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HARWOOD v. STREET COMMISSIONERS
Harwood v. Street Commissioners of the City of Boston, 1903 — Case Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter was a petition for a writ of certiorari filed February 5, 1902, by Herbert J. Harwood to quash an assessment for street and sewer benefits arising from the construction of Lauriat Avenue in Dorchester, Boston. The street commissioners of the City of Boston were respondents.
The order for construction was made September 7, 1895. The sewer work was begun September 30, 1895, and finished June 1, 1896. The street work was begun October 5, 1896, and finished June 1, 1897. The assessment at issue was made January 8, 1900.
The case was heard initially before Hammond, J., who, by agreement of the parties, reserved it for determination by the full court on the petition and answer with exhibits and a statement of agreed facts. It was argued in December 1902 before Knowlton, Morton, Lathrop, Barker and Hammond, JJ., and subsequently submitted on briefs to the full court except Braley, J. Counsel of record were W. Bolster for the petitioner and T. M. Babson for the respondents.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of St. 1891, c. 323 (as amended) that direct assessments upon abutting owners for the whole cost of a street and sewer, without reference to the special benefits received, are constitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution.
- Whether the assessment in this case was made under St. 1891, c. 323 (and its amendments) or under St. 1899, c. 433, and consequentially whether the assessment as made was lawful under either statute.
- Whether the proceedings and the assessment as carried out by the street commissioners provide a lawful foundation for the assessment on each parcel (including determination of special benefits as required by statute).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lorden v. Coffey, 178 Mass. 489 | Holds unconstitutional the part of St. 1891, c. 323 directing assessment of the whole cost of a street and sewer upon abutters without reference to the special benefits to their property. | The court relied on this decision to conclude that the statute is unconstitutional in that part which directs assessments upon abutters and to invalidate the assessment made under that framework. |
| French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 | U.S. Supreme Court decision advanced (by some) as a reason to overrule Lorden v. Coffey. | The court stated that the decision in French has no bearing upon the recent decisions of this court under the Massachusetts Constitution and rejected it as a basis for overruling Lorden v. Coffey. |
| White v. Gove, ante, 333 | Referenced to support the view that the federal decision in French does not affect this court's constitutional holdings. | The court cited White v. Gove to reinforce that French is not controlling on Massachusetts constitutional questions and to justify adhering to prior state precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying that the challenged assessment was made January 8, 1900, following the earlier construction orders and completion dates for sewer and street work in 1895–1897. It referenced Lorden v. Coffey as controlling authority that the portion of St. 1891, c. 323 directing assessments upon abutters without regard to special benefits is unconstitutional.
The opinion addressed an asserted counter-argument based on the United States Supreme Court decision in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., stating that French does not affect this court's recent decisions under the Massachusetts Constitution and therefore does not justify overruling Lorden v. Coffey.
The court then considered whether the assessment was made under the earlier statute (St. 1891, c. 323) or under the later amendment (St. 1899, c. 433). It concluded the assessment was plainly made under the earlier statute because the order of assessment expressly recited that the commissioners were "acting under the provisions of chapter 323 of the Acts of 1891, and acts in amendment or addition thereto," and because the commissioners determined assessable cost in the manner required by the earlier statute while disregarding the form and substantive requirements of the 1899 statute.
The court further analyzed that, if one attempted to treat the assessment as made under the 1899 statute, the proceedings would still be invalid: the commissioners included the cost of the sewer along with the street (thereby creating an assessment roughly twice as large as permitted under the 1899 statute, which excludes sewer expense from assessable cost), and the proceedings failed to determine for each parcel the value of the special benefit as required by statute. Thus, the assessment had no lawful foundation whether viewed under the earlier or later statute.
Finally, the court noted that St. 1902, c. 527 provided means for reassessment of benefits on equitable principles, and on that basis a majority of the court concluded the proceedings before the court must be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Writ of certiorari to issue; the assessment is set aside.
Holding: The court held that the assessment at issue lacked legal foundation and must be quashed. It reaffirmed that the portion of St. 1891, c. 323 directing assessments upon abutters without reference to special benefits is unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution, and it rejected the applicability of French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. as a basis to overrule Lorden v. Coffey.
Implications: The direct effect is that the particular assessment made January 8, 1900, is invalid and the proceedings are set aside. The opinion notes that St. 1902, c. 527 provides for reassessment of benefits on equitable principles. The court's disposition adheres to prior state decisions; the opinion does not announce a novel departure from that precedent beyond applying it to these proceedings.
Constitutional Law, Assessments. An assessment for street and sewer benefits from the construction of a street in the city of Boston, made under and in accordance with the provisions of St. 1891, c. 323, is void, that statute being in violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
KNOWLTON, C.J.
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to quash an assessment for the construction of a street with a sewer running through it, under the St. 1891, c. 323, as amended by the St. 1892, c. 418. The assessment was made on January 8, 1900, the order of construction having been made on September 7, 1895, the work of the sewer having been begun on September 30, 1895, and finished on June 1, 1896, and the work of the street having been begun on October 5, 1896, and finished on June 1, 1897.
In Lorden v. Coffey, 178 Mass. 489, this statute, in that part which provides for assessments upon land of abutting owners, was held to be unconstitutional, inasmuch as it directs the assessment of the whole cost of the street and the sewer upon the abutters, without reference to the benefits which they receive, even if the cost is much greater than the amount of the special benefits to the abutting property. It is contended that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U.S. 324, should induce us to overrule Lorden v. Coffey.
But, as was pointed out in White v. Gove, ante, 333, this decision has no bearing upon the recent decisions of this court under the Constitution of Massachusetts. And we must hold the statute unconstitutional in that part which directs assessments upon the abutters.
The question is raised whether the assessment in the present case was made under this statute, or under the St. 1899, c. 433. We think it appears pretty plainly that it was intended to be made under the earlier statute. The order of assessment recites that the commissioners are "acting under the provisions of chapter 323 of the Acts of 1891, and acts in amendment or addition thereto," and then goes on to determine the assessable cost in a way required by the earlier statute, but in direct violation of the later statute. The order includes the costs of both the street and the sewer, while the St. 1899, c. 433, amends the St. 1891, c. 323, as previously amended, by striking out the section, and enacting one which makes the assessable cost of the work "the actual reasonable expenses incurred by the city, for land damages, for subgrading, surfacing, and laying the roadways, gutters, sidewalks, and edgestones," and which does not include any part of the expense of the sewer. There is no rational theory upon which it can be held that the street commissioners were acting under the later statute when their proceedings were in utter disregard of it, and were in the form prescribed by the earlier statutes.
If we seek to bring their action under the later statute because that was the only one then in force, we are met by the fact that they made an assessment about twice as large as they had a right to make, because they included the cost of the sewer with the cost of the street, and by the additional fact that there is nothing in their proceedings purporting to determine for each parcel of land the value of the special benefit and advantage to the property, as the statute required them to do. We can find no foundation in law for this assessment as it was made, whether we treat it as made under the earlier or later statute.
The St. 1902, c. 527, seems to make ample provision for a reassessment of the benefits upon equitable principles, and in the opinion of a majority of the court the proceedings before us must be set aside.
Writ of certiorari to issue.
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