and he commits no trespass upon the real estate in so doing, even if force is used in making such entry; and, therefore, in such a case, he is not liable to a civil action for trespass. If, however, the landlord, in making such entry, commits a trespass upon the person of the outgoing tenant, or upon his personal property, he may be liable to a civil action for such trespass. But the simple removal of the tenant's personal property from the premises which had been rented, does not constitute a trespass, unless it is effected by the use of unnecessary force, whereby such property is destroyed or injured.
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